Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Barrigas de aluguer. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Barrigas de aluguer. Mostrar todas as mensagens

quinta-feira, 5 de dezembro de 2013

One child and... actually how many parents did you say? - by José Ramos-Ascensão


In europeinfos

A “Comparative study on the regime of surrogacy in EU Member States”, commissioned by the Committee of Legal Affairs, has recently been presented at the European Parliament; whereas, at the same time, it has been announced that rising ‘surrogacy tourism’ in India is boosting an already four-billion dollar industry in that country. A sign of the times!

Surrogate motherhood is the practice whereby a woman (the surrogate mother) becomes pregnant with the intention of handing over the child to someone else (the intended parent) after the birth. A distinction is made between traditional and gestational surrogacy depending on whether the surrogate mother´s eggs are used or not. In the first case, the surrogate is also the genetic mother of the child. In the second case, the intended parent may or may not be also the genetic parent of the child, depending on whether a third person’s gametes were used or not (with regard to the donation of gametes, the so-called heterologous in vitro fertilization, see our article in europeinfos issue no. 146). Finally, with new techniques such as pronuclear transfer, even the “genetic material” might, at least in theory, originate from more than one donor.

Lost count? Indeed, too many “parents” for just one child, let alone mentioning a possible husband or partner of the surrogate mother herself!

Ethical and legal concerns

These assisted reproductive technologies – as a matter of fact, actual reproductive technologic revolutions – pose, of course, enormous ethical and legal questions and difficulties. To complicate things even more, surrogacy may be “commercial” or “altruistic”, and the surrogate mother and the intended parents may be from different countries (“cross-border surrogacy”), with different applicable legislations, often with one of them prohibiting (or simply not recognizing) the surrogacy arrangement – and therefore the corresponding foreign birth certificate – with possible, dire dramas of ‘parentlessness’ and ‘statelessness’ being created, often with the foreknowledge of the intended parents!

All this is pursued in the name of granting the ‘enjoyment’ of an alleged “right to a child” by anyone, at the expense of the disruption of marriage, motherhood and parenthood, and indeed family relationships in general. The human dignity of all parties, above all the surrogate mother and the child to born, is violated inasmuch as they are treated as mere objects or commodities; and, in the case of the child to born in particular, his or her very right to personal identity is also breached.

No wonder that surrogacy experiences a rather negative attitude from the point of view of the general public, despite the fact that some specific groups, such as the LGBTI (Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex) community and activists, are particularly interested in its legalization and facilitation. Nonetheless, only Greece, in the EU, has a comprehensive legal framework allowing ex ante (before birth) “altruistic” gestational surrogacy, yet with access limited to heterosexual couples or single women and, in either case, depending on “medical necessity”.

The way ahead

Notwithstanding, the aforementioned “Comparative study…” claims a lack of European consensus, indicating that the safeguarding of the best interests of the child is possibly the only common recognizable trend among Member States.

The “Comparative study…” also analyses the potential for regulation of surrogacy at the EU level, and possible legal grounds for it: Article 56 (services) and Article 168 (public health) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) enshrining the freedom of movement of patients; Articles 20 and 21 TFEU guaranteeing the freedom of movement of citizens and European citizenship; and Article 19 TFEU, on non-discrimination, among others.

Meanwhile, two cases are pending at the European Court of Justice (Cases C-167/12 and C-363/12) and three more at the European Court of Human Rights (Sylvie Mennesson and other v. France, Francis Labassee and others v. France and Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy), chiefly linked to Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) or Article 14(prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In any case, given not least the complexity of the issue and the recognized limited competence of the EU regarding family law, the “Comparative study…”  suggests that a global approach would be the most desirable in governing this matter, and it even makes a proposal modelled on the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (1993), for regulating cross-border surrogacy.

Definitely an issue of the highest ethical and legal importance to be followed closely in the near future!

quarta-feira, 5 de junho de 2013

Lessons from France on the Myths of Same-Sex Marriage - by Robert Oscar Lopez

In The Public Discourse

If the recent French mobilizations against same-sex marriage have taught us anything, it’s this: The LGBT lobby has misrepresented its cause’s relationship to time and history. Illinois Democrat Greg Harris stated in a National Public Radio piece what the lobby has been claiming for years:

Folks know this will be a vote that history will remember . . . And I think a lot of folks are deciding they’re going to want to be remembered on the right side of history.

The proponents of same-sex marriage like polls. A Gallup poll published in mid-May showed public support for their cause rising from 27 percent in 1996 to 53 percent this year. Pew’s survey data reflect a more modest rise, from 35 percent in 2001 to 49 percent in 2013, but the upward march is still clear. In April 2013, the Williams Institute published a state-by-state analysis that reflected a steady growth in the number of states, such as New York, in which more than 50 percent of respondents supported same-sex marriage.

Less often mentioned are certain caveats in all these polls. For instance, in Gallup’s poll respondents were asked to choose between supporting or opposing same-sex marriage, without being offered a third option such as civil unions. The data from the Williams Institute show that liberal California is still only at 50 percent for same-sex marriage, perhaps because the state has domestic partnerships already. Minnesota residents only supported same-sex marriage by 43 percent, despite their popular vote to reject a constitutional ban in 2012 and despite the legislature’s hurried process of legalizing it in the state.

Nevertheless, two assumptions have determined the way pundits have interpreted these data.

One assumption is that the increase in support will be consistent over time rather than fickle. We can name this the Inevitability Assumption, a quasi-Marxian or at least Hegelian view that History is beckoning in one direction and there will be no turning back.

The second assumption is that more people accept same-sex marriage because they have more reliable information about what it entails. This is the Enlightenment Assumption, the notion that there is a transcendental benevolence in same-sex marriage, which can rely on the good and the true, if not the beautiful, to be vindicated by the diffusion of knowledge.

A recent piece in the Los Angeles Times offers a digestible version of the Enlightenment Assumption: “Knowing a gay person is a key factor in rising support of gay marriage.” The example of Ohio Senator Rob Portman is Exhibit A for this line of reasoning: All Portman had to do was put a face on the issue, in the form of his gay son’s visage, to be persuaded to the cause.

If we combine the Inevitability Assumption and the Enlightenment Assumption, the resulting concoction is the message that predominates in American propaganda: Gay marriage is on the right side of history because history will take us in only one direction, based on the most fundamental of human goods: knowledge of the truth.

Assumptions and Fallacies

These assumptions are in fact fallacies. More than any other populace, the French have laid them bare with their four massive “manifs” or mobilizations (November 17, January 13, March 24, and May 26).

These four mobilizations are credited as the largest mass uprising in France since the famous revolts of May 1968. As many as 60 percent of French respondents supported same-sex marriage in the fall of 2012, but the level of support now hovers around only 39 percent, with 54 percent supporting “civil unions” only. It is no wonder that the French government has had to shield itself and its LGBT benefactors from outrage with an increasingly totalitarian modus operandi encompassing tear gas and other familiar police-state tactics.

The French resistance to same-sex marriage has demonstrated that an ostensibly progressive nation that had little issue with homosexuality as a moral question can change its mind, not based on ignorance of reality, but based on knowing more about what same-sex marriage really means. 

Sorry, LGBT lobby, the French are sending your soufflé back to the kitchen.

The French had little issue with the PACS, or domestic partnerships, passed in the 1990s. The nation is not a die-hard right-wing country, as we know from the fact that Socialists took over the government in 2012.

Yet millions of French citizens stormed the streets of Paris and dozens of other cities to block same-sex marriage. Despite attempts by the international press to paint the “Manif pour Tous” and the “French Spring” as a band of intolerant Catholic reactionaries, polls show that a comfortable majority of the French people share their view of the same-sex marriage law, even if some within that majority are not eager to join in the street protests.

The drop in support for same-sex marriage came with education and broader public debate. As the French knew more gay people individually and learned more about the ramifications of their legalized marriage on the community at large—especially children and poor communities overseas targeted for adoption and surrogacy—they liked the idea of same-sex marriage less and less.

The text of the law that passed bears the scars of a public backlash. For instance, both insemination rights for lesbian couples and gestational surrogacy rights for gay men had to be scrapped by President François Hollande’s government because of their horrendous unpopularity. (Both insemination and surrogacy are subject to broader bans in France than in the United States.)

Adoption was included in the final bill that went through the French parliament, over the strenuous objections of adoptees of all stripes, ranging from a fifteen-year-old writing in Boulevard Voltaire to Cyril Langelot to Benoît Talleu, an eloquent Franco-Vietnamese teen who addressed 700,000 French marchers on January 13.

Benoît’s adoptive father, Franck Talleu, was inexplicably arrested two and a half months after his son’s famous speech. Police detained him for wearing a sweatshirt with the children’s rights blazon on it. The arrest was widely viewed in France as proof that the Hollande regime had to employ invasive practices to cover up the unpopularity of its pro-LGBT proposals.

While same-sex adoption survived massive protests, its chances are going to be rather slim because of the long waiting list of heterosexual couples looking to adopt. Since France’s public controversy, now Russia has refused to authorize any more adoptions into the country and India has blocked surrogacy by same-sex couples. It will be more difficult for same-sex couples to mask their purchase of babies through surrogates abroad as international adoption.

The French attorney general Christiane Taubira tried to skirt the French ban on surrogacy with a memo allowing the government to treat overseas babies conceived by surrogate mothers as adoptees eligible for citizenship. Instead of quiet acquiescence to this sleight, she sparked mass protests against the merchandizing of women’s wombs. The shocking turn in the Washington Post, with an unprecedented column criticizing surrogacy by Kathleen Parker, might be evidence that the French street revolution set off a chain reaction that eventually brought even a super gay-friendly American publication like the Post to face the grim business behind same-sex parenting.

The French government’s attempts to scrub these controversial aspects of the same-sex marriage bill quietly didn’t work. As the public contemplated the problems with sperm banking and surrogacy, they grew increasingly suspicious of everything the LGBT lobby was promoting about its “families.” This happened despite all the assurances from Hollande’s ministers that the marriage bill would not lead to a boost in artificial reproductive technology.

Fallacy #1: The Inevitability Assumption

France proves that no opinion trend on any graph can be taken for granted as perpetual. In the United States we knew this already; we simply weren’t aware that we knew it. We know from the abortion debate that what seems like a steady march of acceptance can actually grind to a halt or reverse.
The Gallup polls on abortion show how unpredictable the trends in opinion can be, for the number of “pro-choice” Americans peaked in 1996 at 56 percent, then declined to 45 percent today, while pro-life opinion gained significant ground, albeit in fits and starts (only 33 percent of Americans were pro-life in 1996, compared to 48 percent today).

If we take a step back and examine how the international LGBT lobby has fought for same-sex marriage, we see that the lobby’s leaders must be equally aware that nothing is inevitable about acceptance of same-sex marriage, regardless of what they say publicly. Rather than patience, haste has characterized their tactics.

It would not be necessary to push the case for same-sex marriage so fervently in the Supreme Court if the electoral victories in Maine, Washington, and Maryland were truly confidence-inspiring signs of the movement’s inexorable march toward mass public approval. Nor would it have been necessary for the lobby to rush same-sex marriage through the Minnesota legislature when polls showed that fewer than 45 percent of the state’s voters really wanted to redefine marriage.

In France, the same sense of haste was also evident. Debate was noticeably cut short by the government. During the hearings leading up to the introduction of the bill in Parliament, only religious groups were invited to express objections. On February 15, 2013, when 700,000 petitions were presented to the nation’s Economic, Social and Environmental Committee (CESE) asking for full research into the impacts of the same-sex marriage bill, the French government committed a possibly unconstitutional act and deemed the petitions “unacceptable.”

The process of passing the law also quickened. The vote in the Senate was held ahead of schedule and only conducted with a show of hands, so that it was impossible to record which parliamentarians voted for the law and which voted against it.

Fallacy #2: The Enlightenment Assumption

Rather than maximize people’s access to information about the impact of same-sex parenting, the lobby has sought to suppress journalistic and academic investigations into areas such as surrogacy, which give people pause with time and reflection. While it is impossible to know the inner thoughts of people running advocacy groups, it is reasonable to conclude that they opt to force same-sex marriage and same-sex parenting through the legislatures and courts at lightning speed, before people have the chance to stop and think about what they are signing up for. (The recent examples of California and Illinois are telling; in both states the large number of people who have gay friends did not lead to easy passage of same-sex marriage, but rather may have triggered a backlash resulting in California’s Proposition 8 and the failure of same-sex marriage last week in the Illinois legislature.)

The other myth that the French pitilessly debunked was the myth of the lovable gay lobby. Since I’ve spent almost my whole life immersed in the LGBT community, I’ve known good and bad people who identify as “gay.” But the attacks of LGBT activists against people who disagree with them are matched by their willingness to subvert other people’s interests to their own. The lobby’s mistake was to try to butter up the French with the usual platitudes about love and bullying.

The French are a tough crowd. I learned this when I took to the stage at the March 24 manif and fielded the boos from over a million marchers at the mention of “homophobia.” They weren’t booing me, thank goodness; they were booing the idea of people accusing someone of homophobia for asking obvious questions about the logistics of surrogacy contracts for gay men like Perez Hilton. The crowd cheered me on for most of my six-minute talk. But the moment was educational.

Whereas in the English-speaking world we observe some British conventions of privacy and politeness, it is never a good idea to tell French speakers that some questions are off- limits. They are a blunt people. It’s one thing to get booed by a few hundred people in a gymnasium. It’s completely another to stand below the Arch of Triumph and hear over a million French people boo at the same time. You feel the zeitgeist with much more force. It seems like the buildings, the sky, the trees, and even the birds overhead are groaning at you. This is not a scenario that will allow you to fudge facts.

Hence in France, the average person’s instinct is to ask the questions and draw the comparisons, which Americans consider taboo for the same-sex marriage movement.

They ask: What kind of crazy country wants to erase gender? The answer: Sweden, where mental illness has skyrocketed since the imposition of gender theory in schools.

They ask: Where the heck are lesbians going to find sperm for a baby? The answer: sperm banks, which are coming under fire from the adult children of anonymous sperm donors, including Alana S. Newman, who testified against homosexual fertility subsidies in California. As it turns out, knowing who one’s father is matters more than same-sex parenting peddlers care to acknowledge.

They ask: Isn’t gestational surrogacy a lot like the historical abuses that human beings committed during the times of slavery—buying and selling people, removing children from their heritage, in order to satisfy an adult consumer desire? The answer: Yes, and let’s not forget eugenics and cultural genocide.

During my time in France, shuttling around with Frigide Barjot and other leaders of the marriage movement, I felt transported to an alternate universe. I suppose that is what “French” is—an alternate world crafted through language. It’s a world where truths aren’t bucked and disguised so easily, a world where arguments aren’t ever settled, and claims to a “consensus” invite people to riot. Strangely, the home country of Roland Barthes, author of the famous book Mythologies, is not an easy habitat for political myths like the Inevitability Assumption and the Enlightenment Assumption. France has sneezed—will America catch cold?

quinta-feira, 6 de setembro de 2012

The Surrogate Uterus: Baby M and the Bioethics Commission Report - by Harold Cassidy

In The Public Discourse 

Governor Christie’s recent veto of a “gestational” surrogacy bill should prompt us to look at the legal history of surrogacy and the terrible injustices that it causes.
On August 8, 2012, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie issued an absolute veto of Senate Bill 1599, which would have created a statute enabling and enforcing so-called “gestational” surrogacy arrangements. The bill was sponsored by New Jersey State Senator Joseph Vitale, and substantially drafted by Melissa Brisman, a commercial surrogacy broker. If signed into law, it would have been the most radical surrogacy bill anywhere in the nation.

In public hearings, neither Brisman nor the bill’s sponsors, nor anyone else, discussed the 177-page New Jersey Bioethics Commission report that condemned gestational surrogacy and strongly recommended against such an enabling statute. Governor Christie, in his veto statement, expressed grave concern that the supporters and sponsors of S1599 did insufficient study and consideration of the many problems that surrogacy poses, especially those discussed by the Bioethics Commission.

Some fervently believe that if gestational surrogacy laws were to be widely accepted they would irreparably change human civilization. Gestational surrogacy is now front and center for debate, not only in New Jersey, but across the nation. It demands attention. Motherhood itself is now on trial.

As the attorney who was chief counsel in the first contested surrogacy case in the United States that struck down surrogate mother contracts as unenforceable, argued before the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1987, who also won, on behalf of the mother, the first contested “gestational” surrogacy case and later represented gestational surrogate Angelia G. Robinson against commercial surrogacy broker Melissa Brisman, I’ll address, in two parts, the legal history of surrogacy in New Jersey—a history that has national, even international, implications—and the terrible injustices to pregnant mothers that surrogacy causes, which have been exposed by both the New Jersey Bioethics Commission and the testimonies from the mothers themselves. Today’s essay discusses the issues addressed in the famous first surrogacy case, In the Matter of Baby M (1988). Tomorrow’s essay discusses some of Brisman’s work as a surrogacy broker, especially in the case of Angelia Robinson.

The Baby M Case

In the Baby M case, Mrs. Whitehead, a married woman with an eleven-year-old son and an eight-year-old daughter, signed a contract with William Stern and his wife Elizabeth, who believed pregnancy and childbirth were medically inadvisable for her. Mrs. Whitehead, by the terms of the contract, was impregnated with Mr. Stern’s sperm through artificial insemination. The child, born on March 27, 1986—named Sarah by Mrs. Whitehead, and Melissa by the Sterns—was genetically related to Mrs. Whitehead and Mr. Stern.

The surrogacy arrangement was made by a broker named Noel Keane. By the terms of the contract, the Sterns would pay Mrs. Whitehead $10,000 following the birth. The contract forbade Mrs. Whitehead to have an abortion. Following the birth of her daughter, Mrs. Whitehead refused to give up custody to the Sterns. After a two-month trial, Judge Harvey Sorkow declared that the terms of the contract that required the termination of Mrs. Whitehead’s parental rights, against her will, were enforceable. At the same time, Judge Sorkow ruled that the terms of the contract that prohibited terminating the life of the child by abortion were unenforceable. The child, he ruled, was the mother’s to kill, but not hers to care for.

The surrogacy arrangement first started to unravel when Mrs. Whitehead was seven months pregnant. One evening, her daughter, then eight years old, was hugging her mother and rubbing her now round and protruding abdomen. The little girl blurted out, “Mommy, I want you to have a girl so I can have a baby sister.”

That night and late into the morning, Mr. and Mrs. Whitehead were forced to discuss what it would be like for the children to see their mother turn over their baby sister in exchange for $10,000. Their original plan, since Mr. Whitehead held a blue-collar job with a sanitation company, was to put the money aside for their children’s education. Then they wondered how they could tell their daughter that they sold her baby sister so she could go to college.

About three years later, Dr. Ruben Pannor, one of the authors of The Adoption Triangle, told me of his television debate with Bill Handle, a surrogacy broker located in Los Angeles. Handle had a “happy” surrogate with him who spoke of the joys of “giving the gift of life” to a couple by acting as a surrogate mother. During a commercial break, Dr. Pannor turned to the surrogate and asked how her other children were doing. She started to tell him how they had to be put in therapy, and suddenly she broke down, crying hysterically. She could not continue on the program and was helped off the stage.
When the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling in the Baby M case, by a unanimous 7-0 decision, the surrogacy contract was declared unenforceable, in violation of New Jersey statutes and public policy. Chief Justice Robert Wilentz wrote the opinion, which many commentators described as “poetic” and “beautiful.” That opinion has been studied in most law schools since that time, as it is a classic teaching case about the kinds of contracts which will not be enforced because they violate public policy. Sixteen separate policies and statutory provisions were violated in the Baby M case. Today, gestational surrogacy arrangements violate those same policies and statutes.

The central purpose of all forms of surrogacy contracts is to terminate the parental rights of the legal mother who carries and bears the child, and to confer legal status as mother or parent on a different person—usually a stranger genetically unrelated to the child. Both termination of the mother’s rights and legal adoption as replacement of the birth mother did not exist at common law and are creations of statutory law. They can be accomplished only by strict adherence to the provisions of the statutory schemes that authorize them. The effort to create surrogacy arrangements are not legally authorized in New Jersey by an enabling statute. In the absence of such an enabling statute, the Sterns and others since have tried to circumvent the requirements of the law by making a variety of legal arguments that have been rejected, as in Baby M.

The contract, the Baby M court observed, constituted a plan, in advance of conception, to deliberately separate a child from his or her mother. Our policies have always been that a child, to the fullest extent possible, should get to know, love, and be raised by both his or her natural parents. It is the traditional policy of every state that no consent to surrender a child to adoption made prior to the birth of the child is ever considered a legal basis to terminate a mother’s rights if she wants to maintain her relationship with her child following birth.

The Baby M court made the following observations: private adoptions are disfavored; the surrogacy arrangement places a child without any regard for the child’s best interests; it circumvents all laws that require counseling of the mother before she surrenders her rights; and the compulsion of the contract makes surrender of the child after birth not truly voluntary or informed. Beyond that, the arrangement exploits women as a “surrogate uterus” or an “incubator” and expects a mother to act as an inanimate object, which denigrates the woman in her role as mother.

The arrangement often achieves its forbidden goals with the corrupting influence of money. It has been a crime in all states to make offers of money in connection with adoption, or surrender of a mother’s parental rights. The influence of money creates the potential for exploitation of the poor by the wealthy. It has been said that the millionaire’s wife will not carry a child for the wife of the sanitation worker. A woman in financial need is particularly vulnerable, and her love for and sense of moral duty to her child, along with the child’s best interests, are all subordinated to the corrupting influence of money, and the rigid compulsion of the terms of the contract.

One of Chief Justice Wilentz’s memorable passages still has the power to stir passion:

There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy. In America, we decided long ago that merely because conduct purchased by money was “voluntary” did not mean that it was good or beyond regulation and prohibition . . . There are, in short, values that society deems more important than granting to wealth whatever it can buy, be it labor, love, or life.

Whether we will use our collective power through our courts to make someone perform under a contract against their will is always a question of whether forcing the person to comply is consistent with our values as embodied in our public policies. Thus, we do not require performance of a contract to murder; nor do we enforce a contract for a usurious rate of interest, or for the sale of body organs, and we certainly do not enforce a contract for the sale of a child; we have never forced a perfectly fit mother to separate from a child she loves and wants, simply because she once said she would agree to separation after the child’s birth.

Baby M was a powerful statement that clearly explained the sixteen policies and statutory provisions that rendered surrogacy contracts unenforceable and exploitative of women, and criminalized both monetary payments in adoption and placement of children for adoption without a license. After the Baby M case, most European countries quickly outlawed surrogacy.

The New Jersey Bioethics Commission Report

At the end of the Baby M opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court observed that the case highlighted many of the problems and evils of surrogacy—including the potential exploitation of women—but that the people and the culture must determine if our policies and laws, after careful consideration, should be changed, subject to constitutional constraints. Following the Baby M decision, the governor and the legislature asked the New Jersey Bioethics Commission to study the issue of whether laws should be changed to create a surrogacy-enabling statute.

The Bioethics Commission included psychologists, scientists, physicians, lawyers, healthcare providers, and other professionals from both ends of the political spectrum. The commission held public hearings and debates on the policy issues, and it employed a task force for purposes of research and field trips. After a process that took over four years to complete, the members issued their powerful 177-page comprehensive report.

I testified twice in the public hearings held by the commission’s task force, both in 1988 and again in 1989. In October of 1990, I was appointed by the Democratic governor, James Florio, to the commission. The twenty-four commissioners unanimously adopted the report they sent to the governor, the legislature, and the chief justice in September 1992, which they titled, “After Baby M: The Legal, Ethical and Social Dimensions of Surrogacy.”

The report strongly condemned all forms of surrogacy, including so-called “gestational carrier” arrangements, which were first employed in the late 1980s. It noted that every evil associated with surrogacy where the birth mother is genetically related to the child is also present in gestational surrogacy, where she is not genetically related. The commission strongly recommended that the state not pass an enabling statute that would legalize enforcement of any form of surrogacy arrangement.

Because the commission concluded that no legitimate policy could justify enforcing such arrangements, and that they were potentially harmful to the mothers and their children, it recommended that legislation be passed to discourage and deter the conduct, including a specific recommendation that commercial surrogacy be criminalized. While it was already a crime in New Jersey to make offers of money in connection with adoption, and it was criminal to help place children for adoption without a license—both done in typical surrogacy arrangements—the commission felt there should be unambiguous sanctions clearly directed at surrogacy arrangements.

If criminal and civil sanctions failed to deter, the commission recommended, in cases where the birth mother wished to assert her parental rights and made that intent known within ninety days after the child’s birth, and a dispute over custody arose, that:
A legal presumption should be established, favoring custody by the birth mother, consistent with assuring satisfaction of the needs and welfare of the child. This presumption may be overcome by a demonstration, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the individual giving birth fails to meet minimal parenting standards necessary to satisfy the basic needs and welfare of the child. Such determinations should not be based on considerations of economics or social class.
All of these recommendations—that legislation should criminalize commercial surrogacy, declare both commercial and non-commercial surrogacy agreements unenforceable, and that courts govern the determination of parental rights by specially crafted rules that create a presumption of custody for the birth mother—were recommended for gestational carrier surrogacy agreements as well as those where the mother was genetically related to the child.

The proponents of the Brisman-Vitale “Gestational Carrier” statute falsely claim that gestational surrogacy uses new technology unavailable until relatively recently, and, therefore, the legislature should not be guided by Baby M. By making this false claim, they hoped to ignore the reasoning of that case, and ignore both the fact that gestational carrier agreements were used as early as the 1980s, and the commission’s report, which recommended that gestational carrier agreements be outlawed.

The New Jersey Bioethics Commission Report discussed one gestational surrogacy case that was already in the courts in 1990. In that case, the contract was signed in 1989, and it was litigated in the California courts when the birth mother sued for the return of the child. By 1991, a whole year before the Bioethics Commission report was completed, that case had been decided by an appellate court. The Bioethics Commission considered all of the issues presented by gestational surrogacy and concluded that every evil present, when the surrogate mother is genetically related to the child, is also present when the surrogate is not genetically related to the baby to whom she gave birth.

All of the statutes and public policies identified and analyzed by the Baby M Court apply equally to the gestational surrogate mother arrangement. The Baby M opinion remains the best and most persuasive court opinion on policy considerations for surrogacy arrangements, and the New Jersey Bioethics Commission report is the most thorough and compelling analysis ever produced concerning surrogacy in general, and gestational surrogacy in particular. Earlier this year, many in the New Jersey Legislature attempted to ignore both, until Governor Christie stepped in. More on this tomorrow.

sábado, 21 de julho de 2012

El matrimonio homosexual dispara el número de vientres de alquiler en los países pobres


El 26 de mayo, un reportaje de The Telegraph reveló que en el último año habían tenido lugar en la India 2000 nacimientos por vientre de alquiler, de los cuales la mitad (1000) provenían de "clientes" británicos. En el Reino Unidos, sin embargo, sólo tuvieron lugar 100 nacimientos.

El negocio de los vientres de alquiler se está moviendo aceleradamente hacia el Tercer Mundo. Supone un negocio de más de 200.000 millones de euros al año, y se basa en la diferencia de precio que cobran las madres: hacerlo en países pobres cuesta hasta una quinta parte que en Occidente. Algo que unos ven como una forma de explotación, y otros como una forma de ganar un dinero que sería imposible conseguir de otra manera.

Incremento de demandas de parejas gay
Cada vez es mayor además el número de reclamaciones que llegan de parejas homosexuales. Según el citado artículo, en la clínica The Birthplace of Joy, de Nueva Delhi, por ejemplo, el 100% de los clientes son extranjeros, y la mitad de ellos parejas homosexuales que acuden para realizar la operación de fecundación.

El experto en bioética Michael Cook, director de BioEdge, dio un paso más adelante para investigar esta cuestión. Y se dirigió a diversas clínicas de la India que ofrecen este servicio para preguntarles si esperan un auge de peticiones si en algunos países (como Francia) se legaliza el matrimonio homosexual.

"Absolutamente, sí", fue la contundente respuesta de la doctora Samundi Sankari, del Shrusti Fertility Research Center de Chennai, que cada vez recibe más demandas de Estados Unidos e Israel para todo lo que tiene que ver con tratamiento de la fertilidad. Y añadió: "La principal razón por la que los clientes vienen desde fuera de la India es el excelente cuidado personal, la experiencia y el ahorro. Los costes que pagan son una quinta parte de los que pagan por alquilar un vientre en Estados Unidos y Europa".

Por su parte, el doctor Samit Sekhar, del Kiran Infertility Centre, en Hyderabad, confiesa: "Tenemos un número considerable de personas gay que visitan nuestra clínica para utlizar los servicios de un óvulo donante". Y, lo que es más relevante: "Hemos visto un incremento en el número de parejas gay y hombres solos que vienen a nuestra clínica a medida que su unión pública va siendo legitimada en sus respectivos países".

Esto lo corroboran incluso clínicas norteamericanas. El doctor Jeffrey Steinberg, director de dos institutos de fertilidad en Los Ángeles y Las Vegas, lo ha estudiado y se lo explica a Cooke: "Cuando un país empieza a considerar la legalización del matrimonio gay, tenemos un incremento de consultas sobre lo que implica contratar un óvulo donante y el vientre de alquiler. Una tercera parte de las consultas siguen adelante con nuestros servicios incluso antes de que se apruebe la ley. Otro tercio nos dicen que esperarán a ver cómo se desarrolla la legislación. Y del otro tercio no volvemos a saber nada". Pero una vez legalizado el matrimonio homosexua, "un 40% firman enseguida".

Impresionante reportaje
Un reciente reportaje televisivo de The Wall Street Journal (puede verse más abajo) describía con toda crudeza estos procesos, relatando el caso de dos gays, Jocelyn -que será el padre biológico- y su compañero, que alquilan a una madre en la India: "Trato de estar tranquilo en un proceso que parece surrealista", admite Jocelyn.

Los médicos, afirma con toda frialdad el doctor Sekhar ante la cámara, no le dicen a la madre que su hijo irá con una pareja homosexual: "No lo entenderían, es un concepto extraño entre gente sin educación".

Y es que, obviamente, las mujeres que se someten a este proceso son extremadamente pobres, e incluso recurren a alquilar su útero y tener un hijo al que no volverán a ver, para alimentar a otros. Pero quitarle el niño a su madre no roba el sueño a los contratistas. Incluso en ocasiones los niños han quedado en un vacío legal, al no ser reconocida su nacionalidad en los países de origen de los clientes (homosexuales o heterosexuales).

A favor y en contra
Expertos en bioética recuerdan que las mujeres en la India no tienen la misma capacidad de decisión en Occidente, y por tanto es imposible saber si ofrecerse como vientre de alquiler es una idea suya o una exigencia de su marido por razones económicas.

Pero los dirigentes del negocio no lo ven de la misma forma. La doctora Nayna Patel, directora médica de la clínica Akanksha, dice que ha visto "cómo vivían antes y cómo viven ahora" las madres de alquiler, en referencia al dinero que cobran: "Ha cambiado sus vidas. Es muy transformador", elogia.

En la investigación de Michael Cook hubo una voz discrepante en torno a la influencia de la legalización del matrimonio homosexual. El doctor Shivani Sachdev, del Surrogate Center India, no cree que eso aumente el número de demandas: "Apoyaremos que el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo se apruebe en cualquier país, pero no creo que eso incremente nuestra clientela". La mitad de ella, sin embargo -desvela BioEdge-, son parejas gays

Pinche aquí para ver el extraordinariamente revelador reportaje de la televisión de The Wall Street Journal sobre esta práctica. Está en inglés, con subtítulos en español.

quinta-feira, 5 de abril de 2012

Maternidade de Substituição: Declaração de voto contra nova legislação no Conselho Nacional de Ética


Lisboa, 04 abr 2012 (Ecclesia) – Seis membros do Conselho Nacional de Ética para as Ciências da Vida (CNECV) votaram contra um parecer que aceita a maternidade de substituição constante em propostas de lei parlamentares, alertando para “problemas potenciais graves e potencialmente irreversíveis”.

Numa declaração conjunta de voto assinada por Michel Renaud, Ana Sofia Carvalho, Agostinho Almeida Santos, Francisco Carvalho Gerra, José Germano de Sousa e Maria do Céu Patrão Neves observa-se que a aprovação da “gestação de substituição” não é tida como “eticamente justificada”.
Os conselheiros aludem à “incidência negativa sobre o interesse, a construção de identidade e o bem-estar físico e psicológico do nascituro, entendido como prevalecente sobre o interesse do «casal beneficiário»”.

O voto contra é “essencialmente justificado pelo facto de se considerar que foi o interesse sempre prioritário e frequentemente exclusivo do casal beneficiário e não o interesse do nascituro que esteve na base da discussão do CNECV”.

O Conselho aceita a maternidade de substituição constante em propostas de lei parlamentares, mas apresenta 13 condições, de acordo com um parecer, aprovado por maioria, que divulgou esta segunda-feira.

O documento prevê que possa ser o tribunal a decidir em prol da criança e recomenda que a mãe que faz a gestação possa sempre recuar na sua decisão até ao momento do parto.

Para os seis conselheiros que votaram contra, “até ao nascimento permanece uma indeterminação intencional quanto à identidade da mãe, quer legal, quer biológica, o que altera o conceito de maternidade”.

Quanto à alteração às práticas de procriação medicamente assistida (PMA), a declaração de voto sustenta que "em princípio, o acesso à PMA devia contemplar apenas problemas de infertilidade e de esterilidade".
OC
 
Documento para download: 1333387293declaraaaodevotoconj.pdf

quarta-feira, 4 de abril de 2012

O Parecer do CNECV sobre as Alterações à Lei da PMA - por Pedro Vaz Patto


O Conselho Nacional de Ética para as Ciências da Vida (CNECV) emitiu parecer sobre as propostas de alteração à lei da procriação medicamente assistida.  Nele se afirma que não há uma justificação eticamente válida para negar o acesso a essas técnicas a pessoas sós ou que vivam em união homossexual (sobretudo se o fazem com os seus próprios recursos). E nele se aceita a maternidade de substituição (aí designada por “gestação” de substituição”), sob um conjunto de condições tendentes a eliminar ou reduzir os seus possíveis malefícios.
           
Invoca-se o direito à parentalidade de quaisquer candidatos, sem discriminação, e alega-se que não se justifica privilegiar uma forma de família em relação a outras e que o risco de instrumentalização do filho não depende do facto de os progenitores serem, ou não, um casal heterossexual.
           
Contra esta tese, há, porém, que invocar a primazia do bem do filho sobre as pretensões dos candidatos. De outro modo, o filho seria instrumentalizado como objecto de um direito que se reivindica (não há um “direito ao filho”). E o bem do filho exige, por um lado, que ele seja fruto de uma relação de amor, não de uma afirmação individual. E exige que tenha um pai e uma mãe (cada um deles único e os dois complementares), não só um pai, só uma mãe, dois pais ou duas mães.
           
Quanto à “gestação de substituição”, o parecer reflecte o propósito (louvável) de acautelar uma série ampla de riscos que essa prática tem suscitado nos países onde foi legalizada. Um propósito que, pelo contrário, os proponentes das alterações em discussão parlamentar têm descurado. Mas as soluções indicadas (como outras que poderiam ser alvitradas) serão sempre insatisfatórias e não eliminam esses riscos, que só a efectiva proibição dessa prática elimina. Mesmo com todas essas (ou outras) cautelas, não deixamos de estar perante uma instrumentalização da criança que nasce e da mulher gestante. A esta continuará a ser sempre imposta por contrato a obrigação de abandonar o ser que acolheu dentro de si e com quem partilhou aquela que é talvez a experiência mais íntima, intensa e marcante da vida de uma mulher.
           
Indica o parecer que à mulher gestante deve ser reconhecida a faculdade de mudar de ideias e assumir a maternidade até ao início do parto. E porque não logo a seguir, ou enquanto amamenta (uma questão – a de saber quem amamenta - que o parecer também indica como necessário objecto do contrato)? E, se não o fizer, fica privada do direito de visitar a criança no futuro? E, nesse caso, em que a mulher gestante muda de ideias e assume a maternidade, ficam os pais genéticos privados de qualquer direito, sendo eles pais genéticos?. Quem será, nesse caso, o pai da criança (se é que o tem)? Mudando de ideias, a mulher fica obrigado a indemnizar os pais genéticos (qual o sentido da sua vinculação)?
           
Indica, por outro lado, o parecer que a mãe gestante deve ser saudável e o contrato deve conter disposições para o caso de malformação ou doença fetal. Mas em que sentido devem ser essas disposições (obrigação de abortar, possibilidade de o casal beneficiário se desvincular e abandonar a criança)? Se a mãe gestante não for, afinal, saudável, ou vier a revelar-se uma sua doença durante a gravidez, que responsabilidade tem perante o casal beneficiário? Este pode, por isso, desvincular-se e abandonar a criança?
           
Pretende o parecer que seja garantida a avaliação da motivação altruísta da mãe gestante e a impossibilidade de subordinação económica desta em relação ao casal beneficiário. Mas a realidade é o que é e o direito não pode ilusoriamente pretender modificá-la: só o desespero de graves carências económicas leva mulheres a sujeitar-se a tão traumatizante experiência (é assim na Índia e em muitos países). De forma oculta ou indirecta, as contrapartidas económicas hão-de verificar-se. E as pressões que tal situação de carência suscita tornam vãs quaisquer cautelas e garantias jurídicas. Com tais pressões, a mulher gestante pode acabar, na prática, por sujeitar-se àquilo que o parecer pretende afastar (como a imposição de regras de conduta durante a gravidez pelo casal beneficiário).
           
Talvez só a ligação familiar entre a mãe gestante e o casal beneficiário possa garantir a motivação altruísta daquela. Mas os problemas que essa ligação acarreta (porque muito mais difícil será que a mãe gestante se desligue da criança e mais fácil e mais complexa a possível “concorrência” entre as duas “mães”) tornam-na desaconselhável a vários títulos.
            
Todos estes riscos são inelimináveis se a prática não for proibida. Nenhuma das possíveis alternativas para as situações indicadas é isenta de malefícios e quase todas têm uma faceta chocante. É assim porque na “maternidade de substituição” (“barriga de aluguer”, “gestação de substituição” –chame-se o que se quiser), com todas as possíveis regulações jurídicas, a criança nunca deixa de ser tratada como um objecto de um contrato (uma mercadoria) e a gestação como uma qualquer prestação de serviços (como se a mulher gestante fosse uma máquina incubadora).