quarta-feira, 10 de julho de 2013

U.S. street preacher arrested in London for saying homosexuality sinful - Police told him he was “guilty of using homophobic speech that could cause people anxiety, distress, alarm or insult.”


NY woman declared ‘brain dead’ woke up moments before organs harvested - by Thaddeus Baklinski

SYRACUSE, NY, July 9, 2013 (LifeSiteNews.com) - A woman who was pronounced brain dead by doctors unexpectedly woke up just as her organs were about to be removed for transplant. 
Doctors at St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center were called on the carpet by the state Health Department for not properly determining if Colleen S. Burns was actually dead before they sought permission from her family to harvest her organs and scheduled the procedure. 

Burns, 41, of Syracuse, New York, was taken to hospital in October 2009 after a drug overdose.

Doctors believed she had suffered irreversible brain damage and was on the point of death, but it later came to light that she was in fact in a deep drug-induced coma.

The Health Department's investigation uncovered a series of mistakes and miscommunications that culminated in a situation that was saved only because Burns opened her eyes on the operating table. 
According to a report on the case, the state Health Department found that doctors ignored a nurse's observations indicating Burns was not dead and her condition was improving, and that not enough brain scans were performed to confirm the often-contested diagnosis of brain death. 

Moreover, Health Department investigators found that staff skipped a recommended treatment to prevent the drugs the patient took from being absorbed by her digestive system, and that not enough testing was done to see if she was free of all drugs before her organs were taken. 

The report said that the day before her organs were to be removed, Burns responded to a reflex test. Her toes curled downward when a nurse scraped the bottom of her foot with her finger.

A nurse said she saw Burns' nostrils flare on the way to the operating room, indicating that she was breathing independently of the respirator she was attached to, and that her lips and tongue were moving.

Click "like" if you are PRO-LIFE!

According to hospital records, twenty minutes after those observations were made a nurse gave Burns an injection of the sedative Ativan. The doctors' notes, however, make no mention of the sedative or give any indication they were aware of the nurse's observations. 

Dr. David Mayer, general and vascular surgeon and an associate professor of clinical surgery at New York Medical College, also reviewed the records and found the use of a sedative perplexing. 
"It would sedate her to the point that she would be non-reactive," Mayer told the Post-Standard. "If you have to sedate them or give them pain medication, they're not brain dead and you shouldn't be harvesting their organs." 

The Health Department's report said that Burns "did not suffer a cardiopulmonary arrest and did not have irreversible brain damage," as St. Joseph's doctors had determined. 

"The hospital did not undertake an intensive and critical review of the near catastrophic event in this case," the report said, and hospital officials did not "identify the inadequate physician evaluations of (Burns) that occurred when nursing staff questioned possible signs of improving neurological function."

Tragically, it was reported that Burns committed suicide 16 months after her sojourn in the hospital. Her mother, Lucille Kuss, told the Syracuse Post-Standard that the family did not pursue an investigation of the incident or sue the hospital because her daughter had been severely depressed before the incident and afterwards was not concerned that doctors almost took her life.

The state Health Department fined St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center $6,000 for mishandling the Burns case and for not properly investigating the cause of the incident. The hospital was also ordered to review its quality assurance program, and to hire a consulting neurologist to provide instruction on how to accurately diagnose brain death. 

This is not the first time that a potential organ donor has woken up literally on the operating table, moments before they were opened up. 

In 2008, a 45-year-old Frenchman revived on the operating table as doctors prepared to “harvest” his organs for donation, following cardiac arrest. In the subsequent investigation by the hospital’s ethics committee, a number of doctors admitted that such cases, while rare, were well known to them. 

That same year, a “brain dead” 21-year-old American, Zack Dunlap, was about to have his organs harvested when his two sisters, both nurses, decided to test the hospital’s theory that his brain was no longer functioning. Family members poked his feet with a knife and dug their fingernails under his nails, provoking strong reactions by Dunlap and proving he was conscious. He recovered completely. He later related that he was conscious and aware as doctors discussed harvesting his organs in his presence.

The term “brain death” was invented in 1968 to accommodate the need to acquire vital organs in their “freshest” state from a donor who some argue is still very much alive.

While death had previously been defined as lack of respiration and heart activity, “brain death” was judged as compatible with an otherwise living patient. “Brain death” has never been rigorously defined, and there are no standardized tests to determine if the condition exists.

The report by the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services on the Burns case at St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center is available here.

Hatred of Nature: Hatred of Sex - by Anthony Esolen

In Crisis 

 Well—the legislators of California did not really do these mad things.  They did something crazier still.  They decreed that children in the schools should be addressed and treated as belonging to the sex of their choice or invention, and that such children should be allowed to participate in team sports, and to use locker rooms and bathrooms, according to their choice.


The state legislature of California has passed a bill to protect self-identification in matters of class and race.  If a child in a public school identifies himself as the Prince of Pasadena, and dresses and behaves accordingly, then he must be addressed as such by the teachers and his fellow students.  Special care is to be taken in the use of deferent pronouns:

“Might your Lordship be pleased to read the paragraph beginning on page five?”

“Jenny, take this box of crayons to his Lordship.”

“Their Lordships will not eat pate de foie gras without Camembert and mineral water.  Kindly see to it.”

Since class really is a social construct, the state solons wish to encourage its deconstruction, so that any person may adopt the social role that he feels will fulfill his desires.  Some people may self-identify as peasants, or indentured servants, or merchants.  The thing to remember is that there is a difference between peasantry as a mere political fact, and self-made peasantry.  No one should be compelled to occupy any class because of economic or political happenstance.  Freedom of choice is all.

Or not quite all.  For the legislators warn all people engaged in business that they too must comply with the self-identification of their customers.  If a Queen of San Quentin (there may be several Queens of San Quentin; queenship, again, is no mere political office, but is the crafting of a royal identity) visits a baker’s shop and orders a cake, reading, “Congratulations on Your Coronation,” the baker must comply, or be sued for lese majeste.  If a woman identifies as a slave and finds a master, and if she wishes to memorialize the happy occasion by ordering photographs portraying her in fetters and manacles, or tossing a spiked collar over her shoulder to be caught by an expectant slavesmaid, then that photographer had damned well better go along with it and do his job, or be fined so heavily as to put his business in jeopardy.

The legislators stipulate that no differences may be drawn between an actually existent class and a class contrived by the imagination, or between present and past.  Someone may insist that he is Napoleon reincarnate, and strut about with the tricorner hat, muttering, “It was that subtle Talleyrand!  It was that beef-eating Wellington!”  He is to be addressed as Emperor or First Citizen.  Another man may brandish a Jedi light sabre bought at the local dollar store; he is to be addressed as Sir Knight.

And then there’s race.  What is race, after all?  If a student checks “White” as his racial identity, then he will be regarded as white.  If a student checks “Black,” then he will be regarded as black.  If he checks “Native American,” as did Senator Elizabeth Warren, back when she was a student, in order to snatch a bit of an advantage when she was applying to law school, then we should get out the feather headdress and dance along with her in the sun.  Some students, by mere genetic inheritance, may be of African descent, but may wish to distance themselves from their cousins.  That is their choice.  They may check “Other,” and designate themselves as “black and white,” or “trans-black,” or “trans-white,” as they please.  Another student may be of Norwegian heritage, with tow-colored hair and fair skin and blue eyes, but, because he feels he is not essentially Norwegian, he may instead identify with his ancestors on the steppes a hundred generations back, and check “Asian” as his race.  That is his choice.

Admissions officers in the state colleges must take note.  They’ve done a good job ensuring racial diversity in their enrollments, but this has been diversity of the first degree only.  The next degree is meta-diversity, or diversity beyond diversity.  Among the “blacks” at Fullerton, there should be a certain percentage of trans-whites, that is, blacks who are blacks by self-identification and not by genotype or phenotype.  Among the “wealthy” at Fullerton, there should be a certain percentage of trans-royals, that is, children of plumbers or housemaids, but who occupy a class of their choosing or invention.  Fullerton should reach out not only to those who suffer pecuniary poverty, but also to those who are poor by self-identification, regardless of their income.  Diversity should not be limited to mere factual differences.

The legislators stopped short of granting legal status to self-identifying amputees.  They will consider it during the next session.  Some people feel they must be amputees.  To be crippled is not just an unfortunate consequence of a genetic anomaly or an accident or an act of violence, but a positive good—so long as it resides in the free choice of the individual.  “Why should I be burdened with this right arm?” they cry.  “Why should a narrow minded society condemn me to walk about on my two feet, when I can stump around on a crutch and a wooden peg?”  “Why must I see out of two eyes, when one eye and a black patch would be so much nicer?”  “I am a pirate—it’s what I am—why should I not be free to hire a doctor to make me look like one?”

The Real Offense Against Nature
 
Well—the legislators of California did not really do these mad things.  They did something crazier still.  They decreed that children in the schools should be addressed and treated as belonging to the sex of their choice or invention, and that such children should be allowed to participate in team sports, and to use locker rooms and bathrooms, according to their choice.

Why is that even more insane, more evident of a mind determined to hate reality, than what I have described above?  How do they hate us?  Let me count the ways.

First: class really is a social construct.  That’s why the Army was such a democratizing institution in the days of the draft.  Strip fifty men naked, and you can’t tell who came from Harvard and who came from the Bronx.  You can’t tell, because there are no physical differences.  The ancient Athenians understood the principle, and that’s why the gymnasion—athletic complex and school and political hangout all in one—was crucial to their democracy.  But sex is not a social construct.  It is all too real—and don’t bother to refer to me to a hermaphrodite living in Winnipeg.  Sex is the first thing we notice about someone, and the last thing we forget.

A man may or may not be Napoleon, according to circumstance.  If our neighbor thinks he is Napoleon, we rightly regard him as mad, because his thoughts and words and actions are not in accordance with reality.  If he thinks he is a prince and demands that we bow before him and kiss his signet ring, we call the men in white coats.  Sanity is the adequate response of the mind to the real thing: adaequatio mentis ad rem.  But at least the would-be Prince of Wales might have been the Prince of Wales; and who knows but by some bizarre concatenation of political upheavals, he might yet enjoy that exalted station.  But under no circumstances could he ever be the Princess of Wales.  To believe the first is to believe something that is not true, but is at least conceivable.  To believe the second is to believe what is not even conceivable.  It is not like believing that the moon is made of green cheese.  It is like believing that two and two are seven.

Second: race is epidermal, but sex is not.  A boy from the Congo and a boy from Italy are pretty much alike.  Anybody who travels knows this—boys are boys.  Now, if it’s madness for Lars Larsen to say, “I am really the son of a Congolese fisherman,” when his father was an accountant in Trondheim, then it is utter raving insanity for him to say that his name is really Lara, and demand to join the field hockey team or the softball team.  But as insane as the lad is, how insane must be the legislators who allow him to do it?  It is as if Lars could wave a wand, sprinkle pixie dust, and, ping!—he’s a girl.  He doesn’t have the boy’s torso, the boy’s hands, the boy’s muscles, the boy’s heart-lung capacity, the boy’s heavy bones, and so forth.  There’s a reason why boys are not allowed to compete on girls’ teams.  It is reality.  If they were allowed to compete, there would still be two teams; one called the boys’ varsity, and the other called the boys’ junior varsity.  People who live in reality may notice that the LPGA has never invited a teenage boy (say, Tiger Woods, Matt Kuchar, or Luke Donald at age 16) to compete in any of their golf tournaments—and they never will.

But the third reason is the most damning.  If I say, “I am the Prince of Wales,” I do not imply a rejection of anything healthy and normal.  It’s just that I am not sane.  But if I say that a boy may be a girl or a girl may be a boy, I do in fact reject the healthy and normal.  I do not love boys and girls sufficiently to help them enjoy, and flourish in, the sex with which God has endowed them.  I see two boys arm-wrestling at a party, and I’m moved to disdain or dislike; why should there be such ordinary boyish creatures in the world?  I see a young woman playing with her small child, wholly absorbed in the play, and I’m moved to disdain or dislike: why should there be so girlish a creature in the world?

The legislators, then, resemble most of all those confused souls who determine to lop off healthy limbs, because they feel they must be mutilated in order to be whole.  They cannot endure the normal.  They hate reality.  They are quite mad.


In Lampedusa, Europe Is Also Emigrating. To the South - by Sandro Magister

In Chiesa

Algeria now has the same birth rate as Norway. Tunisia that of France. Demographics is reversing the scenario of an Islamized Europe. Philip Jenkins explains how and why

ROME, July 8, 2013 - Just as Saint Francis began his mission by going to kiss the lepers, so also the first pope to bear his name is pushing himself to the limits of the human, at the beginning of his mandate.

As the destination of his first voyage, Jorge Mario Bergoglio has chosen the tiny island of Lampedusa, in the hinterlands between Italy and Tunisia. And he has wanted it this way - he has explained - because he was "deeply touched by the recent sinking of a ship that was transporting migrants from Africa, the latest in a series of similar tragedies,” with the intention of “praying for those who have lost their lives at sea, visiting the survivors and refugees, encouraging the inhabitants of the island and appealing to the responsibility of all so that care may be taken of these brothers and sisters in extreme need.”

Lampedusa is the symbol of a dramatic geographical and civilizational boundary. Many of the migrants and refugees who land there are Muslims. And they are part of that migratory wave which some fear will soon transform Europe into a sort of Islamized “Eurabia.”

In reality, not only has this alarmist scenario been hazy for quite some time, but it also appears more and more disproven by the facts.

There are even some who maintain that the opposite will prove true. Not an ever more Islamized Europe, but a Maghreb and a Middle East ever more "European."

The key to this interpretation is demographics, above and beyond politics and religion.

One of its supporters is a scholar highly experienced in the analysis of great global transformations, the American Philip Jenkins, a member of the Anglican Communion, professor of humanities at Pennsylvania State University, in an article in the latest issue of “Vita e Pensiero," the magazine of the Catholic University of Milan.

The article is reproduced below. And in the same issue of “Vita e Pensiero" it is accompanied by the concurring evaluations of two other specialists: Khaled Fouad Allam, Muslim, professor of sociology of the Muslim world at the University of Trieste, and Giuseppe Caffulli, Catholic, director of the publications of the Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land.

In applying Jenkins's theses to the Christians who live in northern Africa and in the Middle East, Caffulli demonstrates how the plunge in birth rates that is increasingly bringing these regions closer to Europe is also impacting the Christian populations living there, which "could become a minority on the way to extinction" if it were not for the increasing arrival in those same lands of Christian immigrants from the Far East, above all from the Philippines and southern India.

***

THE MUSLIM WORLD'S COMING EUROPEAN REVOLUTION
by Philip Jenkins


A revolution is sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. No, not the one you've been hearing about in the media -- all the protests against dictatorship and oppression, in Egypt and Tunisia, and most violently, in Libya. The revolution I'm referring to certainly affects all those countries, profoundly, but its effects promise to outlast any change of regime, or even any new constitutions. Barely noticed by the West, many Muslim societies are experiencing a demographic transformation that is going to make them look far more European: more stable, more open to women's rights and above all, more secular. That change underlies all the current political upsurges.

The magic number in this story is 2.1, which is the fertility rate a society needs if its population is to remain constant. If the typical woman has significantly more than 2.1 children during her life, then that society's population will expand, and it will be a youthful community. If the rate falls below 2.1, then populations will stagnate and decline, and the average age will rise.

According to a familiar stereotype, Europeans have lost the long term vision that would make them want to have large families, and religion no longer provides such an incentive: the closer a woman lives to Rome, the fewer children she has. When commentators look at modern Europe, they worry about the long term prospects for low fertility nations like Italy (1.39), Germany (1.41) and Spain (1.47). Pundits are all the more concerned when they compare these European rates with the notoriously high-fertility Third World demographic profiles that long prevailed across the Middle East. It's not difficult to imagine a scenario in which those mainly Muslim Middle Easterners outbreed and overwhelm the staid Europeans, creating an Islamicized Eurabia.

But here's the problem. In just the last thirty years or so, those very Middle Eastern countries that used to teem with children and adolescents have gone through a startling demographic transformation. Since the mid-1970s, Algeria's fertility rate has collapsed from over 7 to 1.75, Tunisia's from 6 to 2.03, Morocco's from 6.5 to 2.21, Libya's from 7.5 to 2.96. Today, Algeria's rate is roughly equivalent to that of Denmark or Norway; Tunisia's is comparable to France. Counter-intuitively, that remark about "the closer to Rome" also holds good on the southern, Muslim, side of the Mediterranean.

Just what is happening here? Everything depends on the changing attitudes and expectation of the women in these once highly-traditional societies. Across the region, women have become increasingly involved in higher education, and have moreover moved into full-time employment. That sea-change simply makes it unthinkable for women to manage a rampaging tribe of seven or eight children. Often, too, images of women's proper role in life have been upended by extended contacts with Europe. Migrants to France or Italy return home with changed attitudes, while families who stay at home find it hard to avoid the media portrayals of Western lives they see via cable and satellite dish. Maybe Europe and the Middle East are merging into one common Eurabia - but it's far from clear which side is doing a better job of imposing its opinions on the other. Presently, it looks as if the Maghreb is becoming European.

Such a wrenching change cannot fail to have political implications. In a country with a Third World fertility rate, it is very unlikely that women will seek or be granted education: their designated career path as mothers is starkly clear. Meanwhile, adolescents and young men proliferate, and provide ample cannon fodder for armies or militias, to whom life is cheap. (Yemen's fertility rate is still over 5.0, Somalia's is 6.4).

But then imagine a newer, more European society, in which men and women are intensely concerned about their nuclear families, and have invested their love and attention into just one or two offspring. As citizens become more educated, they are not prepared to accept the demagoguery and systematic corruption that has long passed for government in those regions. They see themselves as responsible members of a civil society, with aspirations that demand to be met: they feel they deserve full democratic participation. Of course the recent turmoil began in Tunisia, with its very low fertility rate and its intimate ties to France.

Sudden demographic change also seems to be closely linked to secularization, a point of potentially great significance in the Middle East. Smaller family sizes can result from a decline in religious ideologies, but falling fertility can itself drive such a decline, as has happened in modern Christian Europe. When children abounded, as they did in the 1950s, strong pressures kept families close to religious institutions, as they sought common religious training and religious rituals. parents attended churches to ensure their children received the familiar cultural heritage. Church prestige rode high when priests were shepherding hundreds of local children through annual confirmation classes. But as the children became scarce from the 1970s onwards, so the churches emptied. At the same time, couples highly concerned with their own personal and emotional fulfillment became increasingly impatient about clerical attempts to enforce morality laws. Women, especially, became highly disaffected from the mainstream churches.

If the European precedent is anything to go by, that could well provide a model for religious developments in the Maghreb over the next decade or two. A society so dependent on women in the school and the workplace simply cannot support the kind of intransigent orthodoxies offered by the familiar Islamists. Extremists may not vanish overnight, but they will have to adapt substantially to present their message in a civil society with a powerful taste for democratic values and gender equality.

Demography is not, of course, the whole story. But it has to play a full part in any attempt to understand the current political revolutions in the Middle East.

Una tassa europea per promuovere i gay - di Tommaso Scandroglio

In NBQ

Gli obiettivi del millennio sono otto punti programmatici che tutti i 191 stati membri dell’ONU si sono impegnati a realizzare entro il 2015. Dato che questa data si avvicina e l’Unione Europea si è accorta che tali obiettivi sono ben lungi dall’essere stati raggiunti, ecco che si guarda già al dopo 2015 e si stilano le linee operative future per tutti i paesi europei.

Il 5 giugno scorso a tal proposito è stato approvato il “Report sugli obiettivi di sviluppo del millennio – definizione del quadro post-2015” elaborato dalla Commissione sviluppo del Parlamento europeo. Nella genericità e quindi fumosità di questo documento di 38 pagine si possono intravvedere sicuramente aspetti positivi in merito alla lotta alla povertà e alla discriminazione, nonché riguardo alla tutela dei diritti fondamentali per i cittadini europei. Ma se poi si gratta un po’ via la vernice dorata che è stata stesa sopra questi principi si scopre cose intende l’Unione europea per “povertà”, “discriminazione” e “diritti fondamentali”.

Ad esempio “l’eliminazione della povertà – si legge nel report - è una multi-lotta: la definizione [di povertà] dovrebbe essere ampliata invece di essere ristretta al solo problema dell’accesso ad una certa soglia monetaria”. E infatti la povertà secondo la Commissione sviluppo interessa anche la discriminazione di genere. La prova viene dal fatto che sotto il paragrafo “L’eliminazione della povertà” si può leggere: “si incoraggiano politiche di integrazione della parità di genere orientate alla crescita […] e di includere la parità di genere in tutte le politiche, programmi e le strategie dell’UE. […] Deve essere data particolare attenzione alla formazione di uomini e donne su questioni attinenti al genere nella scolarizzazione primaria, per cambiare gradualmente atteggiamenti e stereotipi sociali”.

Insomma il povero rimarrà tale se non si inchina all’ideologia gender. Non solo: per chi siede a Strasburgo il vero povero è colui che non può ricorrere ad aborto e contraccezione. Infatti sempre nel paragrafo dedicato alla povertà la Commissione “invita l’UE a difendere con forza il diritto ad un più alto standard di salute, compresa la salute sessuale e riproduttiva […] anche fornendo pianificazione familiare volontaria, aborti sicuri e contraccettivi”. Insomma un tempo se eri povero ti tiravano le pietre, ora i preservativi. Per paradosso forse era meglio prima.

Quindi la UE sciorina soluzioni sulla povertà ma mira a ben altro. E’ un po’ come la lima che i parenti dei carcerati cercavano di nascondere nelle arance quando andavano a trovarli. Io ti parlo di povertà ed intanto ti sdogano il pensiero gay e l’aborto.

In Europa sono davvero ossessionati da aborto e omosessualità. Infatti questi due temi potevano benissimo essere ricompresi – così come lo sono in molti altri documenti dell’UE – nell’obiettivo del millennio “Promuovere la parità dei sessi e l'autonomia delle donne” e in quello “Migliorare la salute materna”. Però l’occasione fa l’uomo gay e abortista e così chi sta nella sala dei bottoni in Europa - affinchè il verbo abortista e quello omosessualità non manchino nelle agende anche di coloro che si occupano di povertà -  ha pensato bene di mettere a punto un’innovativa ricetta per non morire più di fame nei paesi in via di sviluppo: aderire al credo gay e all’aborto.

Che la questione omosessuale sia cruciale per la soddisfazione degli obiettivi del millennio trova poi conferma in molti altri passaggi di questo documento. Ad esempio nel paragrafo “Approccio fondato sui diritti umani” si preme di ricordare che una “particolare attenzione” deve essere rivolta verso le “persone LGBT” e che occorre “vietare la discriminazione” basata, tra gli altri motivi, sull’ “orientamento sessuale [e] identità di genere”. Ovviamente non può mancare un Grande Fratello Europeo che tutto scruta e tutti punisce. Nel paragrafo “Meccanismi di monitoraggio e indicatori” così si stabilisce: “L’UE, le agenzie delle Nazioni Unite e le organizzazioni internazionali devono adottare una combinazione appropriata di indicatori quantitativi e qualitativi. Un meccanismo multidimensionale dovrebbe valutare e prendere in considerazione le questioni rilevanti quali […] l’uguaglianza di genere”. Un metro comune per la discriminazione omosessuale, per evitare di discriminare tra loro con punizioni diverse gli eterosessuali dissenzienti e riottosi. Questa è la vera uguaglianza.

L’omino della strada si domanderà: “Tutti questi progetti ed iniziative, costeranno. E chi paga tutto questo?”. Che scoperta: il signor Pantalone siamo tutti noi. Infatti al punto 69 del documento si spiega che gli obiettivi del millennio saranno raggiunti grazie al prelievo dello 0,7% del PIL nazionale di tutti i paesi membri e grazie ad una tassa sulle transazioni finanziarie. Lo 0,7% del PIL italiano corrisponde a più di 10milardi di euro. Tanti sono i soldi che il popolo italico dovrà forse sborsare per promuovere, tra le altre cose, aborto, contraccezione e omosessualità. Una tassa per demolire i principi non negoziabili.

Se questo prelievo non bastasse il report della Commissione sviluppo tranquillizza gli animi: al punto 68 rende noto che altri quattrini dovrebbero venire da “partenariati pubblico-privati”. Un modo per far entrare dalla porta principale le lobby abortiste e omosessualiste le quali a fronte di qualche emolumento chiederanno come merce di scambio ¬ – tiriamo ad indovinare - “nozze” gay per tutti, indottrinamento “gender” sin dalla tenera età e aborto post-natale.

8 razones y 4 testimonios por los que una violación no justifica que se aborte al bebé

In RL

La asociación Derecho a Vivir ha difundido "ocho razones por las que una violación no justifica abortar a ningún niño", a raíz de un caso de violación con resultado de embarazo en Chile, un país sin aborto desde 1983 y con la mejor salud maternal de todo el continente americano (con la excepción de Canadá).

La violación no justifica el aborto: 8 razones
 
1. El aborto, sea cual sea la circunstancia de la madre, supone acabar con la vida de un ser humano.

2. La violación es una atrocidad y un delito que debe perseguirse. Pero el embrión no es culpable de lo que le sucedió a su madre, ni de que su padre sea un criminal.

3. El culpable de la violación no es el embrión, pero quieren convertirlo en la principal víctima.

4. Si no contemplamos la pena de muerte, ni siquiera para el violador, ¿por qué algunos la defienden para el hijo?

5. La madre no tiene por qué quedarse con el hijo. La adopción es una respuesta más humana.

6. El aborto no soluciona, ni cura, ni hace desaparecer lo ocurrido. Al trauma de la violación se suma el del aborto.

7. La historia personal del embrión o sus características familiares no le restan carácter humano.

8. La cualidad humana del embrión, y por tanto su dignidad y protección, no depende de lo que sucedió entre sus progenitores.

Además, abundan los testimonios de mujeres que han amado a sus hijos tras la violación... y de personas que agradecen no haber sido abortadas pese a ser concebidas en una violación.

Engendrada en incesto: adoptada que adoptó
Kristi Hofferber, por ejemplo, descubrió que fue engendrada en incesto: su abuelo/padre violó a su madre. Y lo que dice Kristi es: "Por favor, no matéis, abortándolos, a niños como yo".

"Le agradezco mucho a mi madre biológica haberme protegido y dado en adopción. Llegué a una familia maravillosa que me acogió con los brazos abiertos y me dio el amor y el cuidado que necesitaba". Kristi hoy ayuda a muchas mujeres, está casada con un adoptado y han adoptado ellos mismos a otro niño.

Su hija hoy le llena de felicidad
También la colombiana Verónica Cardona quedó embarazada a los 16 años de edad tras ser violada por su propio padre. Defendió la vida del bebé y, cinco años después de vivir este drama, exhorta a las mujeres que pasan por casos similares a que “¡no tengan miedo de decirle sí a la vida, no tengan miedo de decirle sí al amor!”.

“Yo no tenía el derecho de arrancarle la vida a nadie, y menos a una personita indefensa, una personita que no me había hecho nada a mí”, señala. Hoy vive feliz con su hija de 5 años y ha sido capaz de perdonar a todos los que la dañaron.

"Puedes sacar algo bueno: yo soy ese algo"
Otro caso es el de Ken, un norteamericano que dice a las madres: "La violación es espantosa, pero lo que quiero decir a las mujeres que nos estén escuchando es lo siguiente: puedes coger eso tan terrible que han hecho contigo y sacar algo bueno de ello. Ese algo soy yo".

Ken cuenta que a su madre "cuando ella tenía 15 años, la golpearon con un bate de béisbol y la violaron. Entonces acudió a una institución católica de caridad y me tuvo a mí, tomó la valiente decisión de conservarme... de dejarme vivir. Luego fui adoptado. Llevo quince años casado, tengo tres hijos... y quisiera hablar en nombre de los que no tienen voz".

"Estoy cansado de que la gente trate a esos niños como si no fuesen nada. Y pueden nacer, pueden crecer, pueden llegar a tener una vida extraordinaria", concluye Ken.

Madre drogada y violada en grupo
Alfar Antonio Vélez cuenta cómo su madre, a los 27 años, fue drogada y violada por un grupo de compañeros de trabajo borrachos en Colombia. Pero era una mujer de fe, tuvo al niño, lo educó... y hoy, para gran orgullo y alegría de ella, Alfar es sacerdote misionero en Argentina.

"Ella decía que, pese a las tan terribles circunstancias, llevaba en su seno el milagro de una nueva vida, una vida que Dios le había dado y que, por sus convicciones, no podía abortar. Y que si Dios se la había dado debía encontrarle el sentido. Para ella lo más duro era no poder mostrarme un padre que me amara, que me enseñara a caminar, pero lo sobrellevaba sintiendo que yo la llenaba totalmente. Y que, tarde o temprano, sería su bastón. De hecho, los tres años que vivió conmigo a raíz de una larga enfermedad hasta su muerte, en 2009, fueron para ella los años más bellos de su vida", recuerda su hijo, que ayuda a muchas personas.

Un vecindario volcado en acoger
En 2011 en Argentina se conoció la historia de la hija de Hilda, que fue violada por un pariente que se aprovechó de su minusvalía psíquica. Quedó embarazada. Pero el vecindario de esta familia, pobre pero generoso, se volcó en ayudarles y desarrolló una gran ternura por el bebé: engendrado en la violencia, pero nacido rodeado de amor.

Irish Bishops’ briefing note on the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Bill 2013

In ICBC

In recent days bishops have sent the following briefing note to deputies and senators on the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Bill 2013.  The briefing note highlights flaws in the abortion bill which is currently being debated in Oireachtas Éireann and explains that, if the abortion bill is enacted, it:
  • will fundamentally alter the culture and practice of medical care in Ireland;
  • accepts the premise that abortion is an appropriate response to suicidal ideation; and,
  • creates serious moral, legal and constitutional conflicts in the area of freedom of conscience and religious belief.
 
1.      This Bill will fundamentally alter the culture and practice of medical care in Ireland. It provides a wide and at times subjective interpretation of the risk to the life of the mother, by which the life of an unborn child can be ended. This is clear because:

  1. In the assessment of ‘a real and substantial’ risk to the life of the mother, whether arising from a medical situation or a threat of suicide, the explanatory memorandum to the Bill is clear that, ‘this risk does not need to be immediate nor inevitable’. This means that a risk which is ‘remote’ or ‘avoidable’ could trigger the death of an innocent and voiceless child in the womb;
  2. At the same time, the assessment of risk is to be based on ‘reasonable opinion’, which in the words of the notes to the Bill, ‘means an opinion formed by the practitioner or committee, as the case may be, in good faith which has regard to the need to preserve unborn human life as far as practicable’. The phrase ‘in good faith’ is subject to wide interpretation;
  3. In addition, Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 have been repealed, thereby giving doctors latitude to terminate pregnancy in a wider range of circumstances than heretofore. While the Bill makes it an offence to ‘intentionally destroy human life’, it explicitly excludes the possibility of such an offence for all terminations carried out under the Bill;
  4. The Bill provides mechanisms of appeal for a mother to vindicate her right to life. However, it provides no mechanism of defence or appeal for the unborn. The Government claims vindication of the right to life of the unborn is provided by the legislative obligation on medical personnel to ‘have regard to’ the right to life of the unborn ‘as far as is practicable’. However, the Heads of Bill are clear that: “This emphasis on preserving unborn human life as far as practicable governs the actual medical procedure – the termination of pregnancy only and not whether there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother.” In other words, it applies only to the procedure carried out following the assessment of the risk to the life of the mother but not to the assessment of risk itself, upon which the decision to end the life of the unborn will be made.
Taken together, these aspects of the Bill mean that in practice the right to life of the unborn child is no longer treated as equal to that of the mother. This represents a fundamental shift in current medical culture and practice in Irish hospitals, which to date have provided some of the safest places in the world for a mother and her unborn child during pregnancy precisely because they were treated as two patients with an equal right to life.  The failure of this Bill to adequately vindicate the equal right to life of the unborn, in so many respects, provides grounds for a viable challenge to the Constitutionality of the Bill itself and that this ought to be pursued.

2.      The Bill accepts the premise that abortion is an appropriate response to suicidal ideation. This is contrary to substantial medical evidence.
  1. The direct and intentional ending of the life of an unborn child, at any stage of pregnancy from the moment of conception, is never morally acceptable. What will happen if the unborn child is close to viability, say, at twenty two weeks? Would termination be postponed to give the child a greater chance of survival outside the womb? Who will advocate for the rights of the child in this situation? The Bill is silent on these matters.
  2. Furthermore, where the unborn child is deemed viable, the Bill envisages the child being delivered prematurely in response to the suicidal ideation of the mother. Such premature delivery runs a high risk of serious and permanent damage to the health of the child. We are told that the child will then be placed into State care. How can such a foreseeable damaging and high risk medical procedure be reconciled with the Constitutional duty on the State (Article 42A) to ensure that in all decisions the welfare of the child shall be ‘the paramount consideration’ and with the provisions of Part 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 on the Reckless Endangerment of Children?
  3. A further very serious confusion exists in relation to the scope for “termination” in response to the risk of suicide. According to the interpretive notes to the Heads of the Bill: ‘In circumstances where the unborn may be potentially viable outside the womb, doctors must make all efforts to sustain its life after delivery. However, that requirement does not go so far as to oblige a medical practitioner to disregard a real and substantial risk to the life of the woman on the basis that it will result in the death of the unborn.’ It is legally possible to understand this note to mean that where the child is ‘potentially viable outside the womb’, but there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother based on suicidal ideation, a doctor may directly and intentionally intervene in a manner that ‘will result in the death of the [viable] unborn’. There are no time limits on such an intervention.
 
3.      The Bill also creates a number of serious moral, legal and Constitutional conflicts in the area of freedom of conscience and religious belief, notably:

  1. The Bill provides for conscientious objection by ‘any medical practitioner, nurse or midwife’ only. It excludes others who may be obliged to co-operate in providing abortion services against their conscience or religious belief. This is in contrast to the wording of the proposed Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Bill 2001, which provided for conscientious objection by ‘any person’ carrying out or assisting in an abortion. The operation of this clause is also unacceptable because it involves a form of co-operation in evil by obliging those who conscientiously object to knowingly put the patient in to the care of medical personnel who will carry out an abortion. In effect, therefore, medical personnel are being given no choice but to cooperate in an abortion. This is in contrast to the practice in many other countries which ask only that the patient be handed over to the care of other medical personnel. Limiting the scope of conscientious objection in this way is potentially in conflict with Article 44.2.3 of the Constitution, which states that: “The State shall not impose any disabilities or make any discrimination on the ground of religious profession, belief or status”, with the general direction of legal interpretation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and with recent UK based cases such as Doogan & Anor v NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde Health Board [2013] ScotCS CSIH 36.
  2. Article 44.2.3 also raises important questions of principle about the application of the Party Whip system to oblige members of the Oireachtas to vote in favour of this legislation, against their religious conscience. It may even open the possibility of a Constitutional challenge to the legislation itself on the basis of an un-constitutional legislative process.
  3. The obligation on ‘appropriate institutions’ identified by the Minister to provide abortion services may be in conflict with existing legal arrangements and, in some cases with Article 44.2.5 of the Constitution, which states that: “Every religious denomination shall have the right to manage its own affairs, own, acquire and administer property, movable and immovable, and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes”.
A final question:  Was it possible to provide an adequate response to the European Court by means of justiciable professional guidelines which do not involve legislating for the direct and intentional killing of the unborn?

The questions posed above are substantial. They reflect the seriousness of the issues at stake.

Legislators should be free to exercise their conscience on this fundamental moral issue, in accordance with the principles of a free and democratic society and their express right as citizens under Article 44.2.3 of the Constitution.  No one should entrust the decisions of their conscience to another on issues like this which are, literally, matters of life and death.