Amparo, exrevolucionaria y funcionaria de la ONU: «Mi trabajo era destrozar la fe de los católicos»

In RL 

Amparo lo tuvo claro. Era la Virgen María quien le hablaba.

Todo sucedió cuando recibió un disparo de la policía en plena refriega. Cuando despertó en el hospital decidió que su vida debía cambiar radicalmente.

Su “enfangada” vida debía dar un giro de 180 y dejar de lado su servilismo político y su vida de pecado, y dedicarse a las mujeres y a los niños buscando su auténtico bien.

Un abuelo católico
Ella había nacido en una familia muy normal de Ecuador. Su fe era tradicional, de Misa dominical y poco más. La excepción de la regla fue su abuelo, quien sí vivía una auténtica vida cristiana.

En cierta ocasión, siendo Amparo adolescente y de camino hacia el ateísmo, su abuelo le dejó unas palabras que no habría de olvidar nunca. Estaban entrando en una iglesia, y ante una imagen de la Virgen le dijo: “Mírala a los ojos. Ella es la única que te va a salvar y la que te va a llevar a la fe”. La cosa quedó ahí.

El resto fue una caída libre: expulsada del colegio por pelearse con una monja, y un encuentro con evangélicos que acabaron de rematar su camino rebelde y ateo.

La revolución y las izquierdasEran los años 70 y 80, y la oferta social que Amparo encontró fuera de la Iglesia era la de los movimientos revolucionarios, la teología de la liberación marxista, el Che Guevara, los movimientos feministas, abortistas, el indigenismo y ese largo etcétera. Se metió de cabeza en todo ello.

Si algo no se le puede reprochar a Amparo es que no fuera una persona coherente con sus principios. Y tomó todas las banderas, las abrazó y se dedicó a ellas. Lo mismo la encontrábamos en una confrontación armada o en una manifestación antigubernamental, que en una campaña a favor de los derechos reproductivos de las mujeres, es decir, promoviendo los anticonceptivos y el aborto.

Se radicaliza en EspañaComo la situación política en Ecuador se complicó, su padre la envió a España a estudiar Pedagogía Social. En este país obtuvo su título universitario, pero también su radicalización política y el contacto con otros movimientos revolucionarios, ateos y anticlericales.

Ya de vuelta a Ecuador, su visión feminista y de izquierdas casaba perfectamente bien con las políticas que lleva a cabo la ONU en Latinoamérica, así que gracias a ello y a su formación llegó a ser responsable en Ecuador del programa de la UNFPA, es decir del Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas, desde donde contaba con todos los millones de dólares que necesitase para cumplir, o mejor dicho, imponer los programas contrarios a la natalidad, a favor del aborto y la anticoncepción.

Mi trabajo: quitar la fe a los católicos Amparo ha explicado en la cadena católica de televisión EWTN que “los grupos comunistas y socialistas saben que la única institución que puede romper sus mentiras es la Iglesia Católica. Entonces –confiesa- lo primero que buscas son argumentos que puedan destrozar la poca fe que tienen los católicos. Ves las noticias o vas detrás de ese sacerdote que no está viviendo su vida en gracia con Dios… Lo publicas y lo sacas en la prensa… Y –concluye- si hay que callar que en Ecuador, el 60% de las obras de ayuda a la gente pobre están en manos de la Iglesia, pues se silencia”.

Dañar a la Iglesia desde dentro

El gran problema de los sacerdotes es su soledad: “Nosotros íbamos buscando a los sacerdotes abandonados en los pueblos y en las serranías para decirles que si Dios existía, entonces por qué permitía la pobreza.

‘La única manera es la revolución. Únase a nosotros, y nosotros le ayudamos’. Había sacerdotes –lamenta ahora- que cedían y que pensaban que tendrían un grupo que le ayudase, que le apoyase, que estuviese con él… En ocasiones les ofrecíamos dinero a los sacerdotes y a las religiosas para que pudieran reconstruir, mejorar sus centros educativos con la única condición de que nos dejaran impartir clases de educación sexual y reproductiva en sus colegios”.

Alejándose aún más de Dios…En Amparo se cumple aquella cita de Chesterton que “cuando se deja de creer en Dios enseguida se cree en cualquier cosa”.

Inmersa en el ateísmo no dejaba de buscar algún resquicio de espiritualidad en la lectura de cartas, reiki, yoga…: “Como la vida en la lucha de izquierdas era una vida de pecado no te puedes librar de las consecuencias del pecado. Es la muerte espiritual. Son como pequeños pactos con el demonio. Y el demonio te los cobra -advierte. Así que empecé a sufrir por la parte del dinero".

"Alguien me recomendó que me hiciera unas limpias. Tenía mis propios mantras… que ahora que he podido traducirlos dicen ‘yo pertenezco a Satanás’. Las mantras las hice en Estados Unidos e, incluso, llevé a mis hijos al chamán que era un maestro ascendido de la Religión Universal”.

…aunque Dios no está lejosEn cierta ocasión estando en una comunidad, Amparo le retó a Dios. Había una mujer rezando, pero ella empezó a increparla y llamarla loca. Al grado de que acabó rompiéndole una estampita que tenía la pobre señora.

Su prepotencia de revolucionaria no le facilitaba muchas otras soluciones en aquella ocasión. Poco después vino el siguiente paso hacia su conversión.

Herida por una bala de la policíaAmparo había participando en todo tipo de

manifestaciones y luchas contra el gobierno. En ocasiones movilizando a los indígenas y facilitando que éstos acudieran armados con lanzas. Pero cierto día estando en una de ellas fue herida por una bala. Cuando recibió el impacto, Amparo recuerda dos cosas: por un lado a su marido y sus hijos, y por otro lado una paz inexplicable, total. No tenía miedo de irse. Todo era alegría, gozo, paz…

En eso, escuchó una voz que le cantaba: “Vi unos ojos maravillosos. Vi el amor. Eran los ojos de la Virgen. ¡Eran justamente los ojos de la estampa que yo había roto! La estampa de la Virgen Milagrosa. La vi como una adolescente de 15 años. Con traje blanco…”.

Mientras ella se desangraba, lo único que sentía era paz, alegría… En ese momento la Virgen le dijo: “Mi pequeña, yo te amo”. Y le pidió que dejara todas las causas que ella llevaba y que tomara la causa de su Hijo. También se dio cuenta de que detrás de la Virgen había un señor mayor: era su abuelo.

Y su marido la tomó por loca
Cuando se despertó le narró toda la experiencia a su marido, Javier. Él la tomó por loca, y no era para menos. Una atea convencida, militante anticatólica, y despertando de aquellos sueños…

En seguida le llevaron a que maestros ascendidos, a psicólogos y expertos de la Nueva Era la examinaran y la convencieran de que aquellas experiencias eran fruto de sus alucinaciones y las heridas recibidas. Sin embargo, “nadie podía quitarme de la cabeza que era Dios”.

Lo primero, confesarse“Lo primero que necesitaba era un sacerdote. Necesitaba confesarme. Lo primero, lo primero, era la confesión. Yo le pedía a Dios que no me muriera por el camino, yendo a casa, porque me iría al infierno. En la confesión estaban todos los pecados. Los más horribles”.

Era una nueva etapa, y había que comenzar desde el principio y bien hecho todo. Así que “lo primero que hice fue aprender a amar a Jesús, a amar a los sacerdotes, a amar a la Iglesia, amar a los sacramentos”.

Amparo se sentía totalmente enfangada y a la vez invitada a una nueva revolución: “Lo único que transforma el mundo es Dios. Yo no soy digna. Es tan grande el amor de Dios…”

La conversión de su maridoAmparó rezó e invitó a su marido Javier a la conversión. Con el tiempo, Javier, igual de revolucionario que ella, empezó a dar pruebas de cambio por amor a Amparo.

Debía ser una experiencia dramática en sí misma por el solo hecho de tener que romper con toda una vida de convicciones y lucha comprometida. Amparo lo explica así: “Mi marido aceptó creer en Dios y en la Virgen, pero no creía en el sacramento. Pero Dios nos puso un sacerdote santo en el camino. Por fin se confesó y su confesión duró más de dos horas. Al salir, sintió que se había quitado quintales y quintales de cosas”.

Ahora tocaba denunciar las mentiras de la ONU

La conversión de las personas, las más de las veces, es un proceso largo y con etapas. Amparo estaba en camino, pero aún no renunciaba a toda su vida de pecado. Parte de ella la necesitaba, pues su sueldo de Naciones Unidas era un ingreso necesario para la familia y su ritmo de gastos.

Todo vino cuando una amiga suya le pidió información sobre la distribución de la píldora del día siguiente por parte de Naciones Unidas en Ecuador. Amparo era responsable de su importación y distribución en el país.

De hecho su agencia de Naciones Unidas había vendido a Ecuador 400.000 (cuatrocientas mil) dosis de la píldora del día siguiente. La ONU en Nueva York, a la UNFPA en Ecuador: “Nos las venden a 25 centavos de dólar, y nosotros las vendemos entre 9 y 14 dólares. Es un negocio redondo”.

En Ecuador hubo un juicio que perdió Naciones Unidas por la distribución de la píldora y lo ganaron los provida, puesto que tuvieron que reconocer que no es un método anticonceptivo, sino que es antiimplantatorio, es decir abortivo, y que se utiliza cuando los métodos anticonceptivos fallan.
 

El culmen de su decisión de convertirse y dar un paso  definitivo hacia Dios se dio de camino al juzgado en ese juicio que perdió la ONU: “Cuando estábamos llevando la información al Tribunal, un periodista me hizo una pregunta que pensé que era Dios quien me la hacía -estás con Dios o estás con el demonio-. La pregunta fue: ¿Qué pensaba yo de la pastilla del día siguiente? Y, claro, yo seguía trabajando para las Naciones Unidas y apoyaba a todas las organizaciones proaborto. En ese momento me di cuenta de que era el momento de decir la verdad y dejar de mentirme a mí misma. Era una incoherencia ser católica y a la vez, por el dinero, seguir apoyando a una organización que va contra mis valores. Y, claro, dije la verdad y las Naciones Unidas me echaron”.

¿Qué hay detrás de Naciones Unidas?
Detrás de los proyectos de la ONU, detrás de las palabras bonitas que usan cuando hablan de salud reproductiva, en realidad hay toda una promoción del aborto y de los anticonceptivos. Es el único objetivo para toda América Latina.

En la entrevista de Amparo en la cadena de televisión norteamericana EWTN, denunciaba que en el libro “Cuerpos, tambores y huellas”, editado por las propias Naciones Unidas, se reconoce la promoción de las relaciones sexuales en niños desde los 10 años. Y que en él se explica claramente tres cosas:

- que los padres no deben ser informados de la educación sexual que reciben sus hijos,

- que los colegios deben distribuir anticonceptivos a sus alumnos sin conocimiento y consentimiento de los padres,

- y que si un maestro o médico llegase a informar a los padres de que sus hijos están usando anticonceptivos, ese maestro o médico debe ser expulsado de su trabajo por romper el silencio profesional.

Amparo, y no sólo de ella, denuncian la existencia de un completo negocio en el que no se desaprovecha nada: se promueve las relaciones sexuales entre los niños y adolescentes, y se les venden preservativos. Como éstos fallan, entonces se les ofrece el aborto o la píldora del día siguiente. Como el aborto produce restos humanos, estos sirven bien para la experimentación o bien para extraer algunas sustancias que después se usan cremas, champús, etc. Negocio completo.

Puede ver una conferencia de Amparo Medina

Y ahora en la lucha por la vidaLa realidad fue más dura de lo previsto en un primer momento. El matrimonio lo perdió todo cuando salió de la revolución. Tuvieron que renunciar a muchas cosas, las primeras a las materiales. Pero fue “hermoso encontrar juntos el amor de Dios y quitarse los mitos con respecto a los sacerdotes, a la Virgen, a la Iglesia…”

Amparo Medina y su marido Javier Salazar son padres de tres hijos. Ella es Directora ejecutiva de Acción Provida Ecuador (http://accionprovida.com.ec/) además de colaborar y asesorar en otros organismos.

Ahora también lucha por la familia, las mujeres y los niños, pero desde la verdad integral de las personas, y no desde el negocio económico.

Amenazas de muerteUn nuevo enfoque, sí, pero no exento de peligros. Así, Amparo ha sufrido amenazas de muerte como la que recibió no hace mucho en una caja de zapatos dentro de la cual había una rata muerta con el mensaje “muerte a los provida” y “recuerde que los accidentes existen, recuerde que las muertes accidentales son el día a día de este país, NO SIGA CON SU CAMPAÑA ANTI MUJER Y HOMOFÓBICA…Muerte a los traidores, muerte a los anti Patria, MUERTE O REVOLUCIÓN”.

Amparo no se arredra. Y sigue con su lucha confiada en que tiene en sus manos la posibilidad de defender miles de vidas humanas.

Si desea ver una entrevista realizada a Amparo Medina en la cadena de televisión nortemericana EWTN puede seguirla aquí

Pope Benedict XVI: "The Christian vision of man is, in fact, a great 'yes' to the dignity of the person"

VATICAN CITY, January 20, 2013 (Zenit.org) - Here is a translation of the address Benedict XVI gave Saturday when receiving in audience participants in the plenary assembly of the Pontifical Council Cor Unum.

* * *

Dear friends,

... Your witness can open the doors of faith to many people who seek Christ's love. Thus, in this Year of Faith the theme "Charity, the New Ethics and Christian Anthropology," which you are taking up, reflects the close connection between love and truth, or, if you will, between faith and charity. The whole Christian ethos receives its meaning from faith as a "meeting" with the love of Christ, which offers a new horizon and impresses a decisive direction on life (cf. "Deus caritas est," 1). Christina love finds its basis and form in faith. Meeting God and experiencing his love, we learn "no longer to live for ourselves but for him and, with him, for others" (ibid. 33).

Beginning from this dynamic relationship between faith and charity, I would like to reflect on a point that I would call the prophetic dimension that faith instills in charity. The believer's adherence to the Gospel impresses on charity its typically Christian form and constitutes it as a principle of discernment. The Christian, especially those who work in charitable organizations, must let himself be oriented by principles of faith through which we adopt "God's perspective," we accept his plan for us (cf. "Deus caritas est," 1). This new way of looking at the world and man offered by faith also furnishes the correct criterion for the evaluation of expressions of charity in the present context.

In every age, when man did not try to follow this plan, he was victim of cultural temptations that ended up making him a slave. In recent centuries, the ideologies that praised the cult of the nation, the race, of the social class, showed themselves to be nothing but idolatry; and the same can be said of unbridled capitalism with its cult of profit, which has led to crisis, inequality and misery. There is a growing consensus today about the inalienable dignity of the human being and the reciprocal and interdependent responsibility toward man; and this is to the benefit of true civilization, the civilization of love. On the other hand, unfortunately, there are also shadows in our time that obscure God's plan. I am referring above all to a tragic anthropological reduction that re-proposes ancient material hedonism, to which is added a "technological prometheism." From the marriage of a materialistic vision of man and great technological development there emerges an anthropology that is at bottom atheistic. It presupposes that man is reduced to autonomous functions, the mind to the brain, human history to a destiny of self-realization. All of this prescinds from God, from the properly spiritual dimension and from a horizon beyond this world. In the perspective of a man deprived of his soul and of a personal relation with the Creator, that which is technologically possible becomes morally legitimate, every experiment is thus acceptable, every political demographic acceptable, every form of manipulation justified. The danger most to be feared in this current of thought is the absolutization of man: man wants to be "ab-solutus," absolved of every bond and of every natural constitution. He pretends to be independent and thinks that his happiness lies solely in the affirmation of self. "Man calls his nature into question … From now on there is only the abstract human being, who chooses for himself what his nature is to be" (Speech to the Roman Curia, December 21, 2012). This is a radical negation of man's creatureliness and filial condition, which leads to a tragic solitude.

The faith and healthy Christian discernment bring us therefore to pay prophetic attention to this problematic ethical situation and to the mentality that it supposes. Just collaboration with international organizations in the field of development and in human promotion must not make us close our eyes to these dangerous ideologies, and the Pastors of the Church – which is the "pillar and ground of the truth" (1 Timothy 3:15) – have a duty to warn both faithful Catholics and every person of good will and right reason about these deviations. This is a harmful deviation for man even if it is waved with good intentions as a banner of presumed progress, or of presumed rights, or of a presumed humanism. In the face of these anthropological reductions, what is the task of every Christian – and especially your task – involved in charitable work, and so in direct relations with many social protagonists? We certainly must exercise a critical vigilance and, sometimes, refuse money and collaboration that would, directly or indirectly, support actions and projects that run contrary to a Christian anthropology. But, positively speaking, the Church is always committed to the promotion of man according to God's plan, man in his integral dignity, with respect for his twofold vertical and horizontal dimension. The actions of ecclesial development organizations are also oriented in this direction. The Christian vision of man is, in fact, a great "yes" to the dignity of the person called to intimate communion with God, a filial communion, humble and confident. The human being is neither an individual subsisting in himself nor an anonymous element of the collective. He is rather a singular and unrepeatable person intrinsically ordered to relationship and sociality. For this reason the Church stresses her great "yes" to the dignity and beauty of marriage as an expression of a faithful and fecund alliance between man and woman, and says "no" to such philosophies as the philosophy of gender. The Church is guided by the fact that the reciprocity between man and woman is the expression of the beauty of the nature willed by the Creator.

Dear friends, I thank you for your commitment on behalf of man, in fidelity to his true dignity. In the face of these challenges of our times, we know that the answer is the encounter with Christ. In him man can fully realize his personal good and the common good. I encourage you to continue in your work with a joyful and generous spirit as I bestow upon you the Apostolic Benediction from my heart.

[Translation by Joseph G. Trabbic]

Why Darwinist Materialism is Wrong - by Alvin Plantinga

In CERC

According to a semi-established consensus among the intellectual elite in the West, there is no such person as God or any other supernatural being.

Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian
Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False By Thomas Nagel
(Oxford University Press, 144 pp., $24.95) 

I.

According to a semi-established consensus among the intellectual elite in the West, there is no such person as God or any other supernatural being. Life on our planet arose by way of ill-understood but completely naturalistic processes involving only the working of natural law. Given life, natural selection has taken over, and produced all the enormous variety that we find in the living world. Human beings, like the rest of the world, are material objects through and through; they have no soul or ego or self of any immaterial sort. At bottom, what there is in our world are the elementary particles described in physics, together with things composed of these particles.

I say that this is a semi-established consensus, but of course there are some people, scientists and others, who disagree. There are also agnostics, who hold no opinion one way or the other on one or another of the above theses. And there are variations on the above themes, and also halfway houses of one sort or another. Still, by and large those are the views of academics and intellectuals in America now. Call this constellation of views scientific naturalism — or don't call it that, since there is nothing particularly scientific about it, except that those who champion it tend to wrap themselves in science like a politician in the flag. By any name, however, we could call it the orthodoxy of the academy — or if not the orthodoxy, certainly the majority opinion.

The eminent philosopher Thomas Nagel would call it something else: an idol of the academic tribe, perhaps, or a sacred cow: "I find this view antecedently unbelievable — a heroic triumph of ideological theory over common sense. . . .

 I would be willing to bet that the present right-thinking consensus will come to seem laughable in a generation or two." Nagel is an atheist; even so, however, he does not accept the above consensus, which he calls materialist naturalism; far from it. His important new book is a brief but powerful assault on materialist naturalism.

Nagel is not afraid to take unpopular positions, and he does not seem to mind the obloquy that goes with that territory. "In the present climate of a dominant scientific naturalism," he writes, "heavily dependent on speculative Darwinian explanations of practically everything, and armed to the teeth against attacks from religion, I have thought it useful to speculate about possible alternatives. Above all, I would like to extend the boundaries of what is not regarded as unthinkable, in light of how little we really understand about the world." Nagel has endorsed the negative conclusions of the much-maligned Intelligent Design movement, and he has defended it from the charge that it is inherently unscientific. In 2009 he even went so far as to recommend Stephen Meyer's book Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design, a flagship declaration of Intelligent Design, as a book of the year. For that piece of blasphemy Nagel paid the predictable price; he was said to be arrogant, dangerous to children, a disgrace, hypocritical, ignorant, mind-polluting, reprehensible, stupid, unscientific, and in general a less than wholly upstanding citizen of the republic of letters.

His new book will probably call forth similar denunciations: except for atheism, Nagel rejects nearly every contention of materialist naturalism. Mind and Cosmos rejects, first, the claim that life has come to be just by the workings of the laws of physics and chemistry. As Nagel points out, this is extremely improbable, at least given current evidence: no one has suggested any reasonably plausible process whereby this could have happened. As Nagel remarks, "It is an assumption governing the scientific project rather than a well-confirmed scientific hypothesis."

The second plank of materialist naturalism that Nagel rejects is the idea that, once life was established on our planet, all the enormous variety of contemporary life came to be by way of the processes evolutionary science tells us about: natural selection operating on genetic mutation, but also genetic drift, and perhaps other processes as well. These processes, moreover, are unguided: neither God nor any other being has directed or orchestrated them. Nagel seems a bit less doubtful of this plank than of the first; but still he thinks it incredible that the fantastic diversity of life, including we human beings, should have come to be in this way: "the more details we learn about the chemical basis of life and the intricacy of the genetic code, the more unbelievable the standard historical account becomes." Nagel supports the commonsense view that the probability of this happening in the time available is extremely low, and he believes that nothing like sufficient evidence to overturn this verdict has been produced.

So far Nagel seems to me to be right on target. The probability, with respect to our current evidence, that life has somehow come to be from non-life just by the working of the laws of physics and chemistry is vanishingly small. And given the existence of a primitive life form, the probability that all the current variety of life should have come to be by unguided evolution, while perhaps not quite as small, is nevertheless minuscule. These two conceptions of materialist naturalism are very likely false.

But, someone will say, the improbable happens all the time. It is not at all improbable that something improbable should happen. Consider an example. You play a rubber of bridge involving, say, five deals. The probability that the cards should fall just as they do for those five deals is tiny — something like one out of ten to the 140th power. Still, they did. Right. It happened. The improbable does indeed happen. In any fair lottery, each ticket is unlikely to win; but it is certain that one of them will win, and so it is certain that something improbable will happen. But how is this relevant in the present context? In a fit of unbridled optimism, I claim that I will win the Nobel Prize in chemistry. You quite sensibly point out that this is extremely unlikely, given that I have never studied chemistry and know nothing about the subject. Could I defend my belief by pointing out that the improbable regularly happens? Of course not: you cannot sensibly hold a belief that is improbable with respect to all of your evidence.

Nagel goes on: he thinks it is especially improbable that consciousness and reason should come to be if materialist naturalism is true. "Consciousness is the most conspicuous obstacle to a comprehensive naturalism that relies only on the resources of physical science." Why so? Nagel's point seems to be that the physical sciences — physics, chemistry, biology, neurology — cannot explain or account for the fact that we human beings and presumably some other animals are conscious. Physical science can explain the tides, and why birds have hollow bones, and why the sky is blue; but it cannot explain consciousness. Physical science can perhaps demonstrate correlations between physical conditions of one sort or another and conscious states of one sort or another; but of course this is not to explain consciousness. Correlation is not explanation. As Nagel puts it, "The appearance of animal consciousness is evidently the result of biological evolution, but this well-supported empirical fact is not yet an explanation — it does not provide understanding, or enable us to see why the result was to be expected or how it came about."

Nagel next turns his attention to belief and cognition: "the problem that I want to take up now concerns mental functions such as thought, reasoning, and evaluation that are limited to humans, though their beginnings may be found in a few other species." We human beings and perhaps some other animals are not merely conscious, we also hold beliefs, many of which are in fact true. It is one thing to feel pain; it is quite another to believe, say, that pain can be a useful signal of dysfunction. According to Nagel, materialist naturalism has great difficulty with consciousness, but it has even greater difficulty with cognition. He thinks it monumentally unlikely that unguided natural selection should have "generated creatures with the capacity to discover by reason the truth about a reality that extends vastly beyond the initial appearances." He is thinking in particular of science itself.

Natural selection is interested in behavior, not in the truth of belief, except as that latter is related to behavior. So concede for the moment that natural selection might perhaps be expected to produce creatures with cognitive faculties that are reliable when it comes to beliefs about the physical environment: beliefs, for example, about the presence of predators, or food, or potential mates. But what about beliefs that go far beyond anything with survival value? What about physics, or neurology, or molecular biology, or evolutionary theory? What is the probability, given materialist naturalism, that our cognitive faculties should be reliable in such areas? It is very small indeed. It follows — in a wonderful irony — that a materialistic naturalist should be skeptical about science, or at any rate about those parts of it far removed from everyday life.

This certainly seems right, and perhaps we can go even further. Perhaps it is not initially implausible to think that unguided natural selection could have produced creatures with cognitive faculties who are reliable about matters relevant to survival and reproduction. But what about metaphysical beliefs, such as theism, or determinism, or materialism, or atheism? Such beliefs have little bearing on behavior related to survival and reproduction, and unguided natural selection couldn't care less about them or their truth-value. After all, it is only the occasional member of the Young Humanist Society whose reproductive prospects are enhanced by accepting atheism. Given materialist naturalism, the probability that my cognitive faculties are reliable with respect to metaphysical beliefs would be low. So take any metaphysical belief I have: the probability that it is true, given materialist naturalism, cannot be much above .5. But of course materialist naturalism is itself a metaphysical belief. So the materialistic naturalist should think the probability of materialist naturalism is about .5. But that means that she cannot sensibly believe her own doctrine. If she believes it, she shouldn't believe it. In this way materialist naturalism is self-defeating.

II.

The negative case that Nagel makes against materialist naturalism seems to me to be strong and persuasive. I do have the occasional reservation. Most materialists apparently believe that mental states are caused by physical states. According to Nagel, however, the materialistic naturalist cannot stop there. Why not? Because the idea that there is such a causal connection between the physical and the mental doesn't really explain the occurrence of the mental in a physical world. It doesn't make the mental intelligible. It doesn't show that the existence of the mental is probable, given our physical world.

Some materialists, however, seek to evade this difficulty by suggesting that there is some sort of logical connection between physical states and mental states. It is a logically necessary truth, they say, that when a given physical state occurs, a certain mental state also occurs. If this is true, then the existence of the mental is certainly probable, given our physical world; indeed, its existence is necessary. Nagel himself suggests that there are such necessary connections. So wouldn't that be enough to make intelligible the occurrence of the mental in our physical world?

I suspect that his answer would be no. Perhaps the reason would be that we cannot just see these alleged necessities, in the way we can just see that 2+1=3. These postulated necessary connections are not self-evident to us. And the existence of the mental would be intelligible only if those connections were self-evident. But isn't this a bit too strong? Why think that the mental is intelligible, understandable, only if there are self-evident necessary connections between the physical and the mental? Doesn't that require too much? And if intelligibility does require that sort of connection between the physical and the mental, why think the world is intelligible in that extremely strong sense?

Now you might think someone with Nagel's views would be sympathetic to theism, the belief that there is such a person as the God of the Abrahamic religions. Materialist naturalism, says Nagel, cannot account for the appearance of life, or the variety we find in the living world, or consciousness, or cognition, or mind — but theism has no problem accounting for any of these. As for life, God himself is living, and in one way or another has created the biological life to be found on Earth (and perhaps elsewhere as well). As for the diversity of life: God has brought that about, whether through a guided process of evolution or in some other way. As for consciousness, again theism has no problem: according to theism the fundamental and basic reality is God, who is conscious. And what about the existence of creatures with cognition and reason, creatures who, like us, are capable of scientific investigation of our world? Well, according to theism, God has created us human beings in his image; part of being in the image of God (Aquinas thought it the most important part) is being able to know something about ourselves and our world and God himself, just as God does. Hence theism implies that the world is indeed intelligible to us, even if not quite intelligible in Nagel's glorified sense. Indeed, modern empirical science was nurtured in the womb of Christian theism, which implies that there is a certain match or fit between the world and our cognitive faculties.

Given theism, there is no surprise at all that there should be creatures like us who are capable of atomic physics, relativity theory, quantum mechanics, and the like. Materialist naturalism, on the other hand, as Nagel points out, has great difficulty accounting for the existence of such creatures. For this and other reasons, theism is vastly more welcoming to science than materialist naturalism. So theism would seem to be a natural alternative to the materialist naturalism Nagel rejects: it has virtues where the latter has vices, and we might therefore expect Nagel, at least on these grounds, to be sympathetic to theism.

Sadly enough (at least for me), Nagel rejects theism. "I confess to an ungrounded assumption of my own, in not finding it possible to regard the design alternative [i.e., theism] as a real option. I lack the sensus divinitatis that enables — indeed, compels so many people to see in the world the expression of divine purpose." But it isn't just that Nagel is more or less neutral about theism but lacks that sensus divinitatis. In The Last Word, which appeared in 1997, he offered a candid account of his philosophical inclinations:

I am talking about something much deeper — namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. . . . It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that.

Here we have discomfort and distress at the thought that there might be such a being as God; but this discomfort seems more emotional than philosophical or rational.

So is there a strictly philosophical problem with theism, according to Nagel? As far as I can see, the main substantive objection that he offers is an appeal to that notion of unity. A successful worldview will see the world as intelligible; and intelligibility, as Nagel conceives it, involves a high degree of unity. The world is intelligible only if there are no fundamental breaks in it, only if it contains no fundamentally different kinds of things. Descartes, that great dualist, thought that the world displays two quite different sorts of things: matter and mind, neither reducible to the other. Nagel rejects this dualism: his reason is just that such dualism fails to secure the unity necessary for the world's being intelligible.

Yet is there any reason to think that the world really is intelligible in this very strong sense — any good reason to think that there is fundamentally just one kind of thing, with everything being an example of that kind, or reducible to things that are? Here three considerations seem to be necessary. First, we need to know more about this requirement: what is it to say that fundamentally there is just one kind of thing? It is not obvious how this is to be understood. Aren't there many different sorts of things: houses, horses, hawks, and handsaws? Well, perhaps they are not fundamentally different. But what does "fundamentally" mean here? Is the idea that the world is intelligible only if there is some important property that houses, horses, hawks, and handsaws all share? What kind of property?

Second, how much plausibility is there to the claim that this sort of unity really is required for intelligibility? Clearly we cannot claim that Descartes's dualism is literally unintelligible — after all, even if you reject it, you can understand it. (How else could you reject it?) Is it really true that the world is more intelligible, in some important sense of "intelligible," if it does not contain two or more fundamentally different kinds of things? I see little reason to think so.

And third, suppose we concede that the world is genuinely intelligible only if it displays this sort of monistic unity: why should we think that the world really does display such a unity? We might hope that the world would display such unity, but is there any reason to think the world will cooperate? Suppose intelligibility requires that kind of unity: why should we think our world is intelligible in that sense? Is it reasonable to say to a theist, "Well, if theism were true, there would be two quite different sorts of things: God on the one hand, and the creatures he has created on the other. But that cannot really be true: for if it were, the world would not display the sort of unity required for intelligibility"? Won't the theist be quite properly content to forgo that sort of intelligibility?

III.

 

I come finally to Nagel's positive thesis. Materialist naturalism, he shows, is false, but what does he propose to put in its place? Here he is a little diffident. He thinks that it may take centuries to work out a satisfactory alternative to materialist naturalism (given that theism is not acceptable); he is content to propose a suggestive sketch. He does so in a spirit of modesty: "I am certain that my own attempt to explore alternatives is far too unimaginative. An understanding of the universe as basically prone to generate life and mind will probably require a much more radical departure from the familiar forms of naturalistic explanation than I am at present able to conceive."

There are two main elements to Nagel's sketch. There is panpsychism, or the idea that there is mind, or proto-mind, or something like mind, all the way down. In this view, mind never emerges in the universe: it is present from the start, in that even the most elementary particles display some kind of mindedness. The thought is not, of course, that elementary particles are able to do mathematical calculations, or that they are self-conscious; but they do enjoy some kind of mentality. In this way Nagel proposes to avoid the lack of intelligibility he finds in dualism.

Of course someone might wonder how much of a gain there is, from the point of view of unity, in rejecting two fundamentally different kinds of objects in favor of two fundamentally different kinds of properties. And as Nagel recognizes, there is still a problem for him about the existence of minds like ours, minds capable of understanding a fair amount about the universe. We can see (to some degree, anyway) how more complex material objects can be built out of simpler ones: ordinary physical objects are composed of molecules, which are composed of atoms, which are composed of electrons and quarks (at this point things get less than totally clear). But we haven't the faintest idea how a being with a mind like ours can be composed of or constructed out of smaller entities that have some kind of mindedness. How do those elementary minds get combined into a less than elementary mind?

The second element of Nagel's sketch is what we can call natural teleology.His idea seems to be something like this. At each stage in the development of our universe (perhaps we can think of that development as starting with the big bang), there are several different possibilities as to what will happen next. Some of these possibilities are steps on the way toward the existence of creatures with minds like ours; others are not. According to Nagel's natural teleology, there is a sort of intrinsic bias in the universe toward those possibilities that lead to minds. Or perhaps there was an intrinsic bias in the universe toward the sorts of initial conditions that would lead to the existence of minds like ours. Nagel does not elaborate or develop these suggestions. Still, he is not to be criticized for this: he is probably right in believing that it will take a lot of thought and a long time to develop these suggestions into a truly viable alternative to both materialist naturalism and theism.

I said above that Nagel applauds the negative side of Intelligent Design but is doubtful about the positive part; and I find myself in much the same position with respect to Mind and Cosmos. I applaud his formidable attack on materialist naturalism; I am dubious about panpsychism and natural teleology. As Nagel sees, mind could not arise in our world if materialist naturalism were true — but how does it help to suppose that elementary particles in some sense have minds? How does that make it intelligible that there should be creatures capable of physics and philosophy? And of poetry, art, and music?

As for natural teleology: does it really make sense to suppose that the world in itself, without the presence of God, should be doing something we could sensibly call "aiming at" some states of affairs rather than others — that it has as a goal the actuality of some states of affairs as opposed to others? Here the problem isn't just that this seems fantastic; it does not even make clear sense. A teleological explanation of a state of affairs will refer to some being that aims at this state of affairs and acts in such a way as to bring it about. But a world without God does not aim at states of affairs or anything else. How, then, can we think of this alleged natural teleology?

When it comes to accommodating life and mind, theism seems to do better. According to theism, mind is fundamental in the universe: God himself is the premier person and the premier mind; and he has always existed, and indeed exists necessarily. God could have desired that there be creatures with whom he could be in fellowship. Hence he could have created finite persons in his own image: creatures capable of love, of knowing something about themselves and their world, of science, literature, poetry, music, art, and all the rest. Given theism, this makes eminently good sense. As Nagel points out, the same cannot be said about materialist naturalism. But do panpsychism and natural teleology do much better?

Nagel's rejection of theism does not seem to be fundamentally philosophical. My guess is this antipathy to theism is rather widely shared. Theism severely limits human autonomy. According to theism, we human beings are also at best very junior partners in the world of mind. We are not autonomous, not a law unto ourselves; we are completely dependent upon God for our being and even for our next breath. Still further, some will find in theism a sort of intolerable invasion of privacy: God knows my every thought, and indeed knows what I will think before I think it. Perhaps hints of this discomfort may be found even in the Bible itself:

Before a word is on my tongue, you know it completely, oh Lord....
Where can I go from your Spirit?
Where can I flee from your presence?
If I go up to the heavens, you are there;
If I make my bed in Sheol, you are there.

This discomfort with theism is to some extent understandable, even to a theist. Still, if Nagel followed his own methodological prescriptions and requirements for sound philosophy, if he followed his own arguments wherever they lead, if he ignored his emotional antipathy to belief in God, then (or so I think) he would wind up a theist. But wherever he winds up, he has already performed an important service with his withering critical examination of some of the most common and oppressive dogmas of our age.

Islam’s Rise and the West’s DenialIslam’s Rise and the West’s Denial - William Kilpatrick

In CWR

William Kilpatrick is an author and lecturer who taught for many years at Boston College and whose articles on Islam have appeared in numerous publications, including Investor's Business Daily, FrontPage Magazine, the National Catholic Register, and World magazine. He has written several books, including Psychological Seduction and Why Johnny Can't Tell Right from Wrong, and his most recent book, Christianity, Islam and Atheism: The Struggle for the Soul of the West, will be released next week from Ignatius Press. Kilpatrick recently spoke with Catholic World Report about Islam and its growing significance for the West.

CWR: You begin by noting that, yes, there is some common ground between Christianity and Islam, but the differences are far more important. What are the most important differences between the two religions? 

William Kilpatrick: Beneath the surface similarities lie important and largely irreconcilable differences. Islam rejects the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection. In fact, associating partners with Allah—as Christians do—is considered the very worst sin. Chapter nine, verse 30 of the Koran says, “the Christians call Christ the son of Allah…Allah’s curse be on them: how they are deluded away from the truth.” Moreover, the God of the Koran bears little resemblance to the God worshipped by Christians and Jews. Although he occasionally expresses solicitude for Muslim widows and orphans, he shows little in the way of mercy, compassion, or justice, and he appears to hate non-Muslims with a vengeance. The Koran is full of lurid descriptions of the fate that awaits unbelievers in hell. 

The two faiths also differ sharply in their vision of paradise. Heaven for Christians means union with God and the fellowship of the saints. For Muslims heaven means union with 72 “high-bosomed” and eternally youthful virgins. That’s for males, of course; the Koran is unclear about what sort of heaven women will enjoy. These differing views of paradise have very serious practical implications in the here and now. The Islamic version of paradise creates quite an incentive for young men to try to get there as quickly as possible. And, according to Islamic tradition, the only sure route is by “killing and being killed in the cause of Allah.” Take Mohamed Atta. Due to an airline mistake his luggage was left behind in Boston on the day of the 9/11 flight. When authorities later opened it they found a wedding suit, a bottle of cologne, and a letter expressing his anticipation of marriage to his 72 heavenly wives. As Richard Weaver wrote, “ideas have consequences.” 

CWR: The Second Vatican Council and the Catechism of the Catholic Church mention Islam briefly and rather positively. Otherwise, there isn’t much in the way of official Church statements on Islam. Why is that? Is there a need for such?

 

Kilpatrick: Nostra Aetate, the Second Vatican Council’s declaration on the relation of the Church to non-Christian religions, includes two short paragraphs sketching out several commonalities between Christians and Muslims. It must be remembered, however, that finding commonalities was precisely the task set forth in the initial paragraph of the declaration: “She considers above all in this declaration what men have in common….” In light of this and in view of its brevity, Nostra Aetate can hardly be considered to be the Church’s final word on Islam—although some Catholics have taken it to be just that. The statement about Muslims in the Catechism is even shorter—only 44 words—and merely echoes Nostra Aetate’s observation that both Christians and Muslims worship the One God. 

How do you account for this minimalist treatment? The probable answer is that at the time of the Vatican Council, militant Islam was fairly quiescent, and the Church fathers were far more concerned with the threat from atheistic communism. Now that Islam is once again set on subjugating the rest of the world, Catholics need to be given a fuller picture of Islam, if for no other reason than that their survival may depend on it. Catholics and other Christians have been lulled into complacency by the simplistic notion that Christians and Muslims share much in common. For example, when a Catholic reads that Muslims worship the same God and revere the same Jesus he does, he might easily jump to the conclusion that Islam is really a religion of peace and that terrorists are “misunderstanders” of their Islamic faith. That is a very naïve view to hold in these very dangerous times. 

CWR: “This book,” you write in the introduction, “is intended, in part, as a wake-up call.” What is the Western world missing? And, more specifically, what are Catholics missing when it comes to rightly gauging and studying Islam today?

 

Kilpatrick: One thing that the West doesn’t grasp is that Islam is a political religion with political ambitions. Omar Ahmad, the co-founder of the Council on American Islamic Relations, has said that “Islam isn’t in America to be equal to any other faith but to be dominant. The Koran should be the highest authority in America, and Islam the only accepted religion on earth.” Numerous Islamic authorities have expressed similar sentiments. The supposedly moderate Imam Feisal Rauf, the initiator of the Ground Zero mosque project, wrote an article for the Huffington Post containing the observation, “What Muslims want is a judiciary (in the US) that ensures that the laws are not in conflict with the Qur`an and the Hadith.” What he means is that US law must be brought in line with Islamic sharia law. Since very many provisions of sharia law are considered criminal under US law, that would mean the overthrow of much of our legal code. 

Many Catholics also fail to realize the political nature of Islam and imagine that a mosque, like a church, is simply a place of worship. But a mosque is more than that. Political and community issues are dealt with in a mosque, and calls to jihad are frequently issued in mosques. For example, many of the “Arab Spring” demonstrations were set in motion from mosques following the Friday sermons. Moreover, there are many instances of mosques being used for mentoring terrorists or for storing arms and explosives. According to a popular Muslim poem: 

The mosques are our barracks,

the domes our helmets

the minarets our bayonets

And the faithful our soldiers 

Many Muslims think of Islam not only as a religion but also as an army—an army with a mission of subjugation. That’s why the penalty for apostasy is death. Just as a deserter from an army in time of war may be punished with the death penalty, so also a deserter from the army of Islam. 

The political nature of Islam ought to give pause to Catholics who think they can dialogue with Muslims in the same way they dialogue with Baptists or Jews. A recently concluded series of Catholic-Muslim dialogues sponsored by the USCCB highlights the problem. It turns out that the bishops’ dialogue partners are all members of Muslim activist groups with links to the Muslim Brotherhood. One of the counterparts, Sayyid Syeed, is a prominent figure in the Islamic Society of North America—a group that was designated as an unindicted co-conspirator in a massive terrorist funding scheme. One wonders if the bishops fully understand who they are dealing with. 

CWR: How has Islam, worldwide, changed since the mid-20th century? 

Kilpatrick: It’s changed for the worse. The Muslim world was far more moderate in the mid-20th century than it is now. That’s in large part because secular strongmen in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and elsewhere acted as a restraining force on the more extreme manifestations of Islam. But as these rulers were swept aside, often with the help of the West, traditional Islam was able to assert itself, and traditional Islam is, in many senses, more oppressive and dictatorial than the dictators it replaced. Egypt, Iraq, and Iran, for example, were far more Westernized and secularized than they are now. Young women didn’t wear hijabs or ankle-length chadors, and as Ali Allawi—a former Iraqi cabinet minister—writes, “Muslims were more likely to identify themselves by their national, ethnic, or ideological affinities than by their religion.” Allawi observes of Iraq in the 1950s: “It appeared to be only a matter of time before Islam would lose whatever hold it still had on the Muslim world.” The recent revival of traditional, militant Islam is, in many respects, a reaction to that loss of faith. The new breed of Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood preachers are intent on recalling Muslims to the full practice of their faith—including the “forgotten obligation” of jihad. 

CWR: Why is it that so many secularists attack and mock Christianity but treat Islam with a strangely milquetoast sort of respect? How much of this is rooted in a flawed multiculturalism?

 

Kilpatrick: The attacks on Christianity are not rooted in a flaw in multiculturalism, but rather in the nature of multiculturalism. The multicultural creed is based on the fiction that all cultures, religions, and traditions are roughly equal. But there is no equivalence between the achievements of Western Christian civilization and Islamic civilization. In order to equalize them it’s necessary to pull down Christianity and the West while applying affirmative action whitewash to Islam. This, of course, leads to any number of bizarre double standards. For example, Mayor Tom Menino of Boston stated that the Chick-fil-A restaurant chain was not welcome in Boston because its president does not approve of gay marriage, while the same Mayor Menino has been very welcoming to Islamic groups that, in addition to wanting to abolish gay marriage, also want to abolish gays. Mayor Menino gave a speech at the ribbon-cutting ceremony of a very large mosque built by the Islamic Society of Boston. Not only that, he donated a $1.8 million parcel of municipal land to the project. One of the seven trustees of the Islamic Society of Boston is the world-renowned Imam Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who believes that gays should either be burned to death or thrown from a high place. So, in Boston, what’s sauce for the goose is not necessarily sauce for the chicken fillet. 

A more ominous development is that there now exists a tacit alliance between radical secularists and radical Islam. The most obvious example of this is the alliance between Islamic Iran and leftist Venezuela, but there are many other examples. Leftist professors regularly work with members of the Muslim Student Association (a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot) toward furthering Islamic goals. The campaign against the supposed hate crime of Islamophobia has been largely engineered by the left. And the leftist Justice Department has done its best to undercut the ability of law enforcement to investigate terrorist activities. Muslims, for their part, quickly learned to employ the methods pioneered by secular militants. Muslim activists groups portrayed themselves as civil rights groups and labeled any resistance to their agenda as hateful, bigoted, racist, and Islamophobic. At the same time, these Muslim groups can rely on the secular media to portray them in the best possible light. 

CWR: Many parts of Europe appear to be succumbing, in one way or another, to Islamization. What about the United States?

 

Kilpatrick: The US is on the same river as Europe, but not as close to the falls. It appears, however, that it’s trying hard to catch up. During the last three administrations, Muslim activists have worked hard to gain positions of influence in the government, and with great success. Muslim activist groups convinced the Department of Homeland Security to delete words like “jihad,” “Islamist,” and “terrorist” from their lexicon. In compliance with Muslim demands the Justice Department ordered the military to delete from its training manuals any suggestion that there is a connection between Islam and violence. And the State Department played a major role in enabling the Muslim Brotherhood to come to power in North Africa. Moreover, the State Department has been working with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation for more than a year toward the goal of establishing anti-blasphemy laws or something akin to them. If the effort succeeds, criticism of Islam will then be a crime—as it already in many European countries. Meanwhile, a steady flow of Saudi money helps to ensure that college students learn only an Islam-friendly version of history and current events. 

At first glance it would appear that Islamization is unlikely here because the Muslim population is small and, unlike Europe, America is a churchgoing nation with a healthy birthrate. But there is still reason for alarm. Although Christianity is in much better shape in America than in Europe, there has been a significant decline in the number of those who self-identify as Christians and a significant increase in the number of atheists, agnostics, and those who identify with no religion. Moreover, if American Christians haven’t been able to resist the growth of anti-religious secularism, how likely is it that they will be able to resist the efforts of dedicated and well-funded cultural jihadists? 

In addition, America’s healthy birthrate is not as healthy as it first appears, because 41 percent of those births now occur out of wedlock. Fifty-five percent of Hispanic children are born out of wedlock, as are 72 percent of black children. As they grow older, children born into unstable families are more likely to see the structured life of Islam as a solution rather than as a problem. 

Islamization is not simply a numbers game. For an analogy, consider that homosexuals make up only 2 to 3 percent of the population, but have nevertheless exerted an outsize influence on public policy and school curriculums. Of course, they have been able to do this with the help of liberal elites in media, academia, the courts, and the entertainment industry. But remember that Islamic activists have the backing of the very same people. 

Islamization won’t happen tomorrow in America, but there is a distinct possibility that our children will grow up in an America dominated by Islam. It’s not necessary to be a majority or anywhere near a majority in order to dominate. Throughout history Islamic warriors have managed to subdue populations much larger than their own. If America is eventually subjugated, however, it won’t be the result of armed jihad, but of cultural jihad—the steady incremental advance of sharia law through agitation, propaganda, lawfare, political activism, and infiltration of key governmental and educational institutions. Many Muslim leaders have made it plain that they plan to subjugate America under Islam. We should take them seriously. 

CWR: What do you think of the current approach taken by our government toward Islam in the Middle East?

 

Kilpatrick: Our policies have enabled the creation of a Middle East that is far more radical than it once was. The media likes to refer to terrorists as “misunderstanders” of Islam, but it is our government that misunderstands Islam. In failing to understand Islam we have cooperated in the ascendancy of the most extreme types of Islamists. As a result, much of the Muslim Middle East is falling into the hands of our enemies. One of the immediate results has been intensified persecution of Christians. As bad as they were, the previous secular rulers at least provided some protection to Christians. Now, Christians are increasingly subject to intimidation, confiscation of property, forced conversions, rape, mob attacks, and murder. 

Another result of our misguided policies is that Israel is now surrounded by people who seek its annihilation. Hatred of Jews is deeply rooted in the Koran and in Islamic tradition. In helping to bring to power those Muslims who adhere most closely to the Koran, we have put Israel in a precarious position. The new, Muslim Brotherhood-led government of Egypt has already signaled its intention to break its peace treaty with Israel. All of this was entirely predictable for anyone with a basic knowledge of the Muslim Brotherhood. 

CWR: What must Christians do to address and cope with the problems presented by the spread of Islam?

The first thing Christians need to do is inform themselves about Islam. Christians, like secularists, tend to view Islam through a multicultural lens and assume that Islam is like other religions. But it is not. Islam is not a religion of peace, but a religion of conquest that aims to subjugate non-Muslims. This isn’t just a theory. Look at every nation where Muslims rule and you will find that non-Muslims are assigned an inferior status. In studying Islam, Christians will also find that the Jesus of the Koran is nothing at all like the Jesus of the Gospels. In fact, he seems to have been introduced into the Koran for the sole purpose of contradicting the Christian belief in Jesus as the son of God. The Church also has an obligation to more fully inform Catholics about Islam. The treatment of the subject in Nostra Aetate and the Catechism of the Catholic Church are brief and inadequate. Catholics need to know a great deal more about Islam and have to move beyond the simplistic assumption that because God and Jesus and Mary are in the Koran, everything must be okay. 

As I said earlier, Christians must realize that Islam is a political religion, and they need to be aware that religious overtures on the part of Muslims are often nothing other than political maneuvering. For example, Christians should avoid being pulled into Islam’s anti-blasphemy/anti-defamation campaign, because the ultimate goal of this campaign is to criminalize criticism of Islam. And, by the way, simply to assert the divinity of Christ is a blasphemy of the highest order according to the Koran. 

Likewise, Christians should be careful about aligning themselves with Islamic activist groups on religious freedom issues. When Muslim leaders talk about freedom of religion, they mean freedom to practice sharia—a legal, social, political, and theological system that is inimical both to Christianity and the First Amendment. Muslim spokesmen are quite willing to affirm their belief in religious freedom because according to Islamic tradition there is only one religion—Islam. Under Islamic law, all other religions are considered abrogated. In Muslim countries, religious freedom for non-Muslims is either non-existent or greatly restricted. Christians who are tempted to partner with Muslims in the cause of religious freedom need to recall Christ’s words about “sheep in the midst of wolves.”

As Irmãzinhas Ateias da Caridade - P. Gonçalo Portocarrero de Almada

Por que razão a Igreja tem o monopólio da caridade? 

Consta que um zeloso pároco afixou esta convocatória para uma quermesse paroquial: «Estimadas senhoras: vamos ter em breve a nossa habitual venda de caridade, para a qual esperamos que contribuam com aquelas coisas que têm lá em casa e que não servem para nada. Tragam os vossos maridos!». 

A referência aos esposos não foi, de facto, feliz. Mas a verdade é que a Igreja, com ou sem maridos, realiza obras de caridade desde o início: um dos seus primeiros problemas foi, precisamente, o excesso de empenho com que os apóstolos se dedicaram a esta pastoral, com prejuízo da oração e do ministério da palavra. Depois floresceram, ao longo dos séculos, múltiplas instituições religiosas vocacionadas para o serviço dos mais carentes. 

Mesmo aqueles que não prezam a presença e a acção da Igreja, tendem a elogiar a sua generosa dedicação aos órfãos, aos doentes, aos prisioneiros, aos imigrantes, aos moribundos e, em geral, aos mais necessitados. Um escritor actual, premiado com o Nobel, chegou mesmo a dizer que não subscrevia a fé da Beata Teresa de Calcutá, mas que não podia deixar de louvar a ajuda que a sua benemérita ordem religiosa presta aos mais pobres dos pobres. E é de crer que esta genuína e sincera admiração seja um sentimento comum a muitas outras pessoas, não obstante as suas reservas em relação ao dogma cristão e à moral católica.

Assim sendo, porque não congregar todas essas boas vontades, avessas à fé e à moral cristãs, numa ordem das irmãzinhas ateias da caridade?! 

Com efeito, se tantas pessoas boas, embora não crentes, manifestam o seu entusiasmo pela dedicação aos mais necessitados, por que não institucionalizar esses sentimentos altruístas numa ordem arreligiosa, que se dedique a praticar o bem que tão entusiasticamente louvam?! Se, de facto, muitos ateus e agnósticos têm tanto apreço pelo trabalho humanitário das instituições católicas de caridade, porque não possibilitar que façam o mesmo pelo próximo, mas sem necessidade de se inscreverem numa religião em que não crêem, nem de professarem uma fé que não têm? Se é genuína a sua preocupação social, como autêntico o seu empenho em servir os mais indigentes, porque não fazem o que fazem tantas e tantos religiosas e religiosos de tantas congregações católicas, mas numa ordem ateia ou agnóstica?!

Em teoria, são viáveis instituições humanitárias laicas, mas dois mil anos de história ensinam que foi, sobretudo por virtude da fé cristã, que tantos e tantas entregaram a sua própria vida ao serviço dos outros. O facto, empiricamente demonstrável, de que essa abnegada e tantas vezes heróica prestação social ocorre, por regra, como consequência de uma prévia experiência de amor pessoal a Jesus Cristo, na sua Igreja, prova que é essa fé e a correspondente moral que fazem possível uma tal caridade. 

Os homens, como as árvores, conhecem-se pelos seus frutos e não pelas suas palavras, ou pelos seus bons sentimentos, de que se diz estar o inferno cheio. Todos podem enaltecer a caridade, ou compadecer-se com os que sofrem, mas é Cristo que faz possível o amor maior, ou seja, dar a vida pelos outros. Elogiar a caridade cristã, menosprezando a correspondente fé, é tão absurdo como louvar as rodas de um carro, subestimando o seu motor; ou apreciar uma flor, mas esquecendo a sua raiz. 

Bento XVI recordou, na sua primeira encíclica, o caso de Juliano, cognominado o apóstata, por ter abandonado a religião cristã. Este imperador pretendeu restaurar o paganismo, mas enriquecido com uma prática social análoga à actividade caritativa da Igreja. Também agora, não poucos países laicos, se não mesmo apóstatas, renunciam à fé, mas pretendem dar continuidade às obras da caridade cristã. Mas se a fé, sem caridade, está morta, a caridade, sem fé, não existe.