segunda-feira, 3 de setembro de 2012
Utopia ou Ousadia? - por Pedro Vaz Patto
sábado, 28 de julho de 2012
Malta’s bishops speak out against IVF
Pastoral Letter – Celebrating Human Life
Cherishing Life
YES to Life
The Church has always taught that authentic service to humanity and the protection and promotion of his dignity cannot be guaranteed unless one abides by the principles of truth about mankind. This is explained very clearly by Pope Benedict XVI in his encyclical Caritas in veritate. In fact, the Church has always taken loving initiatives (Caritas) in favour of mankind in the light of the truth about the human person. Charity and truth go hand in hand; it is truth which ensures authentic charity.
The Church has the right and duty to proclaim its moral judgment upon research and upon technical methods used for human reproduction. By so doing, she is in no way interfering in the scientific field; rather she is fulfilling her mission of bringing to the attention of one and all, the ethical and social responsibilities which arise from any action taken in respect of human beings.
The Truth protects Life
The natural law safeguards life
Solidarity with couples who wish to accept the gift of life
Today, 26th July, 2012 Memorial of St Joachim and St Anne.
+ Paul Cremona O.P.
Archbishop of Malta
+ Mario Grech
Bishop of Gozo
.Click here to view the Pastoral Letter in PDF version.
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[1]In EU countries, the birth rate is 1.59, a litte higher than ten years ago, however in Malta is decreased from 1.77 in 1999 to 1.38 in 2010. See Eurostat,
sexta-feira, 20 de julho de 2012
Argentina: Bendicen cementerio para niños no nacidos
domingo, 5 de fevereiro de 2012
The Importance of Dignity: A Reply to Steven Pinker - by Christopher Kaczor
Steven Pinker, a Harvard psychologist, is well known for his 2008 article in the New Republic titled “The Stupidity of Dignity.” The President’s Council on Bioethics, in its Human Dignity and Bioethics, had underscored the importance of dignity in contemporary ethical discussion, and Pinker wanted to reject it wholesale. Pinker criticizes the use of dignity for a variety of reasons and holds that we should replace “dignity” with “autonomy” in bioethics discussions. His arguments still enjoy great purchase in our intellectual culture today, but they are fallacious and inconsistent in a variety of ways. And it is important for us to see how they fail and to understand why dignity matters.
So, what argument does Pinker give against making use of dignity in discussing issues of bioethics? He writes,
First, dignity is relative. One doesn’t have to be a scientific or moral relativist to notice that ascriptions of dignity vary radically with the time, place, and beholder. In olden days, a glimpse of stocking was looked on as something shocking. We chuckle at the photographs of Victorians in starched collars and wool suits hiking in the woods on a sweltering day, or at the Brahmins and patriarchs of countless societies who consider it beneath their dignity to pick up a dish or play with a child.
Pinker fails to realize that autonomy is also relative. Kant, the originator of the contemporary emphasis on autonomy, considered it always contrary to autonomy, the self-given universal law of practical reason, to commit suicide or to have sexual activity of any kind outside of a marriage between one man and one woman. Contemporary advocates of using autonomy as the basis for ethics reject these positions with scorn. Now autonomy is used to attempt to justify physician-assisted suicide as well as freedom of “sexual expression.” So, if dignity cannot be used in bioethics because it has been understood in various ways over the ages, this standard likewise excludes appealing to autonomy in bioethical disputes.
Second, Pinker notes that dignity is fungible:
The [President’s] Council and [the] Vatican treat dignity as a sacred value, never to be compromised. In fact, every one of us voluntarily and repeatedly relinquishes dignity for other goods in life. Getting out of a small car is undignified. Having sex is undignified. Doffing your belt and spread-eagling to allow a security guard to slide a wand up your crotch is undignified.
But Pinker’s premise also renders autonomy problematic, since autonomy too is fungible. Soldiers give up autonomy when they enlist for military service. Employees give up autonomy when they sign contracts agreeing to perform certain services and refrain from doing other activities that constitute a conflict of interest. Police officers, FBI agents, and politicians relinquish autonomy when they swear to enforce the laws of our nation. Lawyers and psychologists give up autonomy in speech in preserving client or patient confidentiality. Do the actions of these people reveal that autonomy is a trivial value, well worth trading off for money, public order, confidentiality, the good of raising children, or health?
Third, Pinker argues that dignity can be harmful. He writes,
In her comments on the Dignity volume, Jean Bethke Elshtain rhetorically asked, “Has anything good ever come from denying or constricting human dignity?” The answer is an emphatic “yes.” Every sashed and be-medaled despot reviewing his troops from a lofty platform seeks to command respect through ostentatious displays of dignity. Political and religious repressions are often rationalized as a defense of the dignity of a state, leader, or creed: Just think of the Salman Rushdie fatwa, the Danish cartoon riots, or the British schoolteacher in Sudan who faced flogging and a lynch mob because her class named a teddy bear Mohammed. Indeed, totalitarianism is often the imposition of a leader’s conception of dignity on a population, such as the identical uniforms in Maoist China or the burqas of the Taliban.
However, it is even more obvious that autonomy can be harmful. Consider the case of Desmond Hatchett who, before the age of thirty, exercised his sexual autonomy by fathering twenty-one children with eleven different women. Exercising her reproductive autonomy in similarly irresponsible fashion, Nadya Suleman, unemployed and unmarried, used in vitro fertilization to add eight more babies to join her other six young children at home. Drug abusers exercise their autonomy in harming themselves physically and mentally, often to the point where they become a drain on society. Politicians regularly exercise their autonomy in such a way as to cause unreasonable taxes, unfair laws, and unjust wars for their own political gain. Indeed, misuse of autonomy causes more harm, arguably much more harm, than misuse of dignity.
A fourth and unoriginal argument from Pinker for abandoning dignity echoes Ruth Macklin, who highlights the ambiguous ways in which the term “dignity” has been used in bioethics. The ambiguity of the term is an important issue that deserves serious consideration, something that Pinker himself fails to offer. He also fails to notice that “autonomy” is used in a variety of ways, so the difficulty of ambiguous terms is not unique to the term “dignity.” Does “autonomy” mean anything actually desired by the agent, even if the agent is brainwashed or under the influence of drugs? Does autonomy mean “informed consent” (which itself is a term used in various ways)? Does autonomy means rational, self-given law, so that an irrational request cannot be considered autonomous? Indeed, there is no term that cannot be used ambiguously. Admittedly, “dignity,” in the contemporary discussion, is even more prone to ambiguous usage than “autonomy,” but this is hardly ground for dismissing it entirely or for prejudicially abandoning attempts at disambiguation.
Disambiguation of the term dignity is done quite well by Daniel P. Sulmasy, in the very book Pinker criticizes. Sulmasy distinguishes dignity as attributed, dignity as intrinsic worth, and dignity as flourishing. Dignity as attributed is the worth human beings confer on others or on themselves. Attributed dignity comes in degrees and is at issue in some of the examples raised by Pinker in his argument that dignity can be harmful. Dignity as intrinsic worth is understood by Sulmasy as “the value that human beings have simply by virtue of the fact that they are human beings” rather than in virtue of performance, health, wealth, location, or social status. Dignity as flourishing is understood as the excellence of a human life consistent with, and expressive of, intrinsic dignity.
This simple disambiguation removes the alleged contradictions seen by Pinker. Slavery and degradation are morally wrong because they take away someone’s dignity as flourishing. Nothing you can do to a person, including enslaving or degrading him, can take his intrinsic dignity away. Dignity as attributed reflects excellence, striving, and conscience, so that only some people achieve it by dint of effort and character. Everyone, no matter how lazy, evil, or mentally impaired, has intrinsic dignity in full measure, but not dignity as flourishing or as attributed.
Even if we can successfully disambiguate the term, why is dignity important? The concept of dignity does a better job than autonomy in describing and accounting for the intrinsic value of every human being. We are valuable not simply because of our choices, and still less do we have value only while we are exercising our autonomy. We have value even when we are not choosing or cannot choose. In his 2009 Tanner Lectures at UC Berkeley, “Dignity, Rank, and Rights,” Jeremy Waldron pointed out that in ancient times dignity was accorded in particular to persons regarded as royalty or nobility. Noble persons were accorded rights, privileges, and immunities that accorded with their elevated rank. Contemporary society at its best does not reduce the noble but elevates the commoner, making every single human person equal in rank to the Duke or Lady. Although these ideals are often imperfectly realized in our society, still Waldron has a point when he writes, “we are not like a society which has eschewed all talk of caste; we are like a caste society with just one caste (and a very high caste at that): every man a Brahmin. Every man a duke, every woman a queen, everyone entitled to the sort of deference and consideration, everyone’s person and body sacrosanct, in the way that nobles were entitled to deference or in the way that an assault upon the body or the person of a king was regarded as a sacrilege.” The term dignity better captures than most, if not all, other terms the elevated status of the human person.
Do we have any reason for ascribing to all human beings such intrinsic dignity? In an earlier essay, I suggested that there are a number of ways to argue for the proposition that all human beings are endowed with intrinsic dignity and certain inalienable rights. The first is that our dignity should be based on who we are, the kind of being that we are, rather than on how we are functioning in the moment. Dignity should be based on our membership in the human family, rather than on any particular performative activity in which we could engage. Our functioning, whether it be understood in terms of our ability to experience pleasure and pain, or our consciousness, or our intelligence, comes in many degrees. If we think that our value as persons is based on a degreed characteristic, an accident in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics, then we cannot secure equal basic dignity and equal basic rights for all persons. We should therefore base our fundamental ethical judgments on the substantial identity of who we are rather than on any accidental degreed quality. Since all human beings are endowed with the same nature, members of the same kind—homo sapiens—they all share equally basic rights and dignity.
Christopher Kaczor is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola Marymount University and the author of The Ethics of Abortion: Women’s Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice (Routledge 2011). This piece is adapted from his remarks delivered at the conference “Radical Emancipation” sponsored by the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture on the campus of the University of Notre Dame on November 10-12, 2011, and an article in the National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly.
sábado, 10 de dezembro de 2011
sábado, 12 de novembro de 2011
Benedict XVI Supports Adult Stem Cells Research
In Vatican.va
12. 11. 2011
Dear Brother Bishops,
Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests,
Dear Friends,
I wish to thank Cardinal Gianfranco Ravasi, President of the Pontifical Council for Culture, for his kind words and for promoting this International Conference on Adult Stem Cells: Science and the Future of Man and Culture. I would also like to thank Archbishop Zygmunt Zimowski, President of the Pontifical Council for Pastoral Care of Health Workers, and Bishop Ignacio Carrasco de Paula, President of the Pontifical Academy for Life for their contribution to this particular endeavour. A special word of gratitude goes to the many benefactors whose support has made this event possible. In this regard, I would like to express the Holy See’s appreciation of all the work that is done, by various institutions, to promote cultural and formative initiatives aimed at supporting top-level scientific research on adult stem cells and exploring the cultural, ethical and anthropological implications of their use.
Scientific research provides a unique opportunity to explore the wonder of the universe, the complexity of nature and the distinctive beauty of life, including human life. But since human beings are endowed with immortal souls and are created in the image and likeness of God, there are dimensions of human existence that lie beyond the limits of what the natural sciences are competent to determine. If these limits are transgressed, there is a serious risk that the unique dignity and inviolability of human life could be subordinated to purely utilitarian considerations. But if instead these limits are duly respected, science can make a truly remarkable contribution to promoting and safeguarding the dignity of man: indeed herein lies its true utility. Man, the agent of scientific research, will sometimes, in his biological nature, form the object of that research. Nevertheless, his transcendent dignity entitles him always to remain the ultimate beneficiary of scientific research and never to be reduced to its instrument.
In this sense, the potential benefits of adult stem cell research are very considerable, since it opens up possibilities for healing chronic degenerative illnesses by repairing damaged tissue and restoring its capacity for regeneration. The improvement that such therapies promise would constitute a significant step forward in medical science, bringing fresh hope to sufferers and their families alike. For this reason, the Church naturally offers her encouragement to those who are engaged in conducting and supporting research of this kind, always with the proviso that it be carried out with due regard for the integral good of the human person and the common good of society.
This proviso is most important. The pragmatic mentality that so often influences decision-making in the world today is all too ready to sanction whatever means are available in order to attain the desired end, despite ample evidence of the disastrous consequences of such thinking. When the end in view is one so eminently desirable as the discovery of a cure for degenerative illnesses, it is tempting for scientists and policy-makers to brush aside ethical objections and to press ahead with whatever research seems to offer the prospect of a breakthrough. Those who advocate research on embryonic stem cells in the hope of achieving such a result make the grave mistake of denying the inalienable right to life of all human beings from the moment of conception to natural death. The destruction of even one human life can never be justified in terms of the benefit that it might conceivably bring to another. Yet, in general, no such ethical problems arise when stem cells are taken from the tissues of an adult organism, from the blood of the umbilical cord at the moment of birth, or from fetuses who have died of natural causes (cf. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Dignitas Personae, 32).
It follows that dialogue between science and ethics is of the greatest importance in order to ensure that medical advances are never made at unacceptable human cost. The Church contributes to this dialogue by helping to form consciences in accordance with right reason and in the light of revealed truth. In so doing she seeks, not to impede scientific progress, but on the contrary to guide it in a direction that is truly fruitful and beneficial to humanity. Indeed, it is her conviction that everything human, including scientific research, "is not only received and respected by faith, but is also purified, elevated and perfected" (ibid., 7). In this way science can be helped to serve the common good of all mankind, with a particular regard for the weakest and most vulnerable.
In drawing attention to the needs of the defenceless, the Church thinks not only of the unborn but also of those without easy access to expensive medical treatment. Illness is no respecter of persons, and justice demands that every effort be made to place the fruits of scientific research at the disposal of all who stand to benefit from them, irrespective of their means. In addition to purely ethical considerations, then, there are issues of a social, economic and political nature that need to be addressed in order to ensure that advances in medical science go hand in hand with just and equitable provision of health-care services. Here the Church is able to offer concrete assistance through her extensive health-care apostolate, active in so many countries across the globe and directed with particular solicitude to the needs of the world’s poor.
Dear friends, as I conclude my remarks, I want to assure you of a special remembrance in prayer and I commend to the intercession of Mary, Salus Infirmorum, all of you who work so hard to bring healing and hope to those who suffer. I pray that your commitment to adult stem cell research will bring great blessings for the future of man and genuine enrichment to his culture. To you, your families and your collaborators, as well as to all the patients who stand to benefit from your generous expertise and the results of your work, I gladly impart my Apostolic Blessing. Thank you very much!
terça-feira, 8 de novembro de 2011
“Pornography and prostitution are crimes against humanity” - Benedict XVI
On the occasion of the arrival of the new German ambassador to the Vatican, Benedict XVI warns: “A society is humane only if it defends the dignity of each person”
In a pluralistic society, the Catholic Church is convinced that it is duty bound “to intervene in favor of the values that are valid for man as such, independently of the various cultures” - values the Church knows “through its faith” but which at which all men can arrive through reason alone, regardless of faith.
Pope Benedict XVI touched upon themes he had addressed in his discourse to the Bundestag in Berlin, on the occasion of the arrival in the Vatican of the new German ambassador, Reinhard Schweppe. The traditional audience to consign the Letter of Credentials became an occasion, for the German pontiff, to relaunch an appeal in defense of man, because – he said - “only a society that respects and defends unconditionally the dignity of every person, from conception until natural death, can call itself a humane society”.
But the Pope's strongest words were reserved for the “sexual discrimination against women”, pornography and prostitution, likened to “crimes against humanity”. They are the consequence, says the Pope, of the “materialistic and hedonistic tendencies” that are spreading above all in the “so-called Western world”, that is, the sexual discrimination against women.
“Every person”, admonished Benedict XVI, “whether man or woman, is destined to exist for the others. A relationship that does not respect men and women's equal dignity, constitutes a grave crime against humanity. It is time to make a vigorous effort to stem prostitution, as well as the widespread diffusion of material with erotic or pornographic content, also on the Internet”.
Regarding this point, he assured, “the Holy See will see to it that the commitment of the Catholic Church in Germany against these evils is brought forward in a clear and decisive manner”.
The Pope's reference to the issues are anything but coincidental: last week, the weekly “Die Welt” accused the German Church of making money through the sale of pornographic books, through the publishing house Welbild, one of the largest in Germany, and which belongs to several German dioceses. The publisher's catalogue includes some 2,500 erotic titles, with covers that are anything but modest. The scandal had already been pointed out in 2008 by a document prepared by numerous faithful, but without effect.
But in his speech, as he had done in his trip to his homeland last September, Pope Ratzinger also reasons about the contribution - which for him is fundamental – of faith to common life. And as he did before the German parliament, he recalled the dark period of Nazi dictatorship, to warn Germans of the risks of separating power from values.
And yet, he warned, “today, once more, there is discussion about the fundamental values of the human being, involving the dignity of man as such. Here the Church, beyond the realm of her faith, considers it her duty to defend, throughout all of our society, the truth and values, in which the dignity of man as such is at stake”.
The reference is to the bioethical questions at the center of a heated debate in Germany in the past few months. In particular, the German Catholic Church has committed herself fully – though unsuccessfully – against the legalization of a limited form of 'pre-implantation diagnosis' of the illnesses that an embryo might bear.
For the Pope, a society that “wishes to decide to select its members who are most in need of care, wanting to exclude persons from becoming a person, would be acting in a profoundly inhumane and non-credible manner before the equality of the dignity of all people at every stage of life, evident to any person of goodwill”.
If the Church intervenes in the legislative process on these themes, it is because “fundamental questions that regard the dignity of man” are at stake, and not to “indirectly impose its faith on others”.