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sábado, 18 de janeiro de 2014

«La Chiesa é l' ostacolo da abbattere» - di Massimo Introvigne

In NBQ

Il 16 gennaio 2014 la Pontificia Commissione Teologica Internazionale ha pubblicato un corposo documento «Dio Trinità, unità fra gli uomini. Il monoteismo cristiano contro la violenza» (aqui em HTML; aqui em PDF), presentato come frutto di cinque anni di lavoro e come testo specificamente approvato e rivisto dal Prefetto della Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede, il prossimo cardinale Gerhard Müller. Temo di essere facile profeta se prevedo che questo documento, lungo e complesso, sarà letto da pochi, avrà scarsa eco sui media e finirà rapidamente nel dimenticatoio. Male: perché questo grande lavoro, voluto e richiesto da Benedetto XVI e ora completato sotto Papa Francesco, è di qualità veramente notevole e denuncia un'aggressione senza precedenti alla Chiesa che è in atto da parte della cultura laicista dominante, rispondendo colpo su colpo.

«La Chiesa è l'ostacolo da abbattere». Così il documento descrive l'attuale temperie culturale, dove agguerriti poteri forti danno il tono non solo alla cultura dominante nelle università, ma anche alla maggior parte dei media. Come si cerca di abbattere la Chiesa? Ascrivendole la responsabilità di tutte le violenze più gravi della storia. Queste, si afferma, derivano dalla fede nell'esistenza di verità assolute garantite da Dio creatore di una natura che la ragione può conoscere e decifrare come verità. Derivano, cioè, dal rifiuto cattolico del relativismo: e dal monoteismo, che rende fanatici e intolleranti.

C'è, anzitutto, un «disegno totalitario del pensiero unico», fondato su un «sentire relativistico totale»: è la dittatura del relativismo, che aggredisce chiunque pensi che esista la verità. Anzi, la verità «viene esplicitamente indicata come una minaccia radicale per l’autonomia del soggetto e per l’apertura della libertà. Soprattutto perché la pretesa di una verità obiettiva e universale, di riferimento per tutti, supposto che sia accessibile allo spirito umano, viene immediatamente associata ad una pretesa di possesso esclusivo da parte di un soggetto o gruppo umano. Essa porterebbe così alla giustificazione del dominio dell’uomo che ne rivendica il possesso sull’uomo che, secondo questa pretesa, ne è privo. In conseguenza di questa rappresentazione della verità, che la ritiene inseparabile dalla volontà di potenza, anche l’impegno per la sua ricerca, e la passione della sua testimonianza, sono viste a priori come matrici di conflitto e di violenza fra gli uomini».

Per la dittatura del relativismo, di questa violenza sarebbe responsabile la Chiesa perché insegna il monoteismo. Se c'è un solo Dio c'è anche una sola verità. Se invece ci sono più dei, allora sono possibili più verità. Solo il politeismo garantisce il relativismo. C'è una vera inversione rispetto alla tradizionale storia delle religioni, anche laica, che considerava il monoteismo un progresso rispetto al politeismo. Questo «rovesciamento del quadro moderno è inaspettato: ora il monoteismo è arcaico e dispotico, il politeismo è creativo e tollerante».

Per mettere in conto ai cristiani - che certo talora nella storia hanno ceduto alla tentazione della violenza, ma assai meno di altri, e certo meno delle ideologie anticristiane - anche massacri commessi da altre religioni, continua il documento, si ricorre a una categoria che la storia delle religioni ha invece da tempo messa in discussione, quella delle «tre grandi religioni monoteistiche», che esprime certo qualcosa di vero ma tratta l'ebraismo, l'islam e il cristianesimo. - che sono invece molto diversi fra loro - come se il loro «monoteismo» fosse identico. È un notevole merito del documento denunciare «la sommaria classificazione dell’ebraismo, del cristianesimo e dell’islam, come le tre grandi “religioni monoteistiche”», perché si tratta di tesi diffuse anche nel mondo cattolico. Lo scopo per cui il moderno laicismo ripropone queste vecchie teorie non è il dialogo interreligioso ma l'attacco alla religione, il cui scopo principale è attaccare il cristianesimo, anzi attaccare in particolare la Chiesa Cattolica. «Non possiamo passare sotto silenzio il fatto che, in qualche parte intellettualmente rilevante della nostra cultura occidentale, l’aggressività con la quale viene riproposto questo “teorema”, si concentra essenzialmente nella denuncia radicale del cristianesimo». «La puntigliosa identificazione del cristianesimo cattolico come l’ostacolo da abbattere, nella lotta contro il monoteismo che diffonde la violenza religiosa nel mondo, nonostante tutto, non cessa di stupire».

Il documento ribatte colpo su colpo a queste accuse. Interpreta alcune affermazioni bellicose dell'Antico Testamento, mostrando che s'inquadrano in uno specifico contesto storico, vanno lette anche come metafore della lotta contro il Diavolo e il male morale, e soprattutto sono state superate dal messaggio del Vangelo. In una parte di non agevole lettura del documento, ispirata al Magistero di Benedetto XVI, si fa anche notare che il cristianesimo ha permesso per la prima volta nella storia la distinzione - non la separazione - fra religione e politica, e ha fondato l’autonomia della politica, superando ogni tentazione teocratica.

Non è vero, si aggiunge, che il politeismo è tollerante: nel clima culturale creato dalle religioni politeistiche si sono consumate autentiche stragi contro i seguaci di religioni diverse. Associare politeismo e tolleranza appare persino «stravagante». La stessa «religione politeistica dell’impero romano, a sua volta, con tutta la straordinaria modernità del suo concetto di cittadinanza, e della sua struttura multi-etnica e multi-religiosa, perseguitò con specifico accanimento il cristianesimo, colpevole di rifiutare l’incensazione dell’imperatore come figura divina. La risposta si espresse nella testimonianza non violenta e nell’accettazione del martirio cristiano». Non parliamo, poi, delle ideologie moderne, portatrici di «un crescente e sconcertante dispiegamento di stili di vita e di comportamento ispirati alla violenza: spontanea, immediata, distruttiva. Sempre più inconsapevole di se stessa, e persino eticamente giustificata», o consacrata dalle leggi. Le ideologie, specie quelle distruttive del XX secolo, sono in realtà i nuovi politeismi, dove «l’uomo ostile al Dio buono e creatore, nell’ossessione di “diventare come Lui”, diventa un “Dio perverso” e prevaricatore nei confronti dei suoi simili. Dal politeismo di queste controfigure narcisistiche del “Dio perverso”, che viene dal peccato fin dall’origine, non può venire nulla di buono per la pacifica convivenza fra gli uomini».

Oggi l'aggressione contro la Chiesa Cattolica e i cristiani continua, fondata sul
«pregiudizio – tipico del modello razionalistico – secondo il quale, anche sul piano esistenziale e sociale, c’è un solo modo per affermare la verità: negare la libertà o eliminare l’antagonista». L'orizzonte è quello dell'eliminazione di Dio e dell'imposizione - ora suadente, ora violenta - dell’ateismo, con la conseguente negazione della libertà. «L’eliminazione di Dio, stabilita sulla base di una ragione "naturalistica", si associa oggi frequentemente alla risoluzione "biologica" della libertà umana. In questa prospettiva il nostro cervello si è costruito il pensiero di Dio per ragioni legate ad un determinato stadio evolutivo: in funzione del governo della complessità, per compensare l’inevitabilità della frustrazione, come dispositivo di neutralizzazione della morte».

La religione è dunque una patologia, che va eliminata. Il futuro che le ideologie preparano all'umanità è però un futuro di violenza e di morte. Già oggi viviamo - conclude il documento - nel «tempo della persecuzione», che «deve essere sostenuto, nell’attesa della conversione sperata per tutti. Di questa pazienza, di questa sopportazione, di questa tenacia dei “santi” nel portare la tribolazione dell’attesa, noi siamo in debito di riconoscenza verso molti fratelli e sorelle perseguitati per la loro appartenenza cristiana. Noi onoriamo la loro testimonianza come la risposta decisiva alla domanda sul senso della missione cristiana in favore di tutti. L’epoca di una nuova evidenza a riguardo del rapporto fra religione e violenza fra gli uomini è aperta dal loro coraggio. Dovremo sapercelo meritare. Dell’avvento di questa nuova epoca, e dei frutti dello Spirito che ne devono seguire, la Madre del Signore deve essere considerata l’insostituibile custode. La coscienza e l’invocazione della sua speciale intercessione, dovrà essere un tema speciale della nostra conversione e della nostra preghiera».

sábado, 12 de outubro de 2013

Laicity, Christianity, the West: an Historical Profile - Archbishop Giampaolo Crepaldi

In Catholic Culture

The paradox of the West

The relationship of the Christian faith with the West, but more specifically the Catholic faith, is essential in nature. By that I do not intend to argue that there is a sort of identity between the West and Christianity, or that Christianity is a category of the western mentality, or that Christianity can be such only within the West in a geographical, historical or cultural sense. Such a banal pretence could be all too easily rebutted in an equally banal way by remarking that Christianity saw the light of day in the eastern Mediterranean and has spread throughout the world. In other words, the ‘western’ relationship was not a contingency in the history of Christianity. Emerging in the relationship with the West have been characteristics Christianity cannot separate itself from without ceasing to exist, but from which it has historically taken its distance precisely in the West. Thus issuing forth is the problematic and paradoxical character of the West. On one hand, Christianity’s encounter with the West was “providential”[1], helped mould and shape western civilization, and in certain periods of history – especially in the XII and XIII centuries – projected a Christian civilization[2] with particularly creative expressions. On the other hand, however, developing in the West has been a process of secularisation that progressively tends to exhaust Christianity in its ability to ‘produce’ civilization. Developing for the first time only in the western world has been “a culture that constitutes the absolutely most radical contradiction not only of Christianity, but of the religious and moral traditions of society” [3]. Hence the profound ambiguity of the category of “west” as regards Christianity itself. The “resilience” and the resistance” of Christianity are faced with a decisive ‘test bench’ in the West.

Catholic dogma and the West

Often given is a rather reductive interpretation of Catholicism’s impact on western civilization in the sense of being looked upon as influence and nothing more. That is tantamount to saying that Catholicism influenced western civilization with its works charity, art, literature, religion driven social networks, the coronation of kings and the like. All this is true, but Catholicism’s profound relationship with the west concerns dogmas and is the expression of the historicity of dogmas. This expression – historicity of dogmas – does not mean dogmas evolve historically in a manner parallel with self-awareness believers have of them. This would be the modernist vision of the issue. What the expression actually means is that a dogma has an historical and real content, and may not be relegated to the realm of myth. Dogmas nourish the Church and the Church is the Body of Christ in history, a Body remaining for eternity[4]. Between dogma and Body there is an indivisible unity, such that a dogma is present not only in a believer’s conscience, but by its very nature becomes history, and therefore civilization. This is the realism of the Catholic faith.

The Church has moulded western Christian civilization with its dogmas defined in its dogmatic Councils. Nowadays there is a widespread underrating of doctrine in the life of the Church and an emphasis on pastoral praxis, which runs the risk of thrusting this important aspect into the background. I’d like to offer two examples in this regard. The first of them has to do with Gnosis. The condemnation of Arianism and the definition of the human and divine nature of Jesus contradicted Gnosis, which was an expression of Hellenic rationalism. This entailed a lengthy process, which involved both Councils and the work of the great Fathers and Doctors of the Church. This ‘match’ has yet to be won since alongside the Gnosis of the early centuries of Christianity there is an “eternal Gnosis”, but the battle of Christian dogma against Gnosis preserved human civilization from the catastrophes of Catharism, the simultaneous refusal and exaltation of matter, the destruction of matrimony and the family, and the refusal of political authority. It produced fruits of civilization in the form of the just consideration of evil and suffering, and defended against nihilism. The defence of the Old Testament against the Gnostic onslaught made it possible to preserve the positive vision of creation and the historical social dimension of the Christian faith. The baptism of children, prayers for the dead, priestly celibacy and the worship of images: what benefits brought by these elements to western civilization, and all of them would have been lost forever by a possible prevalence of Gnosis. What damage would have been caused by pauperism, pacifism, Gnostic-type radical purism if they had been able to spread without restraint! When commenting on the battle of Muret on 13 September 1213, when Simone de Montfort, after having attended Mass celebrated by St. Dominic, led 1,000 men in a rout of the Aragonese army supporting the Albigensians with 40,000 men, Jean Guitton said: “Muret is one of those decisive battles where the destiny of a civilization was decided. Strangely enough, most historians overlook this fact”[5].

The second example concerns Pious IX and the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Jesus. The definition of this dogma issued forth from a theological reading of the events of the liberal revolution. According to Pious IX all the contemporary errors stemmed from the negation of original sin, and hence the irreconcilability between God and sin. The aim of life had to be the progress of man and the world; modern man had to become autonomous and self-sufficient, liberating himself from the tutelage of the Church; religion was only useful for purposes of civil progress and had to be subordinate to it. Once original sin was denied, however, there was no place for Christ, the Church and for grace.

In the face of such a vision of things Pious IX wanted to reiterate the irreconcilability between God and the sin of the world, as well as the fact that the ultimate aim of the world and history is not the celebration of human progress, but the glory of God. And he did this by proclaiming the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary, “glorious victor over heresies”.

The violent events Pious IX had to witness were part of a plan to emancipate the natural order from the supernatural order. He was of the opinion that it was not possible to come to terms with this plan, that it could not be “Catholicised”. Hence the genesis of the Encyclical Letter Quanta cura and the Sillabo, which are not to be separated from the profound theological significance of the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, but, together with Vatican Council I, seen as Pious IX’s response to modern sin. Not by chance was 8 December an important date for all of them: the proclamation of the dogma on that date in 1854, the Quanta cura and the Sillabo in 1864, and the opening of Vatican Council I in 1869[6].

The construction of western civilization took place with dogmas. Dogma was the principle wellspring for countering the apostasy of the West from Christianity. And this because that apostasy had also become dogmatic.

The secularisation of the West

I intentionally took an example from the early centuries of Christianity and a second one from modernity. Between them there is the construction of a Christian civilization and then a progressive parting from it through ever more accentuated secularisation. Nonetheless, since many are those who attribute this secularisation to Christianity itself, things become a bit complicated. But let’s take it by steps.

Perhaps less than well known may be the fact that the most enthusiastic exaltation of the importance of the Catholic Church for western civilization is contained in the work, which, more so than any other, theorized a rigorous and complete secularisation of that selfsame civilization, I am referring to Auguste Comte’s The Course in Positive Philosophy. Karl Löwith, in his rightly famous book “Meaning in History. The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, cites Comte’s laudatory words regarding Catholicism[7] and argues that Comte held the Catholic system in high esteem especially as regards the separation of spiritual power from temporal power. That’s what we could call laicity. Regarding Protestantism, on the other hand, Comte thought it had favoured “the emancipation of temporal power and the subordination of spiritual power to national interests”[8]. Catholicism had founded an order, while Protestantism “had laid the foundations for the modern philosophical revolution, proclaiming the right of each individual to free enquiry in all fields”[9]. Comte was of the opinion that “the degeneration of the European system has but one cause, that being the political degradation of spiritual power”, and Karl Löwith comments: “If we think each immature spirit was left to its own decisions in the most important matters, there is reason for being surprised that morality did not decline completely”[10]. Back during his times it had yet to decline completely.

The work by Karl Löwith I have cited here explains in a convincing manner how the modernist philosophy of history from Voltaire all the way to Nietzsche consists in a progressive secularisation of Catholic dogmas. A turning point of great interest in this secularisation process is to be found in Comte. In Catholic dogma he saw the condition for the existence of the social order according to a principle of distinction between temporal and spiritual power based on the political role of spiritual power. Nonetheless, he also saw that this equilibrium was by then in disarray because in the wake of the “Protestant revolutions”, the spiritual realm had abdicated its duties over the temporal order, and the latter had emancipated itself from the spiritual realm. At one and the same time, therefore, in Comte we have utmost praise for the historical structure of Catholicism and its most radical negation through the proposal of a equally absolute but radically lay position: the positive spirit. According to Henri de Lubac, Comte’s positivism is the most radical among the forms of contemporary atheistic humanism insofar as it projects a life without God, with no more regrets or illusions, and precisely for this reason has the same motivating force of a religion able to construct an order. An order without God. In de Lubac’s mind this project was and remains doomed to failure.[11] This, however, is not the point of interest for us at the moment. What interests us here is its “dogmatic” character, dogmatic in the sense of being radically and absolutely anti-Catholic. Then again, if the construction of the West had been due to Catholic dogmas, and if the ‘dismantling’ had taken place through the secularisation of Catholic dogmas as so will demonstrated by Karl Löwith, the decisive turning point had to take place when secularisation also assumed the character of dogmatic absoluteness. This transpired with Comte, and we can therefore say positivism is the dogma of modernity. 

Regarding the presumed irreversibility of secularisation

I’d like to return to Karl Löwith’s comment about the modern autonomy of the temporal sphere from the spiritual one cited above: “If we think each immature spirit was left to its own decisions in the most important matters, there is reason for being surprised that morality did not decline completely”. Coming to the surface here is a decisive point in the issue at hand: does the emancipation of the temporal from the spiritual, the replacement of Christian salvation with progress and religion with science produce true autonomy capable of self-conservation at its own level, or does it produce “decadence”? Löwith seems to align with the latter position, and in the commentary under consideration considers it miraculous that it proved possible to maintain an albeit weak form of morality after this detachment.

Laicity understood as the mutual distinction of the temporal sphere and the spiritual sphere is an historical contribution of Christianity. Said distinction, however, did not mean the separation and absolute autonomy of the temporal sphere from the spiritual sphere, but took place within Christian civilization, against a religious horizon. The Christian sovereign acted autonomously, deploying political prudence, which means exercising liberty within a system of truths whose ultimate guarantor was the Church, which in Catholic dogmas conserved and protected the patrimony of natural law as well.

As Karl Löwith remarks, however, beginning with modernity is an ever more demanding secularisation that renders the temporal sphere “capax sui”, autonomous in an absolute sense, sufficient unto itself, and able to endow itself with sense. Initially this ‘sense’ was borrowed from Christian dogmas through a secularised interpretation of them, but then claimed more and more as proper to secularisation itself, and this seems to have occurred especially with Comte and positivism.

Published in 1968 was the book “On the Theology of the World” written by Johann Baprist Metz, a German theologian and disciple of Karl Rahner. Prior to this he had written “Christian Anthropocentricity” in which he had argued that secularisation had been caused by Christianity and was hence a Christian fact to be accepted and lived as a fruit of Christianity, not to be fought against as contrary to Christian faith. In this manner the process of secularisation was interpreted as irreversible. In this later book Metz sustained that in the wake of secularisation the world had by now become completely worldly: “This the world where God is not encountered” [12]. In is opinion, “for a long time – almost up to the beginning of the last Council – the Church had followed this process only with resentment, considered it almost exclusively as a downfall and a false emancipation, and only quite slowly built up the courage to let the world become ‘worldly’ in this sense, and hence consider this process not just a fact contrary to the historical intentions of Christianity, but rather a fact determined also by the most profound historical impulses of this Christianity and its message” [13].

In my opinion it is not correct to retain that positivist secularisation stems from Christianity itself, nor can we accept the view that it is the destiny of history. The irreversibility of secularisation is a positivist dogma issuing forth from an ideological reading of history, the Comtean reading of the law of the three stages, whereby humanity would have evolved from the religious stage to the metaphysical stage to the positive stage in an irreversible manner.
What are the ultimate reasons why positivist secularisation cannot be seen as a consequence of Christianity, or considered irreversible?

The first reason is that positivism cannot help but project itself as a new religion. We saw this above: secularisation becomes such when it does not limit itself to being the immanent reformulation of Catholic dogmas, detaches itself completely from Christian tradition, and proposes itself as an absolute principle. For as long as Hegel, Marx, Pr0udhon, and Voltaire, Condorcet, and Turgot before them had limited themselves to replicating Christianity by proposing an immanent and secularised version of it, the phases of secularisation could not lay a claim to true self-autonomy or embody secularisation in the true sense. The process remained linked to Christianity and continued to be reversible. What other way to sever this umbilical cord with Christianity than to propose secularisation as an absolute principle? Hence its religious character; religious no longer in the sense of still being in debt to the ‘old’ religion, but religious in the sense of religiously expressing an absolute anti-religiosity.
This secularisation is not the fruit of Christianity.

The eclipse of nature and human nature in particular

As already remarked above, the second reason has to do with the possibility for the temporal level emancipated from the spiritual level to maintain itself without succumbing to self-degeneration.

Having acquired the feature of religious absoluteness, as we have just seen, secularisation is destined to be opposed to the concept of nature, as well as the concept of human nature. This is because otherwise maintained would be a moral order that would constantly and implicitly demand completion of some sort of religious form. If nature remains, so does natural law, that being the order of nature that expresses a moral norm. In its turn, the norm contained in natural law would keep ever open the issue of its absolute and transcendent foundation, because in itself the moral order needs an absolute foundation. Proposed anew, therefore, would be the ‘old’ religion. For as long as Hugo Grotius denies the transcendent foundation of natural law, but maintains natural law, there is no irreversibility: the need for a transcendent foundation can be argued and recovered. But if nature is denied, as does positivism, this becomes definitively impossible and we have irreversibility.

Naïve, therefore, is the perplexed astonishment voiced by Karl Löwith. It is not possible for the natural level to endure on its own once detached from the supernatural level. The stark version of positivism projects itself as a “new beginning”, absolute and religiously anti-religious. In order to do this it cannot help but deny nature and natural law. Their decomposition and their abandonment may well be progressive in time, but the principle of this process is stipulated in its absoluteness from the very outset. What we witness nowadays is a rampant and alarming negation of nature and natural law. Without the support of the Christian religion the natural dimension of procreation, matrimony and the family is not able to hold its ground. The so-called “gender ideology”[14] is the most recent outpost of this negation of nature and human identity.

West means Jerusalem, Athens and Rome. Benedict XVI repeated his in his famous speech to the Bundestag in Berlin[15]. However, when Christianity encountered Greek thought and Roman civilization, in addition, quite naturally, to the Jewish religion, it discovered in them both openness to transcendence and consideration of the force of natural law. It found a pre-Christian but human world. Today, however, it is faced with a post-human and hence radically post-Christian world.

The religious proposal of laicity

I have depicted an historical profile more in terms of the history of ideas than the history of facts, and this itinerary has shown that laicity is a Christian concept. This concept implies the separation of the political sphere from the ecclesial one, temporal power from spiritual power. It does not, however, call for the separation of politics from ethics, because the political sovereign, who is distinct from he who exercises spiritual authority, acts according to rational prudence and not in an arbitrary manner, since “there are limits to what the State may command, also when it is a matter of what belongs to Caesar” [16]. Neither in terms of personal will or discretion, nor in terms of a “will expressed by the majority”: as far as this point is concerned democracy has not contributed – in theory – to any radical change of perspective. Insofar as inseparable from ethics, to which it is directly bound, politics is also inseparable from religion as such and from the Catholic religion in particular. In fact, the ethical level is ultimately unable to serve as its own foundation by remaining at the simply natural level: “If we do not first understand our relationship with God we’ll never be able to keep these ambits in correct order” [17].

In modernity, however, another concept of laicity saw the light of day. Initially this was divined as the secularisation of Christian dogmas, but then became radically detached from Christianity and from any order, erecting itself as a new absolute and religious principle. This happened with positivism understood as a perennial category. In this manner the political level became completely autonomous from the religious level, but it also became incompatible with Christianity by assuming a religious form in itself. This is how relativism became a dictatorship.

In the face of such a scenario, rather naïve is the attempt on the part of Christianity to “laicise itself”, abandoning the cloak of dogmas and doctrine in order to dialogue with the lay world. If there were anything akin to a non absolute lay level open to human nature and religion, dialogue on laicity involving believers would prove possible. Unfortunately, this is not the main trend, and the reason is quite simple and grave at one and the same time: in order to be ‘lay’ in the sense we have just seen, laicity needs the Christian religion. Therefore, a laicity that has projected itself with positivism as an absolute and religious principle cannot be ‘lay’. This is the paradox of the west: the farther away people go from Christianity in order to be ‘lay’, all the less are they so.

Following this paradox is yet another one. If Christians wish to contribute to positive laicity they must propose the religious dimension of their faith in its completeness, without any forms of horizontal reductionism. Here as well is the reason so tragically simple: in a religiously post-human world it is necessary to begin from the proposal of Christ and then, within the religious vision, recover the human dimension and hence the ‘lay’ dimension. This is where the Social Doctrine of the Church encounters “new evangelisation”.

Endnotes

[1] This expression is used often by Joseph Ratzinger lo indicate the encounter of the Christian faith with Greek philosophy, and we can also use it in the broader sense of encounter with the West. Cf for example: J. Ratzinger, Fede Verità Tolleranza. Il cristianesimo e le religioni del mondo, Cantagalli, Siena 2003, p. 98.
[2] Fundamental references are the works of Christopher Dawson: La formazione della civiltà occidentale, D’Ettoris editori, Crotone 2011; Id., La divisione della Cristianità occidentale, D’Ettoris editori, Crotone 2009.
[3] J. Ratzinger, L’Europa di Benedetto nella crisi delle culture, Cantagalli, Siena 2005, p. 37.
[4] J. Ratzinger,Fede Verità Tolleranza. Il cristianesimo e le religioni del mondo cit., p. 74.
[5] J. Guitton, Il Cristo dilacerato. Crisi e concili nella storia, Cantagalli, Siena 2002, p. 166.
[6] Cf R. de Mattei, Pio IX e la rivoluzione italiana, Cantagalli, Siena 2012.
[7] K. Löwith, Significato e fine della storia. I presupposti teologici della filosofia della storia, Il Saggiatore, Milano 2010, pp. 98-104 (prima edizione 1977).
[8] Ibid, p. 100.
[9] Ibid, p. 101.
[10] Ibid, p. 103.
[11] De Lubac H., Il dramma dell’umanesimo ateo, Morcelliana, Brescia 1988.
[12] J. B. Metz, Sulla teologia del mondo, Queriniana, Brescia 1969, p. 144.
[13] Ibid, pg. 141.
[14] Osservatorio Internazionale Cardinale Van Thuân sulla Dottrina sociale della Chiesa, Fourth Report on the Social Doctrine of the Church in the World (edited by G. Crepaldi and S. Fontana), Cantagalli, Siena 2012.
[15] Benedetto XVI, Seech at the Reichstag in Berlin, 22 September 2011.
[16] J. V. Schall,Filosofia politica della Chiesa cattolica, Cantagalli, Siena 2011, p. 123.
[17] Ibid, pg. 122.

sábado, 23 de março de 2013

Dictadura del relativismo es pobreza espiritual de nuestros días, dice el Papa

VATICANO, 22 Mar. 13 / 10:01 am (ACI/EWTN Noticias).- Al dirigir esta mañana un discurso a los miembros del Cuerpo Diplomático acreditado ante la Santa Sede, el Papa Francisco explicó que su nombre se debe al gran santo de Asís y su amor a los pobres, y precisó que existe en nuestros días una pobreza espiritual aún mayor que es la dictadura del relativismo, como la llamaba Benedicto XVI.

"Como sabéis, son varios los motivos por los que elegí mi nombre pensando en Francisco de Asís, una personalidad que es bien conocida más allá de los confines de Italia y de Europa, y también entre quienes no profesan la fe católica. Uno de los primeros es el amor que Francisco tenía por los pobres", dijo el Santo Padre.

"¡Cuántos pobres hay todavía en el mundo! Y ¡cuánto sufrimiento afrontan estas personas! Según el ejemplo de Francisco de Asís, la Iglesia ha tratado siempre de cuidar, proteger en todos los rincones de la Tierra a los que sufren por la indigencia, y creo que en muchos de vuestros países podéis constatar la generosa obra de aquellos cristianos que se esfuerzan por ayudar a los enfermos, a los huérfanos, a quienes no tienen hogar y a todos los marginados, y que, de este modo, trabajan para construir una sociedad más humana y más justa".

El Papa explicó luego que "hay otra pobreza. Es la pobreza espiritual de nuestros días, que afecta gravemente también a los países considerados más ricos. Es lo que mi Predecesor, el querido y venerado Papa Benedicto XVI, llama la ‘dictadura del relativismo’, que deja a cada uno como medida de sí mismo y pone en peligro la convivencia entre los hombres".

"Llego así a una segunda razón de mi nombre. Francisco de Asís nos dice: Esforzaos en construir la paz. Pero no hay verdadera paz sin verdad. No puede haber verdadera paz si cada uno es la medida de sí mismo, si cada uno puede reclamar siempre y sólo su propio derecho, sin preocuparse al mismo tiempo del bien de los demás, de todos, a partir ya de la naturaleza, que acomuna a todo ser humano en esta tierra".

Tras señalar que otro de los títulos del Obispo de Roma es el de Pontífice, es decir, el que construye puentes, el Santo Padre dijo que "en esta tarea es fundamental también el papel de la religión. En efecto, no se pueden construir puentes entre los hombres olvidándose de Dios. Pero también es cierto lo contrario: no se pueden vivir auténticas relaciones con Dios ignorando a los demás".

"Por eso, es importante intensificar el diálogo entre las distintas religiones, creo que en primer lugar con el Islam, y he apreciado mucho la presencia, durante la Misa de inicio de mi ministerio, de tantas autoridades civiles y religiosas del mundo islámico". 

El Papa dijo luego que "también es importante intensificar la relación con los no creyentes, para que nunca prevalezcan las diferencias que separan y laceran, sino que, no obstante la diversidad, predomine el deseo de construir lazos verdaderos de amistad entre todos los pueblos".

"La lucha contra la pobreza, tanto material como espiritual; edificar la paz y construir puentes. Son como los puntos de referencia de un camino al cual quisiera invitar a participar a cada uno de los países que representáis. Pero, si no aprendemos a amar cada vez más a nuestra Tierra, es un camino difícil".

Para concluir el Papa reiteró su agradecimiento a las delegaciones que estuvieron presentes en la Misa de inicio de su pontificado e hizo votos para que "el Señor Todopoderoso colme de sus dones a cada uno vosotros, a vuestras familias y a los Pueblos que representáis. Muchas gracias".


sexta-feira, 15 de fevereiro de 2013

The Left Lobbies for a Liberal Successor to Benedict - by George Neumayr

In Crisis

To the dictators of relativism and their allies in the chattering class, the resignation of Pope Benedict XVI is seen as an occasion for celebration and a chance to lobby the Church for a liberal successor. The mischief is already underway, as seen in such headlines as: “New Pope should not condemn contraception, says cardinal.”

The Church’s enemies, both within and without her walls, see an opportunity to capitalize on Benedict’s resignation, and the media, as always, stands ready to help. The coverage so far of the resignation has been grotesquely biased. ABC News wins the prize for the most ludicrously unfair post-resignation story: “Pope Benedict Dogged By Hitler Youth Past, Despite Jewish Support.”

Other media outlets have been only slightly less subtle in their distaste for Benedict’s pontificate. They considered it newsworthy to report that he didn’t “change” Church teaching, as if that fell within the range of plausible choices before him.

That the Church persists in naming believing Catholics to the chair of St. Peter is somehow “controversial” in the eyes of the media. “Benedict’s eight-year reign will be appraised intensively and, I expect, unkindly. He will be described as a diehard traditionalist, a reactionary in a time of revolutionary yearnings,” wrote Bill Keller, the former executive editor of the New York Times.  (Author Thomas Cahill, after John Paul II’s death, took a similar line in the pages of the Times, writing that historians may conclude that his conservatism “destroyed” the Church.)

Such judgments on Benedict’s pontificate are wholly predictable, given the hostility with which the media greeted his elevation and its equation of liberalism with “reform.” Leading newspapers billed Benedict at the time of his election as “God’s Rottweiler” (though later they would cast him as a lap dog during the abuse scandal). He “never had a chance” with the media, as an executive at Fox News put it.
But Benedict was never as rigid as the media claimed. If anything, he approached non-doctrinal matters with great flexibility, a style that explains his willingness to buck 600 years of history and resign from office. That’s quite a departure from tradition for the “diehard traditionalist” of Keller’s fevered imagination.

The media’s obsessional interest in the papacy is a tacit acknowledgment of its power. Journalists may claim the papacy has “weakened” under Benedict, but the very fact that they cover it with such intensity belies that description. What the media treats as the papacy’s greatest weakness—adherence to orthodoxy—is in fact the source of its prestige.
The media’s frenetic lobbying for a “more progressive” successor to Benedict, as the Washington Post editorialized, is also a measure of the papacy’s enduring power and influence. Why should liberals care so much about the direction of a religion to which they don’t belong? The answer is that they envy its immense power and wish to harness that power for their own ideological purposes. Out of this envy they pose as “reformers” who know what is best for the Church. Yet their unsolicited advice, if taken, would only  weaken her.

They regard the papacy as a relic of “absolutism” and the last great obstacle to the triumph of their ideology.  Consequently, they expend great energy in trying to neutralize or co-opt it. A liberal pope, in their eyes, would be an even greater propaganda coup than a liberal president. They think that if they could somehow cow the Church into naming a “progressive” to bless their various revolutions—from socialism to same-sex marriage—those revolutions would spread everywhere.

In the past, the Church’s enemies sought to eliminate the power of the papacy by force, even to the point of throwing popes in prison. And a few of her modern enemies harbor the same thoughts, as Pope Benedict found out. “Arrest the Pope? I rather think we should,” ran a headline on a column in the British press in 2010. “Put the Pope in the Dock,” read another headline. United Nations jurist Geoffrey Robertson, joined by atheists Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens, wanted Pope Benedict prosecuted for “crimes against humanity.”

But since imprisoning popes is unrealistic the Church’s enemies seek to control the papacy through alternative means. Through the manipulation of  popular opinion and media pressure, they clamor for a liberal pope who will confirm the world in all its errors and surrender the Church’s institutions to the dictatorship of relativism.

The faithful, however, can take solace in the promise of Jesus Christ that that day will never come. The gates of Hell may clank against the Church, but they will never crush her.

domingo, 7 de outubro de 2012

Relativism or Relativity: Religious Freedom and the Family - Prof. Mary Shivanandan

In Culture of Life Foundation

Posted:By: William E. May


In Relativism or Relativity: Religious Freedom and the Family Professor Shivanandan illuminates the debate about religion and the public square by throwing a searching light on antithetical understandings of human freedom, particularly religious freedom. A popular understanding is that freedom is requisite to autonomy. Less popular is the understanding that freedom is requisite to relationality. Professor Shivanandan explains how contemporary public debates about the family, issues of birth, marriage and death, are corollary to a prior confusion between autonomy and relationality. In the autonomy model, others are an imposition on freedom. In the relational model, others are integral to freedom. These models are at the heart of debates about family, birth , marriage and death, and they are at the heart of what religious freedom means and the place of religion in the public square. Professor Shivanandan's masterful treatment of freedom is crucial to setting aright a Culture of Life in our public square. 

Relativism or Relativity:  Religious Freedom and the Family

 

Prof. Mary Shivanandan, S.T.D. John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage & Family; At the Catholic University of America December 9, 2005
            
The fact that issues of birth, marriage and death figure so prominently in debates in the United States on the role of religion in public life should alert us to the possibility that the family holds a special place in the context of religious freedom.  Here we are not talking about members within the family adhering to or converting to a faith according to their conscience, although that is indeed a serious problem in some societies.  Rather it is a question of the very composition of the family and the dignity of its various members.  Are interventions opposing abortion, assisted suicide, so-called homosexual “marriage” an unwarranted imposition of a religious belief on society or legitimate, indeed essential, perspectives to be brought to the public arena?
           
It is generally agreed that Dignitatis Humanae marks a major step forward in the Church’s understanding and endorsement of religious freedom.[1]  Yet right from the beginning arguments arose on the relationship of freedom to truth.   In 1965, when the document was promulgated, the current contentious issues on birth, marriage and death had scarcely ruffled the surface of public concern.  John Courtney Murray, one of the document’s recognized architects, acknowledged that governments’ “first and principle concern for the common good [is] the effective protection of the human person and its dignity.”[2]  But he did not feel it necessary to spell out in what that dignity consists beyond self-determination and an orientation to the good of society.
           
David Crawford, professor at the John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage & Family, has argued that Murray’s main understanding of religious freedom as a juridical not an ontological concept, comprising only immunity from state interference, leaves the way open for the separation of freedom from truth.  Each self-determining individual is left free to decide for himself the nature of reality, even of good and evil.  That is the definition of relativism, relating everything to myself, without taking into account the objective truth or reality of any thing or person outside myself.  That relativism is now the recognized content of freedom can be seen from the work of Alan Wolfe, director of the Boise Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College.  In his book Moral Freedom[3]  Wolfe describes the 19th century as the century of economic freedom, the 20th of political freedom and the 21st of moral freedom, when each individual will determine for himself his moral and ethical standards.   It is not co-incidental that the first example Wolfe takes up is gay “marriage,” which calls in question the very identity of the traditional family. 
         
John Paul II himself says: 

Freedom negates and destroys itself and becomes a factor leading to the destruction of others when it no longer recognizes its essential link with the truth.  When freedom out of a desire to emancipate itself from all forms of tradition and authority, shuts out even the most obvious evidence of an objective and universal truth. . . then the person ends up by no longer taking as his sole and indisputable point of reference for his own choices the truth about good and evil, but only his subjective and changeable opinion, or, indeed, his selfish interest and whim.[4] 

Dignitatis Humanae reiterates that all men are impelled by their nature as free and reasonable beings to seek the truth, especially religious truth. [5]  At the same time they are called to be lovers of “true freedom—men that is who will form their own judgments in the light of truth, direct their activities with a sense of responsibility, and strive for what is true and just.”[6] 

In this brief paper I seek to show how in the thought of John Paul II (1) freedom is intrinsically related to the truth and dignity of the human person created in God’s image; (2) freedom from its origin is relational and; (3) relations within the family cannot be detached from the truth of the human person as relational, who finds himself only through a “sincere gift of self.”  In other words relativity is at the heart of human nature, a relativity that recognizes the objective truth of the other as gift.  In conclusion, I shall argue that the debate needs to move to this ontological level, which means that far from imposing a religious view, the Church, especially through the thought of John Paul II, is contributing a vital component to our understanding of religious freedom, the dignity of the human person and the welfare of society.

Inseparable Bond of Freedom, Truth and the Good        
  
 Jesuit scholar, Herminio Rico in his detailed analysis of John Paul II and Dignitatis Humanae ascribes to the separation of freedom from truth when he calls for the primacy of the individual’s freedom.  Freedom is to be joined to responsible promotion of truth but not in an intrinsic way.  Like most commentators, who adhere to democratic liberalism Rico applauds John Paul II’s commitment to human rights understood politically.  What he and others criticize John Paul II for is, in Rico’s words, his “uncompromising,” dogmatic” and “extreme positions” on ethical questions.[7]  He takes as an example the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae, the Gospel of Life.  
          
John Paul II is indeed uncompromising in viewing the right to life as a fundamental right.  “Upon the recognition of this right, every human community and the political community itself was founded.”[8]  Far from seeing a dichotomy between what is understood as human rights and the right to life, he states in Gift and Mystery, that he came to see a profound connection between them from his encounter with Nazism and communism.[9]  The former pope sees attacks against life as making it “increasingly difficult to grasp clearly the meaning of what man is, the meaning of his rights and duties.”[10]  In fact, he says, “they represent a direct threat to the entire culture of human rights.”[11] 
          
The source of this threat, he charges, lies in secularism, which promotes a “perverse idea of freedom,” the autonomy of the individual separated from any idea of God.
   
In such an agnostic not to say atheistic environment, man loses the sense of his uniqueness among earthly creatures.  Living “as if God does not exist,” he loses sight also of “the mystery of his own being.”  And that leads to utilitarianism, individualism and hedonism.[12]  This rejection of God and its deleterious effect on the human person runs like a refrain throughout Evangelium Vitae. 
  
He sums it up in no. 96: Where God is denied and people live as though he did not exist or his commandments are not taken into account, the dignity of the human person and the inviolability of human life also end up being rejected and compromised. Conversely where the word of life is proclaimed, life acquires its full meaning and value since eternal life is the end towards which our life on earth is directed.[13] 

The saving event of Jesus Christ is the guarantor of all human rights.“By his incarnation the Son of God has united himself in some fashion with every human being.” (GS 22) This saving event reveals to humanity not only the boundless love of God, who “so loved the world that he gave his only Son (Jn. 3:16) but also the incomparable dignity of every human person.[14]   
        
In Veritatis splendor John Paul II is even more explicit concerning the “essential bond between truth, the good and freedom. ” [15]  Here again in this encyclical on the Splendor of Truth he points to the fact that when the good of human life is rejected, truth suffers as a consequence.  Man begins to doubt that there can be any true salvation.  All that is left is a commitment to a detached freedom that decides for itself both good and evil. Such an attempt to separate freedom from truth results in a yet graver consequence, the separation of faith from its moral content.  For faith is “a decision involving one’s whole existence,” and is deeply bound up with obeying God’s commandments.[16]  “Only God, the supreme good, constitutes the unshakeable foundation and essential condition of morality.”[17]  Man’s freedom is constituent to his nature but it is given to him within the truth of his being as ordered to the good, ultimately the good of eternal life.[18] 

The Relational Nature of Freedom     
        
Man’s life is intimately linked to God.  “The dignity of this life,” says John Paul II,  “is linked not only to its beginning, to the fact that it comes from God, but also to its final end, to its destiny of fellowship with God in knowledge and love of him.” [19] As Crawford points out, my freedom does not pre-exist my relationship with God.  It is that pre-existing relation that allows me to make the decision for or against God.  Religious freedom can never be simply a juridical construct.   Freedom as part of the imago Dei, comes to me as a gift and finds its fulfillment in a reciprocal gift of self.  This notion of freedom as prior gift to the person, whose freedom is fulfilled in becoming a gift to another opens up perspectives of religious freedom that mere immunity from state interference cannot encompass.  First of all it places the understanding of religious freedom, indeed all freedom, in its proper theological context. Crawford draws from John Paul II’s encyclicals what he calls “freedom’s “architecture.” It arises from “within the gift character of creaturehood.”[20] 

Two passages from Gaudium et spes are central to the pope’s understanding of man.  

GS 24 states, “man is the only creature on earth that God wanted for its own sake” and “man can fully discover his true self only in a sincere giving of himself.”  In other words freedom is a gift from God, given for man to freely give himself as a gift.  John Paul II in Veritatis splendor describes Christ’s total gift of himself on the cross as the “authentic meaning of freedom.” 
  
Freedom is “ultimately directed towards communion”[21].   Man cannot give himself as a gift without the freedom of self-determination and self-possession.  Paradoxically this same freedom offers the possibility of making myself over to another as a gift and in that self-bestowal Christ tells us our true freedom and fulfillment lies.[22]  For, as John Paul II, amply demonstrates in his Catechesis on Human Love, man is more fully the image of God as a Trinity of Persons in the moment of communion. [23] 
           
John Paul II spells this out explicitly in Evangelium Vitae:  God entrusts us to one another.  And it is also in view of this entrusting that God gives everyone freedom, a freedom which possesses an inherently relational dimension.  This is a great gift of the Creator, placed as it is at the service of the person and of his fulfillment through the gift of self and openness to others; but when freedom is made absolute in an individualistic way, it is emptied of its original content, and its very meaning and dignity are contradicted.[24] 

The Family    
        
John Paul II in the first encyclical of his papacy, Redemptor Hominis writes: Man cannot live without love.   He remains a being incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate intimately in it. [25] It is in the love revealed by Jesus Christ that “man finds again the greatness, dignity and value that belongs to his humanity.”[26]   It is in the family above all that human love is experienced.  In fact the mission of the family is to “guard, reveal and communicate love.”  Its role is “decisive and irreplaceable.”[27] Emphatically John Paul II states that “there is no true freedom where life is not welcomed and loved; and there is no fullness of life except in freedom.”[28]  In other words freedom and love are inextricably linked.  It is this link between freedom, life and love that compels the Church to speak out on so many issues that affect the essence of the family as a communion of life and love, such as divorce, gay “marriage” and reproductive technologies. 
           
Let us set what the Church teaches about the family beside the message our culture gives implicitly through technological manipulation of sexuality and procreation.  In “Letter to Families,” John Paul II contrasts the “civilization of love,” which has the family as its center with the anti-civilization of agnoticism and utilitarianism.  Instead of being a gift, the child is seen as a “hindrance” to the woman’s self-realization or else a product to be purchased from a fertility clinic.  The woman, often with her own unwitting cooperation, becomes a mere object of sexual desire.  With contraception and abortion readily available she absolves the man of making a true gift of himself.  A pseudo freedom belongs to both, one that short circuits the total gift of self, which alone can fulfill their freedom.[29] In this section of the Letter, John Paul II speaks a great deal about the connection between freedom, truth and love.
    
The gift-character of the human person demands freedom.  He must be free both to give himself and free to receive in a way that honors his or her dignity and humanity.  Bodily sexual union is the sign of the total gift of self between a man and a woman.  The fact that man is a body is intimately bound up with his dignity as a person and a gift.  To treat the body as mere raw material that can be molded according to the desires of the individual is to deny the very nature of the person as a unity of body and soul.  As the present Holy Father, Pope Benedict XVI says, “Although in modern culture, the concept of ‘human nature’ seems to have been lost, the fact remains that human rights cannot be understood without presupposing that man in his very being, is the bearer of values and norms that must be rediscovered and reaffirmed, not invented and imposed in a subjective and arbitrary manner.”[30]  One might say that relativism has been enshrined in the United States Constitution as a result of Roe vs Wade. This applies both to values such as masculinity and femininity and their ordination to union and fruitfulness as well as to the nature of the human embryo.
   
It is specious, for example, to claim: No one thinks that blastocysts (the microscopic balls of human cells from which embryonic stem cells are derived four or five days after fertilization) are actual people, and potentiality alone is not a sufficient basis for rights.  We do not, for instance, think that a child of ten who has the potential to become medically qualified actually has the right to practise as a physician.[31]To become medically qualified is to add an extrinsic quality to the human being.  There is no inevitability that the ten-year-old child will become a doctor, whereas the human blastocyst, if allowed to develop normally, inevitably becomes a human person.  It is this intrinsic humanness of the blastocyst that accords it rights.  Otherwise at what stage do rights begin? 

  
The Public Debate 

The abortion issue, along with all the other life issues, is not likely to go away.  Neither can these issues be separated from issue of religious freedom, which Herminio Rico intimates, because they deal with ultimates.  As Pope Benedict XVI says, “Prior to any positive law emanated by states, such rights are universal, inviolable and inalienable, and must be recognized as such by everyone, especially by the civil authorities who are called to promote them and guarantee that they are respected.”[32] Crawford concludes his discussion of John Courtney Murray on religious freedom by noting his emphasis on the need for a “public conversation and what he called ‘consensus.’ [33]Murray  recognized that no society can survive if it cuts itself off from foundational truths, but the public debate cannot be fruitful if it is based on a concept of freedom severed from truth and the good.
           
There is increasing recognition in the United States that the discussion that should have taken place on abortion was short-circuited by the Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade, which legalized abortion virtually through all nine months of pregnancy. [34]  A  University of Alabama Law professor in 1968 came up with the suggestion that, rather than legalize abortion through the democratic process in state legislatures, it would be quicker to secure it as a right through judicial fiat.
  
A privacy right was conjured up from the 14th amendment.  This privacy right now extends far beyond abortion.  It has come to mean “personal autonomy—everyone’s right to do whatever he or she pleases so long as others are not harmed.”[35] By becoming a matter of constitutional law the opportunity for principled discussion of the ultimate values involved was cut short.   As Justice Antonin Scalia, wrote, Roe v. Wade “destroyed the compromises of the past, [and] rendered compromise impossible in the future. ‘. . .  To portray Roe as the statesmanlike settlement of a divisive issue . . .is nothing less than Orwellian. [36] .

Confrontational politics took over, with the “religious” right on one (the losing) side and the secular liberals ostensibly on the other.  Yet according to several opinion polls the majority of Americans declare that abortion should be illegal in the second (72%) and third (86%) trimesters of pregnancy.  Because of Roe v. Wade, these views can find no expression in state legislatures or state laws.[37]   The very freedom of the majority of the people has been stifled.  In such circumstances the Church has a duty to inform the public debate. There is recognition that John Paul II’s encyclical, Evangelium Vitae has in fact significantly influenced public discussion.  The November 2005 issue of Washingtonian, a magazine read widely by policy makers in the capital, lists a handful of titles in the last 40 years that “have moved the debate.”  Among them are such influential books as Alan Bloom’s (1987) The Closing of the American Mind and Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) The End of History and the Last Man.”  Evangelium Vitae merits the following evaluation: From its use of such phrases as “culture of life” and “culture of death” to its insistence that human life must be protected at every stage, Pope John Paul II’s 1995 encyclical laid the foundation for today’s evangelical conservatives.  A book that reaches far beyond its Catholic roots.[38] 

This brief paper will finish with one of John Paul II’s many quotes on the relationship of democracy and the moral life:
 
Your country prides itself on being a realized democracy, but democracy is itself a moral adventure, a continuing test of a people’s capacity to govern themselves in ways that serve the common good and the good of individual citizens. The survival of a particular democracy depends not only on its institutions, but to an even great extent on the spirit which inspires and permeates its procedures for legislating, administering and judging.[39]
 




 
[1] Herminio Rico declared that the document “has effected a definitive break, set an irreversible direction of openness and dialogue in the attitude of the Church toward the World.” John Paul II and the Legacy of Dignitatis Humanae (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004) 16.
[2] John Courtney Murray, “Arguments for the Right to Religious Freedom,” in Religious Liberty: Catholic Struggles with Pluralism, ed. J..Leon Hooper (Louisville, Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993) 239, as cited by David Crawford in “The Architecture of Freedom: John Paul II and John Courtney Murray on Religious Freedom” in a forthcoming publication on Religious Freedom.
[3] Alan Wolfe, Moral Freedom:The Search for Virtue in a World of Choice, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 2001).
[4] Evangelium vitae, Encyclical Origins, 24 no. 42 (April 6, 1995)  no. 19.
[5] Dignitatis Humanae, Walter M. Abbott., ed. The Documents of Vatican Council II ( New York, Guild Press, 1966) no. 2.
[6] Ibid., no. 8.
[7] Tad Szulc in his biography, Pope John Paul II (NY: Scribner, 1995) writes that “the great novelty of John Paul II’s reign was his dedication to religious liberty and tolerance.”  315.  Yet he uses the same adjectives as Rico to describe his stance on moral issues, “inflexibility,” “iron opposition to ordination of women,” “unbending insistence on priestly celibacy: 318.”
[8] EV no. 2
[9] John Paul II Gift and Mystery (New YorK: Doubleday, 19996) 66-67.
[10] EV no. 11.
[11] EV no. 18.
[12] EV no. 21, 22.
[13] EV no. 29.
[14] EV no. 2
[15] Veritatis splendor, encyclical Origins 23, no. 18 (October 14, 1993) no. 88.
[16] VS, no. 88, 89.
[17] Vs no. 99.
[18] VS no. 86.
[19] Ev no. 38.
[20] Crawford, 4
[21] VS no. 86.
[22] David Crawford, “The Architecture of Freedom: John Paul II and John Courtney Murray on Religious Freedom, 11.
[23] John Paul II, Theology of the Body: Human Love in the Divine Plan (Boston, MA: Pauline Media and Books, 1997) November 14, 1979.
[24] EV no. 19.
[25] Redemptor Hominis encyclical, (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 1979) no. 10.
[26] Ibid.
[27] EV no. 92.
[28] EV. No. 96.
[29] “Letter to Families,” Origins  23, no. 37 (March 3, 1994) no. 13.
[30] Zenit ZE05120107
[31] Philosopher, Baroness Onora O’Neill, “The Ethical Dimension,” Cam: Cambridge Alumni Magazine no. 46 (Michaelmas Term, 2005) 24.
[32] Zenit News Agency, ZE05120107.
[33] Crawford, “The Architecture of Freedom,” 22, 23.
[34] See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
[35] George F. Will, “The Abortion Argument We Missed,” The Washington Post, December 1, 1925, A25
[36] Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It brought about  just  the kind of extremist situation of Pilgrims v. Park Rangers Kevin Seamus Hasson describes in his book, The Right to be Wrong: Ending the Culture War Over Religion in America (San Francisco:  Encounter Books, 2005)1-7..
[37] Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Thomburgh v. American College, of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814 (1986)
[38] Online Washingtonian
[39] “Moral Truth, Conscience and American Democracy Ad Limina Address to U.S. Bishops, June 27, 1998