The New Homophiles and Their Critics - by Austin Ruse

In Crisis

This new school of writers and thinkers that I have called the New Homophiles are not without their critics. How could they not be? After all, while they want a warmer embrace from the Church, they want more than that and some of it seems at variance with the wishes and perhaps even the teachings of the Church.

Some of their critics come from their own ranks, those with chaste same-sex attraction but who also believe the New Homophiles have gone too far.

Terry Nelson runs a blog called “Abbey Roads in Ordinary Time” where he regularly takes after New Homophile propositions. In an October 2010 post he wrote about the idea that St. Aelred was gay or at least same-sex attracted. This is a major point among the New Homophiles who believe Aelred’s book “Spiritual Friendship” offers a treatise for how to be gay and chaste and still experience intensely loving relationships with another man.

Aelred wrote, “It is no small consolation in this life to have someone you can unite with in an intimate affection and the embrace of holy love, someone in whom your spirit can rest, to whom you can pour out your soul, to whom pleasant exchanges, as to soothing songs, you can fly in sorrow … with whom spiritual kisses, as with remedial salves, you may draw out all the weariness of your restless anxieties.”

Sounds pretty gay to my modern ears, and to the New Homophiles, too.

Terry Nelson begs to differ, as do Aelred scholars. He says the Aelred-as-gay meme is of recent vintage, “…a novel theory postulated in the mid-twentieth century … those who make this claim are looking at this from our nineteenth–twenty-first century perspective and contemporary understanding of same-sex relations as posited by gay culture today.”

He accuses the New Homophiles of playing something of a “doctrinal shell game” where “just about every time a couple of them write anything ‘ground-breaking’ they seem to be challenged by readers as to their orthodoxy. Subsequently they appear to backtrack and present voluminous explanations of what they really meant to say … it seems to me the underlying intention is to normalize homosexuality and to declare gay is good.”

This gets to the most serious problem with the New Homophile proposition, their insistence on maintaining their gay identity. Melinda Selmys, a formerly active Lesbian who publishes books at Our Sunday Visitor, now married with six children, actually calls herself “queer.” She and her friends want to be known as gay and they want the Church not just to welcome but to celebrate their gayness.

Not a homosexual himself, Michael W. Hannon comes to the debate from a more academically rigorous point of view than Terry Nelson but he, too, takes issue with this main proposition of Ron Belgau, Chris Damian and the rest, that it is perfectly fine to maintain a gay sexual-identity.

In a First Things essay last fall, Hannon criticized Pope Francis for his casual use of the term “gay people.” He calls the concept of homosexuality “unmerited by its pedigree” because it was constructed in the nineteenth century when the classical notion of the sodomite “was set up as the bearer of a distinct and pervasive psychological persuasion.”

Hannon believes the heterosexual-homosexual construct is “masquerading … as a natural categorization, applicable to all people in all times and places according to the typical objects of their sexual desires.”

He says, “…this framework puts on airs, deceiving those who adopt its distinctions into believing that they are worth far more than they really are.”

Hannon warns, “Our young people … now regularly find themselves agonizing over their sexual identity, navel-gazing in an attempt to discern their place in this allegedly natural framework of orientations.”

Paul Scalia wrote a widely read essay in First Things nine years ago called “A Label that Sticks.” A well-regarded priest in the Diocese of Arlington, Virginia and at the time chaplain to the Courage chapter in Arlington, Scalia offered a warning about the dangers of young people identifying themselves as gay.

He said educators uniformly try to keep kids from labeling themselves and others as such things can “reinforce prejudices.” The exception, however, is for those who experience same-sex attraction. For them there is a whole educational apparatus waiting to identify, encourage, label and then lock them under gay amber for all time.

Scalia says at a time of general adolescent confusion about almost everything, such labels are tempting to the child because he wants to belong somewhere and to others “because of their convenience and efficiency. They are common, close at hand, and make quick work of a difficult issue. But they also identify a person with his homosexual inclinations. They presume that a person is his inclinations or attractions; he is ‘gay’ or ‘homosexual’.” He insists—in keeping with the Church—“People’s sexual inclinations do not determine their identity.”

The most prolific of the New Homophile critics is Daniel Mattson, a working musician and himself same-sex attracted, also living chaste, but insisting he is not “gay” but rather simply a man and a child of God. He says the word “gay” does not accurately describe who or what he is. Those who use it, like the New Homophiles, are not faithful to the theological anthropology of the Church.

Mattson sees the New Homophile embrace of the gay identity as “counter to the truth of man and therefore an obstacle to authentic self-knowledge.” He says “Though people may describe themselves by using terms like ‘gay’ or ‘queer’ which are commonly used in today’s culture, as Christians who believe in man created in the image of God, we should ask if these cultural terms are, in fact, true ontological categories of the human person, in accord with the blue print of human existence.” Mattson insists the “clear definition of our sexual identity [is] revealed to us by Scripture and the Church.”

Mattson says “Since I am Catholic, the sexual identity I am called to embrace is my maleness; my true sexual orientation is towards women, my true sexual complement.” He says his attraction to men is not a new essential orientation but a “disorientation” that “does not exist within God’s blue print for humanity.”

In 1986, then head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger issued the “Pastoral Letter on the Care of the Homosexual Person” where he wrote, “Today the Church provides a badly needed context for the care of the human person when she refuses to consider the person as a ‘heterosexual’ or a ‘homosexual’ and insists that every person has a fundamental right Identity: the creature of God, and by grace, his child and heir to eternal life.”

Mattson says he takes no umbrage at the phrase objectively disordered, something the New Homophiles bristle at, and that he views his same-sex attraction as a disability “in some ways similar to blindness or deafness.”

Against the New Homophiles he does not see same-sex attraction as a gift “in and of itself.” He insists that any goods “supposedly unique to homosexuality are common to man, and all that is good in man is the result of being made in the image and likeness of God.”

He opposes the New Homophile notion of “gay exceptionalism” flowing from the supposed good of homosexuality. “No,” he says, “the good is the redemptive healing work of God that begins when we honestly acknowledge that homosexuality is a wound” and he says that if same-sex attracted persons take this view they can become “wounded healers.”

Most people were not even aware the New Homophiles were even out there. Most of us discovered it when they were given a regular home at First Things last year, something that has concerned any number of faithful Catholics. Mattson was given a few chances to engage their ideas there but then he was mysteriously dropped without a word last summer.

What is needed now is for serious Catholic theologians to engage the New Homophile proposition. These folks are not going away, and neither should they. But should their ideas be bandied about without real heavyweight consideration? Most of them are only recently decanted PhDs, not that there is anything wrong with that, but they are proposing things that are new and even esoteric and are going largely unchallenged.

And even if they cannot convince the Church to develop or change the teaching on homosexuality, and they probably can’t, the real problem is their ideas are circulating and, according to one priest who deals with these issues, undermining the pastoral work of the Church. This priest bluntly told me, “They are in their ivory towers, they are not pastors and they are not only undermining our work but they are undermining the wishes of Catholic families.”

Think of it this way. Your 14-year-old son feels different from the other guys at school. For whatever reason, he always has. He confides this to a counselor who asks him about his sexual orientation. Your son says that maybe the difference he feels is that he is gay. The apparatus kicks in to place him under the gay amber for life.

Now, do you want your son to talk to Chris Damian, one of the New Homophiles who has said he would tell that young man to “Seek to draw yourself more fully into the Church and to discern how this might be a gift in your life and in others’ lives.”

Or do you want him to meet Daniel Mattson and Father Paul Scalia who would tell the boy, “You are not your sexual inclinations. You are not ‘gay.’ What you are is a man and a Son of God.”

At first blush there seems to be very little difference between the two, but as you gaze more closely at all that is packed into the New Homophile Proposition, you realize the difference is immense and may be profoundly harmful.

Cuomo to Catholics: You’re Not Welcome in NY - by George J. Marlin

In TCT

I was born in New York State and have lived here for more than 61 years. During that time I have paid plenty in state and local taxes and have served the public in a number of capacities including two terms as Executive Director of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

I am also a Catholic and a member of New York’s Conservative Party, have served on the transition teams of governors-elect George Pataki (R) and Andrew Cuomo (D), and have been a member of Cuomo’s Council of Economic and Fiscal Advisors.

Yet despite my public service and the large chunk of my earnings that have gone to support New York’s governmental maze, according to Governor Cuomo, I should move out of the Empire State.

Why?  Because I am pro-life, oppose same-sex marriage, and have doubts about Cuomo’s 2013 hastily prepared gun legislation (the SAFE Act) that permits you to buy a gun with a 10-round magazine, but bans using more than seven shots if you need to defend yourself.      

Here’s what Cuomo said this past Friday on “The Capital Pressroom,” an Albany radio talk show, about a large segment of NY voters:

Who are they? Are they these extreme conservatives who are right to life, pro-assault weapons, anti-gay? Is that who they are?  Because if that’s who they are and they’re the extreme conservatives, they have no place in the state of New York because that’s not who New Yorkers are.

In an unguarded moment, Governor Cuomo stated publicly what many on the Left have been privately thinking for years: that pro-life and pro-traditional marriage supporters are Ku Klux Klan-like bigots who should either shut up or get out.

Cuomo has not only written off millions of New York Christians and Jews (among others) as unfit citizens, he has yanked the welcome mat from under half the nation’s population, who, public opinion polls indicate, oppose abortion and same-sex marriage.

As for those who “have no place in the state of New York,” the person at the top of that list must be the Archbishop of New York, Cardinal Timothy Dolan. That’s because Dolan has proudly followed in the footsteps of his predecessors who were unabashed defenders of Church teachings in the public square.

For instance, Cardinal Terence Cooke, NYC’s seventh archbishop (1968-1983), whose cause is being promoted for sainthood, publicly fought the passage of the state’s 1970 liberal abortion bill. And the week Roe v. Wade was handed down by the Supreme Court, he issued a pastoral letter that was read in every parish condemning abortion as a “fundamental moral evil.”  Cooke inaugurated the annual Respect Life week and established “Birth Right,” a service to help pregnant women who choose not to abort their babies.

As for “gay rights,” every year Cooke opposed proposed legislation in New York’s City Council that would have amended the administrative code to outlaw discrimination due to “sexual orientation or affectional preference.” You read that right.

A typical statement expressing the Church’s position, released by Cardinal Cooke in April 1978, reads:

If the bill has an underlying purpose, to advocate and gain approval of homosexual behavior and lifestyle, then there is no way in which the Catholic Church in the City of New York may find it acceptable. And there is no way in which we can remain silent on the issue.

The Catholic Church’s moral teaching differentiates between “orientation” and “behavior” for both homosexuals and heterosexuals. While a person’s orientation is not subject to moral evaluation, there is no doubt that a person’s behavior is subject to evaluation. Homosexual behavior and an attendant homosexual life style is not in accord with Catholic moral teaching and is, in fact, harmful to all persons who become involved; heterosexuality is the norm for human behavior.

And lest we forget, in the mid-1970s Cooke had an ally in his fight against abortion and gay rights: Mario Cuomo, father of the current governor.

The New York Times reported during Cuomo the Elder’s unsuccessful 1974 primary run for lieutenant governor that he said in a televised debate that “he would have voted against the 1970 law that relaxed abortion curbs in the state.”  The New York Daily News and the Post also reported that, in his unsuccessful 1977 run for mayor, Mario said he would veto a gay rights bill “that would give homosexual teachers the right to proselytize or advocate their lifestyle.”

I wonder if Governor Andrew Cuomo, a baptized Catholic and a graduate of Archbishop Molloy High School and Fordham University, will demand that Cooke’s cause for canonization be, well, aborted because the cardinal was an “extremist” for defending the teachings of his Church. Will ask his father, himself a former governor, to leave the state for having politically incorrect thoughts forty years ago?

By claiming that people who disagree with his cultural views “have no place in the state of New York,” Cuomo has joined those whom historian Richard Hofstadter described as “totalitarian liberals,” people who employ illiberal means to achieve so-called liberal reforms.

Cardinal Dolan and the bishops of New York’s other eight dioceses have an obligation to respond and to condemn anyone – especially any Catholic public figure – who threatens those who adhere to Church doctrine.

Chicago’s Cardinal Francis George has predicted that he will die in his bed, his successor will die in prison, and his successor will die a martyr. We may not be quite there yet. But unless Church leaders and others act quickly and forcefully, Catholics and others of traditional moral views may find themselves not simply marginalized, but – if some politicians have their way – facing something very like exile in their own nation.

Laicity, Christianity, the West: an Historical Profile - Archbishop Giampaolo Crepaldi

In Catholic Culture

The paradox of the West

The relationship of the Christian faith with the West, but more specifically the Catholic faith, is essential in nature. By that I do not intend to argue that there is a sort of identity between the West and Christianity, or that Christianity is a category of the western mentality, or that Christianity can be such only within the West in a geographical, historical or cultural sense. Such a banal pretence could be all too easily rebutted in an equally banal way by remarking that Christianity saw the light of day in the eastern Mediterranean and has spread throughout the world. In other words, the ‘western’ relationship was not a contingency in the history of Christianity. Emerging in the relationship with the West have been characteristics Christianity cannot separate itself from without ceasing to exist, but from which it has historically taken its distance precisely in the West. Thus issuing forth is the problematic and paradoxical character of the West. On one hand, Christianity’s encounter with the West was “providential”[1], helped mould and shape western civilization, and in certain periods of history – especially in the XII and XIII centuries – projected a Christian civilization[2] with particularly creative expressions. On the other hand, however, developing in the West has been a process of secularisation that progressively tends to exhaust Christianity in its ability to ‘produce’ civilization. Developing for the first time only in the western world has been “a culture that constitutes the absolutely most radical contradiction not only of Christianity, but of the religious and moral traditions of society” [3]. Hence the profound ambiguity of the category of “west” as regards Christianity itself. The “resilience” and the resistance” of Christianity are faced with a decisive ‘test bench’ in the West.

Catholic dogma and the West

Often given is a rather reductive interpretation of Catholicism’s impact on western civilization in the sense of being looked upon as influence and nothing more. That is tantamount to saying that Catholicism influenced western civilization with its works charity, art, literature, religion driven social networks, the coronation of kings and the like. All this is true, but Catholicism’s profound relationship with the west concerns dogmas and is the expression of the historicity of dogmas. This expression – historicity of dogmas – does not mean dogmas evolve historically in a manner parallel with self-awareness believers have of them. This would be the modernist vision of the issue. What the expression actually means is that a dogma has an historical and real content, and may not be relegated to the realm of myth. Dogmas nourish the Church and the Church is the Body of Christ in history, a Body remaining for eternity[4]. Between dogma and Body there is an indivisible unity, such that a dogma is present not only in a believer’s conscience, but by its very nature becomes history, and therefore civilization. This is the realism of the Catholic faith.

The Church has moulded western Christian civilization with its dogmas defined in its dogmatic Councils. Nowadays there is a widespread underrating of doctrine in the life of the Church and an emphasis on pastoral praxis, which runs the risk of thrusting this important aspect into the background. I’d like to offer two examples in this regard. The first of them has to do with Gnosis. The condemnation of Arianism and the definition of the human and divine nature of Jesus contradicted Gnosis, which was an expression of Hellenic rationalism. This entailed a lengthy process, which involved both Councils and the work of the great Fathers and Doctors of the Church. This ‘match’ has yet to be won since alongside the Gnosis of the early centuries of Christianity there is an “eternal Gnosis”, but the battle of Christian dogma against Gnosis preserved human civilization from the catastrophes of Catharism, the simultaneous refusal and exaltation of matter, the destruction of matrimony and the family, and the refusal of political authority. It produced fruits of civilization in the form of the just consideration of evil and suffering, and defended against nihilism. The defence of the Old Testament against the Gnostic onslaught made it possible to preserve the positive vision of creation and the historical social dimension of the Christian faith. The baptism of children, prayers for the dead, priestly celibacy and the worship of images: what benefits brought by these elements to western civilization, and all of them would have been lost forever by a possible prevalence of Gnosis. What damage would have been caused by pauperism, pacifism, Gnostic-type radical purism if they had been able to spread without restraint! When commenting on the battle of Muret on 13 September 1213, when Simone de Montfort, after having attended Mass celebrated by St. Dominic, led 1,000 men in a rout of the Aragonese army supporting the Albigensians with 40,000 men, Jean Guitton said: “Muret is one of those decisive battles where the destiny of a civilization was decided. Strangely enough, most historians overlook this fact”[5].

The second example concerns Pious IX and the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Jesus. The definition of this dogma issued forth from a theological reading of the events of the liberal revolution. According to Pious IX all the contemporary errors stemmed from the negation of original sin, and hence the irreconcilability between God and sin. The aim of life had to be the progress of man and the world; modern man had to become autonomous and self-sufficient, liberating himself from the tutelage of the Church; religion was only useful for purposes of civil progress and had to be subordinate to it. Once original sin was denied, however, there was no place for Christ, the Church and for grace.

In the face of such a vision of things Pious IX wanted to reiterate the irreconcilability between God and the sin of the world, as well as the fact that the ultimate aim of the world and history is not the celebration of human progress, but the glory of God. And he did this by proclaiming the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary, “glorious victor over heresies”.

The violent events Pious IX had to witness were part of a plan to emancipate the natural order from the supernatural order. He was of the opinion that it was not possible to come to terms with this plan, that it could not be “Catholicised”. Hence the genesis of the Encyclical Letter Quanta cura and the Sillabo, which are not to be separated from the profound theological significance of the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, but, together with Vatican Council I, seen as Pious IX’s response to modern sin. Not by chance was 8 December an important date for all of them: the proclamation of the dogma on that date in 1854, the Quanta cura and the Sillabo in 1864, and the opening of Vatican Council I in 1869[6].

The construction of western civilization took place with dogmas. Dogma was the principle wellspring for countering the apostasy of the West from Christianity. And this because that apostasy had also become dogmatic.

The secularisation of the West

I intentionally took an example from the early centuries of Christianity and a second one from modernity. Between them there is the construction of a Christian civilization and then a progressive parting from it through ever more accentuated secularisation. Nonetheless, since many are those who attribute this secularisation to Christianity itself, things become a bit complicated. But let’s take it by steps.

Perhaps less than well known may be the fact that the most enthusiastic exaltation of the importance of the Catholic Church for western civilization is contained in the work, which, more so than any other, theorized a rigorous and complete secularisation of that selfsame civilization, I am referring to Auguste Comte’s The Course in Positive Philosophy. Karl Löwith, in his rightly famous book “Meaning in History. The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, cites Comte’s laudatory words regarding Catholicism[7] and argues that Comte held the Catholic system in high esteem especially as regards the separation of spiritual power from temporal power. That’s what we could call laicity. Regarding Protestantism, on the other hand, Comte thought it had favoured “the emancipation of temporal power and the subordination of spiritual power to national interests”[8]. Catholicism had founded an order, while Protestantism “had laid the foundations for the modern philosophical revolution, proclaiming the right of each individual to free enquiry in all fields”[9]. Comte was of the opinion that “the degeneration of the European system has but one cause, that being the political degradation of spiritual power”, and Karl Löwith comments: “If we think each immature spirit was left to its own decisions in the most important matters, there is reason for being surprised that morality did not decline completely”[10]. Back during his times it had yet to decline completely.

The work by Karl Löwith I have cited here explains in a convincing manner how the modernist philosophy of history from Voltaire all the way to Nietzsche consists in a progressive secularisation of Catholic dogmas. A turning point of great interest in this secularisation process is to be found in Comte. In Catholic dogma he saw the condition for the existence of the social order according to a principle of distinction between temporal and spiritual power based on the political role of spiritual power. Nonetheless, he also saw that this equilibrium was by then in disarray because in the wake of the “Protestant revolutions”, the spiritual realm had abdicated its duties over the temporal order, and the latter had emancipated itself from the spiritual realm. At one and the same time, therefore, in Comte we have utmost praise for the historical structure of Catholicism and its most radical negation through the proposal of a equally absolute but radically lay position: the positive spirit. According to Henri de Lubac, Comte’s positivism is the most radical among the forms of contemporary atheistic humanism insofar as it projects a life without God, with no more regrets or illusions, and precisely for this reason has the same motivating force of a religion able to construct an order. An order without God. In de Lubac’s mind this project was and remains doomed to failure.[11] This, however, is not the point of interest for us at the moment. What interests us here is its “dogmatic” character, dogmatic in the sense of being radically and absolutely anti-Catholic. Then again, if the construction of the West had been due to Catholic dogmas, and if the ‘dismantling’ had taken place through the secularisation of Catholic dogmas as so will demonstrated by Karl Löwith, the decisive turning point had to take place when secularisation also assumed the character of dogmatic absoluteness. This transpired with Comte, and we can therefore say positivism is the dogma of modernity. 

Regarding the presumed irreversibility of secularisation

I’d like to return to Karl Löwith’s comment about the modern autonomy of the temporal sphere from the spiritual one cited above: “If we think each immature spirit was left to its own decisions in the most important matters, there is reason for being surprised that morality did not decline completely”. Coming to the surface here is a decisive point in the issue at hand: does the emancipation of the temporal from the spiritual, the replacement of Christian salvation with progress and religion with science produce true autonomy capable of self-conservation at its own level, or does it produce “decadence”? Löwith seems to align with the latter position, and in the commentary under consideration considers it miraculous that it proved possible to maintain an albeit weak form of morality after this detachment.

Laicity understood as the mutual distinction of the temporal sphere and the spiritual sphere is an historical contribution of Christianity. Said distinction, however, did not mean the separation and absolute autonomy of the temporal sphere from the spiritual sphere, but took place within Christian civilization, against a religious horizon. The Christian sovereign acted autonomously, deploying political prudence, which means exercising liberty within a system of truths whose ultimate guarantor was the Church, which in Catholic dogmas conserved and protected the patrimony of natural law as well.

As Karl Löwith remarks, however, beginning with modernity is an ever more demanding secularisation that renders the temporal sphere “capax sui”, autonomous in an absolute sense, sufficient unto itself, and able to endow itself with sense. Initially this ‘sense’ was borrowed from Christian dogmas through a secularised interpretation of them, but then claimed more and more as proper to secularisation itself, and this seems to have occurred especially with Comte and positivism.

Published in 1968 was the book “On the Theology of the World” written by Johann Baprist Metz, a German theologian and disciple of Karl Rahner. Prior to this he had written “Christian Anthropocentricity” in which he had argued that secularisation had been caused by Christianity and was hence a Christian fact to be accepted and lived as a fruit of Christianity, not to be fought against as contrary to Christian faith. In this manner the process of secularisation was interpreted as irreversible. In this later book Metz sustained that in the wake of secularisation the world had by now become completely worldly: “This the world where God is not encountered” [12]. In is opinion, “for a long time – almost up to the beginning of the last Council – the Church had followed this process only with resentment, considered it almost exclusively as a downfall and a false emancipation, and only quite slowly built up the courage to let the world become ‘worldly’ in this sense, and hence consider this process not just a fact contrary to the historical intentions of Christianity, but rather a fact determined also by the most profound historical impulses of this Christianity and its message” [13].

In my opinion it is not correct to retain that positivist secularisation stems from Christianity itself, nor can we accept the view that it is the destiny of history. The irreversibility of secularisation is a positivist dogma issuing forth from an ideological reading of history, the Comtean reading of the law of the three stages, whereby humanity would have evolved from the religious stage to the metaphysical stage to the positive stage in an irreversible manner.

What are the ultimate reasons why positivist secularisation cannot be seen as a consequence of Christianity, or considered irreversible?

The first reason is that positivism cannot help but project itself as a new religion. We saw this above: secularisation becomes such when it does not limit itself to being the immanent reformulation of Catholic dogmas, detaches itself completely from Christian tradition, and proposes itself as an absolute principle. For as long as Hegel, Marx, Pr0udhon, and Voltaire, Condorcet, and Turgot before them had limited themselves to replicating Christianity by proposing an immanent and secularised version of it, the phases of secularisation could not lay a claim to true self-autonomy or embody secularisation in the true sense. The process remained linked to Christianity and continued to be reversible. What other way to sever this umbilical cord with Christianity than to propose secularisation as an absolute principle? Hence its religious character; religious no longer in the sense of still being in debt to the ‘old’ religion, but religious in the sense of religiously expressing an absolute anti-religiosity.

This secularisation is not the fruit of Christianity.

The eclipse of nature and human nature in particular

As already remarked above, the second reason has to do with the possibility for the temporal level emancipated from the spiritual level to maintain itself without succumbing to self-degeneration.

Having acquired the feature of religious absoluteness, as we have just seen, secularisation is destined to be opposed to the concept of nature, as well as the concept of human nature. This is because otherwise maintained would be a moral order that would constantly and implicitly demand completion of some sort of religious form. If nature remains, so does natural law, that being the order of nature that expresses a moral norm. In its turn, the norm contained in natural law would keep ever open the issue of its absolute and transcendent foundation, because in itself the moral order needs an absolute foundation. Proposed anew, therefore, would be the ‘old’ religion. For as long as Hugo Grotius denies the transcendent foundation of natural law, but maintains natural law, there is no irreversibility: the need for a transcendent foundation can be argued and recovered. But if nature is denied, as does positivism, this becomes definitively impossible and we have irreversibility.

Naïve, therefore, is the perplexed astonishment voiced by Karl Löwith. It is not possible for the natural level to endure on its own once detached from the supernatural level. The stark version of positivism projects itself as a “new beginning”, absolute and religiously anti-religious. In order to do this it cannot help but deny nature and natural law. Their decomposition and their abandonment may well be progressive in time, but the principle of this process is stipulated in its absoluteness from the very outset. What we witness nowadays is a rampant and alarming negation of nature and natural law. Without the support of the Christian religion the natural dimension of procreation, matrimony and the family is not able to hold its ground. The so-called “gender ideology”[14] is the most recent outpost of this negation of nature and human identity.

West means Jerusalem, Athens and Rome. Benedict XVI repeated his in his famous speech to the Bundestag in Berlin[15]. However, when Christianity encountered Greek thought and Roman civilization, in addition, quite naturally, to the Jewish religion, it discovered in them both openness to transcendence and consideration of the force of natural law. It found a pre-Christian but human world. Today, however, it is faced with a post-human and hence radically post-Christian world.

The religious proposal of laicity

I have depicted an historical profile more in terms of the history of ideas than the history of facts, and this itinerary has shown that laicity is a Christian concept. This concept implies the separation of the political sphere from the ecclesial one, temporal power from spiritual power. It does not, however, call for the separation of politics from ethics, because the political sovereign, who is distinct from he who exercises spiritual authority, acts according to rational prudence and not in an arbitrary manner, since “there are limits to what the State may command, also when it is a matter of what belongs to Caesar” [16]. Neither in terms of personal will or discretion, nor in terms of a “will expressed by the majority”: as far as this point is concerned democracy has not contributed – in theory – to any radical change of perspective. Insofar as inseparable from ethics, to which it is directly bound, politics is also inseparable from religion as such and from the Catholic religion in particular. In fact, the ethical level is ultimately unable to serve as its own foundation by remaining at the simply natural level: “If we do not first understand our relationship with God we’ll never be able to keep these ambits in correct order” [17].

In modernity, however, another concept of laicity saw the light of day. Initially this was divined as the secularisation of Christian dogmas, but then became radically detached from Christianity and from any order, erecting itself as a new absolute and religious principle. This happened with positivism understood as a perennial category. In this manner the political level became completely autonomous from the religious level, but it also became incompatible with Christianity by assuming a religious form in itself. This is how relativism became a dictatorship.

In the face of such a scenario, rather naïve is the attempt on the part of Christianity to “laicise itself”, abandoning the cloak of dogmas and doctrine in order to dialogue with the lay world. If there were anything akin to a non absolute lay level open to human nature and religion, dialogue on laicity involving believers would prove possible. Unfortunately, this is not the main trend, and the reason is quite simple and grave at one and the same time: in order to be ‘lay’ in the sense we have just seen, laicity needs the Christian religion. Therefore, a laicity that has projected itself with positivism as an absolute and religious principle cannot be ‘lay’. This is the paradox of the west: the farther away people go from Christianity in order to be ‘lay’, all the less are they so.

Following this paradox is yet another one. If Christians wish to contribute to positive laicity they must propose the religious dimension of their faith in its completeness, without any forms of horizontal reductionism. Here as well is the reason so tragically simple: in a religiously post-human world it is necessary to begin from the proposal of Christ and then, within the religious vision, recover the human dimension and hence the ‘lay’ dimension. This is where the Social Doctrine of the Church encounters “new evangelisation”.

Endnotes

[1] This expression is used often by Joseph Ratzinger lo indicate the encounter of the Christian faith with Greek philosophy, and we can also use it in the broader sense of encounter with the West. Cf for example: J. Ratzinger, Fede Verità Tolleranza. Il cristianesimo e le religioni del mondo, Cantagalli, Siena 2003, p. 98.

[2] Fundamental references are the works of Christopher Dawson: La formazione della civiltà occidentale, D’Ettoris editori, Crotone 2011; Id., La divisione della Cristianità occidentale, D’Ettoris editori, Crotone 2009.

[3] J. Ratzinger, L’Europa di Benedetto nella crisi delle culture, Cantagalli, Siena 2005, p. 37.

[4] J. Ratzinger,Fede Verità Tolleranza. Il cristianesimo e le religioni del mondo cit., p. 74.

[5] J. Guitton, Il Cristo dilacerato. Crisi e concili nella storia, Cantagalli, Siena 2002, p. 166.

[6] Cf R. de Mattei, Pio IX e la rivoluzione italiana, Cantagalli, Siena 2012.

[7] K. Löwith, Significato e fine della storia. I presupposti teologici della filosofia della storia, Il Saggiatore, Milano 2010, pp. 98-104 (prima edizione 1977).

[8] Ibid, p. 100.

[9] Ibid, p. 101.

[10] Ibid, p. 103.

[11] De Lubac H., Il dramma dell’umanesimo ateo, Morcelliana, Brescia 1988.

[12] J. B. Metz, Sulla teologia del mondo, Queriniana, Brescia 1969, p. 144.

[13] Ibid, pg. 141.

[14] Osservatorio Internazionale Cardinale Van Thuân sulla Dottrina sociale della Chiesa, Fourth Report on the Social Doctrine of the Church in the World (edited by G. Crepaldi and S. Fontana), Cantagalli, Siena 2012.

[15] Benedetto XVI, Seech at the Reichstag in Berlin, 22 September 2011.

[16] J. V. Schall,Filosofia politica della Chiesa cattolica, Cantagalli, Siena 2011, p. 123.

[17] Ibid, pg. 122.

© International Observatory Cardinal Van Thuân for the Social Doctrine of the Church

Galli Della Loggia, historiador ex-comunista, denuncia la «revolución anticristiana» en Europa hoy

In RL  

“Una gran revolución se acerca en silencio a su fin en Europa. Una revolución de la mentalidad y de las costumbres colectivas que marca una gran ruptura con el pasado: la revolución anti-religiosa. Una revolución que golpea indiscriminadamente al hecho religioso en sí de cualquier confesión, pero que por razones históricas, y en concreto hablando de Europa, se presenta como una revolución esencialmente anticristiana”.

Así comienza un artículo escrito en la primera página de Il Corriere della Sera por Ernesto Galli della Loggia, intelectual laico italiano no conocido precisamente por sus posiciones conservadoras.

Por su interés y actualidad, ReL recoge en este reportaje las principales partes de este artículo de opinión.

Galli della Loggia es uno de los muchos intelectuales laicos italianos que se ha desvinculado del coro de acusaciones contra la Iglesia “oscurantista” que asola hoy en día el continente.

“Las iglesias cristianas no sólo han sido expulsadas progresivamente en casi todas partes de cualquier esfera pública mínimamente relevante, [...] sino que, a diferencia de las demás religiones, en la actualidad es legítimo dirigir las ofensas más graves y los insultos más sangrientos contra el cristianismo”, se lamenta.

El historiador y periodista hace un variado elenco de las diferentes ofensas que la religión cristiana está recibiendo en Europa:  

» En Irlanda, las iglesias están obligadas a alquilar sus propias salas de celebraciones, incluso para bodas entre homosexuales;

» en Roma, durante el concierto del 1 de Mayo, el cantante imitó el gesto de la consagración durante la Eucaristía pero con un preservativo entre sus manos en lugar de la hostia sagrada;

» en Dinamarca, el Parlamento ha aprobado una ley que exige a la Iglesia Evangélica Luterana  celebrar matrimonios entre personas del mismo sexo a pesar de que una tercera parte de sus ministros se hayan manifestado en contra;

» en Escocia dos obsétricas católicas fueron obligadas por un tribunal a participar en abortos realizado por sus compañeros; el colegio oficial de médicos británicos ha determinado que deben estar preparados para dejar de lado sus creencias personales con respecto a algunos aspectos controvertidos;

» en un vídeo reciente de David Bowie, aparece una escena en la que un sacerdote, después de golpear a un mendigo, entra en un burdel y seduce a una monja con estigmas en sus manos; en Inglaterra, se le ha prohibido a una enfermera llevar una cruz en el cuello durante horas de trabajo,

» una pequeña imprenta ha tenido que enfrentarse a acciones legales por negarse a imprimir material sexualmente explícito encargado por una revista gay; en Francia, de acuerdo con la legislación vigente, es prácticamente imposible para los cristianos manifestar públicamente que las relaciones sexuales entre personas del mismo sexo constituye un pecado según su religión”.

Y así sucesivamente en una avalancha de casos impresionantes que se pueden consultar en el sitio web intoleranceagainstchristians.eu.

Galli della Loggia es leído siempre con atención en El Vaticano, dicen. Su esposa es Lucetta Scaraffia, historiadora, y escribe a menudo en L´Osservatore Romano. Mantiene una estrecha amistad con su director, Giovanni Maria Vian.

Precisamente de este periódico, entre otros, ha extraído los numerosos ejemplos de discriminación comentados anteriormente. “Es más que suficiente para despertar el interés de cualquier conciencia liberal”, afirma Galli della Loggia.

“En este caso no se trata tanto de la Cristiandad, la Iglesia o la religión, sino de algo mucho más importante: se trata de la libertad. Y de la historia. De la conciencia de que libertad religiosa en Europa ha representado históricamente el origen (y condición) de todas las libertades civiles y políticas”, advierte el historiador.

“Ser absolutamente libre de adorar al propio Dios, de propagar la fe, de guardar los mandamientos, de adherirse a la visión del mundo y al sentido de la existencia que estos definen, de practicar públicamente el culto; pero también, por supuesto, de tener la libertad de no tener Dios ni religión: así se ha comenzado el camino de la libertad Europa. ¿Hay que recordar que ha sido el Dios cristiano?”.

Por último, el periodista e historiador concluye: “La libertad religiosa por un lado y la libertad de opinión y de expresión por otro –que son los dos pilares de la libertad política- van al unísono. Desde este punto de vista, es aún más preocupante el hecho de que hoy en día, en Europa, en muchos lugares y de muchas maneras, la libertad de los cristianos parezca objetivamente en peligro de extinción”.
Puede consultar el artículo completo en Il Corriere della Sera aquí.

L' Europa diventa meno religiosa, meno cristiana e meno cattolica - di Massimo Introvigne

Il 28 giugno 2013 il più autorevole centro di statistica religiosa del mondo, il Center for the Study of Global Christianity di South Hamilton (Massachusetts), diretto da Todd M. Johnson, ha pubblicato il suo atteso rapporto «Christianity in its Global Context, 1970-2020» (Il cristianesimo nel suo contesto globale, 1970-2020), che offre tutta una serie di statistiche aggiornate al 2013 e una proiezione fino al 2020. 

Il risultato essenziale di questa vasta inchiesta può essere riassunto in una frase: il mondo sta diventando non meno, ma più religioso, e in particolare il numero dei cristiani e dei cattolici sta aumentando, ma questo aumento dipende dall'Africa e dall'Asia, mentre le Americhe rimangono stabili e l'Europa diventa meno religiosa, meno cristiana e meno cattolica. Il rapporto osserva giustamente che l'elezione di un Papa argentino è un simbolo eloquente di questo spostamento epocale del centro della vita religiosa e cristiana lontano dall'Europa.

Le persone che si dichiarano religiose nel mondo sono aumentate dall'82% nel 1970 all'88% del 2013 e sfioreranno il 90% nel 2020. Questo aumento è dovuto alla caduta dell'impero sovietico, alla perdita di credibilità del comunismo e all'avanzata della religione in Cina, che il regime non riesce a fermare. Ma - com'è stato rilevato al congresso annuale del CESNUR (Centrp Studi sulle Nuove Religioni) che si è tenuto dal 21 al 24 giugno 2013 a Falun, in Svezia - dipende anche da un fattore demografico. Le persone religiose fanno più figli, sia nel Sud del mondo sia in Europa e nel Nord America, il che a gioco lungo conterrà le perdite anche in queste regioni. Questo spiega anche perché le forme più «liberal» o progressiste di religione siano destinate a pesare di meno in futuro: possono anche vincere la guerra dei media, ma perdono ogni giorno la guerra più importante, quella del numero dei figli e delle culle.

Il mondo diventa anche più cristiano, e nello stesso tempo più musulmano. Nel 1970 cristiani e musulmani insieme rappresentavano il 48% della popolazione mondiale, nel 2020 saranno il 57,2%. I cristiani saliranno nel 2020 al 33,3% e i musulmani al 23,9%. Un abitante del pianeta su tre sarà cristiano e quasi uno su quattro musulmano. Ma nel 1970 solo il 41,3% dei cristiani vivevano nel Sud del mondo - Asia, Africa e America Latina - mentre nel 2020 saranno il 64,7%. In Africa, dove già da qualche anno sono maggioranza relativa superando i musulmani, i cristiani nel 2020 sfioreranno il 50% e la maggioranza assoluta. In Asia e in Africa il cristianesimo cresce a un ritmo doppio rispetto alla crescita della popolazione in generale, e questo vale anche per la Chiesa Cattolica, che in America Latina - contrariamente a un mito diffuso - è invece in lieve declino, a causa della crescita non solo del protestantesimo ma anche del numero di persone che non frequentano alcuna chiesa.

Queste ultime sono già maggioranza in Europa Occidentale e nel 2020 saranno i due terzi della popolazione, anche se l'Italia rimane e verosimilmente rimarrà fra i grandi Paesi europei quello dove la più alta percentuale di persone si dice cristiana nelle indagini demoscopiche - l'ottanta per cento -, per quanto queste affermazioni non si traducano poi in un contatto regolare, e spesso neppure irregolare, con le istituzioni religiose. Gli Stati Uniti rimangono il primo Paese del mondo per numero di persone che si dichiarano cristiane, anche se questo è sceso dal 90,9% del 1970 all'80,1% attuale e si prevede che scenda al 78,1% nel 2020. Gli USA saranno nel 2020 il solo Paese «occidentale» fra i primi dieci per numero di cristiani, una lista che nel 1970 comprendeva Italia e Spagna e che ora invece, dopo gli Stati Uniti, elenca Brasile, Cina, Messico, Russia, Filippine, Nigeria, Congo, India ed Etiopia.

Nel 2020 su due miliardi e mezzo di cristiani oltre settecento milioni, cioè più di un quarto, saranno pentecostali e carismatici - compresi i carismatici cattolici - e curiosamente il Paese con la più alta percentuale di pentecostali e carismatici sul totale della popolazione (23%) sarà il Congo. Per ragioni di zelo missionario, ma anche come si è accennato di demografia, il segmento «evangelical», cioè conservatore, del protestantesimo cresce a un ritmo doppio rispetto al totale della popolazione mondiale, mentre il protestantesimo storico «progressista» continua a perdere membri con in declino che appare ormai irreversibile e mondiale.

Questi dati offrono un quadro contro-intuitivo rispetto al martellamento mediatico sulla secolarizzazione e il declino della religione, che scambia l'Europa Occidentale per il mondo. Ci dicono anche che la religione, come molte altre realtà sociali, è strettamente correlata alla demografia. Le religioni avanzano, e le forme più conservatrici di religione sopravanzano quelle progressiste, per una serie complessa di motivi tra cui non si può però trascurare il dato secondo cui più una coppia è religiosa e conservatrice, più tende a fare figli. Le grandi agenzie e i poteri forti che promuovono l'irreligiosità e il secolarismo conoscono perfettamente queste statistiche. È per questo che - facendo battere la grancassa anche dalla cultura popolare con romanzi come «Inferno» di Dan Brown - insistono tanto sulle politiche antinataliste. Perché sanno che - nonostante tutte le loro considerazioni trionfalistiche sulla secolarizzazione obbligatoriamente vincente - c'è per loro una bomba a orologeria che ha già cominciato a ticchettare. Su dieci bambini che nascono nel mondo, nove nascono in famiglie che si dichiarano religiose, e sei nascono in un contesto che o è cristiano conservatore o è musulmano. Mentre i «progressisti» e i fan del secolarismo fanno sempre meno figli.

Entrevista ao Arcebispo Jean Laffitte, Secretário do C. P. para a Família, por Mons. Duarte da Cunha

Diez comparaciones para entender las cifras: la Iglesia ha crecido un 17% desde el año 2000 - Pablo Ginés

In RL

 

Cada día se bautizan 50.000 nuevos católicos. Desde el 2000, la Iglesia ha crecido el equivalente a toda la población inglesa, española, portuguesa y francesa junta. 

 Este lunes por la mañana presentaron al Papa Francisco el Annuario Pontificio 2013, con datos estadísticos que se refieren a 2011, y que descubren en números el estado de la Iglesia Católica.

Así, en 2011 el catolicismo contaba con 1.214 millones de bautizados, un 17,5% de la población mundial. Les atienden 413.418 sacerdotes, 41.000 diáconos permanentes, unos 55.000 religiosos no sacerdotes y 713.000 religiosas.

De los 12 apóstoles que Cristo eligió, la Iglesia ha llegado a tener, para ese año, 5.132 obispos, que son sus sucesores. Esta cifra incluye muchos obispos eméritos y obispos auxiliares, porque en 2011 sólo había 2.979 diócesis y circunscripciones eclesiásticas.

Pero para entender mejor estas cifras, es bueno compararlas con una fecha tan reciente como el año 2000, para ver cómo está creciendo la Iglesia Católica en pleno siglo XXI.

1. Un crecimiento del 17%, unos 180 millones de personas
En el año 2000 (según el Annuario de dos años después) había 1.050 millones de católicos. En 2011 (últimos datos oficiales que tenemos, los presentados al Papa) eran 1.214. Pero estamos en 2013, y la Iglesia ha seguido creciendo, más o menos al ritmo de 16 millones al año. Tirando a la baja, habría hoy en realidad en el mundo unos 1.230 millones de católicos, un 17% más que en el año 2000, 180 millones de personas más. 

2. Ese crecimiento es igual a España, Portugal, Francia y Reino Unido juntos
Para imaginar lo que significan esos 180 millones de católicos más, imagínese toda la población de Portugal (10 millones), y toda la de Francia (62 millones) y toda la del Reino Unido (otros 62 millones) y la de España (46 millones). Eso son 180 millones. Eso sí, la mayoría son bebés y niños menores de 12 años, bautizados en su infancia.

3. Cada año, 16 millones más: el equivalente a todos los judíos del mundo
Después de más de 3.000 años de historia (y de vicisitudes históricas realmente duras) hay unos 14 millones de judíos en el mundo. Pero el Dios de Israel, de Abraham y de Isaac, gana esa cifra de adoradores año tras año en la Iglesia Católica.

Según los Annuarios Pontificios, desde el año 2000:
AP 2002, sobre 2000: 1050 millones de católicos; 17.4% de la población mundial
AP 2003, sobre 2001: 1.061 millones [creció en 11 millones]
AP 2004, sobre 2002: 1.071 millones [creció en 10 millones]
AP 2005, sobre 2003: 1.086 millones [creció en 15 millones]
AP 2006, sobre 2004: 1.098 millones [creció en 12 millones]
AP 2007, sobre 2005: 1.115 millones [creció en 17 millones]
AP 2008, sobre 2006: 1,131 millones [creció en 16 millones]
AP 2009, sobre 2007: 1.147 millones [creció en 16 millones]
AP 2010, sobre 2008: 1.166 millones [creció en 19 millones]
AP 2011, sobre 2009: 1.181 millones [creció en 15 millones]
AP 2012, sobre 2010: 1.196 millones [creció en 15 millones]
AP 2013, sobre 2011: 1.214 millones [creció en 18 millones]
Hipotético, sobre el año 2012: serían 16 millones más (una media de los últimos 5 años); total, más de 1.230 millones hoy.

4. En el mundo hay 67 millones de anglicanos; el catolicismo crece eso en 4 años
Al anglicanismo, en sus diversas ramas, incluyendo las vigorosas iglesias anglicanas de África, le ha costado 500 años llegar a tener 67 millones de fieles. 

La Iglesia Católica, para crecer esa cifra, sólo necesita esperar 4 años y bautizar a los bebés que nazcan en familias católicas. Aunque una decena de obispos anglicanos, unos 200 clérigos y algunos miles de fieles se hayan hecho católicos desde el año 2000, las cifras católicas de crecimiento deben mucho más a la demografía que a las conversiones en Occidente.

5. La Iglesia católica ha crecido en 8.240 sacerdotes desde el año 2000.
Desde el 2000 hasta el 2011, la Iglesia pasó de 405.178 a 413.418 sacerdotes. Es un crecimiento de 8.240 sacerdotes. Parece una buena noticia pero no lo es tanto, porque la población católica que hay que atender crece mucho más.

6. Con cada nuevo cura, llegan casi 20.000 nuevos feligreses
Exactamente, 19.000 nuevos católicos se han sumado a la Iglesia por cada uno de los 8.240 nuevos sacerdotes... Que, a su vez, en su momento heredarán muchos de los católicos ya mayores.

La desproporción numérica entre ovejas y pastores es uno de los puntos débiles de la estructura social del catolicismo. Norberto Strotman, obispo de Chosica (Perú), señalaba hace poco que "a cada presbítero de mi diócesis le corresponden 15.000 fieles, por lo que es imposible tener alguna relación. Todo lo que excede a 2.000 personas es imposible de llegar", admitía.

Incluso si se hiciera un "reparto equitativo" de fieles entre todos los curas del mundo (incluyendo los ancianos, enfermos y retirados), le corresponderían 3.000 fieles a cada uno. Es impracticable, y cada vez más.

7. Crecen curas, diáconos, seminaristas... pero bajan las religiosas: hay un 10% menos que en 2001
La Iglesia está sufriendo el descenso de las vocaciones religiosas femeninas: en 2011 hay 79.000 menos religiosas que en 2001, cuando eran 792.000 en todo el mundo. Con todo, esas 713.000 mujeres (una cifra equivalente a todos los habitantes de Zaragoza ciudad o de la provincia de Guipúzcoa) son un puntal indispensable para la Iglesia.

8. En 2020, la Iglesia habrá crecido en 112 millones más: habrá 1.342 millones de católicos.
Si se sigue el ritmo de crecimiento de16 millones al año, en 2020, dentro de 7 años, habrá 112 millones de católicos más: es el equivalente a toda la población de México hace tres años; o a todos los habitantes de la parte europea de Rusia.

9. Cada día se bautizan como católicos casi 50.000 personas
En realidad, si dividimos los 18 millones de nuevos católicos de 2011 por 365 días del año, salen unos 49.300 nuevos católicos diarios. Aunque no todos llegan por bautismo: especialmente en Pascua hay un pequeño porcentaje que llegan desde otras denominaciones cristianas y ya están bautizados.

10. En África, los católicos crecen a un ritmo que casi dobla al de la población
África es el continente de mayor dinamismo para la Iglesia. En 2011, la población creció en África un 2,3%, pero el número de católicos aumentó un 4,3%. Allí viven ya 16 de cada 100 católicos. Un ejemplo: en apenas 20 años, en Chad, los católicos han pasado de ser el cinco por ciento a más del veinte por ciento.

Al morir los Apóstoles, apenas 7.000 cristianos
Todas estas cifras contrastan con los humildes orígenes del cristianismo. El sociólogo Rodney Stark, en su libro «La expansión del cristianismo», calcula que en el año 200 debía de haber apenas 217.000 cristianos, un 0,36 por ciento de la población del Imperio romano.

Stark calcula que en el año 100 d.C. debía haber tan solo unos 7.500 cristianos en el mundo. ¡Quién le diría a esforzados apóstoles de esa época, como San Policarpo o San Ignacio de Antioquía, que llegaría un momento en que, día tras día, se bautizarían cada día 7 veces esa cantidad!