Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Consciência. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Consciência. Mostrar todas as mensagens

segunda-feira, 25 de novembro de 2013

What Marriage Is . . . and What It Isn't - by Robert P. George

In CERC
Marriage is the kind of good that can be chosen and meaningfully participated in only by people who have at least an elementary understanding of it and who choose it with that understanding in mind.
Marriage is an all-encompassing sharing of life.  It involves, like other bonds, a union of hearts and minds — but also, and distinctively, a bodily union made possible by the sexual-reproductive complementarity of man and woman.  Hence it is ordered to the all-encompassing goods of procreation and family life, and it calls for all-encompassing commitment, one that is pledged to permanence and sexual exclusivity and fidelity.  Marriage unites a husband and wife holistically, not merely in an emotional bond but also on the bodily plane in acts of conjugal love and in the children such love brings forth — for the whole of life.  Marriage is a form of relationship — indeed, the form of relationship — in which a man and a woman unite in a bond that is naturally ordered to, and would be fulfilled by, their conceiving and rearing children together.  And those who enter into this form of relationship — the human good of marriage — are truly and fully participants in it even where their bond is not blessed with the gift of children.
To be in such a relationship — a bodily as well as emotional union whose distinctive features and norms are shaped by its orientation to, and aptness for, procreation and the rearing of children — is intrinsically, not merely instrumentally, valuable.  So marriage, though it bears an inherent (rather than incidental) link to procreation, is not properly understood as having its value merely as a means to the good of conceiving and rearing children.  That is why, historically and rightly, infertility is not regarded as an impediment to marriage.  True bodily union in acts fulfilling the behavioral conditions of procreation is possible even where the nonbehavioral conditions of procreation happen not to obtain.  Such union can provide the foundation and matrix of the multilevel sharing of life that marriage is.
These insights into the nature of marriage as a human good require no particular theology.  They are, to be sure, consistent with Judeo-Christian faith, yet ancient thinkers untouched by Jewish or Christian revelation — including Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Musonius Rufus, Xenophanes, and Plutarch — also distinguished conjugal unions from all others, as do many nonbiblical faiths to this day.  Nor did animus against particular persons or categories of persons produce this conclusion, which arose in various cultures long before the modern concept of "sexual orientation."
Nevertheless, today many are demanding the redefinition of marriage as something other than a conjugal partnership.  Indeed, several jurisdictions in the West, including a number of European nations and several American states, have redefined marriage to eliminate the norm of sexual complementarity.  In truth, what they have done is abolish marriage as a legal category and replace it with something quite different — legally recognized sexual-romantic companionship or domestic partnership — to which the label marriage has been reassigned.  So, strictly speaking, we are talking not so much about a redefinition as an abolition of marriage.

When marriage is understood as a conjugal relationship — that is, as a comprehensive (emotional and bodily) union oriented toward procreation and the providing of children with both a mother and a father — it is easy to make sense of its core features as historically understood in Western and other cultures.  But eliminating the norm of sexual complementarity removes any ground of principle for these features.  After all, if two men or two women can marry, then what sets marriage apart from other bonds must be emotional intensity or priority.  But nothing about emotional union or intensity requires it to be permanent, as opposed to deliberately temporary.  Nothing beyond mere sentiment or subjective preference would require it to be sexually "closed" as opposed to "open," or limited to relationships of two persons, as opposed to three or more in "polyamorous" sexual ensembles.  There would be no ground for understanding marriage as a sexual partnership, as opposed to one integrated around any of a range of possible nonsexual shared interests or commitments (for example, playing tennis, reading novels, supporting a certain sports team).  Nor would there be any basis for understanding marriage as a relationship that is inherently enriched by family life and shaped by its demands.  Yet these have always been defining features and norms of marriage — features and norms that make marriage unlike other forms or companionship or friendship (and unlike in kind, not just in degree of emotional intensity).
These considerations buttress my point that what is at stake in contemporary debates about the definition and meaning of marriage is not whether to "expand" marriage to enlarge the pool of people "eligible" to participate in it.  What is at stake is whether to retain and support marriage in our law and culture or to jettison it in favor of a different way of organizing human relationships.
Marriage law shapes our actions by promoting a vision of what marriage is and, therefore, what its norms and requirements are.  In almost all Western jurisdictions, marriage has been deeply wounded by a culture of divorce, the widespread practice of nonmarital sexual cohabitation, the normalization of nonmarital childbearing, and other practices.  None of these had to do with same-sex partnerships or homosexual conduct, nor were or are people who are attracted to persons of the same sex responsible for them.  It was the impact of these practices on the public understanding of marriage that weakened people's grasp of marriage as a conjugal union and made the otherwise inconceivable idea of same-sex "marriages" conceivable.  Still, abolishing marriage as a legal category and reassigning the label marriage to sexual-romantic domestic partnerships would complete the rout, making it all but impossible to carry out the reforms needed to restore the conjugal understanding of marriage and with it a vibrant and healthy marriage culture.  The more we equate marriage with what amounts to a form of sexual-romantic companionship or domestic partnership, the more difficult it will be for people to live by the stabilizing norms specific to true marriage.  This is the lesson of the past forty-five years.  Unless we restore a sound understanding of marriage and rebuild the marriage culture, the erosion of marriage ideals will continue to harm everyone — children, spouses, societies as a whole — but especially the poorest and most vulnerable.  By rewriting the parenting ideal, abolishing conjugal marriage as the legal norm would undermine in our mores and practice the special value of biological mothers and fathers.  Moreover, by marking support for the conjugal view as "bigotry," it would, as we are already seeing in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere, damage religious liberty and freedom of speech and association.
It is important to bear in mind that under any marriage policy some bonds, some types of intimate relationship, will remain unrecognized, and thus some people will remain legally unmarried (however much they would like their relationships to count as marriages under law).  So we need to be able (and ought) to meet people's concrete needs apart from civil marriage.  Moreover, if we reject equating marriage with companionship — and marriage licenses with generic approval — we will see that conjugal marriage laws deprive no one of companionship or its joys and mark no one as less worthy of fulfillment.  True compassion means extending authentic community to everyone, especially the marginalized, while using marriage law for the social goal it serves best — the goal that justifies regulating such intimate bonds in the first place: to ensure that children know the committed love of the mother and father whose union brought them into being.
Just as compassion for same-sex-attracted people does not require redefining marriage, neither does preserving the conjugal view mean making them scapegoats for its erosion.  It certainly isn't about legalizing (or criminalizing) anything.  In all fifty of the United States, two men or women can have a wedding (if they happen to believe in same-sex marriage) and share a domestic life.  Their employers and religious communities are legally free to recognize their unions.  At issue here is whether governments will effectively coerce many other actors in the public square to do the same.  And also at issue is whether government will expand.  Robust support for marital norms serves children, spouses, and hence our whole economy, especially the poor.  Family breakdown thrusts the state into roles for which it is ill-suited: parent and discipliner to the orphaned and neglected, and arbiter of disputes over custody and paternity.

Redefining Means Undermining

Advocates of redefining "marriage" as sexual-romantic companionship or domestic partnership to accommodate same-sex relationships are increasingly confirming the point that this shift erodes the basis for permanence and exclusivity in any relationship.
University of Calgary philosophy professor Elizabeth Brake, for example, supports what she calls "minimal marriage," in which "individuals can have legal marital relationships with more than one person, reciprocally or asymmetrically, themselves determining the sex and number of parties, the type of relationship involved, and which rights and responsibilities to exchange with each."
Judith Stacey, a prominent New York University professor who is in no way regarded as a fringe figure, testified before Congress against the Defense of Marriage Act.  During her testimony, she expressed hope that the redefinition of marriage would give marriage "varied, creative, and adaptive contours...[leading some to] question the dyadic limitations of Western marriage and seek...small group marriages."
In their statement "Beyond Same-Sex Marriage," more than three hundred "LGBT and allied" scholars and advocates called for legally recognizing sexual relationships involving more than two partners.  Such relationships are by no means unheard of: Newsweek reported in 2009 that there were more than five hundred thousand in the United States alone.  In Brazil, a public notary has recognized a trio of people as a civil union.  Mexico City has considered expressly temporary marriage licenses.  The Toronto District School Board has taken to promoting polyamorous relationships among its students.
What about the connection to family life?  Writer E.  J.  Graff celebrates the fact that recognizing same-sex unions would change the "institution's message" so that it would "ever after stand for sexual choice, for cutting the link between sex and diapers."  Enacting same-sex marriage "does more than just fit; it announces that marriage has changed shape."
What about sexual exclusivity?  Andrew Sullivan, a self-styled proponent of the conservative case for same-sex marriage, has now gone so far as to extol the "spirituality" of "anonymous sex."  He welcomes the fact that the "openness" of same-sex unions might erode sexual exclusivity among those in opposite-sex marriages.
Similarly, in a New York Times Magazine profile, same-sex-marriage activist Dan Savage encourages spouses to adopt "a more flexible attitude" about sex outside their marriage.  A piece in The Advocate, a gay-interest newsmagazine, supports my point still more candidly: "Antiequality right-wingers have long insisted that allowing gays to marry will destroy the sanctity of 'traditional marriage,' and, of course, the logical, liberal party-line response has long been 'No, it won't.' But what if — for once — the sanctimonious crazies are right?  Could the gay male tradition of open relationships actually alter marriage as we know it?  And would that be such a bad thing?"
Other advocates of redefining marriage have explicitly proclaimed the goal of weakening the institution.  Former president George W.  Bush "is correct," writes journalist Victoria Brownworth, "when he states that allowing same-sex couples to marry will weaken the institution of marriage....It most certainly will do so, and that will make marriage a far better concept than it previously has been."  Michelangelo Signorile, another prominent advocate of redefining marriage, urges people in same-sex relationships to "demand the right to marry not as a way of adhering to society's moral codes but rather to debunk a myth and radically alter an archaic institution."  He says they should "fight for same-sex marriage and its benefits and then, once granted, redefine the institution of marriage completely, because the most subversive action lesbians and gay men can undertake...is to transform the notion of 'family' entirely."
Those wishing to overturn the traditional understanding of marriage as a male-female partnership increasingly agree that redefining marriage would undermine its stabilizing norms.
A Culture of Marriage

A standard revisionist response to the defense of conjugal marriage like the one I am here proposing is the claim that, even if the traditional position is, from the moral viewpoint, true, it is nevertheless unfair for the law to embody it.  For example, my friend and colleague Professor Stephen Macedo argues that if disagreements about the nature of marriage "lie in...difficult philosophical quarrels, about which reasonable people have long disagreed, then our differences lie in precisely the territory that John Rawls rightly marks off as inappropriate to the fashioning of our basic rights and liberties."  So Macedo and others claim that law and policy must be neutral with regard to competing understandings of marriage and sexual morality.
This claim is deeply unsound.  The true meaning, value, and significance of marriage are fairly easily grasped (even if people sometimes have difficulty living up to its moral demands) in a culture — including, critically, a legal culture — that promotes and supports a sound understanding of marriage.  Furthermore, ideologies and practices that are hostile to a sound understanding and practice of marriage in a culture tend to undermine the institution of marriage in that culture.  Hence it is extremely important that governments eschew attempts to be neutral with regard to marriage and embody in their laws and policy the soundest, most nearly correct, understanding.
The law is a teacher.  Either it will teach that marriage is a reality in which people can choose to participate but whose contours people cannot make and remake at will, or it will teach that marriage is a mere convention that is malleable in such a way that individuals, couples, or, indeed, groups can choose to make of it whatever suits their desires, goals, and so on.  The result, given the biases of human sexual psychology, will be the development of practices and ideologies that truly tend to undermine the sound understanding and practice of marriage, together with the development of pathologies that tend to reinforce the very practices and ideologies that cause them.
The Oxford philosopher Joseph Raz, a liberal who does not share my views regarding sexual morality, is rightly critical of forms of liberalism, including Rawlsianism, that suppose law and government can and should be neutral among competing conceptions of moral goodness.  He has noted, for example, that "monogamy, assuming that it is the only valuable form of marriage, cannot be practiced by an individual.  It requires a culture which recognizes it, and which supports it through the public's attitude and through its formal institutions."  Of course, Raz does not suppose that, in a culture whose law and public policy do not support monogamy, a man who happens to believe in it somehow will be unable to restrict himself to having one wife or will be required to take additional wives.  His point, rather, is that, even if monogamy is a key element in a sound understanding of marriage, large numbers of people will fail to understand that or why that is the case — and therefore will fail to grasp the value of monogamy and the point of practicing it — unless they are assisted by a culture that supports, formally by law and policy, as well as by informal means, monogamous marriage.  What is true of monogamy is equally true of the other elements of a sound understanding of marriage.
In short, marriage is the kind of good that can be chosen and meaningfully participated in only by people who have at least an elementary understanding of it and who choose it with that understanding in mind.  Yet people's ability to understand it, at least implicitly, and thus to choose it, depends crucially on institutions and cultural understandings that both transcend individual choice and are constituted by a vast number of individual choices.

quarta-feira, 20 de novembro de 2013

Conscience and Its Reviewers: A Response to Kevin Doyle - by Robert P. George

 In TPD


Kevin Doyle, a Catholic lawyer and death penalty opponent, has published a review in America magazine of my new book Conscience and Its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism. I’m grateful for the kind things Mr. Doyle said about me and my work. Still, there is an error at the heart of the review, and it goes to a central matter: the meaning of conscience. So I want to address that error. Before that, I’ll comment on some less significant shortcomings of Doyle’s review.

The Death Penalty

First, Doyle says that “the death penalty wins mention in [George’s] case against Mario Cuomo but draws no condemnation.” Let me say plainly what I have said before: I believe that all direct killing of human beings—that is, deliberately bringing about death, whether one’s own or another’s, as the precise object of one’s act—is morally wrong. So I am opposed to the death penalty.

I did not address the substantive moral issue of capital punishment in this book because support for the death penalty scarcely qualifies as a dogma of liberal secularism. Most liberal secularists oppose the death penalty. I think they are right about that, albeit right for the wrong reason. The subject came up in my chapter on Mario Cuomo and other politicians who claim to be “personally opposed” to abortion yet “pro-choice,” because Cuomo had advanced an absurd argument trying to square his opposition to the death penalty with his support for the legalized and taxpayer financed killing of unborn babies. Here’s what I wrote:

Cuomo claims that when he speaks of the death penalty, he never suggests that he considers it a “moral issue.” Then, in the very same paragraph, he condemns the death penalty in the most explicitly, indeed flamboyantly, moralistic terms: “I am against the death penalty because I think it is bad and unfair. It is debasing. It is degenerate. It kills innocent people.” He does not pause to consider that these are precisely the claims pro-life people make against the policy of legal abortion and its public funding—a policy that Cuomo defends. . .

Subsidiarity and Solidarity

Second, Doyle says that in my analysis “subsidiarity eclipses the counterbalancing imperative of solidarity.” This claim rests on the mistake—a common one, to be sure—of supposing that subsidiarity and solidarity “counterbalance” each other. To suppose so is to misunderstand the principle of subsidiarity (which, among other things, restrains government action in some areas and authorizes or even requires it in others) as well as its relationship to solidarity.

Subsidiarity and solidarity are distinct principles, and respect for both is required as a matter of justice. But they do not pull in opposite directions. They do not need to be “balanced.” Nor, strictly speaking, can their normative demands be in conflict. They do not require tradeoffs. Both are to be applied and respected fully—all of the time. To suppose otherwise is to start heading down the wrong path from one’s first step.

Health Care

Third, Doyle says that, for me, “health care as a human right becomes merely something of which it is ‘certainly not unreasonable to speak.’” Doyle’s “merely” is extremely misleading, as the context of the quoted line from my book makes clear:

Human rights exist (or obtain) if principles of practical reason direct us to act or abstain from acting in certain ways out of respect for the well-being and the dignity of persons whose legitimate interests may be affected by what we do. I certainly believe that there are such principles. They cannot be overridden by considerations of utility. At a very general level, they direct us, in Immanuel Kant’s phrase, to treat human beings always as ends and never as means only. When we begin to specify this general norm, we identify important negative duties, such as the duty to refrain from enslaving people. Although we need not put the matter in terms of “rights,” it is perfectly reasonable, and I believe helpful, to speak of a right against being enslaved, and to speak of slavery as a violation of human rights. It is a right that we have not by virtue of being members of a certain race, sex, class, or ethnic group but simply by virtue of our humanity. In that sense, it is a human right. But there are, in addition to negative duties and their corresponding rights, certain positive duties. And these, too, can be articulated and discussed in the language of rights, though here we must be clear about by whom and how a given right is to be honored.

Sometimes it is said, for example, that education or health care is a human right. It is certainly not unreasonable to speak this way; but much more needs to be said if it is to be a meaningful statement. Who is supposed to provide education or health care to whom? Why should those persons or institutions be the providers? What place should the provision of education or health care occupy on the list of social and political priorities? Is it better for education and health care to be provided by governments under socialized systems or by private providers in markets? These questions go beyond the application of moral principles. They require prudential judgment in light of the contingent circumstances people face in a given society at a given point in time. Often, there is not a single, uniquely correct answer. The answer to each question can lead to further questions. The problems can be extremely complex, far more complex than the issue of slavery, where once a right has been identified, its universality and the basic terms of its application are fairly clear. Everybody has a moral right not to be enslaved, and everybody an obligation as a matter of strict justice to refrain from enslaving others; governments have a moral obligation to respect and protect that right and, correspondingly, to enforce the obligation.

The context reveals that Doyle’s characterization of my view, served by his use of the term “merely,” completely fails to do it justice to my point—an analytical point about a key difference between claims of negative and positive rights. It is a point that Doyle ignores. I doubt that he or anyone else would contest my claim that for assertions of positive rights to be meaningful, the types of questions I mentioned must be addressed.

Marriage

Fourth, Doyle’s treatment of my arguments about what marriage is—and isn’t—is odd. He doesn’t offer any criticism of my arguments or even address them in any substantive respect. Instead, he dismisses them—and dismisses them in a curious way, especially (as we shall see) for someone who dedicates himself to fighting against the death penalty.

Doyle allows that I’ve put the advocates of redefining marriage to include same-sex partners in a tough spot by challenging them to, among other things, identify a basis of principle consistent with their rejection of the conjugal conception of marriage for understanding marriage as inherently involving two persons, as opposed to three or more in polyamorous sexual partnerships. And he notes that those advocates have “side-stepped” the problem “until now.” But he doesn’t suggest how they might actually respond to my challenge. Nor does he offer any criticism of my philosophical defense of the conjugal conception of marriage or my criticism of the revisionist alternative conception of marriage as sexual-romantic companionship or domestic partnership.

Instead, he says this:

For many Americans, George’s marital metaphysic will stand up poorly next to the reality—just down the block or a few family relations away—of a committed gay couple with children. So take or leave George’s argument that a same-sex marriage cannot be a genuine marriage.

This simply will not do. My actual arguments either are successful or they are not. Doyle vaguely suggests that they are not, but he does so without taking a clear position, much less defending it. That this is unsatisfactory in a review would be clear enough to Doyle if we switched the topic from marriage to the death penalty. Doyle has devoted his career to making arguments—serious and well-informed arguments—against capital punishment. But whatever their ultimate merit, it would simply not do for a critic to say something like this:

For many Americans, Doyle’s metaphysic of the inalienable dignity of the life even of a wanton murderer will stand up poorly next to the reality—for some right in the neighborhood, and sometimes even in the family—of young men who have been gunned down in the streets and girls who have been brutally raped and then killed by their assailants. Most Americans fully accept the death penalty for such crimes, and there are countless family members for whom the execution of the perpetrator is essential to emotional well-being and a sense of justice and closure. So take or leave Doyle’s argument that the death penalty is morally wrong.

Conscience and Its Protections

Fifth, let’s turn to that big error I mentioned at the beginning. Doyle claims that while I “plead powerfully for the claims of conscience” of those with whose judgments in conscience I agree, I am “non-committal” or “send signals in different directions” when it comes to consciences that I believe are formed incorrectly. But that is the reverse of the truth—manifestly so. In fact, I do not think I could possibly have made clearer my view of the importance of respecting and protecting the rights of conscience even of those with whose judgments of duty I disagree.

Let’s take an example. I am, to say the least, not especially sympathetic to atheism. Still, here is what I say about the conscience rights of atheists in Conscience and Its Enemies:

Respect for the good of religion requires that civil authority respect (and, in appropriate ways, even nurture) conditions or circumstances in which people can engage in the sincere religious quest and live lives of authenticity reflecting their best judgments as to the truth of spiritual matters. To compel an atheist to perform acts that are premised on theistic beliefs that he cannot, in good conscience, share, is to deny him the fundamental bit of the good of religion that is his, namely, living with honesty and integrity in line with his best judgments about ultimate reality. Coercing him to perform religious acts does him no good, since faith really must be free, and dishonors his dignity as a free and rational person. The violation of liberty is worse than futile.

I make clear here and elsewhere that I utterly reject the “error has no rights” view in the name of which radical traditionalist (“rad trad”) Catholics reject the robust conception of religious freedom set forth by the fathers of the Second Vatican Council in the great declaration Dignitatis Humanae. In fact, I make my view on this point so clear in so many places, that I was initially puzzled at how Doyle could suppose that I was “non-committal” on the rights of people with erroneously formed consciences.

Reading on, though, the basis of Doyle’s error came into focus for me. He must have missed, or in any event he clearly missed the point of, Chapter Ten, entitled “Two Concepts of Liberty . . . and Conscience.” Evidently failing to notice my distinction—drawn from Newman—between the traditional conception of conscience as a “stern monitor” imposing duties we must fulfill whether they are in line with our preferences and desires or not, and the modern autonomy-based liberal idea of conscience as “self-will” grounding a right to do as one pleases, whatever one pleases, so long as there is no direct or palpable harm to others, Doyle supposes that I should be on the side of the liberals concerning the legal regulation of allegedly self-regarding immoralities.

In that chapter—which contrasts the conceptions of liberty and conscience held by John Stuart Mill with those held by John Henry Newman—I go to great lengths to explain the competing views and say why I think it is a mistake to conceive conscience as licensing conduct rather than imposing obligations:

Conscience, as Newman understood it, is the very opposite of “autonomy” in the modern liberal sense. It is not a writer of permission slips. It is not in the business of licensing us to do as we please or conferring on us (in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court) “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Rather, conscience is one’s last best judgment specifying the bearing of moral principles one grasps, yet in no way makes up for oneself, on concrete proposals for action. Conscience identifies one’s duties under the moral law. It speaks of what one must do and what one must not do. Understood in this way, conscience is indeed what Newman said it is: a stern monitor.

Contrast this understanding of conscience with what Newman condemns as its counterfeit. Conscience as “self-will” is a matter of feeling or emotion, not reason. It is concerned not so much with the identification of what one has a duty to do or not do, one’s feelings and desires to the contrary notwithstanding, but rather with sorting out one’s feelings. Conscience as self-will identifies permissions, not obligations. It licenses behavior by establishing that one doesn’t feel bad about doing it—or at least one doesn’t feel so bad about doing it that one prefers the alternative of not doing it.

I’m with Newman. His key distinction is between conscience, authentically understood, and self-will—conscience as the permissions department. His core insight is that conscience has rights because it has duties. The right to follow one’s conscience, and the obligation to respect conscience—especially in matters of faith, where the right of conscience takes the form of religious liberty of individuals and communities of faith—obtain not because people as autonomous agents should be able to do as they please; they obtain, and are stringent and sometimes overriding, because people have duties and the obligation to fulfill them. The duty to follow conscience is a duty to do things or refrain from doing things not because one wants to follow one’s duty but even if one strongly does not want to follow it. The right of conscience is a right to do what one judges oneself to be under an obligation to do, whether one welcomes the obligation or must overcome strong aversion in order to fulfill it. If there is a form of words that sums up the antithesis of Newman’s view of conscience as a stern monitor, it is the imbecilic slogan that will forever stand as a verbal monument to the so-called me generation: “If it feels good, do it.”

Now, Doyle has every right to disagree with me about the superiority of Newman’s conception of conscience as duty-imposing to what, following Newman, I argue is its counterfeit: “conscience” as “self-will,” licensing the subject to do as he or she pleases. But he should be clear that what I oppose is conscience-as-license—and not respect for the good-faith conclusions about duty of people whose moral or theological judgments and beliefs I reject.

Doyle seems to have missed the critical distinction between these two conceptions of conscience altogether. But it is a distinction that is at the heart of Conscience and Its Enemies. Had he noticed it, he would not have supposed I was “non-committal” on the need to respect the consciences of those with whom I disagree. He would have seen that I am committed to an understanding of conscience, and the rights of conscience, that is very different from the one he himself, I gather, holds.

quarta-feira, 2 de outubro de 2013

Aventuras mediáticas do Papa Francisco - o Bem, o Mal e a Consciência - por Nuno Serras Pereira



02. 10. 2013

‘Ai dos têm o mal por bem, e o bem por mal’ (Is 5, 20).

O Santo Padre, na entrevista que deu a Scalfari afirmou peremptório: “Cada um tem a sua ideia do Bem e do Mal e deve escolher seguir o Bem e combater o Mal (tal) como os concebe. Bastaria isto para melhorar o mundo”. Evidentemente esta afirmação é objectivamente falsa. Já na carta que enviou ao mesmo Scalfari quando escreve sobre a consciência afirma algo que pode ser verdade mas também pode ser falsidade, adiante veremos porquê, prestando-se por isso aos maiores equívocos, tendo como efeito a indução em grave erro da multidão daqueles que têm uma ideia muito diferente daquilo que a dela Igreja prega. Por isso é que S. João Paulo II ensinou: “Não basta dizer ao homem: ‘segue sempre a tua consciência’. É necessário acrescentar imediatamente e sempre: ‘pergunta-te se o que a tua consciência diz é verdadeiro ou falso e procura incansavelmente conhecer a verdade’. Se esta necessária precisão não fosse feita, o homem arriscar-se-ia a encontrar na sua consciência uma força destruidora da sua humanidade verdadeira em vez do lugar santo onde Deus lhe revela o seu verdadeiro bem.” (Sublinhados meus).

A concepção que Marx, Engels, Lenine, Estaline, Mao, Pol-Pot tinham do Bem é responsável por monstruosidades horrendas; e a do Mal levou-os a combater Deus, o Cristianismo a Lei Natural e o que mais se sabe. Hitler concebia os judeus como um Mal, e o resultado como sabemos está entre as coisas mais abomináveis e pavorosas da história da humanidade; e entendia que era um Bem as guerras tremendas que desencadeou. Obama acha que é um Bem impor o controlo demográfico, o aborto, o pseudocasamento “gay”, a ideologia do género desde a mais tenra infância, a supressão da liberdade religiosa e de consciência, não só no seu país como na política internacional (coisas que aparentemente não incomodam excessivamente sua Santidade – foi notória a indiferença papal pública, patente em relação aos cristãos e demais pessoas de boa-vontade, crianças, jovens e velhos agredidos e presos em França pelas forças policiais, somente porque se manifestavam pacificamente contra o “casamento” entre pessoas do mesmo sexo, sendo que parece terem levado um “raspanete” na entrevista às revistas jesuítas) e as suas palavras a Scalfari dão a impressão que o incentivam a prosseguir nesse caminho e a combater o Mal que nós somos e representamos. Terá o Papa (nunca pensei que algum dia viria a escrever isto, mas enfim, uma vez que Francisco I não gosta de lisonjeiros e aduladores mas de quem fale com franqueza di-lo-ei) consciência das consequências destas graves imprecisões? O Santo Padre já disse várias vezes que normalmente o que em primeiro lugar lhe vem à cabeça não é bom – não será melhor, apesar dos muitos aspectos positivos nessas entrevistas, repensar este modo de se comportar? 

Depois da segunda grande guerra, conta o então Cardeal Ratzinger, nas conversas entre teólogos era consenso praticamente geral que os nazis, mesmo os SS, tinham o Céu garantido, uma vez que seguiam as suas consciências. Claro que Joseph Ratzinger nunca acolheu, sem mais, esta tese e explica-o num dos seus livros. O pecado não consistiu em ter seguido a sua consciência errónea, mas sim no terem ofuscado e ignorado a Lei natural inscrita nos seus corações, a verdade do seu ser pessoas, a sinderésis, que se torna presente à consciência para a iluminar. Como escrevi há muito:

“A consciência verdadeira é o núcleo mais secreto, o sacrário do homem, onde este se encontra a sós com Deus, para escutar a Sua voz e acolher a verdade do seu ser, a sua estrutura interna, a sua identidade, isto é, a lei inscrita por Deus no seu coração, à qual é chamado a obedecer e segundo a qual será julgado. Podemos dizer que a consciência é: 1. um “ouvido”, uma instância de acolhimento, que escuta a verdade; 2. um “olhar”, isto é, um juízo, lançado sobre a realidade que a) percebe o bem a fazer e o mal a evitar e b) avalia (ajuíza) a bondade ou maldade de uma acção realizada; 3. uma força que move e empuxa a realizar o bem e a evitar o mal.” 

Mas para que não haja dúvidas demos a palavra a Bento XVI:

“No pensamento moderno, a palavra ‘consciência’ significa que em matéria de moral e de religião. A dimensão subjectiva, o indivíduo, constitui a última instância de decisão. O mundo é dividido nos (em dois) âmbitos objectivo e subjectivo. Ao objectivo pertencem as coisas que se podem calcular e verificar por meio da experimentação. A religião e a moral são subtraídas a este método e por isso são considerados como (pertencendo ao) âmbito do subjectivo. Aqui não existiriam (não se dariam), em última análise critérios objectivos. A última instância que pode decidir seria portanto o sujeito, e com a palavra ‘consciência’ exprime-se, precisamente, isto: nesta instância somente cada um é que pode decidir, o indivíduo com a sua intuição e experiências. 

(Ora) “… a ‘consciência’ significa a capacidade de verdade do homem: a capacidade de reconhecer mesmo nos âmbitos decisivos da sua existência – religião e moral – uma verdade, ‘a’ verdade. A consciência, a capacidade do homem reconhecer a verdade, impõe-lhe com isso, ao mesmo tempo, o dever de encaminhar-se para a verdade, de procura-la e de a ela se submeter onde a encontrar. Consciência é a capacidade de verdade e obediência a ela, que se mostra ao homem ao homem de coração aberto. … ”.

Para afirmar a identidade entre o conceito que a Igreja tem da consciência e moderna compreensão subjectiva da mesma muitos gostam de referir as palavras do Bem-aventurado (Cardeal) Newman “… segundo a qual ele – no caso de ter de fazer um brinde – teria primeiro brindado à consciência e depois ao Papa. Mas nesta afirmação, ‘consciência’ não significa a obrigatoriedade última da intuição subjectiva. (Pelo contrário é) “… expressão da acessibilidade e da força vinculante da verdade: é nisso que se funda o seu primado. Ao papa pode ser dedicado o segundo brinde, porque a sua missão consiste em exigir a obediência à verdade”.

O Bem-aventurado Newman di-lo magistralmente, na sua carta ao Duque de Norfolk: “O sentido do que é recto e do desordenado - elemento primeiro da religião - é tão delicado, tão vacilante, tão facilmente confundido, obscurecido, pervertido, tão subtil nos seus métodos argumentadores, tão impressionável por factores educativos, tão influenciado pelo orgulho e pela paixão, tão flutuante e instável no seu percurso, na luta pela existência no meio dos diversos exercícios e triunfos da razão: um sentido, em suma, que é a mais elevada das sabedorias, mas a menos luminosa. Por isso a Igreja, o Papa, a Hierarquia são - no projecto divino - o auxílio que Deus providencia para satisfazer esta nossa necessidade tão urgente.”

Estas são as razões pelas quais S. João Paulo II ensinou, referindo-se a toda a humanidade: “O Magistério da Igreja encontra-se entre os meios que o amor redentor de Cristo providenciou para evitarmos este perigo de erro (da consciência errónea). Em Seu nome, o Magistério possui uma autoridade verdadeira e própria para ensinar”. Foi por isto que o Senhor, depois de ter dito que toda a autoridade Lhe tinha sido dada no Céu e na terra, determinou e ordenou: “Ide, pois, e ensinai a todas as nações; … Ensinai-as a observar tudo o que vos prescrevi.”

Falta-me o tempo para comentar a afirmação do Santo Padre ao dizer que não tinha nenhuma intenção de converter o seu interlocutor. Recordo tão-somente que isso está muito longe do que S. Francisco de Assis viveu, pregou e ensinou; e parece estarem em contraste nítido, não só com a Tradição viva da Igreja, como com as primeiras palavras de Jesus, no início da Sua vida pública, tal como nos é relatado no Evangelho, segundo S. Marcos: “Completou-se o tempo e o Reino de Deus está próximo: arrependei-vos e acreditai no Evangelho.”

À honra e glória de Cristo Ámen.

quarta-feira, 25 de setembro de 2013

Lettera di un cattolico che su famiglia, aborto e liturgia vorrebbe sentire altro (in coscienza) - di Francesco Agnoli

In CR 

Caro Papa, mi scuso per l’ardire che ho nello scriverle una lettera. Premetto di subire il fascino della sua personalità. Pur privo di televisione, ho visto il video in cui lei bacia un bambino malato, mentre le sgorgano calde lacrime, e mi ha commosso. Mi ha ricordato come baciavo il mio piccoletto malato; o la reazione davanti ai bambini infermi del Piccolo Cottolengo: li avrei abbracciati, con tutta la forza… ma non ce la feci. 

La sua cordialità italo-latina-cattolica mi piace anche per questo. Vengo al dunque. Le scrivo riguardo all’intervista da lei rilasciata a Civiltà Cattolica, e che quasi tutti i giornali hanno rilanciato con titoli come “Divorzio, gay e aborto: l’apertura di Papa Francesco”, o simili. I giornalisti, si sa, sono dei semplicioni, oppure dei furbastri: se si parla di cose di chiesa due su tre non capiscono un’acca, il terzo equivoca, come gli fa comodo. Fa parte del gioco… Però è bene segnarselo… Nella lunga intervista lei dice una cosa che sento causa il mio mestiere di insegnante: i cristiani devono porgere, anzitutto, Cristo, non una morale o dei divieti precisi e circostanziati. Mi spiego. Ogni tanto a scuola vengono gli “esperti” che spiegano ai ragazzi che drogarsi fa male, e danno una grande quantità di informazioni scientifiche sui danni provocati dalla droga. Concludono con un mantra: “Drogarsi fa male… non fatelo…”. Non di rado capita che alla fine dell’incontro, qualche ragazzo dica, molto onestamente: “Sappiamo tutti che drogarsi fa male, ma io, prof., mi faccio le canne perché a casa mia è un inferno… perché non so perché sono al mondo… e allora chi se ne frega se fa male!”.

A scuola, caro Papa, invece, dell’aborto non si parla. Nessun medico dice mai che nel grembo di una donna non crescono girini ma bambini; non lo dice, per prudenza, neppure il professore di religione, e neppure quello di biologia; nessuno, o quasi, spiega che la donna che abortisce soffrirà per il gesto compiuto. Per cui non sarebbe male che qualcuno facesse vedere un bambino, come è fatto, che forma e aspetto ha quando viene ucciso…

Eppure, anche in questo caso, è utile, ma spesso non basta: non si frena una donna, consapevole, che vuole abortire, oggi che è legale, se questa donna non ha una certa visione di Dio, dell’esistenza, ed è, nel contempo, sola, respinta dal suo uomo, emarginata dalla famiglia. Concordo dunque con lei: dobbiamo portare, anzitutto, Cristo, “l’annuncio della salvezza”, che dia senso alla vita (allora non sarà necessario drogarsi e sarà automatico accogliere un figlio) e, nelle circostanze odierne, Cristo-medico.

Lei inizia così: “Io vedo con chiarezza che la cosa di cui la chiesa ha più bisogno oggi è la capacita? di curare le ferite e di riscaldare il cuore dei fedeli, la vicinanza, la prossimità. Io vedo la chiesa come un ospedale da campo dopo una battaglia…”. Anche qui, le sue parole commuovono, per quanto sono vere: siamo una società di feriti, di persone sole; di feriti nell’identità sessuale, nella vita affettiva famigliare, perché con uno solo, o due o tre, o quattro genitori…

Quanti figli oggi divisi tra una casa e l’altra. Di fronte a tante ferite la chiesa deve essere madre. Mi viene in mente la preghiera allo Spirito Santo: “Lava ciò che è sordido, bagna ciò che è arido, sana ciò che sanguina. Piega ciò che è rigido, scalda ciò che è gelido, drizza ciò ch’è sviato”. Abbiamo tutti bisogno del Consolatore, e, come dice lei, di preti meno manager e più pastori; di più confessori e di meno documenti; di una chiesa non autoreferenziale. Ma abbiamo bisogno anche di qualche medicina amara, ogni tanto, per guarire. Poi, però, c’è qualcosa che non ho capito. Perché a me sembra che nel suo discorso, nella sua diagnosi, bellissima, manchi una parte (che non manca, certo, in altri discorsi, come quello di ieri ai medici!).

Lei vede le persone ferite, che, certo, abbondano. Ci ricorda che Cristo premia anche gli operai dell’ultima ora; che lascia le 99 pecorelle, dopo averle messe al sicuro, per la pecorona nera; che accoglie il figliol prodigo con tanto clamore. Ci fa bene, ricordarlo. Qualcuno magari potrebbe diventare un po’ fariseo e credersi bravo, quando è solo mediocre. Però, mi scusi, una parolina buona anche per quelli che, con tanti limiti cercano di stare con la propria moglie tutta la vita e di accogliere tutti i figli che Dio dà loro, non sarebbe male… Non saranno feriti dall’aborto, dal divorzio, ma ci sono anche loro, e combattono ogni giorno: feriti, magari, dall’incomprensione, da un mondo che li deride, dalla mancanza di sacerdoti che ricordino anche la via stretta delle virtù.

Perché, vede, in 40 anni di vita in Europa, non so in Argentina, non ho mai sentito un sacerdote spiegare perché la chiesa è per l’indissolubilità del matrimonio; non l’ho mai sentito neppure nominare la parola divorzio, troppo compromettente. Ma se un prete non crede che il divorzio sia una ferita, perché mai dovrebbe poi andare a curare chi ferito non è? Perché dovrebbe mettersi nel confessionale, ad aspettare chi desideri bagnarsi nella misericordia di Dio? A volte mi sembra che ci sia una realtà vera e una virtuale. Nella realtà virtuale dei media la chiesa cattivona condanna sempre e i sacerdoti trattano soltanto di morale sessuale; nella realtà vera, il 90 per cento dei preti, vado a spanne, parla poco di Cristo, molto di morale in senso lato (aiutare gli africani, rispettare il semaforo), ma sfugge come la peste gli argomenti che nella realtà virtuale sono dominanti. Questo è tanto vero che i media hanno sintetizzato quasi tutti le sue dichiarazioni non così: “Il Papa abbraccia ed invita ad abbracciare i feriti (dal divorzio, dall’aborto)”; ma così: “Il Papa apre al divorzio e all’aborto”.

Quelle che per noi sono ferite, per una certa cultura, vedi quotidiano Repubblica di Scalfari, sono medaglie, conquiste, diritti, vanto. D’altra parte Lei sa bene che nel nostro “cattolico” paese, lo sforzo dei cattolici per “tenere insieme” le coppie in difficoltà è quasi nullo. Così pure lo sforzo non solo per aiutare le gestanti con problemi, ma anche per incontrare con una pastorale ad hoc le donne che hanno abortito e che cercano una riconciliazione, perché pentite.

Se il peccato non è una ferita, come è ormai per gli stessi cristiani, perché curarlo? Il suo predecessore vedeva, oltre ai singoli feriti, anche un’altra moribonda, in questo ospedale da campo: la ragione. Per questo insisteva sul rapporto tra fede e ragione e sui principi non negoziabili: perché l’uomo, per guarire, deve essere abbracciato, curato, soccorso; ma bisogna anche che usi uno dei doni che Dio gli ha fatto, la ragione, appunto. Dire che drogarsi fa male, lo dicevamo, non basta. Però è un aiuto. Di una ragione rimessa davvero al centro, con le sue potenzialità e i suoi limiti, nel suo vero rapporto con la fede, hanno bisogno anche i non credenti, che non riconoscono Cristo e che non possono che vagliare il credo cristiano se non alla luce della sua ragionevolezza.

Soprattutto credo che non si possa dimenticare che non esistono solo i feriti, ma anche i feritori; che compito del pastore è sorreggere le pecore, ma anche scacciare il lupo che le aggredisce. Non si può dimenticare, per esempio, che una cosa è la donna che abortisce per svariati “motivi”; una cosa sono gli apostoli dell’aborto. Quelli che sui giornali hanno spiegato per decenni che il feto è un grumo di cellule. Di fronte a loro, non feriti, ma feritori, ci vedrei bene la frusta di Gesù nel tempio.

Penso ora, cambiando argomento, alla sua frase sui gay: vero, ma si può omettere il fatto che oggi il problema è ben più complesso, perché vi è una cultura gay – che molti omosessuali non condividono – che vuole dare i bambini in adozione a due uomini, o a due donne? Si può, di fronte a un dibattito mondiale, ignorare che la direzione che stiamo prendendo, tramite leggi liberticide, è il matrimonio gay (con relativa vendita di ovuli, sperma, uteri, figli)? Un discorso vero, è un discorso completo. I bambini che ormai a milioni sono figli di due padri o di due madri non possono stare fuori dal discorso gay, oggi. Sono feriti, attuali o potenziali, anche loro.
Riguardo alla completezza, mi chiedo, ancora, cosa significa la parola “coscienza”, come Lei l’ha usata nella lettera a Scalfari? Scalfari ne ha tratto subito una conseguenza molto interessata, e molto anti cristiana.

Il suo predecessore avrebbe detto che la parola “coscienza”, non definita, senza aggettivi, come se fosse parola dal significato, oggi, inequivocabile, viene usata dai sostenitori del relativismo per dire che ognuno si fa la verità e la morale come vuole, “secondo la sua coscienza”. Sono certo che lei concorda. Discorso completo, dicevo, cioè non equivocabile. A un certo punto lei afferma: “Penso anche alla situazione di una donna che ha avuto alle spalle un matrimonio fallito nel quale ha pure abortito. Poi questa donna si è risposata e adesso è serena con cinque figli. L’aborto le pesa enormemente ed è sinceramente pentita. Vorrebbe andare avanti nella vita cristiana. Che cosa fa il confessore?”. Lei fa la domanda, e non risponde. E’ un problema. Ricordato che l’aborto è un peccato, come tale sempre perdonabile dove vi sia pentimento, quale è la verità della chiesa sul matrimonio (visto che nell’esempio da lei fatto la donna si è “risposata”)?

E’ ancora indissolubile, o meno? La frase, tronca, non permette di capirlo. Immagino un padre di famiglia, che stenta nel rapporto con la moglie, che tiene duro, anche nell’interesse dei figli, perché educato nella concezione cristiana del matrimonio. Potrebbe dirle: “Caro Papa, e io? Devo continuare a stringere i denti, o mi posso trovare un’altra compagna meno antipatica?”. Un’altra piccola cosa che non capisco (forse annebbiato dalla strana vicenda dei Francescani dell’Immacolata). A un certo punto lei parla di liturgia e fa un cenno al “Vetus Ordo”. Afferma: “Penso che la scelta di Papa Benedetto sia stata prudenziale, legata all’aiuto ad alcune persone che hanno questa particolare sensibilità. Considero invece preoccupante il rischio di ideologizzazione del Vetus Ordo, la sua strumentalizzazione”.

E qui, da semplice amante del gregoriano e dell’antico rito, che il Vaticano II non si incaricò mai di cancellare, mi domando: davvero un rito antichissimo, sarebbe, oggi, la concessione “prudenziale” per nostalgici, con una “particolare sensibilità”? Il fatto che tra i sostenitori del vecchio rito vi siano anche persone ideologizzate (non ci sono, altrove?), toglie qualcosa al rito stesso e alla maggioranza delle persone che lo frequentano con devozione? Infine, perché tanto garbo per tutti, e, già in altre occasioni, una certa “fretta” verso chi predilige il modo di pregare che fu dei suoi genitori e nonni, di sant’Ignazio, san Giovanni Bosco? Non è questa, mi perdoni, una “durezza” che non userebbe mai verso un “lontano”? Quanto alla possibile “strumentalizzazione” del Vetus Ordo, essa non è forse, talora, la conseguenza di innumerevoli abusi e mancanze di segno opposto? Non è spesso la reazione a una concezione della liturgia di tipo protestante (non tanto alla semplicità, quanto alla sciatteria con cui tanti sacerdoti celebrano, non facendo mistero di non credere più nella Presenza reale)? Simpatie e dubbi, di un cattolico qualsiasi….