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quarta-feira, 23 de outubro de 2013

Internet Pornography & the First Amendment -by Morgan Bennett

In TPD 

Introduction

In yesterday’s article, I gave an overview of new brain research that has exposed internet pornography as a powerfully addictive narcotic. I also mentioned that, from a legal and constitutional standpoint, the First Amendment is the ultimate hurdle to clear in order to regulate or prosecute internet pornography.

But why should the government get involved at all? Isn’t consuming internet pornography a private decision that doesn’t hurt anyone?

The claim that internet pornography “doesn’t hurt anyone” is patently disproved by years of multidisciplinary studies in the hard sciences and the social sciences. These studies have exposed internet pornography as a massive, paradigm-shifting social harm that undermines the family unit and causes abuse, life-long addictions, infidelity, and unhealthy perceptions and expectations among men, women, and children.

Likewise, the “no harm” argument also fails to consider the production of internet pornography, which is produced by way of real human beings who are almost always engaged in illegal and dehumanizing acts such as prostitution, rape, sex trafficking, assault, and even murder.

Though sexuality is considered “private” in our society, the social effects of collective sexual behaviors and norms, including the effects of internet pornography, cannot be kept “private.” Because pornography is sexual, it is inherently relational and thus inherently social. How people relate to each other in society is important, but how people relate sexually is crucial to the sustenance of a society because it either incentivizes or de-incentivizes the very foundation of society: the family unit.

How then, one might ask, can such a vice be “protected” under the United States Constitution?
While many assume that the First Amendment protects internet pornography as “artistic expression,” that is largely not the case under current statutory and constitutional law. Still, current First 

Amendment jurisprudence, at least as it relates to sexually explicit material, fails to properly discern and apply the First Amendment’s purposes. An examination of prior and even current precedent reveals that speech or acts of a sexual nature are a historically unique category and thus require a unique analysis. By considering the duties of good government and the intended purposes of the First Amendment, we can develop a just and principled interpretation of the First Amendment as it relates to internet pornography.

The Founders’ Views on Free Speech

The scope and contours of the First Amendment’s speech clause are difficult to decipher by way of “original intent” due to the scarcity of information in the historical records. While the freedom of the press was discussed, the free speech clause was perhaps too obvious or fundamental to require debate. Still, the general principles underpinning the First Amendment are accessible by examining the Founders’ general understanding of liberty (“rights”).

Though the Founders had a broad view of liberty, they also recognized the distinction between liberty and license. In other words, liberty does not include the abuse of rights.

What sort of speech would qualify as an abuse of the “right” to speak freely? Thomas G. West, Professor of Politics at Hillsdale College, explains that there were four commonly-recognized categories of injurious speech in the Founders’ era: personal libel, government libel, speech that injures public health or the moral foundations of society, and speech used in the course of, or that promotes, other injurious conduct.

Internet pornography, with its epidemic social harm, certainly qualifies as speech injurious to society’s health and moral foundations; it could also qualify as “speech used in the course of injurious conduct” due to its use of prostituted and even trafficked people in its production as well as its power to addict and harm those who see it.

It was uncontested in the Founders’ era and far beyond that speech or conduct tending to injure the public morals was subject to government control. Profanity, obscenity, indecency, and pornography were treated the same as public nudity or public intoxication. Consider the following quotation from an 1824 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case: “Licentiousness endangering the public peace, when tending to corrupt society, is considered as a breach of the peace, and punishable by indictment. Every immoral act is not indictable, but when it is destructive of morality generally, it is, because it weakens the bonds by which society is held together.”

Professor West aptly notes that the Founders did not distinguish between speech (obscene novels or drawings) and acts (operating a whorehouse), but rather asked if either tended to “undermine the moral basis of the community, especially of the family and the moral formation of the young.” If so, such activity—whether speech or act—was subject to legal limitation.

Obscenity

Obscenity doctrine in the United States can be traced to the common law doctrine of obscene libel in England. US courts began to cite the common law prohibition of obscenity by the 1810s, emphasizing the “opposition between liberty and license.” Government regulations of publicly-shown films were upheld by the Supreme Court until the 1950s and were considered a legitimate exercise of a state’s police power because such regulations prohibited only films determined to be injurious to public morals or order.

In 1915, the Supreme Court reasoned that film was less like speech and more akin to live theater performances, whose content was widely regulated by state and local governments. At the time, film’s powerful unconscious effect on the viewer was contrasted with the conscious analysis required when reading a book:

Unlike reading, looking at images—particularly moving images—require[s] no active cognition; the message [i]s thrust upon viewers. “When we read, there is time for thought, reasoning, and the formation of judgment; but motion pictures progress so swiftly as to permit almost no cerebral action . . . .” . . . The written word “cannot lead the [viewer] further than his limited imagination will allow, but the motion picture forces upon his view things that are new[;] [it] give[s] firsthand experience. . . .”

But in 1952, the Supreme Court struck down a film censorship statute on First Amendment grounds and announced that motion pictures were “expressions” and therefore protected as “speech.” Even so, the Court still noted that “it does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places.” In fact, it is still good precedent that “prior restraints on expression” are not automatically unconstitutional in all circumstances, as the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that “constitutional protection includes complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture . . . even if this film contains the basest type of pornography, or incitement to riot, or forceful overthrow of orderly government.”

Current State of the Law

Under current First Amendment jurisprudence, any sexually explicit “expression” (including images and videos) is protected under the First Amendment unless it is obscene or “real” (non-virtual) child pornography. The constitutional meaning of “obscenity” has been through a few definitional tug-of-wars since the erosion of “license versus liberty” in First Amendment jurisprudence. The current definition—the three-prong “Miller standard”—has been stable since 1973, but it has been (and still is) heavily criticized:

(1) Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(3) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Despite criticism, the Miller standard was extremely effective for prosecutors under the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. The Clinton administration, under Janet Reno, refused to enforce federal obscenity law, and though a handful of egregious obscenity cases were prosecuted under President George W. Bush, President Obama’s Attorney General, Eric Holder, has now shut down the DOJ’s Obscenity Prosecution Task Force.

Analysis

Though most criticize Miller for its “community standards” requirement, Miller’s most glaring defect is actually the third prong of the test. Assuming that “prurient, patently offensive depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct” can ever have a “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” is unprincipled and absurd. Furthermore, it is ludicrous to suggest that First Amendment protection depends upon a court’s assessment of such value.

The other problem with the Miller obscenity standard is that it requires real people, whether juries or judges, to actually view the obscene material, exposing them to the possibility of addiction or the trauma of what can effectively be the viewing of a live rape. Hardcore pornography is often “performed” as a reenactment of rape, commonly causing internal bleeding from anal or vaginal tears. Thus, the judge or jury is unjustly exposed to a profoundly traumatic and evil act on a real human being.

In light of Miller’s faulty obscenity standard, perhaps a more reasonable, precise, and workable definition for obscenity would be the following: an explicit image, including video, of a sex act, where the image/video is created (1) primarily for, or (2) with the primary effect of, sexually arousing the viewer, and where the image/video was created by actual sex acts (with “explicit” meaning clearly showing, even for a moment, the penetration of/by genital organ(s) and with “actual sex acts” meaning the actual touching of/by genital organs). (My thanks to Patrick A. Trueman and Alan Sears for being instrumental in the formation of this definition.)

Putting aside the obscenity exception for a moment, it is absolutely baffling that the underlying acts required to make internet pornography are not prosecuted by way of prostitution laws. Pornography is “prostitution with a camera” and is almost always created by an act of prostitution (paying a human being to perform a sex act). So why is pornography production not prosecuted under prostitution laws? At least in California, where the majority of the US pornography industry is located, it is precedent that the First Amendment somehow protects prostitution when “actors” are hired to perform sex acts in “the production of a non-obscene motion picture.” This California Supreme Court precedent has discouraged state and local law enforcement from prosecuting pornographers and “performers” using prostitution laws.

Next Steps

Constructing and implementing solutions to the internet pornography epidemic in America is inherently difficult due not only to current First Amendment precedent, but also to our cultural situation: current pornography use is around 87 percent for young adult males and 31 percent for young adult females, and roughly 50–60 percent of both genders find pornography use “acceptable.”
The most realistic first steps we can take in the fight against internet pornography are prosecution and cultural engagement.

First, local, state, and federal governments should enforce the current obscenity-related laws already on the books. Nearly every state has anti-obscenity laws. The enforcement of those laws would send a message that the production and distribution of obscene material is unacceptable in a civilized society. Second, local and national groups should run billboard, TV, and internet advertising campaigns to expose the harms of internet pornography to the public.

Looking beyond those “first steps,” I would argue for the eventual enactment of new laws that would censor obscene internet pornography.

A statutory system of narrowly-tailored, criteria-based censorship would use accurate and effective censorship technology similar to content-control software. According to Freedman v. Maryland, prior restraint is not necessarily unconstitutional, especially when restraining “base pornography” (i.e., hardcore pornography), as long as the statute provides sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that protected speech will not be restrained. Creating such a system with sufficient procedural safeguards will be the ultimate riddle.

Censoring hardcore pornography on the internet would not affect the private viewing of pornographic material by way of a DVD or a downloaded file (current obscenity statutes may apply to the production of distribution of such material), but it would strip two important elements from internet pornography: its affordability and its accessibility. Censoring would also help state and federal prosecutors focus their obscenity prosecutions on the sale and distribution of obscene material by way of mail, downloads, and porn shops. Currently, it feels futile to prosecute obscenity in the face of seemingly endless amounts of free online hardcore pornography, with more added every day.

Conclusion

Internet pornography is not only a public harm but also one of the greatest evils of our time. It destroys human beings: two-year-olds raped for entertainment; women drugged and then videoed while being raped by a dog; young women, often runaways or adolescent victims of prior sexual abuse or neglect, lured into the pornography industry where they are filmed being gang-raped until their internal organs rip.

Pornography undermines civilized society: it erodes the relationship between men and women; it undermines marriage, the family unit, and the well-being and social standing of women and children; it causes sexual addictions that debilitate a person’s productivity, discernment, and ability to form healthy relationships.

And yet, a cultural and legal “knot” has been tied in this country that cleverly protects the “license” of producing and consuming internet pornography.

But the First Amendment was not ratified to protect the prostitution and exploitation of human beings for entertainment; it was not ratified to restrict government prosecution of “speech” that causes grave harm to both individuals and to society as a whole. This concept of the First Amendment would have been unthinkable to the Framers, who lauded virtue as the indispensable ingredient of sustainable freedom.

Surely our current jurisprudence, which protects depictions of prostituted—and therefore criminal—sex acts, cannot be the proper interpretation of the First Amendment. Freedom of speech is certainly a precious liberty, but that liberty does not include its abuse: the freedom of speech is not a license. Nor is it the fundamental social value that should trump all others.

Internet pornography is a “monstrous injustice,” and the time for its abolition has come.


quarta-feira, 26 de junho de 2013

Enthusiasm for neuro-everything seems to be waning in the light of evidence that brain scans don't tell us very much - by Denyse O'Leary

In MercatorNet

Could we be reaching the end of materialist neuroscience?
It’s possible. It’s becoming conventional to assert that the mind is not the brain—even New York Times columnist David Brooks, who wrote an “evolutionary psychology” novel a few years ago, is now doing it. Literary Darwnism, as represented by Brooks’s widely panned novel, is also taking a hit. And science tabloid New Scientist has started to scoff at the idea too. Of course, medical neuroscientist Raymond Tallis has been scoffing at it for years, as have others.
But perhaps the most significant new development is that top biology review The Scientist recently featured a cautiously favourable review of a new book trashing the idea that current neuroscience is close to “reading minds,”Brainwashed: The seductive appeal of mindless neuroscience by psychiatrist Sally Satel and psychologist Scott Lilienfeld. The book is a comprehensive discussion of why we can just forget the pop media claims about the power of fMRI imaging, leading many to believe that neuroscience will eventually be able to read minds. Indeed, one well-known defender of that proposition allows us to know that for now psychiatry and psychology can continue. Never mind the government reading your mail; neuroscientists will read your mind.
Claims like, for example, that conservatives are turned on by “their own disgust” and liberals just like being turned on, period are taken seriously, as a portent of things to come.
As if that would generally explain responses to a local issue like a new plaza or discharge home for parolees? Would some such claim really override the difference it would make to the lives of the individuals in the neighbourhood? Maybe, maybe not. People, otherwise liberal, have been known to be alarmed when they discover that a local group home may house serial violent offenders. Conservatives could be for or against a new road.
This changes matters because, as the New Scientist article puts it,
"That, at least, is the popular conception of neuroscience and it's worth big money. The US and the European Union are throwing billions of dollars at two new projects to map the human brain. Yet there is also a growing anxiety that many of neuroscience's findings don't stand up to scrutiny. It's not just sensational headlines reporting a 'dark patch' in a psychopath's brain, there are now serious concerns that some of the methods themselves are flawed."
For one thing, all that fMRI ((brain imaging) really does is show which brain areas have high oxygen levels when a person is thinking something. It simply cannot tell us what people are thinking, because many brain centres are active and those that are active may be activated for many reasons. Each brain is unique so data from studies must be averaged. But thoughts are not averaged; they belong to the individual.
Flawed methods are only a minor problem with this pseudodiscipline. A bigger one is the basic idea that the mind is simply what the brain happens to be doing. For example, as Satel and Lilienfeld note, you don't have to be a Cartesian dualist to doubt that hate, generally, can actually be detected in our brains in a useful way, as one study has attempted to demonstrate.
"'Brains are hot,' Sally Satel and Scott O. Lilienfeld acknowledge in Brainwashed, their 'exposé of mindless neuroscience' (mostly practiced not by neuroscientists, they stress, but by 'neuropundits,' among others). The 'mediagenic' technology of fMRI imaging has made the brain, aglow with metabolic hotspots, into a rainbow emblem of the faith that science will soon empower us to explain, control, expose, exploit, or excuse every wayward human behavior from buying to lying, from craving to crime."
As if. If religion can’t save us, science won’t either. And it is not clear that very many of the claims made are science.
Note: “Neuropundits?” One outcome of the many questionable claims made for brain imaging is the rise of terminology like “neuromania,” “neurohype,” and “neurobollocks.” The authors of such bon mots are, typically, sceptical neuroscientists.
Denyse O'Leary is co-author of The Spiritual Brain.     

Are You Out of Your Brain? Reflections on Free Will and Neuroscience - by Mark S. Latkovic

 
If, by chance or interest, you have been following contemporary neuroscience, the expression “Are you out of your mind?” should be shelved in favor of the expression “Are you out of your brain?” Or, more accurately, if more cumbersomely, we should ask, “Are you out of your mind=brain?”

This would bring our language up to speed with modern neuroscience (it might also, however, confuse my children and yours). After all, most of the neuroscientists, philosophers of mind, and others who write about the human brain, speak of it as the organ that we think with. It is easy enough to assume the truth of this dubious claim by absorbing, like a sponge, stories in the media that propagate it.

As if to press the Delete key on the views of untold numbers of thinkers who have argued, for centuries, that thinking cannot be reduced to a physical organ of the human body, or more recently, that thinking cannot be reduced to the brain and central nervous system, today’s neurobiologists and neurophilosophers do precisely that: they say that thought can be explained largely by reference to the brain’s electrical-chemical processes.

Neurophilosophers such as Patricia Churchland and Daniel C. Dennett have argued that the mind equals the brain. Thinking, for them, is simply the result of the firing of neurons, neural connections, and various material forces taking place in the brain. As Dennett says, the soul is really a bunch of “robots” and these “robots” are “the mindless swarms of neurons and other cells that cooperate to produce a thinking thing—just not an immaterial thinking thing.” Therefore, psychology is really biology for such contemporary brain scientists.

To be sure, thinking presupposes a functioning brain, but it cannot be reduced to this fist-sized organ. Thinkers ranging from Aristotle (d. 322 BC) and Aquinas (d. 1274) to Mortimer Adler (d. 2001) and Benedict Ashley, O.P. (d. 2013), have shown that thinking is a spiritual or immaterial power of the human person (and only the human person), not a material property.

For instance, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, St. Thomas Aquinas gives five arguments to show why the intellect and the senses, or, as we would say today, why the mind and the brain are not the same. They hold up just as well today as when Aquinas formulated them over 700 years ago, and they have been further developed and refined by Ashley and others.

First, Thomas argues that both human beings and animals possess sense, but only the former have an intellect. The truth of this comes from the observation that animals act in a determined and uniform way by instinct, whereas humans are able to act freely in diverse ways for a goal. That is, humans can think about the best means to realizing the goal they seek and then freely choose it. This is evidence that intellect and sense cannot be equated (Ashley deals with recent studies attempting to show that animals can use language. But he shows that only humans speak a syntactical one; see Ashley, Healing for Freedom, pp. 183-88).

Second, Thomas notes that while the sense power is aware of singulars, the intellect is aware of universals. This is because every sense power knows through individual species, since it receives the species of things in bodily organs. Ashley gives the example of how we can think of both five apples and five oranges (species), but also the number five (universals) (see Healing for Freedom, p. 190).

Third, Thomas observes that our senses take in only material things. The sense organs do this by being physically as neutral as possible to a sensible quality (e.g., eye to color). Thus, I can see red roses without my eyes actually becoming red roses. Or, I can hear a sound without my ears literally becoming that sound. Sensible qualities are the proper object of the senses and exist only in them, not in the intellect. The senses are bereft of knowledge without these sensible properties. On the other hand, the intellect knows non-bodily things, such as wisdom, truth, and the relations existing between things (Ashley notes that this is especially evident in the use of human language, whereby we can assert and know propositions as either true or false; see Healing for Freedom, p. 193).

Fourth, a sense knows neither itself nor its workings. Thomas gives the following example: sight neither sees itself nor sees that it sees. This self-reflexive power (or self-consciousness)—i.e., knowing that you know something—belongs to the intellect alone. Ashley explains this by pointing out that an extended body cannot have every part of its body be in contact with every other part. That is why the human brain, as a material thing having quantity, is unable to have this reflexivity: it is a network of neurons connecting one point of the brain with as many other points of the brain as possible. But no matter how much we compress a body (such as the brain, if that were possible without destroying it) and no matter how interconnected its points by the transmission of signals, we cannot place every part in contact with every other part (see Healing for Freedom, p. 198). So, once again, we can affirm that intellect and sense are different.

Fifth, sense is corrupted by too much of a sensible object. Stated another way, our senses can be overloaded, e.g., the sun can blind one’s eyes. But intellect is not corrupted or overwhelmed by thinking about superior concepts. In fact, knowing abstract and universal concepts makes someone better equipped to understand lesser things later on. So, while our eyes can have too much sunlight, our minds cannot have too much knowledge of God. The sensitive power therefore differs from the intellective power (see Ashley’s discussion of this argument in Healing for Freedom, pp. 199-203, as well as how he relates it to Goedel’s Theorem on pp. 198 and 202-03).

What causes serious problems for the materialist view is that the materialist understanding of the brain makes a mockery of the scientific enterprise itself, in that the materialist brain researcher holds up his research as proof that we think with our brains and in fact appeals to this evidence to convince you and me of the truth of his position. In making this move, the materialist is appealing to a free will that we, in his worldview, actually no longer really have—it’s an illusion too. But if freedom is an illusion, it renders his scientific appeal rather unscientific, as well as unworkable. He is, in other words, caught in a contradiction.

That is, if he is right to deny that thinking is an immaterial process, then he can no longer coherently try to persuade us to “come over” to his way of understanding things. We are in fact already determined: some of us are determined to “think” he is right and some of us are determined to “think” he is wrong, all depending on the particular physiochemical activity going on in our brains. (An early version of this “self-referential” argument against determinism, by Joseph Boyle and his co-authors, is proposed here.)

We are surely not free, according to this view, either to accept or reject the materialist’s argument equating the mind with the brain. But if we actually are free, then we could not in truth equate the mind with the brain, since free choice, like our ability to know, is a spiritual power not dependent on anything material. Science then, by the logic of materialism itself, can no longer be about the rational pursuit of truth, but about power struggles over fixed, predetermined conclusions. To borrow a recent expression from American politics, “It’s a bridge to nowhere.”

I find Gilbert Meilaender’s expression of the mind-brain relationship much closer to the truth. He says our thoughts are “both located in the brain and distanced from it—which is why we are capable of what [philosopher] Thomas Nagel has called ‘the view from nowhere.’” Nagel, himself an atheist, has gotten into hot water lately with his fellow secular philosophers for questioning the very truth of the materialistic/naturalistic account of mind and cosmos. (See the Public Discourse discussion of Nagel’s book here.)

Many of the neurobiologists who deny the immateriality and existence of the rational and intellectual soul, and who therefore deny the immateriality of thinking, seem never to have heard the ancient and modern arguments for these truths. Or, having heard them, they have either forgotten them or rejected them.

This rejection is often driven by the atheistic and neo-Darwinian assumptions of the prestigious scientists who work in this field. These assumptions must be challenged, however, if science is to retain its rightful place as an inestimable source of knowledge and wisdom in our society. Moreover, it is important to note that not all scientists are atheistic materialists; there are many internationally respected scientists who are firm believers in God, among them the recently deceased Hungarian priest-physicist Stanley Jaki who taught at Seton Hall University in New Jersey.

Science deserves more from its scientists than scientism. And so do human persons, whose own God-given dignity depends on the existence (and the acceptance) of the rational soul and the idea that its “faculties” are the “powers” of knowing and willing—not the powerful inner workings of our brains. In the end, as an “embodied intelligent freedom,” to borrow the recent phrase of Benedict M. Ashley and Kevin D. O’Rourke, man’s marvelous brain serves his thinking; it doesn’t do it for him. If you said it did, I think you’d be out of your mind.