Contraception and Public Policy - by Rob Agnelli

In H&PR

One can readily see why there is an insistence against “artificial” methods of birth control, while something like Natural Family Planning is in accord with the natural law.  It is not because they are artificial, per se, but because they are unnatural.  In other words, they violate human nature.

In what many regard as the most prophetic work of the 20^th Century, Brave New World, Aldous Huxley presents a culture in which fertility is seen as a nuisance, with women carry contraceptives with them everywhere they go on their “Maltusian Belts.”  Perhaps, the last major obstacle to making this prediction a reality is the Catholic Church.  That is why the recent HHS mandate that requires religious institutions to subsidize free contraceptives for their employees is seen by many as a shot over the bow of the Bark of Peter in the United States.  Not surprisingly, one Catholic GOP candidate for President was peppered with questions related to the mandate, and birth control in general.  He attempted to address the immorality as well as the societal consequences, but his support of public policy was inconsistent with his personal views.  This is especially true with his support of the Title X program that provides access to contraceptive services, supplies and information.  Clearly, he felt the pressure of speaking to a society that has become dependent upon the widespread availability of contraception.  It seems that the only recourse is to fall back on the safety net of:  “I am personally opposed, but I can’t impose my beliefs on others.”  But given our contraceptive culture, is there a realistic public policy that respects both the common good and the natural law?

To begin, one might simply say that the government ought to give the people what they want.  This is a foundational principle of a government “of the people, by the people, for the people.”  Those that do not want to use contraception have a right not to make use of the service, but that should not take away the rights of those who do.  Although this is the prevailing mentality, it rests upon two erroneous assumptions.

Running from the Natural Law?

The first is a misunderstanding of self-government.  This does not mean majority rules, and whatever a majority wants, they should get.  This eventually leads to the type of soft-despotism that Tocqueville thought a very real possibility in the democracy of the United States.  Instead, because the right to self-government proceeds from the natural law, the exercise of that right must be in accord with natural law.  If natural law is sufficiently valid to give this basic right to the people, then it must be valid to impose its precepts on this same right. 1  Whatever rights the people want to exercise must be in accord with natural law.  You cannot run away from this law, as any honest moral relativist quickly finds out.  To the matter at hand, the immorality of artificial contraception is not simply a religious or personal belief, but something that can be arrived at through the application of natural law.

Despite the fact that the founding fathers framed this country on a Judeo-Christian understanding of natural law, very few Americans today actually know what it is, and how to apply it.  Most assume it has something to do with what naturally occurs rather than something that is linked to man’s nature or essence.  Therefore, it is instructive to discuss precisely why contraception violates the natural law, if for no other reason than to put away the myth that it is merely a regurgitation of outdated religious dogma.

In examining human nature, one finds that man has a natural inclination to the good.  In particular, there are four intrinsic goods in which man is naturally inclined.  First, all men have an inclination to conserve their being.  From this inclination every man naturally does those things which preserve and enhance his life, avoiding those things which would be harmful to it.  Second, man possesses the natural inclination to marriage and procreation (including the raising and education of children).  Third, because man is a rational creature, he has a natural inclination to know the truth, especially about God, and how to live in society.  Whatever pertains to each of these inclinations belongs to the natural law. 2  In other words, whatever leads to true human thriving, ought to be promoted; whatever is contrary to one of these goods, is wrong and ought to be avoided.  It is also important to note that something is wrong, not simply because God said so, but because, ultimately, it is harmful to us.  That is why Aquinas insisted that we offend God only by acting contrary to our own good. 3

Notice also that in the list of intrinsic goods, marriage and procreation appear as a single good.  That is because they are intrinsically linked, so that anything that harms either of the two aspects, harms both.  Therefore, contraception is intrinsically wrong because it harms the good of marriage and procreation.

Many question how these two aspects constitute a single, inseparable good.  If we understand marriage in the traditional sense to mean the “one-flesh communion of persons in which the spouses unite on all levels of their personhood (body and soul)” and we examine the conjugal act on a biological level, we can illuminate the inseparability principle.  Professor Germain Grisez articulates this well when he carefully explains this based on the following principle:

Though a male and female are complete individuals with respect to other functions—for example, nutrition, sensation, and locomotion—with respect to reproduction, they are only potential parts of a mated pair, which is the complete organism capable of reproducing sexually. Even if the mated pair is sterile, intercourse, provided it is the reproductive behavior characteristic of the species, makes the copulating male and female one organism. 4

While it was claimed above that the laws of nature are not the same as the natural law, these laws can serve as a reliable guide in discovering the good.  Because nature is intelligible, to act in accord with nature is to act in accord with reason and, therefore, to act morally.   Conversely, we can say that which is not natural is not in accord with reason and, therefore, is immoral.  One can readily see, based on this principle, why there is an insistence against “artificial” methods of birth control, while something like Natural Family Planning is in accord with the natural law.  It is not because they are artificial, per se, but because they are unnatural.  In other words, they violate human nature.

“I Want My Rights”

A second confusion arises with respect to whether there is truly a “right” to contraception.  There is a necessary distinction to be made between what are commonly referred to as “strong” and “weak” rights.  A “strong” right is always connected to a true perfective good, which cannot be derived from a broader right.   On the other hand, “weak” rights flow from others’ duty of non-interference.  This distinction is important because many people confuse the fact that if there is a right of noninterference, then this gives them a right to a particular activity.  True rights never proceed from another’s duty not to interfere.  This, unfortunately, is a source of confusion even in our current judicial climate, especially in the relationship between Roe vs. Wade’s “right to privacy,” and Casey vs. Planned Parenthood’s declaration that a woman has a “right to abortion.”  In applying this to the question of artificial contraception, one can say that, although there may be a right to non-interference because artificial contraception violates the natural law, there is no right to it.

The Policy

 
Based upon this foundation, one might conclude that artificial contraception should be outlawed immediately.  One can hardly begin to imagine the political upheaval if such a policy was put in-place.  That is why St. Thomas Aquinas thought that not all vice ought to be outlawed.  Instead, he thought only “the more grievous vices from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others…” 5 should be outlawed.  In essence, the Angelic Doctor is saying that when a law prescribes acts that are far beyond the virtue of the average person in society, then there ought to be no laws against it.  One of the reasons for this is that the law may become a pathway to further vice.  For example, suppose you outlaw contraception but not everyone has the level of virtue to follow the law.  Now, you can create a situation where a black market arises, causing  more serious crime to occur.

This does not mean that contraception is a necessary evil, and that nothing can be done.  Classically understood, a good government is one that helps make the people morally good.  This is especially true of a democracy which depends on a “moral and religious people” to survive, as John Adams said.  While laws may not seek to outlaw all vices, they certainly should not promote them.  Therefore, governmental policies, such as Title X, that actually supply and pay for contraception, should not be in-place.  A policy such as this would also respect the fact that most people view contraception as “a private matter,” although they may not be happy once they got their wish. This step in the process may not be a hard sell, but there would be an aspect of the policy that would literally be a very difficult “pill” for many to swallow.

The Bitter Pill

 
Unfortunately, one of the best kept secrets with respect to most chemical contraceptives is that they act as abortifacients.  These would have to be made illegal immediately.  The killing of an innocent child in the womb involves the type of “grievous vice” that St. Thomas said must always be outlawed.  In fact, one could argue (although it might be difficult to prove) that more abortions occur through the use of these “medicines” and devices than the 1.2 million that are performed directly in the US each year.

Justice Harry Blackmum, in the Roe vs. Wade decision, said: “we need not resolve the difficult question as to when life begins.”  But, this is precisely the question that needs to be answered, as shown by the rather schizophrenic manner in which he later says: “(If the) suggestion of personhood {of the preborn} is established, the {abortion rights} case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life is then guaranteed specifically by the {14^th} Amendment.”  A policy such as this would force an answer to this “difficult question” because of the prevalence of chemical contraceptives.

Furthermore, this would force out into the open the myth of government neutrality.  Even though one may say that the question of personhood is “above my pay grade,” and attempt to appear neutral, this so-called neutral position makes a claim that personhood begins at birth (as distinct from “partial-birth”).

This is one of those rare cases in our society in which we drown out the voice of science.  When Congress attempted to answer the question in 1981, they found that “physicians, biologists, and other scientists agree that conception marks the beginning of the life of a human being—a being that is alive, and is a member of the human species. There is overwhelming agreement on this point in countless medical, biological, and scientific writings.” 6  Unfortunately, that initiative failed 30 years ago.  It is time it be reopened in order to provide a definitive answer.

Effect on the Common Good

 
In Huxley’s book, “Brave New World,” the disillusioned Bernard is banned to the Falkland Islands.  While a candidate that ran on a platform that proposed removing the government from the business of providing contraception might get elected, I fear a similar fate to Bernard’s would await any candidate that proposed outlawing all chemical contraception with abortifacient properties.  Nevertheless, the morally responsible policy would be one similar to what has already been proposed.  Still, one aspect that should be examined is the harm that readily available contraception does to the common good, especially to women.

Contraception is often presented as an important issue related to “women’s health.”  But as economist, Timothy Reichert, 7 has shown, contraception is anything but a social good for women.  It shifts wealth and power away from women by creating a “prisoner’s dilemma” game, where each woman is induced to make decisions that make her, and other women, worse off in the long run. 8

One of the social consequences of a contraceptive culture is that, what was once a single mating market—men and women paired in marriage—has now become two markets.  There is the classic “marriage market,” that represents the market for marital relationships, and a “sex market,” which represents a market for sexual relationships.  Because of ready access to contraception, both men and women frequent the “sex market” earlier in life, and then inhabit the “marriage market” later in life.  With supposedly more reliable contraception, assurance is provided that participation in the sex market will not result in pregnancy.  This separation into markets is not necessarily adverse to either sex, assuming that the amount of sex being had is the same.  It only becomes adverse to one of the sexes when there are imbalances in the “price” that is paid.  The price the women pay is much higher than the men.

The two markets are not equally populated by men and women.  At a certain age, because of their biological clocks, most women will inhabit the marriage market rather than the sex market.  Men do not enter the marriage market at the same time, or even at the same rate.  The imbalance comes in that, in the sex market, women have more bargaining power than men, since they are the scarce commodity, and can command higher “prices.” The picture is flipped over when women make the switch to the marriage market, in that there is a relative scarcity of marriageable men. Over time, however, women cut deals and settle for less of a man.  Thus, men take more and more of the “gains from trade” that marriage creates, and women take fewer and fewer.

Contraception, then, ultimately leads to divorce for two reasons.  The first reason is because of the lower relative bargaining power that women wield relative to men, as more women will simply strike bad deals.  The second reason is that it creates a demand for divorce, even before marriage occurs.  Women now need a pre-marriage exit strategy, in case things turn out badly.  They do this primarily by going into the labor market at the price of developing stronger familial relationships.

You might say that professional development is worth the price of stronger familial relationships for women, because the women are more personally satisfied.  However, this ignores the fact that about half the children who are placed in daycares are girls and, therefore, future women.

Obviously, contraception also increases the incidence of infidelity.  It opens up more opportunities for infidelity to married men than it does married women.  It is easier for an older man to enter the “sex market” than an older woman.  It also increases a demand for abortion in that women rationally plan their human capital investments around childbearing in the later phases of their lives.

Conclusion

 
As economists and social scientists know, it is nearly impossible to break out of a prisoner’s dilemma unless there are changes in laws and social mores. Thus, even from a common good standpoint, it is necessary that the access to contraception be limited greatly.  This begins, first of all, by removing the government as a provider of contraceptives.  Catholics also have a key role to play, in not only continuing to preach the message of just how harmful contraception is to women and society as a whole, but also to preach the “new feminism” proposed by Blessed John Paul II in his “Letter to Women.”

Works Cited

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles. n.d.
Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas. 1920.

Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence Katz. “The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions.” Journal of Political Economy, 2000: 730-768.
Grisez, Germain. “The Christian Family as Fulfilment of Sacramental Marriage.” Studies in Christian Ethics, 1996: 23-33.

Maritain, Jacques. Man and the State. Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 1989.

Reichert, Timothy. “Bitter Pill.” First Things, May 2010: http://www.firstthings.com/article/2010/04/bitter-pill

1. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 1989), 135. ↩
2. Summa Theologia (ST), I-II, q.94, a.2 ↩
3. Summa contra Gentiles, 3.122  ↩
4. Germain Grisez. “The Christian Family as Fulfillment of Sacramental Marriage.” Studies in Christian Ethics, 1996: 27. ↩
5. ST, I-II, q.96, a.2 ↩
6. Subcommittee on Separation of Powers to Senate Judiciary Committee S-158, Report, 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981. ↩
7. Timothy Reichert, “Bitter Pill.” First Things, May 2010. ↩
8. Goldin and Katz, “The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions.”  http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~jkennan/teaching/pillpaper2.pdf ↩

O Crime dos Partidos Descarados

“A justa ordem da sociedade e do Estado é dever central da política. Um Estado, que não se regesse segundo a justiça, reduzir-se-ia a um grande bando de ladrões, como disse (Santo) Agostinho … A justiça é o objectivo e, consequentemente, também a medida intrínseca de toda a política. A política é mais do que uma simples técnica para a definição dos ordenamentos públicos: a sua origem e o seu objectivo estão precisamente na justiça, e esta é de natureza ética.” (Bento XVI, Deus Caritas est, nº 28 a).

Impressiona a glacial desvergonha desaforada do psd e do cds com que publicitam, como se fora algo extraordinariamente audacioso e benigno, uma futura apresentação de propostas para cobrar “taxas moderadoras” para as mães grávidas, no caso do psd, que repitam o abortamento de um filho ou, no caso do cds, para toda e qualquer mãe grávida que queira abortar seus filhos, mesmo que se trate da primeira vez. Esta crueza da “maioria absoluta” que parece assim pretender ocultar a sua perversa identidade sinistra revela pelo contrário um maquiavelismo sádico.

De facto, estas organizações partidárias que agora exercem o poder têm o dever estrito de garantir a justiça reconhecendo e tutelando a igual dignidade de todo o ser humano em todas as fases da sua existência, desde a sua concepção, ou estado unicelular, até à morte natural. Sem este fundamento, isto é, o respeito do direito à vida, não existe nem estado de direito nem democracia nem bem comum. De modo que os políticos que detêm os poderes executivo e legislativo ao cumpliciarem-se com uma lei profundamente e gravissimamente injusta, tendo eles a obrigação e a possibilidade de a eliminar, tornam-se, lamento dizê-lo mas é a verdade dos factos, criminosos cuja ferocidade faz empalidecer e praticamente desaparecer a das organizações mafiosas - basta lembrar não só a quantidade de vítimas mas também a qualificação eminentemente tenebrosa, atroz e desalmada dos assassínios perpetrados: “Dentre todos os crimes que o homem pode realizar contra a vida, o aborto provocado apresenta características que o tornam particularmente perverso e abominável … A gravidade moral (= a injustiça) do aborto provocado aparece em toda a sua verdade, quando se reconhece que se trata de um homicídio e, particularmente, quando se consideram as circunstâncias específicas que o qualificam. A pessoa eliminada é um ser humano que começa a desabrochar para a vida, isto é, o que de mais inocente, em absoluto, se possa imaginar: nunca poderia ser considerado um agressor, menos ainda um injusto agressor! É frágil, inerme (indefeso, desarmado), e numa medida tal que o deixa privado inclusive daquela forma mínima de defesa constituída pela força suplicante dos gemidos e do choro do recém-nascido.” (João Paulo II, Evangelium vitae, 58).

Tudo isto que fica escrito, juntamente com todas as outras coisas que não me tenho cansado de redigir e de citar (por exemplo: O Triunfo da Vida e Ao Gólgota), mostra à saciedade, que não é devido nenhum respeito a qualquer referendo ou “lei” ou promulgação emanadas de qualquer órgão político que admita a ignóbil matança de inocentes. E muito menos que os execute através dos serviços de saúde (!) do estado ou dos que com ele estão concubinados. 

No entanto, mesmo para aqueles que absurda e erroneamente consideram que o referendo apesar de não ter sido juridicamente válido o tenha sido politicamente (Cf. A posição anfigúrica, à revelia da doutrina da Igreja, de D. José Policarpo), como o demonstra argutamente a Dra. Isilda Pegado, presidente da Federação Portuguesa pela Vida (cf Público, 07 de Junho de 2012, pág 47), a pseudolegislação actual produzida pela anterior maioria não encontra nele suporte, constituindo mais um abuso infame de poder ao financiar e subsidiar universalmente o abortamento.

O problema do desemprego é seguramente muitíssimo grave mas o principal problema social do país é o abortamento de tantas crianças e se há razão para sair à rua esta é a primeira de entre todas.

Nuno Serras Pereira

10. 06. 2012

Sexual Revolution: Defend It, If You Can

by Anthony Esolen

In Public Discourse - April 18, 2011

Let the sexual revolution be justified on the grounds of the common good.

Why should two men who are sexually attracted to one another not be allowed to pretend that they are married? That we are even asking such a question is the result of our having accepted the premise of the sexual revolution, which is, essentially, that what people do with their bodies is their own business, so long as no one is harmed. By “no one” we mean the people involved in the sexual act, and sometimes, though much less reliably and without a great deal of concern, an unwitting spouse who happens, at the moment, not to be in the bed but, perhaps, shopping for dinner, or laying pipes at a construction site. By “harm” we mean obvious physical or psychological violence. So we frown upon rape and, after two generations of knowing smiles and winks, pedophilia. Everything else goes.

Now the odd thing about this premise is that, despite its being so widely taken for granted, it is astonishingly weak. The person who proclaims it severs himself, in effect, from all considerations of the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. For he says, “With regard to sexual behavior, so long as no one is being coerced into the act, and, perhaps, so long as no spouse is being betrayed, the claims of virtue do not apply.” The justification of the sexual act is located in the desire itself, and the desire is taken as a brute fact, a given. But this is a premise we would reject out of hand in any other sphere of human action. We know, indeed, that the very reason why we inculcate the virtues in ourselves and in our children is so that we will do the right thing despite what we happen to desire, and, more, that we will learn to desire what is right, because it is right, just as we should wish to know the truth because it is true. We would not say, even to a man of independent wealth, “Your desire to spend twelve hours a day playing video games should be respected, because it is your desire.” We would instead say, “You should not be doing that; it is a truncation of your humanity; it is the wrong thing to do, and you should learn to desire something else.” We would not say to a person who spent a thousand dollars a month on shoes, “If this is what you want, I must respect it.” We would instead say, “You are squandering your money, which could be put to far better use. This also is a truncation of your humanity. Of course I know that you want to do this; that’s the very problem. You should learn to want something better.”

Now the playing of pointless games and the buying of rooms full of shoes are trivial matters in comparison with our sexual behavior. About trivialities, the law should have little to say. But our sexual behavior is far from trivial. In fact, the same people who, in one way, claim for it such triviality that it must fall beneath the notice of the law, in another way, exalt it as the lodestone of human life, such that any curtailment of sexual autonomy must strike to the very heart of our beings. We cannot have it both ways at once. Indeed, I can conceive of no other thing more deeply determinative of what a society will be like, or even whether it will be a genuine society at all, than our folkways regarding men and women, their courtship, their marriage, their duties to one another, and their raising of children. Sex—both the distinction between man and woman, and the act that unites man and woman in the embrace that is essentially oriented towards the future—is a foundational consideration for every people. When we ask, “Will a man be allowed to have more than one wife?” or “Will husbands and wives be allowed to divorce at will?” or “Will unmarried people be encouraged to behave as if they were married?”, we are asking, whether we understand it fully or not, “What kind of culture, if any, do we want to share?”

And that sharing of a culture brings me to the crucial point. It is a plain fact that what two people do in a bedroom is not confined to the bedroom. The most obvious evidence for this fact can be seen around us everywhere, walking on two legs. They are the creatures known as children. After a great deal of scientific investigation, conducted by people of unimpeachable honesty, diligence, and intelligence, it can now be declared that sexual intercourse between a healthy man and woman has the natural and predictable consequence, built into the structure of the act itself, of producing children—it is the obvious biological meaning of the act. Perhaps, in less enlightened ages, people believed that it was a prelude to rain or to strife among nations, but now we really do know that when John and Mary get together, Baby is a-waiting to make three.

Now, it is also a plain fact that children deserve to be brought up by both a mother and a father. This ought to be no more controversial than asserting that they deserve to be fed well and dressed warmly and loved. The boy needs a father to teach him to be a man; the girl needs a father to protect her and to affirm her worthiness to be loved by a man; and, as for a child’s need for a mother, it is so obvious that only madmen and modern educators would dare to deny it. If we would deny that children should be brought up in stable families, with mother and father, we need only look to our bursting prisons, and ask how many of the men incarcerated actually grew up in unbroken homes. In other words, when we are talking about sex, we must talk about the common good. How we treat our bodies when they grow ill—that is surely a matter of the common good, the good that is so by virtue of its being shared, enjoyed by all not as individuals alone but also as a people together, a genuine society. We are a fundamentally different people—not as individuals alone but as a people—if we cast our ill to die in the ditches, than if we care for them with the dignity they deserve, not because they may live to profit us or themselves, but merely because they are human and therefore holy. So, too, how we treat our bodily desires—that is also a matter of the common good.

And that is where the revolutionaries fail. They began, in the hoary old days of Herbert Marcuse, by justifying the new “virtues” of freedom of sexual expression, on the grounds that we would be a looser, friendlier, sweeter, less violent, and more beautiful society. Well, that certainly didn’t happen. Aquarius had a cracked pot. Look at Baltimore, look at Detroit, look at the fatherless families, look at the plague of divorce, look at the snarling contempt of one sex for the other, look at the prisons, look at the sewage of mass entertainment, look at the “knowing” and jaded children, look at the venereal diseases, look at the sheer boredom evinced by the women’s magazines boasting the next hottest sex tip or five new and improved ways to get what you want out of your bedmate. The sexual revolutionaries have for too long simply begged the question. They say, “We should be allowed to do this, because every sexual desire short of rape and (sometimes) adultery should be tolerated—no, encouraged, even honored in law.” But that is to justify the sexual revolution by saying that the sexual revolution is justified. Let them do more. Let them argue that the sexual revolution—in its entirety—has conduced to the common good. Let them argue that a society, if it can be called one, wherein a ten-year-old boy knows all about sodomy is a better place than one in which he hasn’t the faintest notion of it, but is too busy collecting baseball cards. Let them argue that a society in which a ten-year-old girl must wait once a month to see her father, if his new bedmate doesn’t get in the way, is a better place than one in which it never occurs to her that her mother and father may ever part company.

In other words, let the sexual revolution be justified on grounds of the common good. I believe it fails that test miserably, with evidence that is weighty, obvious, manifold, logically and anthropologically deducible, and clearly predictable by wisdom both pagan and Christian. Let them make their case, rather than asserting a principle that, in reality, would destroy the very idea of the common good. For if we cannot appeal to the common good in a matter so fundamental, I do not see how we can appeal to it in any other.