A Injustiça da Não Discriminação

P. Gonçalo Portocarrero de Almada

É injusto discriminar o que é igual, mas não o que é diferente

É como a gripe, esta recorrente mania: todos os anos, mais dia menos dia, lá aparece o vírus da não discriminação, a propagar a epidemia do igualitarismo e a exigir, em consequência, a reestruturação de algum órgão ostensivamente discriminatório, ou a aprovação de leis que combatam a exclusão dos grupos sociais mais desfavorecidos.

Exagero? De modo algum! Em plena silly season, dois artigos do Público, de 10 de Agosto passado, pugnam pela não discriminação.

No primeiro, o autor insurge-se contra a composição alfacinha do Conselho de Estado. Segundo o dito ensaísta, este órgão só tem duas mulheres; não tem ninguém mais à esquerda do que os conselheiros de esquerda que já lá estão; não tem membros que não sejam de Lisboa, excepto os que o não são, como o autarca de Gaia e os líderes insulares; não tem nenhum representante da Igreja Católica, nem das artes, nem das letras, nem da sociologia (?!), nem da história, etc. Tudo, claro, por culpa do Presidente da República que, apesar de algarvio confesso, «lisboetizou», segundo a escrita do mesmo autor, o supostamente nacional Conselho de Estado.

Não me compete, como é óbvio, comentar a sua opinião política que, ao exigir a representatividade institucional dos vários grémios profissionais e sociais, parece eivada de um certo saudosismo corporativista. Não posso, contudo, deixar de registar a sua curiosa tese de que a justiça decorre da igual, ou proporcional, representação, nesse órgão consultivo do chefe de Estado, das mais expressivas condições ideológicas, regionais, religiosas, etc.

A bem dizer, com a mesma razão, ou falta dela, também se deveria exigir que o sexo feminino, o norte transmontano, o barlavento algarvio, os evangélicos, os fadistas e os mais exímios pensadores pátrios estivessem representados na nossa selecção de futebol, cuja composição também parece muito politicamente incorrecta, sobretudo se se pensar que essa equipa deveria ser, de algum modo, representativa da nação.

O outro texto versa sobre a Moldávia que, não obstante o assédio da libertina Comunidade Europeia, ainda resiste à política da total permissividade em relação à orientação sexual. Segundo «um estudo de percepções da população» – vá-se lá saber o que isto seja! – «os moldavos, afinal, discriminam. Discriminam, sobretudo, deficientes físicos ou mentais, pobres, portadores de VIH, homossexuais, ciganos, mulheres». Pelos vistos, segundo a abalizada opinião da autora do artigo, em que não falta o coitadinho do costume, este é o principal crime dos moldavos: «discriminam»! E, claro, uma nação que discrimina, não pode fazer parte da nossa moderna e decadente Europa.

Mas, afinal, discriminar é mau? Por exemplo, quando se impede uma senhora corcunda de ser top-model, está-se a cometer uma injustiça? E quando se proíbe que um invisual seja árbitro de futebol, pode-se afirmar que se está a ser iníquo? A não-aceitação de um paralítico, como membro da equipa nacional de atletismo, é um acto punível, por arbitrário e contrário às convenções internacionais dos direitos humanos e de defesa dos deficientes? A norma que impede os cidadãos originariamente estrangeiros, mas naturalizados portugueses, de concorrerem à presidência da República, é ilegal por ser xenófoba? Uma escola que não aceita, para seu professor, um analfabeto, está a cometer um crime contra a igualdade de direitos que a Constituição consagra? A atribuição do Prémio Nobel da Química, a um determinado cidadão, tipifica um delito de injúrias aos restantes químicos? E se um encenador recusar a uma qualquer Julieta o papel de Romeu, ou a um qualquer Romeu o papel de Julieta, está também a incorrer num comportamento ilícito, neste caso por razão do respectivo sexo?

Discriminar é, apenas, distinguir. Será injusto quando distingue o que é igual, mas não quando diferencia o que é diverso. Os corcundas, os cegos, os paralíticos, os cidadãos nacionais de origem estrangeira, os analfabetos, os cientistas, os homens todos e todas as mulheres são iguais quanto à sua comum e inviolável dignidade humana. Mas não quanto às suas capacidades físicas e intelectuais, nem às correspondentes aptidões sociais, políticas e profissionais.

Aliás, a justiça não é, por definição, igualitária, mas discriminatória. Não trata a todos por igual, mas procura atribuir a cada qual o que lhe compete, não apenas em função da sua dignidade humana, mas também das suas características pessoais objectivas que, obviamente, não podem ser ignoradas, sobretudo quando se trata de lhes reconhecer uma específica função social. Não deixa de ser curioso que os grupos que antes mais apelavam à igualdade na diferença, sejam também agora os que mais reivindicam a indiferença na desigualdade, na medida em que não toleram a discriminação do que é, logicamente, diferente.

Todos iguais? Com certeza, no que respeita à comum natureza e dignidade do ser humano, bem como a todos os direitos e liberdades fundamentais. Mas todos diferentes também. A ditadura do igualitarismo, ou da não discriminação, não serve a causa da justiça: só seremos efectivamente todos iguais quando se reconhecer, também a nível social e jurídico, que somos todos diferentes.

The Question of Discrimination in Same-Sex Marriage

by Maggie Datiles, J.D., Associate Fellow

In CultureofLifeFoundation

On January 18^th, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision not to hear a same-sex marriage case brought by traditional marriage supporters. The case challenged the District of Columbia’s refusal to allow a voter referendum on the definition of marriage. The Supreme Court's rejection of the case has closed the door of judicial appeal for D.C. traditional marriage supporters. The debate will now shift to the legislative arena. This essay summarizes the efforts made in the District of Columbia to protect the institution of marriage, and discusses the issue of discrimination in the same-sex marriage context.

In 2009, the D.C. Council enacted two same-sex marriage laws. The first provided for the recognition of same-sex marriages performed outside of D.C., and the second allowed same-sex marriages to be performed in the District. (Bills banning same-sex marriages in D.C. were introduced but failed to make it to the House floor.) Before the two new laws went into effect, Bishop Harry Jackson, the leader of traditional marriage efforts in D.C., initiated a D.C. ballot measure defining marriage as between one man and one woman. Later, an emergency appeal was made to the Supreme Court to delay the enforcement of the new same-sex marriage laws. Chief Justice Roberts denied the emergency appeal because “it has been the practice of the Court to defer to the decisions of the courts of the District of Columbia on matters of exclusively local concern.”

The District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics refused to put Bishop Jackson’s measure on the ballot, stating that a ban on same-sex marriage would violate the D.C. Human Rights Act prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. In response, Bishop Jackson and the National Organization for Marriage (NOM) led a lawsuit challenging the Board’s decision. They argued that, according to the District of Columbia Charter, all legislative issues except appropriations may be voted on through public ballot initiatives. However, the D.C. Court of Appeals ultimately upheld D.C. Board of Elections’ refusal to put the issue to a vote, stating that a voter-based gay marriage ban would “have the effect of authorizing” discrimination.

Traditional marriage proponents appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, but on January 18, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Although the Supreme Court provided no comment on its rejection of the case, we can assume that it was rejected because, as Chief Justice Roberts said, the Supreme Court’s policy is to defer to the decisions of local courts in matters of exclusively local concern.

Importantly, the Supreme Court did not reject the same-sex marriage case based on its merits. This leads us to question the constitutional merits of the case: Is a same-sex marriage ban discriminatory under the constitution?

The case of Loving v. Virginia (1967) is considered to be the most important marriage law case in American history. In that case, the Supreme Court held that laws prohibiting bi-racial marriages are discriminatory and violations of Equal Protection and Due Process under the U.S. Constitution. The Court concluded that prohibiting the marriage of a man and a woman based solely on race constitutes discrimination and violates the right to marry. This right to marry, the Court declared, “is fundamental to our very existence and survival.” Here, the Supreme Court stated that marriage is between one man and one woman, and that the generation of children is inherent in the nature of marriage. This corresponds with traditional Christian views on the definition and purpose of marriage.

In Loving, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between the substance of marriage and the accidental qualities of a marriage. A marriage of a black man and a white woman, the Court declared, is a valid marriage because it has the substance of a marriage – a man and a woman. The races of the spouses are accidental in quality, and therefore have no bearing on the validity of the marriage.

This is why analogies between race and homosexuality in the marriage context do not work. In a homosexual marriage, the substance of the marriage is changed, whereas in an interracial marriage, the substance of the marriage is still the same. In short, the comparison between same-sex marriage and interracial marriage constitutes an erroneous analogy because a change of substance is fundamentally different from a change in accident.

An analogy to merit-based school scholarships is better. If a qualified black student is denied a merit-based scholarship solely based on his or her race, the denial of the scholarship constitutes unjust discrimination. But if an unqualified black student is denied a merit-based scholarship, the denial of the scholarship is valid. Similarly, if a law does not allow homosexuals to marry based on the mere fact that they are homosexual, such a law would be unjustly discriminatory. However, laws prohibiting same-sex marriage are not based solely on the fact that the parties seeking marriage are homosexual. Rather, the law prohibits homosexuals couples from marrying because the union of homosexuals is not in fact a marriage. Homosexual couples do not possess the necessary criteria for marriage, as they are incapable of doing what married couples do.

In addition, the Supreme Court held in Baker v. Nelson (1972) that laws defining marriage as between one man and one woman are constitutional and do not violate the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause and the right to privacy under the 14^th Amendment. Unlike race or gender, sexual orientation is not a “suspect class” that “triggers” a constitutional discrimination analysis. This ruling is binding on lower courts, and has been cited and followed by state and federal lawsuits brought by gays against marriage laws.(1) In fact, the gay couple in Baker tried to file their case two additional times (in 1976 and 2006), but the courts declined to hear the case again because of the binding authority of the Supreme Court decision in Baker.

Similar to the holdings of Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court precedent established in Baker corresponds with traditional Christian views on marriage. Although lower courts have generally followed these Supreme Court precedents in the past, the continuing stability of these precedents is questionable. For example, in August 2010, in the case Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the Ninth Circuit departed from the established Supreme Court precedent by ruling that California’s same-sex marriage ban, Proposition 8, is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause. As a major challenge to existing precedent, this case is anticipated to reach the Supreme Court in the near future.

In short, the definition of marriage as between one man and one woman has, in the past, been generally held by the courts (with rare exceptions) as non-discriminatory towards homosexuals. However, with the Perry case making its way to the Supreme Court and six U.S. jurisdictions recognizing same-sex marriages, this could change. If Perry is upheld in the Supreme Court, it will overturn current Supreme Court precedent and completely change the constitutional landscape of legal marriage. This possibility underscores the urgent need to continue to defend the legal and cultural definition of marriage as between one man and one woman.

[1] See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8^th Circuit, 2006), Wilson v. AkeMorrison v. Sandler (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2005), and Hernandez v. Robles (New York Court of Appeals, 2004). (U.S. District Court, 2005),

Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA) the Road: Homosexual Nondiscrimination Bill Must be Stopped Say Catholic Bishops

By Peter J. Smith

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 26, 2010 (LifeSiteNews.com) – The U.S. Catholic bishops have come out in full force against the federal Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA). They say they can no longer stay neutral on a bill that they charge will lead to the Roe v. Wade of traditional marriage in the United States, and trample on the rights of employers and those speaking the truth about homosexuality.

In a letter sent to Congress on May 19, and obtained by the Jesuit-run publication America, representatives of the Catholic bishops said that their concerns over the current forms of ENDA making their way through the U.S. House of Representatives (H.R. 3017) and the U.S. Senate (S. 1584) are so serious that “we cannot maintain the position of neutrality we held in 2007.”

The letter, sent by Archbishop Joseph Kurtz of Louisville, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Defense of Marriage, Bishop William Murphy, Chairman of the Committee on Domestic Justice and Human Development, and Archbishop Donald Wuerl of Washington, D.C., Chairman of the Committee on Doctrine, stated that the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) was opposing ENDA. They said the law would pose serious danger to marriage, religious liberty, privacy, the right to speak the truth about homosexuality in the public square, the rights of employers to act “consistent with that truth,” and the right of individuals to associate freely as guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

The bishops indicated that they have wised up to the fact that state ENDA laws have been integral – even a necessary last step – for state courts to have a legal basis for imposing a constitutional right to same-sex “marriage.” A federal ENDA would serve to lay the necessary groundwork for building a federal constitutional right to same-sex “marriage,” imposed nationwide, they warned.

“These rulings also reflect a legal strategy that gay rights advocates have repeatedly and publicly explained in scholarly articles and other media — first, secure the passage of sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws, such as ENDA, and then invoke the principle embedded within those laws as a basis for same-sex ‘marriage,’” the letter states.

“If this strategy were to succeed, it would represent a legal and moral disaster comparable in many ways to Roe v. Wade. As leaders of the Catholic Church, we have a moral obligation to oppose any law that would clearly contribute to this outcome,” they declared.

“In contrast to sexual conduct within marriage between one man and one woman — which does serve both the good of each married person and the good of society — heterosexual and homosexual conduct outside of marriage has no claim to special protection by the state.”

They also said that giving the Church a religious exemption would not allay their opposition to the bill. They noted that applying Title VII prohibitions on religious discrimination does not extend to all religious employers, and that they have been taught by “recent experience” that even covered institutions like the Church “may face government retaliation.”

They highlighted the the rights of non-religious employers as well, adding that the “bill also lacks an exemption for a ‘bona fide occupational qualification’ (BFOQ), for those cases where it is neither unjust nor inappropriate to consider an applicant’s sexual inclination.”

They also stressed strongly that ENDA would jeopardize the right to teach the truth about homosexuality – and for employers to act in accord with that truth – with the “threat of government sanction.”

“We recognize that no one should be an object of scorn, hatred, or violence for any reason, including sexual inclination,” said the church leaders. This right comes from the revelation that all persons are “created in the image and likeness of God” and therefore “possess an innate human dignity that must be acknowledged and respected, by other persons and by law,” they said.

The letter concluded by saying that the USCCB could never support ENDA, but was open to “further discussion” on developing legislation protecting those with homosexual inclinations “from unjust discrimination, without protecting homosexual conduct.”

See related coverage by LifeSiteNews.com:

New Documentary on Homosexual Threat to Religious Freedom
http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2010/may/10051313.html

Obama Appoints Lesbian Activist to EEOC Board
http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2010/mar/10032914.html

Obama Assures Homosexualist Leaders He's a "Champion" of Their Cause at Private White House Reception
http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2009/jun/09063007.html