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quarta-feira, 13 de março de 2013

Abortion and Our "Moral Sense" - by S. Adam Seagrave



Roe v. Wade is often compared to the infamous Dred Scott decision, and much has insightfully been made of the parallels between the issues of slavery and abortion. These parallels are usually drawn more for the benefit of persuading the opposition than for the benefit of pro-lifers themselves—pro-lifers already know that abortion is evil without the helpful comparison to the evil of slavery.

I recently had occasion to revisit Frederick Douglass’s immortal “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” speech in a course I’m teaching on slavery, and I realized that one crucial parallel between the issues of abortion and slavery has gone mostly unnoticed, or perhaps has been unduly neglected. The reason for this is simple: It is a parallel that some pro-lifers may find unsettling or uncomfortable, and therefore one that few have been especially eager to find.

In this famous speech, Douglass imagines a member of his audience imploring him to “argue more, and denounce less”—to push rational discourse about the slavery issue toward acknowledging the wrong of slavery, and thereby to further the cause of abolition in a calm and civilized manner.

In response, Douglass asserts that “where all is plain there is nothing to be argued.” He then unleashes a powerful barrage of rhetorical questions on his audience: “Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man? Would you have me argue that man is entitled to liberty? That he is the rightful owner of his own body? Am I to argue that it is wrong to make men brutes, to rob them of their liberty . . . to starve them into obedience and submission to their masters?” According to Douglass, the slavery issue has already been settled on the level of reasoned argument, and “it is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder.”

While there were in fact a variety of pro-slavery arguments current at the time, Douglass was of course absolutely right: The humanity of the slave was obvious, and the right to liberty was, and is, an obvious concomitant of this humanity. The practice of slavery wasn’t being upheld by the force of rational argumentation, but by slaveholders’ desire for self-preservation and non-slaveholders’ apathy or inactivity. The battle to be fought wasn’t a battle of ideas—that battle already had been won—but a battle of conscience.

The same, I submit, is true of the abortion debate today. While, as in the case of slavery, arguments have been and are given against the humanity or right to life of the unborn, the contrary is simply obvious to anyone willing to set aside ideology or narrow self-interest.

Excellent and highly sophisticated arguments for the personhood and dignity of the unborn from the moment of conception have been given by many on the pro-life side (by Robert George, Christopher Tollefsen, and Patrick Lee in particular), arguments clearly unmet by those in favor of abortion rights. Such arguments drive home this basic fact of human existence in a manner that effectively marshals the support of heavy-duty philosophy to the pro-life position. While this is a crucial task, in fact the argument may be settled by common sense and simple reasoning.

In a manner similar to the case of slavery as outlined by Douglass, there are two simple points that, once admitted, join to condemn clearly the practice of abortion: (1) the embryo is a human being from the moment of conception, and (2) all human beings have a natural right to life.

The second point, as in the case of the natural right to liberty, doesn’t require serious argument on the level of ordinary judgment, even though many pro-choice philosophers have tried to argue that only persons have a right to life, and the unborn, in their view, aren’t persons. To make such arguments, however, requires choosing an arbitrary cut-off point for personhood, as pro-life philosophers such as George, Tollefsen, and Lee have shown.

The first point is more often chosen as promising ground for challenges, but it too is plainly obvious to the unbiased mind.

Once conception occurs, the embryo is something other than the woman who carries it. The fact that the embryo requires the mother’s body to live is no argument against this—dependence does not exclude otherness, otherwise none of us would be distinguishable from everyone and everything else in the world upon which we depend in innumerable ways. The embryo is obviously something other than a part of the mother, but what is it?

This is where it gets easy, despite the messy, abstract philosophical arguments. The more appropriate version of the question is the following: What else could it be besides a human being? Is there a single example in natural history of sexual intercourse between two individuals of the same species resulting in something other than another individual of that species? Is it plausible to guess that sexual intercourse between two human beings might result in a fish, at least initially? Or maybe a frog? Such speculation is entirely fanciful and runs directly contrary to our experience of the world since the beginning of recorded history.
It should be obvious to anyone that the two points hold, and that the embryo is a human being possessing a natural right to life from the moment of its conception. The problem is that the younger and less developed the embryo is, the less it excites what some have called our “moral sense,” our sympathy with it as another human being like us. And as Hume correctly notes, human beings tend to be moved more by their passions and feelings, including the so-called “moral sense,” than by their intellectual understanding of the world when determining their actions. Even if our reason and common sense tell us clearly—as they undoubtedly do—that the embryo is a human being with the right to life, our moral sense or sympathy lets us off the hook.

So where does this leave pro-life advocates? How can we bridge the Humean—and human—gap between intellectual understanding and actual practice in our nation? The answer lies in the parallel between the issue of abortion and those of slavery and subsequent civil rights. The pro-life movement needs to model more closely in its organization and practices the antebellum abolition movement and the civil rights movement in order to achieve similar success in ending the evil of abortion. It needs to take up the mantle of these causes in a manner beyond rhetorical parallel or intellectual analogy and be prepared to undergo similar hardships before achieving its goals.

Both of these historical movements ultimately succeeded not by winning arguments, but by awakening the moral sense or conscience of a majority of the nation. Legislation relating to the provision of an ultrasound prior to an abortion, currently in place in some form in more than twenty states, is very well suited to this purpose. The dissemination of graphic images relating to abortion procedures, though controversial in pro-life circles, is also highly appropriate to this purpose.

The civil rights movement was driven forward significantly by television and photographic coverage of the inhuman treatment of protestors, as well as the publication of vivid written reports of racially motivated cruelties. Moral senses or sympathies are sparked most effectively by distasteful, unsettling, and shocking information; and when intellectual argument has had its day in trying to awaken consciences and has shown itself insufficient, recourse must be had to the level of moral sense and feeling.

The pro-life movement currently finds itself in the same place as the abolition movement at the time of Frederick Douglass’s great speech. If we are to experience similar success, we would do well to follow Douglass’s advice and focus our energies on awakening the moral sense of our fellow citizens. It would help to have another Douglass for our cause, but at least we still have his words: “The feeling of the nation must be quickened; the conscience of the nation must be roused; the propriety of the nation must be startled; the hypocrisy of the nation must be exposed; and its crimes against God and man must be proclaimed and denounced.”

quarta-feira, 26 de setembro de 2012

(Sobre as eleições) Quem te avisa… - por Randall Smith

In Actualidade Religiosa

Os debates de 1858 entre Lincoln e Douglas prepararam os americanos para uma eleição que Abraham Lincoln acabaria por perder e cobriram uma série de assuntos políticos daquele tempo, mas houve um que dominou: a escravatura. Na verdade, hoje ninguém quer saber quais eram as posições de Stephen A. Douglas sobre, digamos, a economia, o que pensava sobre meios de pagamento ou impostos. A única coisa que nos interessa agora é que ele votou a favor da escravatura.
 
Em abono da verdade, devemos esclarecer que Douglas repetiu insistentemente que não era a favor da escravatura, mas foi também um dos arquitectos da noção de “soberania popular”, isto é, deixar que os Estados decidam a questão por si.

Assim, Douglas declarou que:

Acredito que a humanidade e o Cristianismo ambos requerem que o negro deva ter, e possa beneficiar de, todos os privilégios e todas as imunidades consistentes com a segurança da sociedade na qual vive. Sobre isso, presumo, não pode haver diversidade de opinião. Somos obrigados a estender aos seres dependentes e inferiores todo o direito, todo o privilégio, toda a facilidades e imunidade que sejam consistentes com o bem público.
 
A questão que surge é, então, que direitos e privilégios são consistentes com o bem público? Esta é uma questão que cada Estado e cada Território deve decidir por si. O Estado de Illinois já decidiu. Decidimos que o negro não deve ser escravo e também que não deve ser um cidadão, mas protegêmo-lo nos seus direitos cívicos, na sua vida, na sua pessoa e propriedade, negando-lhe apenas todos os direitos políticos e recusando colocá-lo num nível de igualdade com o homem branco. A política do Illinois é satisfatória para o Partido Democrático e para mim, e se assim fosse para os republicanos então não haveria nada a discutir; mas os republicanos dizem que ele deve ser um cidadão e quando isso acontece ele torna-se nosso igual, com todos os nossos direitos e privilégios. Eles dizem que a decisão Dred Scott é monstruosa porque nega ao negro o direito à cidadania à luz da Constituição. Ora, eu considero que o Illinois tinha o direito de abolir e proibir a escravatura, como fez, e considero que o Kentucky tinha o mesmo direito de manter e proteger a escravatura que o Illinois tinha de a abolir.
 
Por outras palavras, Douglas era o típico candidato pró-escolha: Defendia a liberdade de escolha para todos – excepto para os americanos negros que não eram inteiramente pessoas à luz da lei de então. Quanto à sua garantia de que os negros deviam poder gozar de “todos os direitos, todos os privilégios” consistentes com o bem público, trata-se de um caso típico de “duplicidade”: aquilo que oferece tão generosamente com uma mão, tira de forma brutal com a outra.

E não pensem que Douglas não tentou classificar Lincoln como um “extremista”, “desalinhado”, próximo dos abolicionistas “fanáiticos”. Disse-o diversas vezes. Mas o próprio Lincoln também não tinha um registo imaculado no que diz respeito à escravatura, optando por compromissos pragmáticos que, sem dúvida, levaram alguns abolicionistas a optar por um candidato mais “puro”. Assim, é natural que muitos grupos tenham votado contra Lincoln: os que discordavam da sua posição sobre a escravatura; os que estavam convencidos de que ele não era suficientemente contra e aqueles que pensavam que a escravatura era apenas uma de entre várias questões e que, pensando bem, preferiam o Douglas.

Seria errado colocar todos os assuntos a par da escravatura em termos de importância, mas seria igualmente errado esquecer que há momentos na história em que as injustiças que surgem tornam tudo o resto insignificante, pese embora a seriedade da situação não seja clara para todos na altura.

Não existiam Nazis na Alemanha depois da Segunda Guerra Mundial, porém o partido tinha sido eleito por largas maiorias em todas as eleições até que a guerra começou a correr mal em 1942. Hoje ninguém olha para trás e diz: “Sim, o candidato Nazi era a favor da deportação de judeus, mas se calhar tinha boas políticas económicas.” As políticas económicas não interessam a ninguém.

A expressão “mas eles puseram os comboios a correr a horas!”, outrora usada para justificar o apelo dos Nazis, é hoje recebida com particular desprezo porque sabemos qual era a carga humana desses comboios. Nem temos grande pachorra para aqueles que argumentariam que era melhor votar num candidato Nazi porque, se a economia melhorasse, poderia diminuir a pressão para deportar judeus. As consequências não intencionais não podem ser controladas, mas o que as pessoas escolhem favorecer ou restringir pode. Os candidatos que se opõem à defesa da vida minam o mais básico princípio fundador da nação.

À medida que nos aproximamos da eleição presidencial de Novembro faríamos bem em recordar esta história. Daqui a 200 anos, quando a visão moral for mais clara, alguem quererá saber das questiúnculas políticas que agora nos dominam? Ou perguntarão simplesmente (como nós fazemos em relação aos nossos antepassados): quem votou contra o aborto e quem não o fez?

O ensinamento da Igreja sobre este assunto tem sido repetida várias vezes; nalguns aspectos é até mais clara do que era em relação à escravatura ou ao tratamento dos judeus. Muitas vezes perguntam-me porque é que os bispos alemães não excomungaram os católicos que votavam nos Nazis. Não sei. Mas também tendo a interessar-me menos pelos pecados do passado e mais em evitar a minha própria cegueira moral. O juizo é uma faca de dois gumes.

A Igreja não pode obrigar, como fazem os governos. Ela pode apenas apelar à consciência dos homens e mulheres de boa vontade. Um católico com consciência bem formada não pode votar a favor de um candidato que defende o aborto por oposição a um candidato que defende a restrição do aborto, da mesma maneira que nenhum católico de consciência bem formada poderia ter votado a favor de um candidato pró-escravatura ou pró-Nazi. Alguém hoje defenderia que era justificável votar em Douglas em vez de Lincoln?

Não se engane a si mesmo. Aqueles que têm ouvidos, que ouçam.

Randall Smith é professor de teologia na Universidade de St. Thomas, Houston.

sexta-feira, 29 de junho de 2012

Casey: Enduring, Entrenched, Intentionally Evil Egregious Error - by Michael Stokes Paulsen


Casey is not a sound exposition of the Constitution, and its authority should be repudiated by all other actors in our constitutional system The second in a two-part series on the deadly significance of Planned Parenthood v. Casey
 
The Supreme Court has done a fair number of truly awful things in its history, falsely blaming them on the Constitution: creating a constitutional property right to slavery and extending it into new territories (Dred Scott, 1857); gutting the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws by warmly embracing state racial segregation (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896); discrimination against women (Bradwell v. Illinois, 1873), and eugenic sterilization of the disabled (Buck v. Bell, 1927); declining to disturb a state-wide scheme to deprive blacks of the right to vote (Giles v. Harris, 1903); ratifying Franklin Roosevelt’s military internment of innocent Japanese-American civilians during World War II (Korematsu v. United States, 1944); ordering a religious college to cease teaching blacks and whites together (Berea College v. Kentucky, 1908); upholding the expulsion from school of children whose religious beliefs forbade them to salute the flag (Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 1940); and affirming the criminal conviction and incarceration of a prominent former presidential candidate for making an anti-war speech (Debs v. United States, 1919), to name just a few of the most infamous.

But of all the atrocious things the Court has done in the name of the Constitution, none is worse than Planned Parenthood v. Casey, decided twenty years ago today. Casey is the worst Supreme Court constitutional decision of all time.

Yesterday, I discussed Casey’s extraordinary significance—for abortion law specifically, for its view of judicial power generally, for its embrace and practice of stare decisis as a tool of judicial power, and for its acceptance of substantive due process. Today, I discuss Casey’s sheer atrocity. For in every respect that Casey is significant, it is cruelly and horribly wrong.

What Makes a Supreme Constitutional Atrocity?

My criteria are simple and straightforward. A Supreme Court decision interpreting the Constitution is atrocious to the extent it is both legally wrong and produces great human harm; and it is worse yet where intentionally wrong and knowingly harmful and where it tends to generate or perpetuate further wrongs and harms.

A decision is legally wrong when it reaches a result not fairly attributable to a rule of law supplied by the text, structure, and history of the Constitution. And a wrong decision is harmful where it produces evil, injurious consequences to innocent human beings—death, oppression, enslavement, deprivation of fundamental human rights, internment, incarceration, deprivation of liberty, misery, discrimination, or indignity.

Both legal error and great harm must be present for a judicial decision to be truly atrocious. A right constitutional decision—one faithful to the text, structure, and historical understanding of the document—might sometimes yield harmful human consequences if the Constitution itself permits such consequences and the people’s democratic representatives enact bad (but not unconstitutional) laws. The fault then lies with the Constitution, or the representatives, or the people, not with the court rendering the decision. Conversely, not all wrong judicial decisions inflict great human harm; some are inconsequential, some have a short shelf life, and some might even produce “good” results (aside from the problem of legal error itself).

If a legally wrong decision is made willfully and intentionally, and its harm is known, the decision is all the worse. As the saying goes, even a dog knows the difference between being tripped over and being kicked. Dred Scott, for example, displays a crafty, deliberate, manipulative, insidious intention to reach a predetermined result of entrenching and extending slavery and de-legitimizing antislavery politics. Dred Scott was a premeditated deed of willful calculation, designed to achieve a clear moral wrong, cloaked in the veneer of legal respectability. Roe v. Wade, in contrast, for all its legal idiocy, was more an act of supreme judicial incompetence by men who seem to have thought that what courts do is make social policy, and who seem neither to have appreciated the moral stakes of abortion nor to have understood what they actually held with respect to it. They may even have believed their decision to be a balanced compromise.

Finally, an egregious decision is even worse to the extent it tends to perpetuate, entrench, or generate further legal wrongs. A horrid bump in the constitutional road is still a horrid bump, but if it is easily corrected, quickly overruled, or readily ignored, it might be confined to that single case. A wrong that begets more wrongs, and that strives to make itself invulnerable to correction, is all the worse.

The search is thus for error, egregious error, evil egregious error, intentionally evil egregious error, and enduring, entrenched, intentionally evil egregious error. And on these criteria, Casey is the Supreme Court’s worst constitutional decision of all time, beating out even Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade for that dishonor.

Casey’s Grave Legal and Moral Wrongness 

The decision in Casey is as legally wrong as Roe, unless somehow repeating wrongs makes them rights. That was Casey’s insidious argument, of course—an illogical sophism and, as deployed by the Court, a dishonest one. That makes Casey even more wrong than Roe. Casey’s harmful and evil effects have, as noted yesterday, now outrun Roe in raw years and raw numbers of human lives killed under its regime. Unless one thinks the right to abortion on demand a good and wonderful thing, the magnitude of human harm wreaked by Casey is greater than any other decision in history, Roe included: the legal warrant for a society’s deliberate killing of thirty million human lives. Casey stands to last longer yet; its whole argument is for entrenchment of the right to abortion—that a grave judicial wrong, once boldly ventured, should, by virtue of that fact, stand in perpetuity.

Casey’s Intentional Embrace of Presumed Error and Known Harm

Casey, more than Roe—and much more like Dred Scott—was intentional, carefully considered (one is inclined to say premeditated), and made with full awareness of both its constitutional weakness and its deadly human costs. Reading the joint opinion in Casey, one cannot help but detect an acute consciousness of guilt on the part of at least several of the justices comprising the majority, each of whose votes was necessary to the result. The opinion is careful to note, repeatedly, and somewhat awkwardly, that not all in the majority were necessarily in agreement with Roe. Indeed, Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy both flipped from previously stated positions.

One cannot at all forgive the Casey Court, as one might the justices who rendered Roe, on the theory that they knew not what they were doing. The Court in Casey knew exactly what it was doing. It knew the jurisprudential stakes; it knew the moral arguments; it knew the reality of what abortion was and what abortion does. The justices did what they did with full knowledge of the consequences, with full awareness that the claimed right to abortion lacked any legitimate legal basis, and with full appreciation that the deaths of millions of unborn human children hung on their decision. For some of them, it is clear that their votes to reaffirm and extend Roe were also cast against their own moral consciences.

And they did it anyway. They did it for reasons of vanity, perception, power, and cowardice, cast as judicial duty. They did it because they thought more people, or more of the right people, would think better of them if they did what they thought wrong, rather than right.

This makes Casey the most reprehensible act of judicial betrayal of the Constitution, of judicial duty, and of judicial morality, in our nation’s history. It is hard to escape the judgment that, for a justice who believed that Roe was legally and morally wrong nonetheless deliberately to reaffirm it, on the pretense that stare decisis or protection of judicial power required it, is to act in deliberate, knowing complicity with evil.

Casey’s Perpetuation, Entrenchment, and Spawning of Ongoing Wrongs and Harms 

Casey also seeks to perpetuate its errors and harms—to entrench abortion on demand and de-legitimize criticism of the Court and its abortion cases. The Court sought to leverage its power forward in time, suppress future opposition, and end the debate about legalizing abortion forever. In this respect, too, Casey is much like Dred Scott. In substance and rhetoric, the opinion is distressingly authoritarian. Casey’s goal was to make Roe harder, if not impossible, to overrule and to make it harder to question the authority of the Court to make social policy. Casey was the taken-as-given starting point for the partial-birth abortion decisions of 2000 and 2007 (Carhart I & II), the first of which struck down a state law, and the second of which upheld a federal law, banning abortion by the method of inducing birth and puncturing the skull during a partial live-birth delivery, but each of which presumed an unqualified “right” to obtain an abortion at any stage of pregnancy by some method or other. Casey also accounts in large measure for the Court’s acceptance of substantive-due-process judicial lawmaking in other areas of controversy, like same-sex sexual relations (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003) and assisted suicide (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997). So long as it stands, Casey will continue to generate further wrongs and obstruct their correction.

Casey’s Future: The Moral Imperative of Principled Resistance

Will Casey fall in our lifetimes? The outlook is not especially rosy. After twenty years, only one justice in Casey’s majority, Justice Kennedy, remains on the Court. Yet the decision remains as secure as ever. Accounting for swaps, four new pro-Casey justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) have replaced the departed four members of Casey’s majority (Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter). Likewise, there remain four likely votes against Casey—two Casey dissenters (Scalia and Thomas), and two new justices (Roberts and Alito), whose views probably track closely those of Casey’s two other dissenters (Rehnquist and White, both of whom had dissented in Roe in 1973). The lineup is thus still 5-4, in favor of Casey. There is, moreover, a limit to how much optimism may be reposed in the prospect of future judicial appointments: it assumes favorable results in politics (in the presidency and Senate), favorable opportunities for favorable appointments, favorable results in politics again (in the confirmation process), favorable occasions for reversing Roe and Casey, and then favorable judicial politics and character. The contingencies are daunting. (Many had, with reason, counted seven probable votes to overrule Roe when Casey came before the Court, including O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, following twelve years of pro-life presidents appointing five new members to the Court.)

It is therefore important to fundamentally de-legitimize the Casey decision, to confront it head-on and deny its authority as constitutional law, and further, to challenge directly and undermine the pretensions to unquestionable authority over the Constitution made by the Court that rendered it. If Roe and Casey are not sound expositions of the Constitution, their authority should be repudiated by all other actors in our constitutional system. It is the shared, sworn duty of the other branches of government to interpret the Constitution—it is not the province of the Court alone—and it is their duty to check, and resist, such egregious judicial violations of the Constitution. Roe and Casey should be declared unconstitutional, forthrightly and unequivocally, and declared therefore to be of no legitimate authority. The decisions should be resisted with all the legitimate constitutional powers at the disposal of the president, the Congress, the lower courts, state officials, voters, jurors, and citizens.

This requires exploding the myth of judicial supremacy that has so infected our constitutional discourse. The Constitution specifies constitutional supremacy, not judicial supremacy; it assigns supreme interpretive authority to no one branch or institution of government. Just as Lincoln denounced Dred Scott and declared that it could not bind the nation, Casey must be denounced and declared not to be binding law.

To achieve this aim, it is essential simultaneously to restore the Supreme Court’s legitimacy by replacing pro-Casey justices with those who reject the case. (It goes without saying that new Casey-collaborator judicial nominees should be rejected.) Casey’s rejection should be the sine qua non of judicial respectability—a legitimate litmus test for all further judicial appointments. A broad range of substantive views, on a broad range of issues, may be tolerable and even desirable among judges, as a general matter. But support of Roe and Casey should be viewed as outside the range of reasonable disagreement about the meaning of the Constitution, just as Dred Scott and Plessy are now properly so viewed.

Almost all of the Supreme Court’s greatest atrocities eventually have come to be rejected, one way or another—Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, Korematsu, Debs, and Gobitis. This in itself is somewhat encouraging. Atrocious decisions may endure for a generation or more, but our constitutional system has a way, usually, of working itself pure. Planned Parenthood v. Casey is at the top of the list of all-time constitutional atrocities. At twenty, Casey has lived too long a life and caused too many millions of deaths. Casey belongs on the pile of cases whose names are now synonymous with judicial infamy.

Michael Stokes Paulsen is University Chair and Professor of Law at the University of St. Thomas, in Minneapolis, and co-director of its Pro-Life Advocacy Center (PLACE). This two-part series was adapted from a law review article published in the Notre Dame Law Review, titled “The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time.”