Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Direito canónico. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Direito canónico. Mostrar todas as mensagens

sexta-feira, 30 de março de 2012

Father Guarnizo and the nitty gritty of Canon Law and refusing Holy Communion

by Steve Jalsevac

March 28, 2012 (LifeSiteNews.com) – In light of the recent news about the Archdiocese of Washington apologizing to an open lesbian for Communion being denied her at a funeral, a U.S. priest canonist has submitted to LifeSiteNews this unsolicited analysis of Catholic Canon Law on the matter. The priest is known to LifeSiteNews but must remain publicly unnamed.

We are including this detailed analysis since the fact that they have not been denied Catholic sacraments has been a large factor in helping very influential, obstinately pro-abortion or anti-family Catholic politicians and activists (Nancy Pelosi, Ted Kennedy, Kathleen Sibelius, Tony Blair, etc.) to legitimize their damaging actions, while still claiming to be in good standing with the Church. The Catholic public figures have in many cases been top leaders of actions against the protection of innocent human life and the family.

There is a growing clamor among pro-life and pro-family leaders, many laity and even from non-Catholics demanding that the Catholic Church end this damaging scandal by using its Canon 915 as an act of charity for the offenders, their victims and the wider community.


A Canonical Defense of Father Marcel Guarnizo


As a priest and canon lawyer, I’d like in canonical terms, to revisit the controversial events surrounding the denial of Holy Communion to Barbara Johnson by
Father Marcel Guarnizo. First of all, while I agree with many of the points by the very well-respected canonist Dr. Ed Peters, I believe that even with the rather limited information currently available, Father Guarnizo very possibly and correctly satisfied the conditions of canon 915 in denying Holy Communion to Barbara Johnson. Secondly, I would like to comment on Father Guarnizo’s unjust “administrative leave” in light of the Code of Canon Law.

Canon 915 and Father Guarnizo

The first rule of interpretation in canon law is to read the canon. Canon 915 reads:

“Those upon whom the penalty of excommunication or interdict has been imposed, and others who obstinately persist in manifest grave sin, are not to be admitted to Holy Communion.”

As Ed Peters clearly points out, canon 915 lays an obligation on the minister distributing Holy Communion to deny Holy Communion to certain parties. Who are these parties? The first two parties are those who have been excommunicated or interdicted by imposition or declaration. The third party to be denied Holy Communion are those who fulfill all of the following three conditions, i.e., those who

1. Obstinately persist

2. in manifest
3. grave sin.

How is this canon to be interpreted? Ed Peters rightly mentions a general norm:

Can. 18 - “Laws which establish a penalty, restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception from the law are subject to strict interpretation.”

as well as canon 912:

Can. 912 - “Any baptized person not prohibited by law can and must be admitted to Holy Communion.”

On the other hand, Father William Byrne, Secretary for Pastoral Ministry and Social Concerns, in the Archdiocese of Washington’s press release, states,

“We should receive Jesus with the intention of becoming more like Him. No one is entitled to the Eucharist. It is a free gift and should be received with humility and reverence.”

Ed Peters is again correct to say that the burden lies upon Father Guarnizo to prove he satisfied the requirements of canon 915. On the other hand, canon 915 lays a grave obligation on the minister of Holy Communion to protect the Eucharist from sacrilege and to prevent scandal. It goes without saying that the minister who violates canon 915 should be justly punished.

Ed Peters summarily explains why Father Guarnizo does not fufill the conditions of canon 915:

“Guarnizo did not know, and could not have verified, whether Johnson’s sin (speaking objectively), which could be grave (a conclusion I think a Catholic could reach based on the words used here) was also manifest, as well as obstinate and perseverating (sic). “

This statement raises a question. Given the extremely limited information we currently have from a variety of sources, how exactly does Ed Peters judge that Father “Guarnizo did not know, and could not have verified” Barbara Johnson was not a manifest, grave sinner? It is safe to assume that Ed Peters was not present at the chapel for the funeral, nor was he in the sacristy, nor does he have knowledge of who or how many persons witnessed the conversation that took place between Father Guarnizo and Barbara Johnson.

Ed Peters goes on to quote a number of very reputable and traditional Catholic moralists and manualists who express in various terms the meaning of canon 915. Let’s look carefully at canon 915. Here’s the canon again:

Canon 915 - “Those upon whom the penalty of excommunication or interdict has been imposed, and others who obstinately persist in manifest grave sin, are not to be admitted to Holy Communion.”

What is the purpose of canon 915? Cardinal Raymond Burke, Prefect of the Apostolic Signatura (the highest tribunal in the Church) answers this question in a paper regarding the liciety of admitting pro-abortion politicians to Holy Communion in light of canon 915. (For those who haven’t read the paper, the quick answer is “no”.) Cardinal Burke states that Canon 915 exists primarily to prevent sacrilege while at the same time preventing our Greatest Good from being violated. His Eminence also remarked in the Jesuit periodical America Magazine that,

“Canon 915 deals with the state of someone who persists in an open, serious moral violation and so has gravely sinned. This means you can’t receive Communion, but it is not saying you are excommunicated. It’s just saying you have broken, in a very serious way, your communion with God and with the Church and therefore are not able to receive Holy Communion.”

The same point is implied in St. Paul’s scolding of the Corinthian Christians during Mass:

“For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself, not discerning the body of the Lord.”

The minister who applies canon 915 actually does the sinner a great service in charity by preventing him from committing another grave sin.

The secondary purpose of canon 915 is the prevention of scandal. What is scandal? Cardinal Burke says:

“The first and properly theological meaning of scandal is to do or omit something which leads others into error or sin. The second meaning is to do or omit something which causes wonderment (admiratio) in others. Denying Holy Communion publicly to the occult sinner involves scandal in the second sense. Giving Holy Communion to the obstinately serious and public sinner involves scandal in the first sense.”

In his Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas Aquinas says that although there is a need for the minister distributing Holy Communion to protect the good name of the hidden sinner, there is also an obligation to protect the Eucharist from sacrilege by a public sinner.

Since Barbara Johnson doesn’t fall into the first two categories of canon 915, let’s see she if she fulfills the following three conditions for the last category of persons, i.e., those who


1. Obstinately persist

2. in manifest
3. grave sin.

1. Obstinately persist


What does it mean to “obstinately persist”?


The Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts (PCLT), the department of the Vatican whose job it is to interpret authentically both universal and particular laws in the Church, states that this phrase “obstinate persistence” is

“the existence of an objective situation of sin that endures in time and which the will of the individual member of the faithful does not bring to an end, no other requirements (attitude of defiance, prior warning, etc.) being necessary to establish the fundamental gravity of “the situation in the Church.”

“Obstinate persistence” denotes an objective (not subjective) state. Although commonly misunderstood, it is not necessary that warnings be issued in order to judge “obstinate persistence”.

Before the funeral Mass, Barbara Johnson declared her homosexual status by introducing her lesbian lover to Father Guarnizo. What was the purpose of this action? We now know, from media reports, that Barbara has been with her partner for 20 years.

We also know that Barbara Johnson walked out of the sacristy while her lover blocked the doorway.

2. “Manifest”

What does “manifest” mean?

Among the leading canon lawyers currently living in North America is Professor John Huels at St. Paul’s University. In his 1985 commentary on canon 915, Professor Huels writes that, “a manifest sin is one which is publicly known, even if only by a few.”

Although tempting, it is not possible completely to equate the term “manifest” with the term “public”, since, in the 1917 Code these two adjectives are used to describe those who are not allowed a Catholic funeral. (1917 Code of Canon Law, c. 1240. Alii peccatores publici et manifesti [Other public and manifest sinners])If “manifest” were exactly the same as“public”, why would the legislator have used both terms?“ Manifest” can also refer to the fact that certain moral actions by their very essence are always immoral and are objectively wrong.For example, we say that it is“manifest” or clear, i.e., there is no doubt, that a certain moral action is definitely wrong.The term “manifest”would certainly in its definition, a politician who is actively attempting to pass legislation to facilitate direct abortions. Understandably there is overlapping in meaning but the the term “public” can mean “that which is provable in the external forum.”

The Jesuit theologian Father Davis, in his classic Moral and Pastoral Theology published in 1938, declared that,

“He is, relatively speaking, a public sinner, if he is known to be such by those who observe that he asks for the Sacraments. He is said to ask for them publicly, if he does so, in the presence of any others, many or few, who would recognize him as a public sinner.”

The ancient Rituale Romanum stated:

“All the faithful are to be admitted to Holy Communion, except those who are prohibited for a just reason. The publicly unworthy, which are the excommunicated, those under interdict, and the manifestly infamous, such as prostitutes, those cohabiting, usurers, sorcerers, fortune-tellers, blasphemers and other sinners of the public kind, are, however, to be prevented, unless their penitence and amendment has been established and they will have repaired the public scandal.”

Furthermore, as Cardinal Burke mentions in his commentary on canon 915,

“Regarding the denial of Holy Communion, the [1720 Ruthenian] Synod made its own the perennial discipline of the Church:

“Heretics, schismatics, the excommunicated, the interdicted, public criminals, the openly infamous, as also prostitutes, the publicly cohabiting, major usurers, fortune-tellers, and other evil-doing men of the same kind, however, are not to be admitted to the reception of this Sacrament, according to the precept of Christ: ‘Do not give the Holy to dogs’. “

A notorious act here means an act that cannot be concealed.

The well-respected Father William Woestman adds that,

“the public reception of Communion by a public sinner implies that the Church and her ministers somehow condone the public serious sin.”

An author that Ed Peters is familiar with and recommends is the Dominican Father Halligan. Father Halligan, in Administration of the Sacraments, states that a crime

“is public, if it is already divulged or is so situated that it may and must be concluded that it will easily become commonly known.”

Who else was present in the sacristy on the day of Barbara Johnson’s mother’s funeral? Who else could have heard the conversation that took place between Father Guarnizo and Barbara Johnson? Usually before a liturgical ceremony such as a funeral, a number persons can be present in the sacristy (e.g., altar servers, schola members, members of the recently deceased, the parish secretary, etc.).

In addition, reasonableness is assumed in law. Is it not reasonable that the community, largely made up of Barbara Johnson’s family, knew of her lesbian relationship before the funeral if not at least at the funeral?

At family gatherings like funerals or weddings, people “catch up” and learn how everyone and everything has been going since the last funeral or wedding. People find out family news. Even strangers discover a little bit about who’s related to whom and so on. Is it not very reasonable that more than a few people present in that church building knew about the lesbian relationship between Barbara Johnson and her lover?

Every human being lives in a community. What about the community of which Barbara Johnson is a member and amongst whom she lives? Are they supposed to assume that Barbara Johnson received Holy Communion just like everybody else? Doesn’t this create scandal in Cardinal Burke’s first sense where the faithful are led into error about who is worthy to receive Holy Communion?

An unnamed source present at the funeral mentioned that most of the congregation was mysteriously not made up of those around the age of the recently deceased mother but were more around the age of Barbara Johnson. An unusually small percentage of people came up to receive Holy Communion. If these were friends of Barbara Johnson, what about the possible scandal that could have taken place if Father Gaurnizo had given her Holy Communion? This witness is confident that the vast majority of the persons present for the funeral knew about the lesbian “lifestyle” of Barbara Johnson.


3. Grave sin.


Regarding “Grave Sin”, the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts declares that this is, “understood objectively, being that the minister of Communion would not be able to judge from subjective imputability.”


Now that we’ve walked through a working description of the phrase in canon 915 asserting that those who “obstinately persist in manifest grave sin, are not to be admitted to Holy Communion,” what is a concrete example of people who fall into this category? The answer is given to us by Blessed Pope John Paul II, Cardinal Ratzinger, Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the Catholic Catechism and again, the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts.


Blessed John Paul II in Familaris Consortio in 1982:

“The Church reaffirms her practice, which is based upon Sacred Scripture, of not admitting to Eucharistic Communion divorced persons who have remarried. They are unable to be admitted hereto from the fact that their state and condition of life objectively contradict the union of love between Christ and the Church which is signified by the Eucharist. Besides this, there is a another special pastoral reason: if these people were admitted to the Eucharist, the faithful would be led into error and confusion regarding the Church’s teaching about the indissolubility of marriage.”

Cardinal Ratzinger, Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1991:

“As far as the internal forum solution is concerned as a means of resolving the question of the validity of a prior marriage, the magisterium has not sanctioned its use for a number of reasons, among which is the inherent contradiction of resolving something in the internal forum which by its nature also pertains to and has such important consequences for the external forum.”

Catechism of the Catholic Church, numbers 1650-1651:

“If the divorced are remarried civilly, they find themselves in a situation that objectively contravenes God’s law. Consequently, they cannot receive Eucharistic Communion as long as this situation persists. “

Pontifical Commission for Legislative Texts in 2000:

“In effect, the reception of the Body of Christ when one is publicly unworthy constitutes an objective harm to the ecclesial communion: it is a behavior that affects the rights of the Church and of all the faithful to live in accord with the exigencies of that communion. In the concrete case of the admission to Holy Communion of faithful who are divorced and remarried, the scandal, understood as an action that prompts others towards wrongdoing, affects at the same time both the sacrament of the Eucharist and the indissolubility of marriage. That scandal exists even if such behavior, unfortunately, no longer arouses surprise: in fact it is precisely with respect to the deformation of the conscience that it becomes more necessary for Pastors to act, with as much patience as firmness, as a protection to the sanctity of the Sacraments and a defense of Christian morality, and for the correct formation of the faithful.”

The noted 1917 Code commentar Fr. Lincoln Bouscaren, SJ, in Canon Law Digest (vol. 1, 408-409) also relates the case of

“a woman that was living in open concubinage with a relative, went to confession to a missionary, and was admitted by him to Holy Communion. The pastor of the church questioned the propriety of this course of action on the part of the missionary, and referred the matter to the Ordinary of the place. The latter forbade the admission of the woman to Holy Communion until she should have separated from the man with whom she was living. From this decree, the missionary had recourse tot he Sacred Congregation of the Council.

Question: Whether the decree of the Ordinary is to be obeyed.
Reply: In the affirmative.”

Father William Woestman logically concludes that

“the same principles apply to everyone whose habitual lifestyle is manifestly gravely sinful, e.g., the unmarried “living together,” homosexuals or lesbians in a public relationship, those actively participating in the performance of abortions, drug traffickers, gang members.”

We can see that Ed Peters clearly contradicts the point reinterated by Father Woestmann:

“I think that withholding Holy Communion from those divorced and remarried outside the Church is an application of Canon 915 (see, e.g., Kelly, in GB&I COMM [1995] 503), but I need not prove that point to show that withholding the Eucharist from divorced-and-remarrieds, that is, those who status is de iure public, is appropriate under, among other things, the 1994 CDF Letter on Communion for Divorced and Remarried Catholics, n. 6. Of course, as Johnson is apparently not divorced and remarried outside the Church, and because Guarnizo did not suspect her of being so, his implicit appeal to the CDF letter and/or c. 915, fails in law and in fact.”

Objectively, homosexuality is graver than adultery. I don’t understand why Dr. Peters says that it is licit to use canon 915 to deny Holy Communion to those who are divorced and have remarried but it is not licit to use canon 915 for a lesbian in a homosexual relationship.

Up to this point, we’ve applied our attention to law relevant to the particular situation of Baabara Johnson. Now we ask, what should be done practically in a concrete situation?


The Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts again provides the answer:

“Naturally, pastoral prudence would strongly suggest the avoidance of instances of public denial of Holy Communion. Pastors must strive to explain to the concerned faithful the true ecclesial sense of the norm, in such a way that they would be able to understand it or at least respect it. In those situations, however, in which these precautionary measures have not had their effect or in which they were not possible, the minister of Communion must refuse to distribute it to those who are publicly unworthy. They are to do this with extreme charity, and are to look for the opportune moment to explain the reasons that required the refusal. They must, however, do this with firmness, conscious of the value that such signs of strength have for the good of the Church and of souls.”

“The discernment of cases in which the faithful who find themselves in the described condition are to be excluded from Eucharistic Communion is the responsibility of the Priest who is responsible for the community.”

We know that Father Guarnizo did not make the funeral arrangments for Barbara Johnson’s mother. We also know that after hearing confessions from 9:30-10:20am, Father Guarnizo wanted to speak with Barbara before the 10:30am funeral Mass but was blocked by Barbara Johnson’s lover. We also know that Father Guarnizo’s action to deny Holy Communion to Barbara Johnson was extremely discreet.

quarta-feira, 1 de junho de 2011

Sexual solicitation in confession may be more widespread than believed, canonist says

By Dr. Edward N. Peters

In Homiletic and Pastoral Review

All would agree that if a given piece of advice is bad in the confessional, then a priest’s giving it to a penitent would be, at a minimum, a failure in pastoral care. Depending on circumstances, a priest’s proffering of bad advice in confession might even, as a violation of charity or justice, be sinful. But, that the giving of bad advice in confession could be a crime under Church law would be startling. And yet, exactly this reading of Canon 1387 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law is required, I suggest, in light of sound canonical tradition and recent Roman curial norms.

Canon 1387 states: “A priest who in the act, on the occasion, or under the pretext of confession solicits a penitent to sin against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue is to be punished, according to the gravity of the delict, by suspension, prohibitions, and privations; in graver cases he is to be dismissed from the clerical state.” The image of solicitation that springs to mind here is, of course, that of a priest using the confessional to propose carnal liaisons to a female penitent.1 To be sure, such reprehensible behavior is criminalized by Canon 1387. But neither the text of Canon 1387 (specifically the phrase, “solicits a penitent to sin against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue”) nor the tradition behind the modern canon construes the crime of solicitation that narrowly.

First, the canonical crime of solicitation is not limited to cases wherein a confessor’s bad advice given is only toward a penitent’s sexual misconduct with the priest himself. John Martin, commenting on Canon 1387 in the British-Irish canonical commentary Letter & Spirit (1985) at 799, observes: “The offence is committed whether the priest encourages the penitent to sin either with the priest himself or with any third party.” Thomas Green, writing in the 2000 CLSA New Commentary (at 1591), agrees: “The delict might also be verified if the solicited sexual activity involves the penitent and a third party, not necessarily the priest and the penitent.” And Leon del Amo in the 2004 Code of Canon Law Annotated (at 1077), notes: “The offense consists in soliciting the penitent to sin against the sixth commandment, either with the person soliciting or with a third party.” No commentator on the 1983 Code disputes the understanding of solicitation in Canon 1387 as embracing not only a confessor’s advice toward sexual sin between the penitent and the confessor himself, but also between the penitent and a third party. But to see clearly how a confessor’s giving a penitent objectively immoral advice, even if such advice is directed toward the solitary acts of the penitent alone, can also constitute a form of solicitation, a review of canonical commentary on the crime of solicitation under the earlier, 1917 Code, is helpful.

Solicitation under the 1917 Code

Canon 1387 traces its roots to Canons 904 and 2368 § 1 of the 1917 Code, which two norms incorporated by express reference the celebrated penal constitution of Pope Benedict XIV Sacramentum poenitentiae (1741), one of just a handful of documents considered so important by the architect of the 1917 Code, Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, that he arranged for it to be repromulgated in toto as an appendix to the Pio-Benedictine Code. Benedict XIV’s constitution Sacramentum, while not the first universal legislation against solicitation in confession—that distinction belongs to Pope Gregory XV’s constitution Universi (1622)—yielded the most detailed, and indeed still current, description of solicitation in confession as being committed by a priest who “in regard to any sort of penitent [nb: male or female, young or old], either in the act of sacramental confession or [in times or places closely related to confession], solicits to turpitude or shameful deeds…by words or signs or nods or touch or by a writing to be read then or later” (my translation). It was the phrase “solicits to turpitude or shameful deeds” that Pio-Benedictine commentators saw as bringing immoral advice by a confessor to a penitent concerning any sexual matters, to be acted upon in any context, within the purview of solicitation as a canonical crime.

For example, Patrick Lydon, in his famous Ready Answers in Canon Law (1937) at 483, wrote: “Solicitation exists if the confessor sinfully suggests that the person commit impure acts alone or with others, for example, counsels the use of contraceptives.” Nicholas Halligan, in his well-regarded Administration of the Sacraments (1963) at 248, noted that “it makes no difference whether the confessor solicited a male or female penitent…to sin with him with another or solitarily.” Likewise Abbo-Hannan in the Sacred Canons (1960) II: 30 said: “Indeed, the delict is committed even by wrong advice as to the sinfulness of evil thoughts.” And Felix Cappello, perhaps the greatest commentator on sacramental law under the Pio-Benedictine Code, in his Tractatus Canonico-Moralis de Sacramentis (1944) II: 434, pointed to a response by the Sacred Penitentiary that called for the formal denunciation of a confessor who suggested various immoral practices (chiefly deliberate fantasies and self-abuse) to female penitents who were experiencing the extended absence of their husbands.

Because the broad interpretation accorded solicitation meant that what might have been, in some cases, simply malformed (as opposed to malevolent) advice to a penitent could be construed as a criminal act, commentators under the 1917 Code urged that caution be exercised in accepting allegations of solicitation, and that undue haste in investigating allegations of solicitation be avoided. Several authors noted that sufficient awareness by the confessor regarding the depravity of his advice must be proven before full sanctions could be levied. In making these cautionary remarks Pio-Benedictine commentators would surely be joined by commentators on the 1983 Code although, it seems, this aspect of the question has not yet attracted much attention from them. But, aside from a few prudential caveats, there seems to be no doubt that a confessor’s advice toward immoral activity in sexual matters, whether it concerns acts to be performed by the penitent alone, with a third party, or with the confessor himself, constitutes solicitation in confession and hence is a very serious crime under modern canon law.

Procedural directives

Prosecuting cases of alleged solicitation, however, is difficult for a number of reasons. First, because by definition the crime of solicitation occurs with regard to the sacrament of confession, an accused priest will be very limited in what responses he can make in his own defense. Moreover, the very words or actions by which solicitation might be suspected can be open, often enough, to various interpretations. In recognition of this problem Pio-Benedictine commentators analyzed many hypothetical confessor-penitent exchanges to help ecclesiastical authorities distinguish between what were criminal acts of solicitation and what were perhaps imprudent comments or even inappropriate flirtations. Finally, it is clear that mere rumors of solicitation by a confessor, even if untrue, can be very damaging to the reputation of the priest in question and to the integrity of ministry in the Church, and the discussion of possible cases of solicitation outside the strict confines of the canonical investigation process can lead to the suppression, distortion, or exaggeration of the evidence.

To assist local church leaders in handling cases of alleged solicitation in confession under the Pio-Benedictine Code, the Holy See issued two almost identical sets of instructions—the first in 1922, and a second, slightly expanded, in 1962—regarding the manner of proceeding canonically in solicitation cases.2 Both documents were titled Crimen sollicitationis, and both dealt overwhelmingly (as in 70 out of 74 numbered paragraphs in the 1962 version) with the crime of solicitation in confession. Because both documents also dealt very briefly with the canonical process for the investigation of clergy homosexual acts and child sexual abuse, however, it was in the latter, highly charged atmosphere that these documents, chiefly the 1962 version, were most often discussed—and quite often misconstrued.3

Today, in any event, the procedural norms of Crimen are no longer law. The 1962 instruction (which had replaced the 1922 version) was itself replaced in April-May of 2001 by two documents: first, John Paul II’s motu proprio Sacramentorum sanctitatis tutela, which served as a sort of ecclesiastical enabling legislation, and second, a set of implementing norms issued by Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in its “Epistula ad totius Catholicae Ecclesiae Episcopos.”4 It is within a single sentence—indeed, a single phrase within a sentence—of the CDF implementing norms that modern support for the interpretation of the crime of solicitation to include the rendering of objectively immoral advice on sexual matters to a penitent is, I think, to be found.

According to Art.4 §1,4° of the revised “Substantive Norms” for implementing Sacramentorum, among delicts against the sacrament of penance reserved to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith for judgment is “the solicitation to a sin against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue in the act, on the occasion, or under the pretext of confession, mentioned in Canon 1387 of the Code of Canon Law and in Canon 1458 of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, if it is directed to sinning with the confessor himself” (emphasis added). It is the reservation of solicitation cases to the Holy See if they were “directed to sinning with the confessor himself” that warrants comment. First, some context.

The adjudication of most canonical crimes is not reserved to the Holy See. This is how it should be. The inherent dignity of particular churches, their responsibility for their own governance, the principle of subsidiarity, all of these factors and others besides suggest that wherever possible, offenses against church order be adjudicated at the local level. When certain crimes are reserved to the Holy See for judgment, it is generally because special difficulties inherent in certain kinds of cases inhibit their effective processing by a local church whose resources might be taxed by unusually complex prosecutions. Similarly, some offenses are so serious that their doctrinal or canonical reverberations could reach beyond the boundaries of the local church, and so an authority above the local level should be involved in trying them. The crime of solicitation in confession seems both serious enough in content and complex enough in the trying that its reservation to Rome, at least under certain circumstances, makes sense in both regards.

Now, as we have seen, commentary on the 1983 Code is unanimous that solicitation in confession occurs when a confessor gives advice to a penitent that countenances or encourages sexual sin by the penitent with the confessor himself or with a third party. Moreover, given the common interpretation of Pio-Benedictine commentators that solicitation occurs even when confessors advise a penitent toward solitary sexual sin (say, that of self-abuse or the use of pornography)—an interpretation not contradicted by any modern scholar and readily embraced within the text of Canon 1387—it seems clear that, even under the revised law, three distinct fact-patterns (namely, solitary sexual sin, sexual sin with a third party, or sexual sin with the confessor) can present themselves in solicitation cases; but only one of these, namely, solicitation directed toward sinning with the confessor himself, is reserved to the Apostolic See for judgment.

The particular depravity of a confessor advising a penitent (of either sex and of any age) toward sexual sin with the confessor himself warrants, I think, this procedural reservation. The confessor is selfishly seeking to satisfy his own lust and is trying to arrange for the violation of his own sacred person contrary to a host of values embraced by the Western Church obligations of celibacy as binding most clerics and of continence binding all clerics (Canon 277). Moreover, if the penitent being solicited is a minor, the confessor might be in violation of one or more civil laws, the additional consequences of which could reach beyond diocesan boundaries. Such considerations support the reservation of solicitation cases in furtherance of sexual conduct with the confessor himself.

But, precisely because the adjudication of solicitation cases is reserved to the Holy See only when a confessor gave immoral advice to a penitent in furtherance of sexual sin with the confessor himself, a confessor’s giving objectively immoral sexual advice to a penitent, to be acted on either by the penitent alone or by the penitent with a third party, remains a crime under the 1983 Code, but one to be tried at the local level.

Local responsibility to hear solicitation cases

The reservation to Rome of only those solicitation cases involving sin with the confessor himself should not in any way diminish appreciation for the depravity of solicitation cases involving confessional advice toward a penitent sinning sexually with a third party or alone. Indeed, it seems much more likely that confessors will offer penitents objectively immoral advice toward activities they foresee happening between penitents and a third party (such as homosexual acts, heterosexual fornication or adultery, contraception, and so on), or acts to be performed by the penitent alone (such as self-abuse, pornography, voyeurism, and so on), than it is that they will try to induce penitents to sins with the confessors personally, which means that these two forms of solicitation in confession are much more likely to occur.

We end these remarks where we began, that is, by recognizing the fact that the very possibility that certain forms of bad advice in confession could constitute a canonical crime is going to be startling. It is quite likely that most younger priests have never been told of this interpretation of the law, however fixed in the canonical firmament it might have been, and that even older priests might have thought that this broad interpretation of solicitation had fallen into desuetude—a position never probable in itself, and, since the appearance of Sacramentorum sanctitatis, etc., a position quite untenable. Yet, however we arrived at the present situation, the harm being done to souls by bad confessional advice in regard to sexual matters is real and requires an effective ecclesiastical response. I have outlined above the penal response to solicitation cases but, before closing, I would like to offer one additional suggestion.

The venerable institution of “canon penitentiary” (Canon 508 §1 and Canon 968) is almost completely absent from the American Catholic landscape. While here is not the place to present the mechanics of reviving this office (an office apparently required, however, at the arch/diocesan level by Canon 508 §2), it does seem useful to suggest that a properly trained canon penitentiary might be in good position to educate arch/diocesan presbyterates as to the basic law regarding solicitation in confession, and to assist confessors with difficult moral cases.5 The point would not be for canon penitentiaries to resolve solicitation allegations (indeed, their special faculties for the remission of certain kinds of censures are, strictly speaking, irrelevant in the adjudication of solicitation cases), but rather, to establish an officer with expertise in helping priests to avoid running afoul of penal law in the first place.

Confessors who, in response to requests by penitents to be led closer to God, offer instead advice toward conduct that leads the faithful further away from him, do damage to those souls and to the wider faith community. Those charged with the care of the community of believers should not delay in advising their priests of the law on solicitation in confession, nor should they hesitate to investigate and, where warranted, to punish such serious crimes promptly.


Dr. Edward Peters holds the Edmund Cardinal Szoka Chair at Sacred Heart Major Seminary in Detroit. His articles and reviews have appeared in numerous journals of canon law around the world, and he serves as a canonical consultant to a number of ecclesiastical persons and institutions. In 2010 Pope Benedict XVI appointed Dr. Peters to a five-year term as Referendary of the Apostolic Signatura.


End notes

1. Anecdotal evidence indicates that some penitents have received bad advice regarding other important areas of moral life (for example in regard to decision-making on bio-medical questions), but Canon 1987 criminalizes only the giving of objectively immoral advice in regard to the sixth commandment of the Decalogue, that is, sexual conduct. See Green, CLSA Commentary (1985) at 927. How the Church should deal with the problem of confessors giving immoral advice regarding, say, euthanasia or infanticide, is not addressed here.
2. An unofficial English translation of the 1962 instruction is available online at http://www.vatican.va/resources/resources_crimen-sollicitationis-1962_en.html.
3. For a refutation of one of the more egregious media misrepresentations of Crimen, see my “Smearing the Pope: The BBC and Benedict XVI,” Catholic World Report (December 2006) at 40-43, available online at: http://www.renewamerica.com/images/columns/080520abbott.pdf. For a good overview of what the 1962 version of Crimen did—and did not—say, see John Beal, “The 1962 instruction Crimen sollicitationis: caught red-handed or handed a red herring?” Studia canonica, 41 (2007), 199–236, available online at http://www.vatican.va/resources/Beal-article-studia-canonica41-2007-pp.199-236.pdf.
4. See John Paul II, Sacramentorum sanctitatis tutela (April 30, 2001), Acta Apostolicae Sedis 93 (2001), 737-739, and Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Epistula ad totius Catholicae Ecclesiae Episcopos aliosque … de delictis gravioribus eidem Congregationi pro Doctrina Fidei reservatis” (May 18, 2001), Acta Apostolicae Sedis 93 (2001), 785-788. The CDF implementing norms were themselves modified most recently in 2010 and (even though these modifications do not affect the topic of solicitation in confession) resort should always be had to the current norms when processing contemporary solicitation cases. The revised norms are available online at: http://www.vatican.va/resources/resources_norme_en.html.
5. I am indebted to a conversation with Timothy Ferguson, JCL, of the Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Detroit for suggesting the possibility of canon penitentiaries serving as resource persons for confessors facing difficult sexual morality questions.

sexta-feira, 3 de dezembro de 2010

Papa Benedicto XVI es artífice de reforma penal en la Iglesia ante abusos sexuales


CIUDAD DEL VATICANO, 2 DIC 2010 (VIS).-Ofrecemos el artículo del obispo Juan Ignacio Arrieta, secretario del Pontificio Consejo para los Textos Legislativos, que la revista italiana “Civiltà Cattolica” publicará el próximo 4 de diciembre, con el título: “La influencia del Cardenal Ratzinger en la revisión del sistema penal canónico”.

En las próximas semanas, el Pontificio Consejo para los Textos Legislativos enviará a sus Miembros y Consultores un borrador con propuestas de reforma del Libro VI del Código de Derecho Canónico, que es la base del sistema penal de la Iglesia. Una Comisión de expertos en derecho penal ha trabajado durante casi dos años en la revisión del texto promulgado en 1983, a la luz de las necesidades que han surgido en los años posteriores. Se ha pretendido mantener la estructura general del texto y la numeración correspondiente de los cánones pero, al mismo tiempo, modificar claramente algunas opciones que se hicieron entonces y que después se han revelado como no del todo adecuadas.



La iniciativa –cuya realización definitiva deberá todavía esperar hasta que se hagan las necesarias consultas y se presente finalmente el texto a la aprobación del Supremo Legislador– surgió del encargo específico dado por Su Santidad Benedicto XVI al Presidente y al Secretario del Pontificio Consejo, en la primera Audiencia concedida a los nuevos Superiores del Dicasterio, en Castel Gandolfo, el 28 de septiembre de 2007. En el curso de dicho encuentro, y debido a los diversos problemas de orden técnico que surgieron espontáneamente en la conversación, resultó evidente que dicha disposición respondía a una convicción profunda del Pontífice, madurada a lo largo de muchos años de experiencia directa, así como a una preocupación por la integridad y la aplicación coherente de la disciplina dentro de la Iglesia; convicción y preocupación que –como se verá a continuación– han guiado los pasos del actual Pontífice desde el principio de su trabajo como Prefecto de la Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe, a pesar de las dificultades objetivas debidas, entre otras cosas, a la concreta coyuntura legislativa en la que se encontraba la Iglesia en 1983, apenas promulgado el Código de Derecho Canónico.

Para valorarlo mejor recordamos algunos aspectos del cuadro legislativo que por entonces había quedado redefinido.

El sistema penal del Código de 1983

El sistema penal del Código de 1983 posee una estructura sustancialmente nueva con respecto al anterior Codex de 1917, y se enmarca en el contexto eclesiológico del Concilio Vaticano II. En cuanto al tema que nos ocupa, la disciplina penal se inspira en los criterios de subsidiariedad y “descentralización” (5° Principio Directivo para la Revisión del CIC aprobado por el Sínodo de los Obispos de 1967), conceptos usados para indicar la atención singular que se otorgaba al Derecho particular y, sobre todo, a la iniciativa de cada uno de los Obispos en el gobierno pastoral, siendo ellos, como enseña el Concilio (LG n. 27), Vicarios de Cristo en sus respectivas diócesis. En efecto, en la mayoría de los casos, el Código atribuye a los Ordinarios locales y a los Superiores religiosos el cometido de discernir la conveniencia de imponer sanciones penales, y el modo de aplicarlas en cada situación.

Sin embargo, otro elemento influyó aún más profundamente en el nuevo Derecho penal canónico: las formalidades jurídicas y los modelos de garantía que se establecieron para la aplicación de las penas canónicas (6° y 7° de los Principios Directivos para la Revisión del CIC). En sintonía con el enunciado de los derechos fundamentales de todos los bautizados, que apareció por primera vez en el Código, se adoptaron unos sistemas de protección y de tutela de dichos derechos, en parte tomados de la tradición canónica de la Iglesia, y en parte provenientes de otras experiencias jurídicas, que no siempre resultaban completamente acordes con la realidad de la Iglesia en todo el mundo. Las garantías son imprescindibles, sobre todo en el sistema penal; pero hace falta que sean equilibradas y, al mismo tiempo, permitan la tutela efectiva del interés común. La experiencia posterior ha demostrado que algunas de las técnicas establecidas en el Código para garantizar los derechos y asegurar su tutela, como exige la Justicia, no son imprescindibles, de modo que se podrían haber sustituido por otras garantías más en consonancia con la realidad eclesial; es más, dichas técnicas representaban en algunos casos un obstáculo objetivo, a veces insuperable por la escasez de medios, para la aplicación efectiva del sistema penal.

Por paradójico que resulte ahora una afirmación así, se podría decir que el Libro VI sobre las sanciones penales es, entre los Libros del Código, el que menos se “benefició” de las continuas variaciones normativas que caracterizaron el período postconciliar. En efecto, otros sectores de la disciplina canónica tuvieron la oportunidad durante aquel tiempo de confrontarse con la realidad concreta de la Iglesia a través de una variedad de normas ad experimentum, que permitieron evaluar posteriormente, cuando se redactaron las normas definitivas del Código, el resultado concreto, positivo o negativo. En cambio, el nuevo sistema penal, aun siendo “prácticamente nuevo” respeto del precedente, se vio privado de la “oportunidad” de confrontarse con una experiencia directa, por lo que tuvo que partir casi “de cero” en 1983. El número de delitos tipificados había quedado drásticamente reducido sólo a aquellos comportamientos de especial gravedad, y la imposición de las sanciones quedó encomendada a los criterios de valoración de cada Ordinario, inevitablemente diferentes.

Hay que añadir, además, que en este sector de la disciplina canónica se notaba particularmente –y todavía hoy puede percibirse– el influjo de un difundido anti-juridicismo que, entre otras cosas, se reflejaba en la dificultad “ficticia” de lograr compaginar las exigencias de la caridad pastoral con las de la justicia y el buen gobierno. En efecto, incluso la misma redacción de algunos cánones del Código contiene exhortaciones a la tolerancia que, a veces, podrían ser interpretadas incorrectamente como un intento de disuadir al Ordinario del empleo de las sanciones penales, en los casos en que fuese necesario por exigencias de justicia.
Estas observaciones, que ciertamente habría que matizar, aunque no es posible hacerlo aquí detenidamente, trazan a grandes líneas algunas directrices del sistema penal del Código vigente que, a su vez, se colocaba en el contexto general de otras muchas importantes innovaciones disciplinares y de gobierno promovidas por el Concilio Vaticano II, pero que “cristalizaron” sólo con la promulgación del Cuerpo codicial.


La petición de la Doctrina de la Fe (febrero de 1988)

En este contexto legislativo que he tratado de esbozar, supuso pues un evidente elemento de contraste una carta que, el 19 de febrero de 1988, escribió el Prefecto de la entonces Sagrada Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe, el Cardenal Joseph Ratzinger, al Presidente de la entonces denominada Pontificia Comisión para la Interpretación Auténtica del Código de Derecho Canónico. Se trata de un documento importante y único, en el que se ponen de relieve las consecuencias negativas para la Iglesia causadas por algunas opciones del sistema penal establecido apenas cinco años antes. Dicho escrito ha sido retomado durante los trabajos que está realizando en estos momentos el Pontificio Consejo para los Textos Legislativos para revisar el Libro VI del Código.

El motivo de la carta está bien delimitado. La Sagrada Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe era por entonces competente para estudiar las peticiones de dispensa de las obligaciones sacerdotales asumidas con la ordenación. La concesión de dicha dispensa era un maternal gesto de gracia por parte de la Iglesia, después de haber examinado atentamente, por un lado, el conjunto de todas las circunstancias que concurrían en el caso concreto, y de haber ponderado, por otro, la objetiva gravedad de los compromisos que se habían asumido ante Dios y la Iglesia en la ordenación sacerdotal. Las circunstancias que motivaban algunas de estas peticiones de dispensa de estos compromisos, sin embargo, no eran en modo alguno meritorias de actos de gracia. El texto de la carta pone elocuentemente de relieve dicha problemática:

Eminencia, este Dicasterio, al examinar las peticiones de dispensa de los compromisos sacerdotales, encuentra casos de sacerdotes que, durante el ejercicio de su ministerio, se han hecho culpables de graves y escandalosos comportamientos, para los cuales el CJC, previo adecuado procedimiento, prevé la irrogación de sanciones concretas, sin excluir la reducción al estado laical.

A juicio de este Dicasterio, dichas medidas, por el bien de los fieles, deberían ser anteriores, en algunos casos, a la eventual concesión de la dispensa sacerdotal que, por su propia naturaleza, se configura como una ‘gracia’ en favor del orador. Sin embargo, dada la complejidad del procedimiento previsto a este propósito por el Código, es previsible que algunos Ordinarios encuentren muchas dificultades para realizarlo.

Agradeceré por tanto a Vuestra Eminencia Reverendísima si pudiera hacer conocer su estimado parecer sobre la eventual posibilidad de prever, en casos determinados, un procedimiento más rápido y simplificado.

La carta refleja, ante todo, la repugnancia natural del sistema de la Justicia para conceder como “acto de gracia” (dispensa de las obligaciones sacerdotales) algo que, en cambio, es necesario imponer como castigo (dimisión ex poena del estado clerical). En efecto, en ocasiones, queriendo eludir las “complicaciones técnicas” de los procedimientos establecidos en el Código para castigar conductas delictivas, se recurría a que el culpable pidiera “voluntariamente” abandonar el ministerio sacerdotal. De esta manera, se llegaba, por así decirlo, al mismo resultado “práctico”, es decir, a la expulsión del sujeto del estado clerical –si ésa era la sanción penal prevista–, evitando al mismo tiempo “engorrosos” procedimientos jurídicos. Era un modo “pastoral” de proceder, como solía decirse en estos casos, al margen de lo que preveía el derecho. Pero actuando de este modo, se renunciaba también a la Justicia y, como señaló el Cardenal Ratzinger, se dejaba injustamente de lado “el bien de los fieles”. Ése era el motivo central de la petición, y también la razón por la que se hacía necesario dar prioridad, en estos casos, a la imposición de justas sanciones penales mediante procedimientos más rápidos y sencillos que los previstos en el Código de Derecho Canónico.

Hay que tener en cuenta, además, que aunque el Código reconocía la existencia de una jurisdicción específica de la Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe en materia penal (CIC, can. 1362 § 1, 1°), incluso fuera de los casos de evidente carácter doctrinal –en delitos de herejía, por ejemplo, así como los delitos más graves en relación al sacramento de la Penitencia, como el delito de la solicitación–, no era en cambio evidente en el contexto normativo de entonces qué otros delitos concretos pudiesen estar comprendidos en las competencias penales del Dicasterio. Por otro lado, el canon 6 del Código había abrogado expresamente cualquier otra ley penal anterior: “Desde la entrada en vigor de este Código, se abrogan… cualesquiera leyes penales, universales o particulares, promulgadas por la Sede Apostólica, a no ser que se reciban en este mismo Código”; y, además, las normas de la Constitución apostólica Regimini Ecclesiae universae, de 1967, que fijaban las competencias de los Dicasterios de la Curia romana, se limitaban a encomendar a la Congregación la tarea de "tutelar la doctrina de la fe y costumbres en todo el orbe católico" (art. 29).

La carta del Prefecto de la Congregación presupone, por tanto, que la responsabilidad jurídica en materia penal recaía sobre los Ordinarios o los Superiores religiosos, como resulta de la literalidad del Código.


La respuesta de la Pontificia Comisión para la Interpretación (marzo de 1988)

Al cabo de tres semanas llegó la respuesta de la entonces Pontificia Comisión, con carta del 10 de marzo de 1988. La rapidez y el contenido de la misma se explican por la peculiaridad legislativa del momento: había apenas concluido el esfuerzo codificador que durante décadas había ocupado a la Comisión y, de hecho, se estaba todavía realizando la adecuación a la nueva disciplina codicial de las otras normas del derecho universal y particular, además de las propias de otras instituciones de gobierno de la Iglesia. La respuesta mostraba, ciertamente, que se compartían las motivaciones aducidas y la conveniencia de anteponer las sanciones penales a cualquier concesión de gracias; inevitablemente, sin embargo, en la respuesta se confirmaba también la necesidad prioritaria de atenerse debidamente a las normas del Código apenas promulgado por parte de quienes tenían autoridad y poder jurídico para hacerlo.

El texto que el entonces Presidente de la Pontificia Comisión envió al Cardenal Prefecto de la Doctrina de la Fe es también testimonio de la situación del momento: Entiendo bien la preocupación de Vuestra Eminencia de que los correspondientes Ordinarios no hayan ejercido antes su potestad judicial para castigar adecuadamente, también como tutela del bien común de los fieles, dichos delitos. Sin embargo, el problema no parece ser de procedimiento jurídico sino del ejercicio responsable de la función de gobierno.

En el Código vigente han sido determinados claramente los delitos que pueden comportar la pérdida del estado clerical: éstos han sido configurados en los cann. 1364 § 1, 1367, 1370, 1387, 1394 y 1395. Al mismo tiempo, se ha simplificado mucho el procedimiento respecto a las precedentes normas del CIC 1917, haciéndolo más rápido y sencillo, también con la finalidad de impulsar a los Ordinarios al ejercicio de su autoridad, mediante el necesario juicio de los culpables "ad normam iuris" y la aplicación de las sanciones previstas.

Tratar de simplificar ulteriormente el procedimiento judicial para infligir o declarar sanciones tan graves como la dimisión del estado clerical, o bien cambiar la actual norma del 1342 § 2, que prohíbe proceder en estos casos mediante decreto administrativo extrajudicial (cfr. can. 1720), no parece en absoluto conveniente. En efecto, por un lado se pondría en peligro el derecho fundamental a la defensa –en causas que conciernen al estado de la persona–, mientras que, por otro, se favorecería la deplorable tendencia –quizás por falta del debido conocimiento o estima por el derecho– a un equívoco gobierno, denominado "pastoral", que en el fondo no es pastoral, porque lleva a descuidar el debido ejercicio de la autoridad, dañando el bien común de los fieles.

También en otros períodos difíciles de la vida de la Iglesia, de confusión de las conciencias y de relajamiento de la disciplina eclesiástica, los sagrados Pastores no han dejado de ejercer su potestad judicial, para tutelar el bien supremo de la "salus animarum".

La carta añade luego un excursus sobre el debate que, durante los trabajos de revisión del Código, se llevó a cabo antes de decidir que no se incluyera en el mismo la así llamada dimisión “ex officio” del estado clerical. Se pensó, en efecto, que las causas que habrían podido justificar dicho procedimiento “ex officio” habían sido casi todas tipificadas entre los delitos para los que estaba prevista la dimisión del estado clerical (cfr. Communicationes 14 [1982] 85), hasta el punto de que, por este mismo motivo, tampoco las nuevas Normas para la dispensa del celibato sacerdotal, del 14 de octubre de 1980 (AAS 72 [1980] 1136-1137), aludían a este procedimiento, contemplado, en cambio, en las anteriores Normas de 1971 (AAS 63 [1971] 303 – 308).

Teniendo en cuenta todo esto –concluía la respuesta–, esta Pontificia Comisión opina que se debe insistir oportunamente ante los Obispos (cfr. can. 1389) para que, cada vez que sea necesario, no dejen de ejercer su potestad judicial y coactiva, en lugar de enviar a la Santa Sede las peticiones de dispensa.
Aun compartiendo la exigencia de fondo de tutelar “el bien común de los fieles”, de hecho, la Pontificia Comisión creyó arriesgado renunciar a algunas garantías concretas en vez de exhortar en cambio, a quien tenía la responsabilidad, para que aplicara las disposiciones del derecho.
El intercambio de cartas entre los Dicasterios concluyó, por entonces, con una respuesta cortés del Prefecto de la Congregación al Presidente de la Pontificia Comisión, del 14 de mayo siguiente:

Deseo comunicarle que ha llegado a este Dicasterio su estimado voto acerca de la posibilidad de prever un procedimiento más rápido y simplificado que el actual para la irrogación de eventuales sanciones por parte de los competentes Ordinarios, respecto de aquellos sacerdotes que sean culpables de graves y escandalosos comportamientos. Al respeto, deseo asegurar a Vuestra Eminencia Reverendísima que cuanto ha expuesto será tenido atentamente en consideración por parte de esta Congregación.


La Pastor Bonus extiende las competencias de la Congregación (junio de 1988)

La cuestión parecía formalmente concluida, pero el problema no se había resuelto. De hecho, la primera señal importante de cambio de situación llegó, por una vía bien distinta, justo un mes después, con la promulgación de la Constitución apostólica Pastor Bonus que modificó la organización de la Curia Romana que la Regimini Ecclesiae universae había establecido en 1967, reordenando las competencias de cada uno de los Dicasterios. El art. 52 de esta norma pontificia, que hoy en día continúa en vigor, establece de modo claro la jurisdicción penal exclusiva de la Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe, no sólo respecto de los delitos contra la fe o en la celebración de los sacramentos, sino también respecto de los “delitos más graves cometidos contra la moral”.

La Congregación para la Doctrina de la fe “examina los delitos cometidos contra la fe y también los delitos más graves cometidos contra la moral o en la celebración de los sacramentos, que le sean denunciados y, en caso necesario, procede a declarar o imponer sanciones canónicas a tenor del derecho, tanto común como propio” (Pastor Bonus, art. 52).

Este texto, evidentemente propuesto por la Congregación presidida por el Cardenal Ratzinger en función de la propia experiencia, está directamente relacionado con cuanto estamos viendo, y resulta aún más significativo si se tiene en cuenta el hecho de que el “borrador” de la ley –el Schema Legis Peculiaris de Curia Romana, preparado tres años antes– se había limitado prácticamente a reproducir la formulación de las competencias asignadas a ese Dicasterio en 1967 por la Regimini, diciendo únicamente que la Congregación “delicta contra fidem cognoscit, atque ubi opus fuerit ad canonicas sanctiones declarandas aut irrogandas, ad normam iuris procedit” (Schema Legis Peculiaris de Curia Romana, art. 36, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis 1985, p. 35).

Así, pues, y con respecto a la situación anterior, el cambio de la Constitución apostólica Pastor Bonus es evidentemente relevante, sobre todo si se tiene en cuenta que esta vez se llevaba a cabo en el contexto normativo del Código de 1983 y, con referencia a los delitos en él definidos, además del “derecho propio” de dicha Congregación. Por consiguiente, en un contexto normativo presidido por los mencionados criterios de “subsidiariedad” y “descentralización”, la Constitución apostólica Pastor Bonus realizaba ahora un acto jurídico por el que se “reservaba” a la Santa Sede (cfr. CIC can. 381 § 1) toda una categoría de delitos, que el Sumo Pontífice confiaba a la jurisdicción exclusiva de la Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe. Difícilmente se hubiera realizado una opción de este tipo, que determinaba mejor las competencias de la Congregación y modificaba el criterio del Código sobre quién debía aplicar estas penas canónicas, si el sistema en su conjunto hubiese funcionado de forma adecuada.
De todos modos, la mencionada norma resultaba todavía insuficiente desde el punto de vista operativo. Elementales exigencias de seguridad jurídica imponían, en efecto, la necesidad de identificar primero cuáles eran en concreto los “delitos más graves” cometidos tanto contra la moral como en la celebración de los sacramentos, que la Pastor Bonus confiaba a la Congregación sustrayéndolos a la jurisdicción de los Ordinarios.


Dos intervenciones sucesivas de singular relieve

Los episodios ilustrados hasta ahora se refieren, como hemos visto, a un breve período de tiempo: algunos meses de la primera mitad del año 1988. En términos generales, en los años sucesivos se trató de hacer frente a las situaciones que iban apareciendo en el ámbito penal de la Iglesia con los criterios generales del Código de 1983, sustancialmente recogidos en la carta de la Pontificia Comisión para la Interpretación del Código de Derecho Canónico. Se buscó, de hecho, alentar la intervención de los Ordinarios locales, en ocasiones tratando de facilitar los procedimientos, o también a través de un derecho especial, en diálogo sobre todo con las Conferencias Episcopales más interesadas. Después, a lo largo de los años noventa, se han realizado numerosas reuniones y proyectos sobre este tema, implicando a diversos Dicasterios de la Curia romana, como puede fácilmente documentarse.

Sin embargo, la experiencia que seguía poniéndose de manifiesto confirmaba la insuficiencia de todas estas soluciones y la necesidad de adoptar otras de mayor envergadura y a un nivel diferente. De modo particular, dos de ellas han modificado de manera significativa el cuadro del Derecho penal canónico sobre el que ha estado trabajando en estos últimos meses el Pontificio Consejo para los Textos Legislativos, y ambas medidas tuvieron como protagonista central al actual Pontífice, en perfecta continuidad con las preocupaciones que había manifestado en la carta de 1988, a la que nos hemos referido más arriba.

La primera de estas iniciativas, de sobra conocida, fue la preparación, en el último periodo de los años noventa, de las Normas sobre los denominados delicta graviora. Esas Normas dieron efectividad al art. 52 de la Constitución apostólica Pastor Bonus al indicar en concreto cuáles eran los delitos contra la moral y los cometidos en la celebración de los sacramentos que había que considerar como “particularmente graves” y, por tanto, de la exclusiva competencia de la Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe.

Dichas Normas, promulgadas finalmente en el año 2001, siguen necesariamente una “tendencia contraria” a los criterios previstos por el Código para la aplicación de las sanciones penales, y por ello en muchos ambientes fueron tildadas de Normas “centralizadoras” cuando, en realidad, respondían a un concreto deber de “suplencia” dirigido, en primer término, a resolver un serio problema eclesial de operatividad del sistema penal y, en segundo lugar, a asegurar un tratamiento uniforme de este tipo de causas en toda la Iglesia. A este respecto, la Congregación tuvo que preparar, antes que nada, las correspondientes normas internas de procedimiento y, al mismo tiempo, reorganizar el Dicasterio para que la actividad judicial estuviera en todo conforme a las reglas procesales establecidas por el Código.

Por otro lado, en los años posteriores al 2001, y sobre la base de la experiencia jurídica que se iba adquiriendo, el entonces Prefecto de la Congregación recibió del Santo Padre nuevas facultades y dispensas para afrontar las diversas situaciones, llegando incluso a la definición de nuevos casos penales. Se llegó en tanto a la convicción de que la “gracia” de la dispensa de las obligaciones sacerdotales y la consiguiente reducción al estado laical de los clérigos reos confesos de delitos muy graves era también una gracia concedida pro bono Ecclesiae. Por eso mismo, en algunos casos particularmente graves, la Congregación no dudó en pedir al Sumo Pontífice el decreto de dimisión del estado clerical ex officio contra los clérigos que se habían manchado con crímenes abominables. Estas sucesivas adecuaciones han sido recogidas ahora en las Normas sobre los delicta graviora publicadas por la Congregación el pasado mes de julio.

Hay, además, otra iniciativa del actual Pontífice, mucho menos conocida, a la que querría referirme brevemente, porque en el momento presente ha contribuido de manera decisiva a modificar el panorama de la aplicación del Derecho penal en la Iglesia. Se trata de su intervención, en calidad de Miembro de la Congregación para la Evangelización de los Pueblos, en la preparación de las “facultades especiales” concedidas por el Papa a esta Congregación para afrontar, también en vía de obligada “suplencia”, otro género de problemas disciplinares en los lugares de misión.
Se puede entender fácilmente, en efecto, que, a causa de la escasez de medios de todo tipo, en las circunscripciones de misión que dependen de la Congregación para la Evangelización de los Pueblos, y que aproximadamente representan la mitad del orbe católico, los obstáculos para aplicar el sistema penal del Código se constaten de modo particular.

Por este motivo, en la Reunión Plenaria de febrero de 1997, dicha Congregación decidió solicitar al Santo Padre “facultades especiales” que le permitieran intervenir por vía administrativa en determinadas situaciones penales, al margen de las disposiciones generales del Código; de aquella Plenaria fue Relator el entonces Prefecto de la Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe. Como es bien sabido, aquellas “facultades” fueron actualizadas y ampliadas en el año 2008, y otras de naturaleza análoga, si bien más adecuadas a sus necesidades particulares, fueron después concedidas también a la Congregación para el Clero.

No parece necesario añadir nada más. En las sedes apropiadas se han publicado ya estudios que ilustran suficientemente las variaciones que se han dado en el Derecho penal de la Iglesia con todas estas iniciativas. La experiencia dirá en qué medida las modificaciones que se trata ahora de aportar al Libro VI del Código conseguirán reequilibrar la situación. Ahora, sin embargo, deseaba sobre todo poner de relieve el papel determinante que, en este proceso de más de veinte años de renovación de la disciplina penal, ha desempeñado la decidida actuación del actual Pontífice, hasta el punto de representar sin duda alguna, junto a tantas otras iniciativas concretas, una de las “constantes” que ha caracterizado la acción de Joseph Ratzinger.
…/ VIS 20101202 (4200)