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domingo, 15 de setembro de 2013

A Defense of Thomistic Natural Law - by Howard P. Kainz, Ph.D.

In HPR

Natural law theory has a long and distinguished pedigree in the Western world, beginning in ancient Greece, where major philosophers refer to a certain law or laws superseding human laws. Anaximander, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Anaxagoras propounded theories of cosmic harmony and the way that humans should, or do, participate in it; and Hippias (ca. 460-390 B.C.) spoke about a divine law that can never and nowhere be superseded. Plato in his Republic and Laws speaks of an ideal “divine” law existing prior to all human affairs; and Aristotle, in offering advice to defense lawyers in his Rhetoric gives examples of civil and criminal cases where the lawyer could cite generally recognized but unwritten “universal” laws which have priority over the state-sanctioned laws which their clients are accused of breaking.

Natural law attained a certain preeminence in Christianity due to St. Paul’s invocation (Romans 2:14-16, 21-24) of a “law engraved on the hearts” of pagans who had never heard of Jewish laws, and Paul’s favorable contrast of such unbelievers with Jews who disobey the laws laid down in the Ten Commandments – Jews who “preach against stealing, yet steal; forbid adultery, yet commit adultery,” etc.

St. Paul may have been influenced by Stoic philosophers who held sway in his time, and extolled a supreme law of nature for all peoples. Among the Stoics, Cicero offered the first and strongest explicit defense of a law which:
cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one thing today and another tomorrow, but in all times and nations this universal law must for ever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author, its promulgator, its enforcer.
Cicero’s concept of natural law was connected, of course, with his ideal of human participation in a harmonious and finely-tuned universe, presenting individuals and societies with an exemplar for ideal moral decision-making and conduct. In our own era of the “Big Bang” theory of cosmic explosion, and Darwinian theories about the evolution of the earth and living species, notions about human coordination with the “rhythms of nature” may seem overly idealistic or even poetic – although for some nature-lovers this idea still has appeal.

During the Middle Ages, Roman jurists like Ulpian and Gaius distinguished natural law from civil law and the “law of nations.”  Canonists of the Church, like Gratian and Rufinus, developed the theory of natural law even further, including incipient concepts of natural rights, as Brian Tierney shows in his excellent book, The Idea of Natural Rights.

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), and other Scholastics, brought these efforts to final fruition. Aquinas, in his Summa theologiae 1a2ae, Q. 94, discusses the general self-evident principle of ethics, “good is to be done, and evil avoided. In article 94:2, he shows how this general principle takes on flesh, so to speak, in three concrete precepts of the natural law:
The order of precepts of the natural law exists according to the order of natural inclinations … (1) Every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law … (2) Those things are said to belong to the natural law, which nature has taught to all animals, such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth … (3) Man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
These three precepts are not original with Aquinas, but were also held by predecessors, such as William of Auxerre and Roland of Cremona, and cited by subsequent scholastics, such as Francisco Suarez, S.J. (1548-1617), who writes, along the same lines, but with a slightly different emphasis:
Man is (as it were) an individual entity, and as such has an inclination to preserve his own being, and to safeguard his own welfare; he is also a being corruptible – that is to say, mortal – and as such is inclined towards the preservation of the species, and towards the actions necessary to that end; and finally, he is a rational being, and as such is suited for immortality, for spiritual perfection, and for communication with God, and social intercourse with rational creatures. Hence, the natural law brings man to perfection, with regard to every one of his tendencies and, in this capacity, it contains various precepts – for example, precepts of temperance and of fortitude, relating to the first tendency mentioned above; those of chastity and prudence, relating to the second tendency; and those of religion, justice and so forth, relating to the third tendency.
During the French Enlightenment, Montesquieu (1689-1775), in The Spirit of the Laws, describes the basic inclinations of the “law of nature” along the same lines as Aquinas:  “the preservation of one’s being” and “seeking for nourishment”; “the attraction arising from the difference of sexes”; and the “advantage of acquired knowledge” and the “desire of living in society.”

Without doubt, the third precept, which has to do with the special exigencies of rational beings, is the most important natural law mandate. It is this third precept that was reiterated by Protestant natural-law theorists, such as Grotius (1583-1645), Cumberland (1631-1718), and Pufendorf (1632-1694), who emphasized the natural altruism of humans and, like Aquinas, the necessity of developing rational and harmonious social structures.
It is often asserted that David Hume (1711-1776) “upset the apple cart” for natural law with the following pithy statement, widely taken out of context, in his Treatise of Human Nature, about not deriving an “ought” from an “is”:
{Morality} consists not in any matter of fact which can be discovered by the understanding … Can there be any difficulty in proving that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? … {However,} in every system of morality which I have hitherto met with … the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find that, instead of … Is, and Is not, I meet with … ought, or an ought not… This ought, or ought not … should be observ’d and explain’d… A reason should be given … how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.
This prohibition (popularly called “Hume’s Guillotine”) is interpreted by many contemporary philosophers as interdicting any further attempts to make moral judgements based on essential aspects of human nature. As an example of this interpretation, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) would stand out as one of the first practitioners of Hume’s caveat. Kant, in his moral philosophy, proposed his “Categorical Imperative” (CI) as the general format for proper ethical reasoning: Employing the CI, the ethical decision-maker must dismiss all human inclinations, and, purely on the basis of the cerebral deliberations of practical reason, formulate only those “maxims” which one would be willing to stand as a universal norm for all humans. This formula has been widely criticized by modern philosophers. For example, R.M. Hare shows that, with a little tweaking, a hypothetical Nazi could devise a CI which would justify him in exterminating Jews.

Nevertheless, Darwin’s theory of natural selection of the species, coupled with various theories of the evolution of homo sapiens from the hunter-gatherer stage, have led to a conception of human nature as almost infinitely variable. This assumed variability seems to stand in the way of any attempts by moralists to derive some reasonably stable moral norms based on human nature.

Thus many contemporary ethicists try, like Kant, to adhere religiously to Hume’s “Guillotine,” focusing only on moral conclusions that can be derived from pure practical reason alone, without any distracting attention to the “facts” of human nature or the welter of human inclinations.

Philosophers are an ornery bunch, however, and many of them have tried to beat Hume at his game, by showing ways in which “oughts” can be, and are indeed, derived from “is.” But probably the best refutation of the supposed is-ought Guillotine comes from Hume himself, who, if one reads a little further in the Treatise, shows how he thinks the task of deriving “oughts” should take place:
See if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but `tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. The fact that we feel a strong repugnance against murder leads us to conclude that murder is wrong.
In other words, there are facts … and there are facts. Hume was against deriving moral principles from certain “external” facts. Alasdair MacIntyre points to a tract read by Hume as a young man in a Presbyterian household, The Whole Duty of Man, which tried to deduce moral duties from Christian “facts” about creation of the world and man. I have suggested in my 2004 book, Natural Law: an Introduction and Reexamination, that Hume’s reaction was triggered by Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688) and Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), proponents of “rational morality” deducing moral truths from metaphysical and religious “facts.”

But Hume was not against derivation from “internal” facts. Quite the contrary, his moral theory is based on internal facts; and, because of that, he is frequently categorized as a “moral-sense” theorist. Moral-sense theory, insofar as it is concerned with basic human tendencies, has some affinity with natural law theory. As Frederick Copleston, S.J., concludes in Volume 5 of his History of Philosophy:
{Hume’s} insistence on the original constitution or fabric of human nature suggests that this nature is in some sense the foundation of morality or, in other words, that there is a natural law which is promulgated by reason apprehending human nature in its teleological and dynamic aspect.
In the 20th century, some unsettling developments led to a re-consideration of the existence of a natural law. In 1945-46, the Nuremberg trials, in which the victors in WWII condemned and executed Nazi officials who arguably were following the laws of their country, raised the question, “on the basis of what law are we judging them?” Is there some superior law, or are there superior laws, to which even the properly legislated laws of the nations have to be subject? For infractions of these higher laws can “law-abiding” citizens of those nations be condemned?

Proponents of such an overarching law began to speak out. Lon Fuller, Jerome Frank, and others voiced renewed support of natural law, and skepticism about the prevailing hegemony of “legal realism.” The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the U.N. in 1948 may be seen as an additional movement for clarifying laws and rights that stand above all national and civil enactments.

In the Catholic Church during the 60s, new cultural strains added to the quest for information about eternal and universal laws which might trump the positive laws enacted by regimes, and even democratic polities. The emergence and popularity of the contraceptive pill, combined with the invocation of natural law against contraception by Pope Paul VI, led to renewed debates by theologians and philosophers concerning the validity of natural law. The widespread opposition of theologians, priests and prelates, as well as lay Catholics, to Pope Paul VI’s 1968 encyclical against contraception, Humanae vitae, is still fresh in the memory of many older Catholics. Dissident theologians published a full page ad in the New York Times advising Catholics to just follow their conscience, and not be concerned about the overly negative restrictions in the encyclical.

But then, in an attempt to dispel the confusion and defend Catholic tradition, a “New Natural Law” theory arrived on the scene, championed by Catholic “analytic” philosophers – John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and others. Depending on reason and logical analysis alone, and purporting to avoid any dependence on the facts connected with human nature, they devised a set of seven basic, self-evident values from which moral norms could be safely derived: (1) knowledge; (2) life; (3) play; (4) aesthetic experience; (5) sociability (friendship); (6) practical reasonableness (applying one’s intelligence to problems and situations); and (7) religion and pursuit of ultimate questions about the cosmos and life.

They came to the defense of the Pope with a robust brief for defending reproductive sexuality, against the inroads of the contraceptive mentality. Finnis, in a 1970 article, Natural Law and Unnatural Acts,” in the Heythrop Journal, argued:
What, in the last analysis, makes sense of the conditions of the marital enterprise, its stability and exclusiveness, is not the worthy and delightful sentiments of love and affection which invite one to marry, but the desire for and demands of a procreative community, a family. Some sexual acts are (as types of choice) always wrong because of an inadequate response, or direct closure, to the basic procreative value that they put in question.
This “new” natural law style of thinking is arguably connected with the second “self-evident” value – namely, life – proposed by Finnis; but Finnis, in his discussion of the value of “practical reasonableness,” presents it as a demonstration of the way that this “6th value” must be coordinated with respect for other “basic values.” He takes as one example, the position of the Catholic Church regarding contraception:
The principal bearer of an explicit theory about natural law happens, in our civilization, to have been the Roman Catholic Church … That Church has stringently elaborated the implications of the seventh requirement {of the sixth value – namely, that practical reasonableness should embody respect for every basic value in every act}, as those implications concern the basic values of life (including the procreative transmission of life), truth (including truth in communication), and religion. And it has formulated those implications in strict negative principle, such as those declaring wrongful any killing of the innocent, any anti-procreative sexual acts, and lying and blasphemy.
The New Natural Law theory offers to many an approach to moral decision-making, based on important values; but, because of its lack of interest in facts about human nature, constitutes a break with the tradition and history of natural law discussed above. Most importantly, the claim to self-evidence of the seven pivotal values (and their subdivisions) is less than persuasive. I became somewhat skeptical about this in reading the chapters concerning each of the self-evident values, in Finnis’ book, Natural Law and Natural Rights. When, for instance, one reads the relatively long chapter (20 pages), full of arguments, about the value of knowledge, one begins to wonder about the purported “self-evidence” of this value: What are we to conclude ethically from knowledge-valuation? That education is important? That knowledge is to be sought for its own sake? That we should not do anything until we have sufficient knowledge of consequences?

Similar excogitations could result regarding the interrelationships between the seven “basic values”: One could, for example, argue in favor of contraception from a reflection on Finnis’ sixth value, practical reasonableness – the desire of spacing offspring in view of economic contingencies, social frameworks, etc.

Like other critics, I have come to view New Natural Law as an interesting moral theory, which may give some guidance for people of good will in making moral decisions, but is not strictly a natural law theory.

Traditional natural law theories, beginning with an analysis of major human inclinations, lead to a philosophical examination of what it means to be a human being, a member of the animal species, and, most importantly, a rational animal. An interesting characteristic of the three precepts of natural law defined by Aquinas, and others, is that they are also, at one and the same time, natural rights. As Brian Tierney points out in The Idea of Natural Rights, self-preservation is one of the chief intuitively obvious duties discussed, over and over again, by medieval and late medieval thinkers; but it is also considered an inalienable right. The dual nature of self-preservation as a duty and a right is frequently brought up in commentaries on the ideas of William of Ockham and Jean Gerson. Thus, the medievalists defended, for example, giving a starving person the moral right to steal from the rich; and the moral right of a person whose life is threatened to kill the aggressor, if necessary.

This dual duty/right aspect is common to all three precepts of natural law: The duty of self-preservation is likewise the right of self-preservation; the duty of conscientious reproduction is also the right of reproducing (now restricted or prohibited for millions by totalitarian governments); and the duty of seeking the truth and building up rational societies is also the right of knowing the truth and contributing to the development of a rightly organized society. Other inclinations do not have this characteristic. The tendency to have power over others is not the right to do so; the tendency to be promiscuous is not the right to be so; the tendencies to lie or steal are not rights to do so.

Jeremy Bentham, the 18th century champion of utilitarian moral theory, criticized natural law as a theory which was so vague and indeterminate that almost anything could be justified by an appeal to “nature.” Stephen Buckle, in his article on “Natural Law” in the Cambridge Companion to Ethics, complains that natural law cannot go beyond a few generalities concerned with being “rational.” However, in Aquinas’ theory, each of the three precepts intuitively generates very specific duties.

No extensive ratiocination is necessary to realize that self-preservation obligates individuals to take care of their health, not overeat, avoid drunkenness, refrain from unnecessary risks, work to earn subsistence, not overwork, and avoid greed – just to mention a few of the obvious implications. The precept about procreation and nurturance of offspring should lead the thoughtful person, without too much hair-splitting, to take sex seriously, avoiding casual liaisons, avoiding a contraceptive mentality, caring for physical and spiritual well being of offspring, even into adulthood, cooperating with even difficult spouses in raising offspring, except where violence, etc. infringes on one’s rights or the rights of one’s children, and possibly even working to overcome anti-reproductive policies of oppressive governments. Finally, as mentioned above, the precept to pursue the truth, both in the theoretic and practical realms, is the most important for humans, and indicates that everyone, according to their capacities, should educate themselves on all important issues, especially regarding God and religion, examining both sides to avoid bias; that voters should inform themselves on issues and candidates in democratic societies; that all should contribute according to their talents and opportunities to their neighborhood or community; and so forth.

Some contemporary values seem to contradict each of the three natural law precepts, and need to be considered:(1) Suicidal tendencies can be understood as desires to escape what appear to be intolerable suffering, either physical or mental or emotional; and seem to contradict the self-preservation instinct, and sometimes require heroic resistance. But with these tendencies the desire for self-preservation is still there, but thought to be no longer possible because of the loss of a sense of health or well-being. And there is, of course, no mandate to use extraordinary measures to stay alive when natural death is imminent. (2) The problem of “overpopulation” is a mythical problem, as I have argued elsewhere, along with many others (see e.g. www.pop.org), and a very strange myth in a world where numerous countries are now facing a demographic winter. In any case, one does nothing for the world by contraception, although personal increases in wealth and lifestyle may result from childless marriages. (3) Most importantly, contradictory theories and relativism in morals may discourage many from even trying to pursue the truth. How can we ever know the truth when there are so many contradictory theories about the cosmos and the world? How can we be sure about right and wrong when there are such rampant disagreements about basic life choices? But this is the wrong question. The important thing is to seek the truth, both in theoretical and practical matters; this is a lifelong pursuit, and ordinarily will result in some successes.

Christianity, with the Decalogue and the Golden Rule, receives welcome support from natural law theory, but of course, goes seriously beyond it with its commandment of love even of enemies, of going the “extra mile,” of forgiveness, of lending without asking for repayment, etc. So natural law has built-in limitations. If there is any other moral theory besides natural law that provides even better guidance for major and common life decisions, then this theory should be proposed, and natural law should take the proverbial back seat.

The chief alternate choices of moral theories at present seem to be reduced to two: Kantian moral theory, depending on moral “universalizability” is taught in most courses on ethics now in our colleges and universities. But I am not the only one who has found it almost impossible, after ignoring (according to Kant’s requirement), my inclinations, to come to good, solid ethical decisions in the crossroads of life by deliberating whether I could, without self-contradiction, will everyone in the world to make the decision I am contemplating.

Probably the most popular ethical theory today, for public officials as well as for private citizens who have never heard of the theory, is utilitarianism, which instructs us to always do what will procure the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. If we were clear on what the greatest “happiness” consists of, and what sort of happiness the greatest number of people are looking for, it would be easier to apply the theory. But, as it stands, noted utilitarian theorists like Peter Singer, and ordinary practicing utilitarians like Barak Obama, strangely find even things like infanticide to be moral. We may react to such things like the observers of the Nuremberg Trials, wondering whether there might be some basic, maybe unwritten, universal laws that trump some of the strange avatars of moral laws that come on the scene and seem to be considered authoritative by masses of “experts.”

segunda-feira, 19 de agosto de 2013

Cattolici in tanti partiti, un modello già fallito - di Stefano Fontana

In NBQ

I ventisei parlamentari che hanno scritto ad Avvenire e di cui si è già occupata La Nuova BQ nei giorni scorsi ripropongono lo schema "militare divisi per colpire uniti". Essi hanno rivendicato il merito di aver migliorato il testo della legge sull'omofobia con una trattativa efficace e di averlo fatto come cattolici. In questo modo ripropongono lo schema della collocazione dei cattolici in tutti i partiti per poi convergere uniti in parlamento per contrastare leggi contrarie ai principi non negoziabili. Una riedizione dello storico programma: "marciare divisi per colpire uniti".

Questo schema ha avuto nel recente passato i suoi momenti di gloria. Dopo la fine del partito cattolico di riferimento, mentre si assisteva ad un attacco legislativo alla natura umana mai capitato prima, si consolidò l'idea che i cattolici potessero ormai entrare in ogni partito, basta che poi unissero trasversalmente le loro forze in parlamento. A dire il vero non esisteva una dottrina che legittimasse questa plurima presenza (che un tempo si chiamava diaspora), anzi, la Nota Ratzinger del 2002 diceva chiaramente che il cattolico non può collocarsi indifferentemente in tutti i partiti. Però nella prassi e nel sentire comune questo schema divenne dominante. Tanto è vero, per fare un esempio, che i settimanali cattolici ad ogni appuntamento elettorale intervistano i candidati cattolici presenti in tutti i partiti, da Sel alla Lega.

Se però osserviamo bene, proprio in occasione della legge sull'omofobia, diversamente da quanto sostenuto dai 26 autori della lettera ad Avvenire, l'unità dei diversi, la convergenza in aula di parlamentari cattolici variamente collocati, non si è verificata. Anzi, si è concretizzata una radicale diversità nella valutazione della legge stessa. Secondo una prima interpretazione, la legge Scalfarotto poteva diventare accettabile se il testo fosse stato corretto nel senso di permettere l'espressione per motivi religiosi o morali di valutazioni contrarie all'omosessualità (la cosiddetta clausola di garanzia). In altre parole, il difetto della legge consisterebbe solo nell'impedire la libertà di espressione. Una volta che quest'ultima venisse tutelata da un miglioramento del testo, la legge risulterebbe positiva e accettabile.

Una seconda valutazione, invece,  afferma che la legge comporta il riconoscimento pubblico da parte dello Stato della normalità dell'omosessualità. Con ciò lo Stato si arroga il diritto di cambiare lo statuto della natura umana. In questo modo si distrugge la legge naturale considerando "naturale" l'omosessualità.  Da questo punto di vista, la legge in questione rimane inaccettabile e non votabile in aula da parte di una coscienza cattolica retta.

Come si vede i deputati cattolici sono arrivati alla legge con posizioni molto diverse e quindi non hanno potuto predisporre un piano di intervento unitario. Anche l'essere giunti in ritardo e alla spicciolata, senza un collegamento con chi, nel Paese, si stava mobilitando, è spiegabile con questa diversità di vedute circa la gravità della legge.  Ciò va detto anche in positivo: i deputati che si sono subito mobilitati - e che non figurano nei 26 - lo hanno fatto in virtù di una comprensione diversa del significato negativo della legge in questione.

Si è marciato divisi ma non si è colpito uniti se perdurano divisioni nella stessa valutazione della legge. 

Questa conclusione ci costringe a riconoscere che lo schema della convergenza in aula non regge e che è di corto respiro continuare ad insistervi.  Uno dei motivi di fondo di questo insuccesso consiste nel fatto che la collocazione partitica comporta anche una scelta culturale che finisce per avere alla fine il sopravvento rispetto alle modulazioni della cultura cattolica e della stessa fede.

Appartenere ad un partito non è solo un fatto tecnico, non è come affittare una stanza, ma alla lunga comporta una ricaduta di ritorno che inquina la purezza dell'ottica della fede cattolica nel punto e nel momento in cui si fa cultura.

Queste vicende ci insegnano che bisogna cambiare percorso. Dalla dispersione non verrà mai nessuna unità. Un quadro culturale e politico unitario non emergerà mai dal confronto tra le diverse anime del cattolicesimo, dato che la dispersione della identità cattolica ha raggiunto livelli molto acuti. Bisognerà invertire la direzione, ricominciare da una proposta unitaria e attorno ad essa coagulare convinte e culturalmente strutturate appartenenze.

sexta-feira, 16 de agosto de 2013

Omofobia, l'equivoco del male minore - di Tommaso Scandroglio

In NBQ 

Come è noto è in corso nelle aule parlamentari il dibattito sulla proposta di legge anti-omofobia. Qual è l’atteggiamento che il politico cattolico dovrebbe tenere nei confronti di questo testo? Quali i suoi spazi di manovra leciti sul piano morale?

Ci viene in soccorso il numero 73 dell’Evangelium Vitae: “Quando non fosse possibile scongiurare o abrogare completamente una legge abortista, un parlamentare, la cui personale assoluta opposizione all'aborto fosse chiara e a tutti nota, potrebbe lecitamente offrire il proprio sostegno a proposte mirate a limitare i danni di una tale legge e a diminuirne gli effetti negativi sul piano della cultura e della moralità pubblica” (in modo analogo si esprime la Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede nella Nota dottrinale circa alcune questioni riguardanti l'impegno e il comportamento dei cattolici nella vita politica al numero 4). Ovviamente il caso dell’aborto può essere esteso per analogia al caso di una legge come quella voluta dall’on. Scalfarotto.

Questo passo dell’Evangelium Vitae fa venire in mente immediatamente quegli emendamenti al testo presentato alla Camera che prevedono clausole di garanzia per la libertà di espressione e la libertà religiosa. Un modo – si potrebbe dire – per attenuare la portata lesiva della proposta di legge. In linea teorica dunque il politico cattolico che presentasse questi emendamenti migliorativi rientrerebbe nel caso prospettato al numero 73.

Però occorre fare due rilievi: uno di ordine valutativo e un secondo attinente alle strategie poste in campo. In merito al primo punto, viene da chiedersi se quella condizione prevista da Giovanni Paolo II che riguarda l’inevitabilità del varo di una legge ingiusta si sia effettivamente verificata nel caso di specie. Siamo davvero così sicuri che il meteorite della legge sull’omofobia colpirà il nostro italico stivale? Siamo certi che un’opposizione radicale e a tutto campo a questa legge, opposizione che coinvolga culturalmente anche il consesso sociale, non potrebbe sortire l’effetto di scongiurare il varo della proposta di legge? Viene il sospetto – ma è solo tale – che qualche politico cattolico quando qualche mese or sono vide spuntare all’orizzonte questa proposta di legge già si dichiarò sconfitto in anticipo.

Seconda nota di carattere strategico. Ammettiamo invece che questa legge sicuramente passerà, cattolici volenti o nolenti. Il Papa ci dice che non solo possiamo ma dobbiamo fare tutto il possibile per limitare i danni. Una strada che si potrebbe intraprendere è senza dubbio quella degli emendamenti. Però, ci viene da obiettare, forse non è più efficace, anche in questo particolare frangente, un’opposizione a tutto il testo, senza se e senza ma? 

E’ stata da sempre la tattica riuscitissima usata dai radicali per le campagne su divorzio, aborto, fecondazione artificiale e da ultimo eutanasia. Chiedi cento e mal che vada ti daranno dieci. Se chiedi dieci rischi di non avere nemmeno quello. La stessa strategia è utilizzata dai movimenti pro-life negli States dove si alzano cartelli con scritto “Stop abortion” senza specificare un limite temporale minimo per l’accesso all’aborto, oppure dai gruppi contrari alla pena di morte che non chiedono che il condannato venga ucciso senza farlo soffrire, ma chiedono che non venga ucciso. Punto. E i risultati si vedono.

E poi vale l’insegnamento della storia: le leggi su divorzio, aborto e Fivet non sono un po’ figlie di questa posizione minimalista? A calcio il catenaccio serve sì per non prendere gol, però non si segnerà mai e mai dunque si vincerà un campionato.

Un no a tutto il testo di legge porterebbe con sé anche altri due effetti positivi. In primis manderebbe un segnale culturale forte. L’uomo della strada non fa tanti distinguo tra legge sull’omofobia emendata e non emendata. Opporsi in toto alla proposta avrebbe il merito di denunciare con chiarezza quale è il vero DNA di questa legge: una norma liberticida e che vuole imporre la cultura di genere.

Un secondo effetto positivo sarebbe di carattere personale per il politico cattolico. Ne uscirebbe pulito dal punto di vista massmediatico, senza l’ombra di collusioni o inciuci, perché avrebbe assunto una posizione chiara e netta. I troppi distinguo portano con sé una lunga teoria di chiarimenti su intenzioni e modalità attuative delle intenzioni stesse che in genere interessano solo gli addetti ai lavori ma annoiano tutti gli altri.

Un nota bene doveroso: le considerazioni appena espresse in merito alla valutazione che questa legge può essere ancora uccisa sul nascere e in merito all’inefficacia della strategia che si incardina solo sulla presentazione di emendamenti: sono considerazioni ovviamente opinabili, proprio perché attengono al campo dei giudizi operativi. 

Non è opinabile invece la seguente considerazione: anche a fronte di un testo emendato in meglio il politico cattolico non può che votare contro questa legge.

La Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede nel documento Dichiarazione sull’aborto procurato al numero 22 scrive: “Dev’essere, in ogni caso, ben chiaro che, qualunque cosa a questo riguardo venga stabilita dalla legge civile, l’uomo non può mai ubbidire ad una legge intrinsecamente immorale[…]. Egli non può né partecipare ad una campagna di opinione in favore di una legge siffatta, né dare ad essa il suffragio del suo voto”. Dunque una legge intrinsecamente ingiusta non può essere votata.

Da qui la domanda: la legge sull’omofobia è una legge intrinsecamente immorale? Sì, perché si fonda sul concetto di “genere”, concetto che è in netto contrasto con la verità antropologica che vede l’uomo attratto dalla donna e viceversa. L’omosessualità è contro natura ed invece questa legge vuole imporre con il carcere l’idea che l’omosessualità sia cosa naturale. Poco importa che il concetto sia imbellettato da norme anti-discriminazioni et similia. E’ solo un cavallo di Troia per far passare una legge intrinsecamente ingiusta che rimarrebbe tale anche se emendata. Quello che si vuole vendere non è più tutela per le persone omosessuali, bensì l’omosessualità come orientamento normale.

Ora votare a favore di una legge come questa perché – così si sostiene – perlomeno in tal modo si faranno passare gli emendamenti migliorativi non è lecito sul piano morale. Perché quel voto direbbe sì agli emendamenti e nello stesso tempo direbbe sì anche alle altre parti della legge che accettano la cultura omosessualista.

L’Evangelium Vitae è chiara: il voto è lecito solo alle proposte “mirate a limitare i danni” (corsivo nel testo), non alle proposte mirate sia a limitare i danni che a provocarli seppur con minor carica virulenta. Il voto a tutta la legge Scalfarotto sarebbe da una parte un placet alla limitazione dei danni realizzata grazie agli emendamenti ma dall’altra anche un placet ai “danni” stessi, cioè a tutto il rimanente corpus. E’ un problema squisitamente morale: l’oggetto dell’azione sarebbe non solo la limitazione del danno ma anche la produzione del danno, cioè la generazione di un male morale. E mai si può compiere il male, anche a prezzo di essere costretti a vedere il varo della versione peggiore di una legge. In caso contrario cadremmo nell’utilitarismo: faccio il male ma in vista di un bene futuro.

Qualcuno dirà: meglio collaborare a fare il male minore, piuttosto che lasciare mano libera agli altri di compiere il male maggiore. Purtroppo, come accennato, il male anche se piccolo mai si può compiere. Si può compiere solo il bene, a volte il maggior bene possibile anche se non è quello perfetto.

quarta-feira, 17 de julho de 2013

Os políticos e os extraterrestres - por Nuno Serras Pereira

17. 07. 2013


Devido a uma leitura precipitada e consequentemente errada do magnífico Concilio Vaticano II, um dos muitos esplendorosos da Igreja, uma parte da hierarquia da Igreja em terras de Portugal e muitos dos fiéis leigos consideraram que a condição de católico era compatível com toda e qualquer organização sindical e partidária. Se essa interpretação do Concílio fosse correcta desmentiria o Episcopado Alemão que, anos antes, excomungava os fiéis que se inscrevessem no partido nazi.


A pluralidade legítima na resolução de problemas concretos que dependem do juízo prudencial de cada um, de que o Concílio fala, nada tem a ver com os absolutos morais enquanto princípios inegociáveis que vinculam a consciência de todos os fiéis e, portanto, também a dos Católicos que se empenham na política. Por exemplo, o direito à saúde e ao trabalho, uma vez que assentam na transcendente e eminente dignidade da pessoa humana (também há pessoas angélicas e Divinas), são sem dúvida alguma um absoluto moral e por isso exigem o empenho resoluto e determinado de qualquer fiel. No entanto, a melhor maneira, ou os meios, de os alcançar e garantir não constituem qualquer absoluto moral, pois que existe um pluralismo de caminhos cuja análise e conclusões podem legitimamente variar dando assim origem a propostas diversas na aplicação das políticas, as quais podem e devem licitamente admitir negociações e compromissos. Mas estes meios, nada têm a ver com os princípios inegociáveis, propriamente ditos, os quais garantem não só a bondade ou maldade dos fins mas também a dos meios para os alcançar ou evitar. Explico-me melhor, não somente é sempre, e em qualquer circunstância, injusto provocar o aborto como o é também admitir na lei, fazer campanha a seu favor ou dar-lhe aprovação com o seu voto. O mesmo se deve dizer em relação à eutanásia e suicídio assistido; à fecundação artificial medicamente substituída, ao congelamento de embriões humanos, à experimentação, eliminação ou clonagem dos mesmos; ao impropriamente chamado “casamento” entre pessoas do mesmo sexo, à co-adopção ou adopção por parte de homossexuais; à subtracção das crianças ao direito dos pais as educarem segundo as suas consciências e crença religiosa ou Fé, desde que nestas nada haja contrário à Lei Moral Natural.


Graças a Deus que na história desde o 25 de Abril houve Católicos corajosos e fiéis a Jesus Cristo e à Sua Igreja que combateram desassombradamente e com denodo em defesa dos princípios inegociáveis não pactuando com qualquer compromisso que os aguasse ou distorcesse. Enquanto “católicos” confusos ou manipulados ou pervertidos votavam e promulgavam crimes inomináveis, por exemplo, a “lei” 6/84 que “legalizou” a chacina de crianças nascituras, outros, em frente unida (PSD e CDS) a elas se opunham com grande clareza e destimidez.


Infelizmente, ou melhor, desgraçadamente, essas duas forças partidárias foram paulatinamente parasitadas por marxistas/liberais (sei que parece estranha a associação, mas é uma fusão verdadeira) e maçons que têm tido o condão de fazer a essas agremiações e seus membros católicos o mesmo que os extraterrestres fazem, nos filmes de ficção, aos humanos: matam-nos, esvaziam-nos, tomam de assalto as suas interioridades, mantendo tão só as suas aparências, e desse modo vão expandindo-se, eliminando as populações e conquistando a Terra. Somente que enquanto nessas fitas as mortes são físicas aqui, na realidade, são espirituais e provavelmente eternas.


De há uns anos a esta parte alguns Católicos generosos, de sangue na guelra, fogosos como cavalos de combate adentraram-se em alguns partidos com o propósito de mudá-los por dentro e restituir-lhes o empenho e dedicação ao Bem Comum, isto é, ao bem de todos e cada um, desde a sua fase unicelular até à morte natural, ou seja, à vida cuidada, servida e amada até ao fim. Infelizmente tem-se verificado que, não obstante, alguns ganhos, as perdas são muito maiores, uma vez que essas associações parlamentares têm vindo de mal a pior e de pior ao péssimo. De facto, não se pode negar que apesar dos esforços desgastantes desta gente boa a decadência tem-se acelerado tão vertiginosamente que actualmente não existe em Portugal nenhum grupo parlamentar que aceite e muito menos se bata pelos absolutos morais e princípios inegociáveis. Daí que podemos concluir que esta gente, apesar do seu sacrifício, tem contribuído para promover as facções partidárias a que pertencem e fidelizar o voto católico contribuindo assim para a degeneração e corrupção dos cristãos e da Igreja. Parece que estão a repetir os erros daqueles “católicos”, que há não muito tempo tentaram algo de semelhante num outro partido, mas que afinal mais não eram que “compagnons de route”, o que em português se poderá traduzir como “idiotas úteis”, descartáveis logo que se alcance o objectivo para que serviram.


Nas circunstâncias actuais só vislumbro duas hipóteses, a saber, ou há uma invasão maciça e organizada de Católicos, de consciência bem formada, fiéis ao Magistério da Igreja, ou de Homens de boa vontade, isto é que seguem a Lei Natural, que tomem o poder ou estes mesmos têm o dever moral grave de se desembaraçarem rapidamente desses bandos de malfeitores e formarem um novo partido político. Não um partido confessional, nem um partido mais ou menos mono-temático como os diversos que têm surgido em alguns países não conseguindo nunca mais do que 1% ou lá perto.


Confesso que actualmente me parece cada vez mais difícil a primeira hipótese ( a da entrada maciça de Católicos) pelo que me parece de melhor aviso a segunda. Não se cuide porém que isto seja um pensamento original ou mesmo uma patacoada excêntrica. 


O Arcebispo Giampaolo Crepaldi (Presidente do Observatório Internacional Cardeal Van Thuân - cujo processo de Beatificação está decorrendo -, é uma das inteligências mais preclaras do Episcopado italiano, o que possui um entendimento mais profundo da Doutrina Social da Igreja, a par da mais nítida clareza e desassombro no anuncio da Verdade) afirma limpidamente isso mesmo, pelo menos, num dos seus livros: quando não há partidos políticos que respeitem os princípios inegociáveis os Católicos têm o dever de criar um novo partido que o faça. 


À honra de Cristo. Ámen.

domingo, 9 de junho de 2013

O respeitinho é muito bonito? ( sobre co-adopção por pares do mesmo sexo) - por Pedro Rosa Ferro



In Público

João Miguel Tavares (JMT) dedicou as duas últimas prosas semanais no “Público” à defesa da co-adopção. Antes do mais, insiste na ideia de que os opositores dessa lei estariam a sacrificar o interesse das crianças no altar de princípios abstractos. É estranha esta insistência porquanto o núcleo dessa oposição consiste precisamente na afirmação de que essa adopção prejudica mesmo, e gravemente, as crianças afectadas. É também estranha porque são os promotores dessa lei que a vêem como um instrumento estratégico (um “pequeno passo”, como já foi dito) para a normalização plena das uniões homossexuais, coisa que suponho JMT não nega. Todavia, gostaria de centrar-me na questão da Lei Natural – que é o objecto específico do último artigo de JMT – cuja caricatura o autor ridiculariza com certa frivolidade e simplismo, que julgo justificar um comentário. Reconheço ser impossível evitar a superficialidade e fazer justiça à Lei Natural, bem como a David Hume (e até a JMT), numa página de jornal. Mas é sempre possível argumentar com um mínimo de seriedade: o escárnio e a piada fácil e grossa não substituem argumentos.



JMT invoca a famosa “guilhotina de Hume”: não é legítimo derivar o “dever-ser” (a moral) do “ser” (a realidade natural). Como argumento de autoridade não é suficiente. A peculiar filosofia moral de Hume é respeitável mas discutível, e não está isenta de fragilidades: o seu conceito de natureza humana não transcende o âmbito dos fenómenos sensoriais e menospreza o papel da razão (que, a seu ver, é apenas, e só deve ser, a “escrava das paixões”). É verdade que a moralidade não se pode extrair mecanicamente do conhecimento da natureza. As inclinações naturais humanas não são leis morais. Mas também não são dados brutos – como pensava Hume – desprovidos de significado moral: a natureza humana (que inclui essencialmente a racionalidade), não é opaca e exterior à pessoa; tem um conteúdo e um sentido inteligíveis. É a base sobre a qual a razão prática reconhece e deseja o que é razoável, conveniente e bom, regulando essas inclinações em ordem à plenitude humana. Aliás, repare-se que o próprio JMT afirma (equivocadamente) que a co-adopção é “um caso elementar de direitos humanos”. Mas que quer dizer JMT com direitos “humanos”? Não faz ele referência, de algum modo, à nossa humanidade comum, à natureza humana, assumindo que essa natureza – por si só – é portadora de valores?



No caso vertente, não é difícil discernir que o bem da criança e o seu crescimento harmonioso reclamam maternidade e paternidade, cuja presença proporciona aos filhos a riqueza da dualidade sexual e da complementaridade pai-mãe: isso parece simplesmente natural, humano, razoável e bom. Ao contrário, a adopção homossexual não exclui apenas o referente materno ou paterno (isso acontece também nas “adopções monoparentais”) mas produz, a priori, a confusão entre os dois, com riscos óbvios para a edificação equilibrada da personalidade e identidade das crianças. E isso não parece humano, nem conveniente, nem razoável.



De resto, a animosidade zombeteira que se abateu sobre Marinho Pinto nos últimos dias, revela que ele atentou contra a “correcção” política: subverteu a ordem estabelecida e transgrediu a nova ortodoxia. Ele poderia dizer todas as barbaridades imagináveis (como já disse algumas). Mas desta vez ousou desafiar a ideologia gay dominante e os poderes deste mundo – de Obama e Hollande à Senhora Ministra da Justiça, do Washington Post aos editoriais do “Público”, da Google a Hollywood. Ele não teve o devido respeitinho. Como não têm os “indignados” da “Primavera francesa”, esses rebeldes e inconformistas de Maio de 13 que protestam pacificamente contra a lei do casamento homossexual em França, enfrentando as bastonadas que a polícia lhes dedica – com a aprovação do establishment mediático – em nome “da lei e da ordem” e dos bons costumes. O respeitinho é muito bonito…

domingo, 10 de março de 2013

In Defense of Marriage - by John S. Hamlon



In CWR

H. L. Mencken—satirist, progressive, pseudo-misogynist, provocateur—wrote a book in 1918 called In Defense of Women. Like an optical illusion, the title, depending on one’s focal point, can mean defending women or defending oneself from women. The irony is the initial hook.

If the executive and judicial branches of the US Government have their way with traditional marriage, the phrase “in defense of marriage” will likewise have two possible slants: defending the marital union as designed by God in the beginning or defending oneself from marital unions as designed by federal authority.

The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)

In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). The general purpose of DOMA was to cement, at the federal level, the traditional understanding of marriage. Why was that deemed necessary?

The seeds for DOMA were sown in 1993. Hawaii’s Supreme Court had ruled that limiting marriage to one man and one woman was probably unconstitutional (Baehr v. Miike). Immediately, there were those who anticipated trouble down the road. Indeed, they reasoned, if the Hawaiian legislature were to pass a same-sex marriage (SSM) law, the spores of that law could drift to other states by way of the Full Fair and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.

That clause (c. 1789) states that “full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.” In short, what is legally binding in one state is legally binding in other states. If, therefore, a same-sex married couple moved from a state that sanctioned SSM to one that did not, the new state of residence would have to recognize the couple’s bond.

Enter DOMA, which says that (1) no state is required to recognize a same-sex marriage from another state, and (2) the word “marriage,” for federal and inter-state recognition purposes in the United States, means a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.

DOMA does not restrict states from passing legislation for or against same-sex marriage. DOMA does prevent a same-sex couple who, married in a non-traditional marriage state, wants the same rights in a traditional marriage state. For the 31 states with constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage and for the 11 additional states that define marriage as between one man and one woman, DOMA is, in effect, an interstate anti-bullying law.

Recently, a federal appeals court in New York City ruled DOMA unconstitutional. The US Supreme Court has agreed to look at that ruling, which focuses only on whether the present federal definition of marriage violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. If the Supreme Court upholds the appeals court decision, essentially opening up federal benefits for legally married same-sex couples, the nose of the camel, as they say, will be in the tent. When the camel’s body (the full weight of SSM and its agenda) follows, DOMA will find itself outside the tent. Upshot: a same-sex marriage performed in one state will have to be recognized by all other states, regardless of how the other states define marriage.

The Catholic Church in America will then find herself wedged between the reality of marriage and the federal government’s idea of marriage. The Church as teacher will continue to proclaim the good news, namely, that marriage is a unique love-giving and life-giving union between one man and one woman, and the federal government will begin to proclaim its “good news,” namely, that it deems all such traditional talk “hate speech.”

Back to the Future—Genesis Revisited

Marriage, in the Catholic view, is neither a social construct nor an ecclesial invention. It is often described as a natural institution that was raised to a higher level the day Jesus turned six jars of water into vintage wine during the wedding at Cana. It is propitious that, regarding the Church’s vision of marriage, John Paul II has brought us to a new place and a new depth.

In his theology of the body, John Paul II talks about the sacrament of creation, the apex of which is when God creates man and woman in his own image and the two become one. In them and their union, a measure of the internal and invisible mystery of God’s life and love first becomes visible (TOB 96:6-7).

Since marriage was in the mind of God from the very beginning, John Paul II concludes that marriage is a primordial sacrament. But he goes further. In our earth-bound experience, marriage is the paradigm of the total self-giving love within the Trinity—“All that is mine is yours and yours is mine…” (Jn 17:10).

For some reason, the love between the First and Second Persons—the love that is the Third Person—does not stay put. It brims up and spills over into Creation. For marriage to reflect Trinitarian life, not just in terms of self-gift, the love between husband and wife is also meant to brim up and spill over into (possible) new human life. There is another important truth to ponder here: the communion of persons formed between husband and wife reflects God more than does the individual husband or wife (TOB 9.3).

The natural law argument for traditional marriage

In What Is Marriage? Man and Woman—A Defense,” authors Sherif Girgis, Ryan T. Anderson, and Robert P. George argue that abolishing the traditional view of marriage would (a) weaken the social institution of marriage, (b) obscure the value of opposite-sex parenting, and (c) threaten moral and religious freedom. Their explication of those three points, using common sense and real-life examples, is masterful and most helpful. All traditional marriage protagonists should have, at the ready, the debating points in What Is Marriage? That said, my caveats are two:
(1) Common-sense arguments find fertile ground in persons who are naturally curious, open to most topics, and delight in reasoned conversation. By contrast, those bent on revising the definition of marriage are single-minded and hard-charging—they love devising “diversity” gauntlets for all within reach. The desired end is the person who, regardless of sexual orientation or religious belief, embraces the homosexual agenda.

Furthermore, whereas natural law proponents understand the importance of historical development, marriage revisionists seem to see each day as literally brand new—life’s events come into existence, change shapes, and evaporate like cumulus clouds. Understanding causes and their long-term effects are not part of the daily fare. And the notion of paradox seems downright flummoxing—I have yet to meet the progressive who understands Luke 17:33, “Whoever seeks to gain his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life will preserve it.” But marriage is, at its core, paradoxical—therein, a man and a woman seek to lose their individual lives to gain a new life of mutual communion and family community.
To reiterate: Those with whom common-sense reasoning resonates are inclined to join the natural law choir, if they’re not already members. Those not able to “compute” such common-sense reasoning are the dug-in opposition. But what about those who could go either way?

According to a 2011 study, “Catholic Attitudes on Gay and Lesbian Issues” (Public Religion Research Institute), 43 percent of American Catholics see no problem with same-sex marriage; an additional 31 percent lean toward same-sex civil unions. Allow me to surmise what nearly three-quarters of the Catholic populace is thinking: If marriage is essentially a natural institution, why can’t it evolve naturally? Is it because the Church has put a sacramental stamp on it? Okay, but most of the world doesn’t believe in that stamp. What about the fact that marriage existed prior to the Church? Finally, are there not equally good, down-home arguments for same-sex marriage? Such questions lead to the second caveat.
(2) We need natural law arguments that support traditional marriage—no question. And we have excellent ones in What Is Marriage? But, in my opinion, we need more. We need to proclaim marriage in such a way that it moves the person in the pew to pause, ponder, and possibly change.

Proclamation—An analogy

How many persons interested in the Christian faith would become converts if we talked sensibly about the Resurrection? Catechist: “Well, what’s important is that we know that the disciples believed that Christ rose from the dead. So, we believe that they believed. We’re carrying on the tradition of knowing that they believed. Whether Jesus actually did resurrect is not the important thing here.”
Juxtapose that witness with this: “I believe that Christ rose from the dead. And that’s the reason I’m standing before you. If the Resurrection did not actually happen, then, quite frankly, I’m wasting your time. Plus, I’ve wasted most of my life. But Christ did resurrect; he is the Way, the Truth, and the Life. That’s what I believe, that’s what Catholics have always believed, and that’s what the followers of Christ will proclaim to all future generations.”

From which testimony will we get more converts? I think the latter.

Proclaiming the mystery of marriage

Over the past four and a half decades, I’ve given countless classes and talks on marriage and family. I believe we need to proclaim the good news about marriage, not just anew, but in a new way. To wit: 

— Marriage is more than a natural, social construct with a subsequent, sacramental seal of approval.
— Marriage was in God’s mind from the get-go.
— The visible sign of marriage “in the beginning,” inasmuch as it is linked to the visible sign of Christ’s spousal love for the Church, embodies God’s eternal plan of love, making it the foundation of the whole sacramental order (cf. TOB 95b.7).
— Marriage, in terms of the nature of self-gift, reflects the internal life of the Trinity.
— The communion of persons formed by husband and wife reflects God more than does each spouse individually. 

These are new ways of describing a reality that we can no longer take for granted or view as a second-tier vocation. They connect marriage directly to God the Creator and to Christ the Bridegroom. In my experience, the Catholic on the fence is moved more by testimony and witness than by logic.
John Paul II, with his theology of the body, put marriage center-stage. SSM activists have also put marriage center-stage. The ensuing drama will determine whether we can continue to carry the good news of God’s plan for marriage and family with verve and in freedom. Hopefully, “in defense of marriage” will not come to mean defending ourselves against marriage, government-style.