Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Natalidade. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Natalidade. Mostrar todas as mensagens

domingo, 29 de dezembro de 2013

Patriarca de Lisboa: Natalidade é problema absoluto e valor primeiríssimo

In RR

Sem natalidade não há presente nem futuro. A preocupação é do Patriarca de Lisboa, que alerta para o que chama de “problema absoluto”. Em declarações à Renascença, à margem de uma conferência sobre política de família, D. Manuel Clemente pede prioridade para políticas que garantam apoios e valorização da natalidade.

“Se não tivermos uma sociedade em que a natalidade seja apreciada como um valor primeiríssimo, depois não temos a base nem para o presente, porque sem filhos também não há pais e as pessoas realizam-se pela paternidade e pela maternidade”, começa por dizer D. Manuel Clemente.

Depois, sublinha o Patriarca, “também não há futuro, porque as novas gerações é que nos trazem esse contributo indispensável, quantitativo e qualitativo, da realidade e da inovação”.

“É um problema absoluto”, alerta, cuja resolução “passa pela vinculação familiar, pelo apoio às famílias para a sua própria constituição e geração de filhos, passa também pela integração dos idosos e este papel reforçado dos avós também na educação dos netos, na colaboração com os pais”. “É um problema fundamental.”

Portugal tem um dos níveis mais baixos de natalidade da União Europeia, muito longe do que é desejável para a renovação das gerações.

sábado, 24 de agosto de 2013

JONATHAN LAST’S What to Expect When No One is Expecting: America’s Coming Economic Disaster - by William E. May

In Culture of Life Foundation 

Last’s Thesis
America’s fertility rate is falling precipitously and if nothing is done to reverse this situation the nation’s population will no longer be able to care for the swelling numbers of the elderly, or have adequate financial resources to maintain a military force capable of resisting hostile and populous nations.  This is the thesis of Jonathan Last’s recent book, What To Expect When No One is Expecting.

America’s Falling Fertility
In Last’s Introduction, he describes the situation in Old Town Alexandria, VA where he and his wife lived until they had children and moved to rural Virginia.  In 2008, a children’s clothing store closed because of sluggish sales.  By 2012, “the average family in Old Town consist[ed] of a mother, a father, and 0. 57 children,” which means that “the average Old Town married couple has a bit more than half a child!”  More broadly, “the fertility rate for white, college-educated women (we’ll use them because they serve as a fair proxy for our middle class), is only 1.6,” almost as low as the fertility rate in China and far below the replacement level of 2.1.

Accompanying the decline in fertility is the proliferation of pet shops and facilities to care for pets. In Old Town, this growth was spectacular, but it is widespread throughout the country. In Old Town, when people went on holiday, they could leave their dog at “Dog Town,” where each dog had a “separate house complete with air conditioning.”

Opponents will say there’s no need to worry about America’s population, pointing out that in 2010, 50.5 million Americans were of Hispanic descent and that the fertility rate for Hispanic women was 2.3 in 2012.  Moreover, between 2000 and 2009, the total population of the U.S. increased by 27.5 million people—more than half of which were Hispanic.  In addition, the growing population of Americans of Asian descent also had healthy fertility rates.  But Last shows that this is not likely to continue.  The fertility of Hispanic women in the U.S. quickly trends downward toward America's national average.  Furthermore, the fertility rates of the Latin American nations from which these immigrants come, though higher than rates in the U.S., are falling even more sharply.

The decline of American fertility “is the result of a complex constellation of factors, operating independently, with both foreseeable and unintended consequences.  From big things—like the decline in church attendance and the increase of women in the workplace—to little things—like a law mandating car seats in Tennessee or the reform of divorce laws in California—our modern world has evolved in such a way as to subtly discourage childbearing.”  Last also notes the impact of the birth control pill, legalized abortion and the delay in marriage and child-bearing.

How to Make Babies, Wanted and Desired
Having described the many roadblocks to having children, Last makes several proposals to remove them, including:
1.  Reform Social Security. The present system distorts the “market value” of children and forces fertility rates down. Last describes several thoughtful ways to reform the system so that it recognizes the value of children for parents. These different schemes share the same goals: (1) “Let parents keep more of their money” now paid in taxes; and (2) “Reduce the fundamental distortion that Social Security now creates by giving everyone welfare state payouts, regardless of whether or not they bore the cost of creating the relatively few workers who now fund them. These reforms do not hand out money to parents; they simply lessen the economic disconnect created by the government in the first place.”

2.   Rethink College. Higher education is a major roadblock. It often delays marriage and results in enormous debts.  Since 1960 “the real cost of college has increased more than 1000 percent. Meanwhile the ‘value’ of a college degree has increased even in jobs where a college degree is not required and has no bearing at all on work-related knowledge. And all of this has happened as the objective quality of the average college degree has, by most standards, declined.”

Last proposes three measures to address the shortcomings of the current system:

a.  Eliminating the need for college.  In many instances, a college degree has little bearing on a person’s qualification for employment.  Employers require degrees in part because the 1971 Supreme Court decision Griggs v. Duke Power held that employers could not rely on IQ-type tests if minorities performed poorly on them, and Blacks and Hispanics show a persistent underperformance on such tests. “But colleges are allowed to use such considerations. The colleges get rich, students and their parents go into hock…If Griggs were rolled back, it would upend the college system at a stroke.”

b.   Encouraging the college system to become more responsive to market forces. One way to reduce exorbitant tuition and be more responsive to the market would be to create a no-frills, federal degree-granting body that would let students “leapfrog the four-year system” by getting certificates when they met standards for such courses as English, the sciences, mathematics etc.  After they gained sufficient certificates, students could receive a national Bachelor’s Degree Equivalency without going to college.  Government agencies would accept the Equivalency, and grad schools receiving any federal funds would be required to accept it.

c.  Government stipulation that public universities become family-friendly. One cannot, and should not, “try to force college students to marry and have children, but for some students starting a family while they’re in college is ideal.”  Last highlights Brigham Young University in Provo, UT, the “flagship school of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.  BYU provides not only dormitory-style housing but family housing just off campus, and there is no reason why state schools should not provide such housing for the relatively few undergraduate married couples who desire such an arrangement.”

3.  Eliminate the “Dirt Gap.”  Most Americas live in large cities where real estate and associated costs are disproportionately much higher than in rural areas, and many must seek housing in the suburbs where real estate and a home are more reasonable; but commuting to jobs in the central cities is expensive and time consuming. The answer, Last argues, is not more public transportation for married couples both of whom  work and must get children to school, leave their car at the rail station, retrieve car when they return etc. Building more roads is the way to go, and Last points out that Dallas has twice as much road pavement as Los Angeles and a higher fertility rate.

An important way to overcome the Dirt Gap is telecommuting. Currently, over 40 % of American workers telecommute for a good part of their work week.  By increasing both the number or telecommuters and the number of hours they are able to telecommute, the Dirt Gap could be significantly reduced.
Conclusion
Last’s book counters forcefully the widespread secularist view that the greatest threat to the survival of Americans and, indeed, the planet, is people. Those holding this view still embrace the philosophy popularized by Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 book The Population Bomb. The idea that overpopulation is the greatest threat to the planet’s survival has led governments throughout the world to take steps to curb population growth, punishing couples who choose to have more than the replacement number of babies. Last presents compelling evidence to show that under-population is the real threat to our survival.
- See more at: http://www.culture-of-life.org/e-brief/jonathan-last%E2%80%99s-what-expect-when-no-one-expecting-america%E2%80%99s-coming-economic-disaster#sthash.oAfaN7yn.dpuf
Last’s Thesis
America’s fertility rate is falling precipitously and if nothing is done to reverse this situation the nation’s population will no longer be able to care for the swelling numbers of the elderly, or have adequate financial resources to maintain a military force capable of resisting hostile and populous nations.  This is the thesis of Jonathan Last’s recent book, What To Expect When No One is Expecting.

America’s Falling Fertility
In Last’s Introduction, he describes the situation in Old Town Alexandria, VA where he and his wife lived until they had children and moved to rural Virginia.  In 2008, a children’s clothing store closed because of sluggish sales.  By 2012, “the average family in Old Town consist[ed] of a mother, a father, and 0. 57 children,” which means that “the average Old Town married couple has a bit more than half a child!”  More broadly, “the fertility rate for white, college-educated women (we’ll use them because they serve as a fair proxy for our middle class), is only 1.6,” almost as low as the fertility rate in China and far below the replacement level of 2.1.

Accompanying the decline in fertility is the proliferation of pet shops and facilities to care for pets. In Old Town, this growth was spectacular, but it is widespread throughout the country. In Old Town, when people went on holiday, they could leave their dog at “Dog Town,” where each dog had a “separate house complete with air conditioning.”

Opponents will say there’s no need to worry about America’s population, pointing out that in 2010, 50.5 million Americans were of Hispanic descent and that the fertility rate for Hispanic women was 2.3 in 2012.  Moreover, between 2000 and 2009, the total population of the U.S. increased by 27.5 million people—more than half of which were Hispanic.  In addition, the growing population of Americans of Asian descent also had healthy fertility rates.  But Last shows that this is not likely to continue.  The fertility of Hispanic women in the U.S. quickly trends downward toward America's national average.  Furthermore, the fertility rates of the Latin American nations from which these immigrants come, though higher than rates in the U.S., are falling even more sharply.

The decline of American fertility “is the result of a complex constellation of factors, operating independently, with both foreseeable and unintended consequences.  From big things—like the decline in church attendance and the increase of women in the workplace—to little things—like a law mandating car seats in Tennessee or the reform of divorce laws in California—our modern world has evolved in such a way as to subtly discourage childbearing.”  Last also notes the impact of the birth control pill, legalized abortion and the delay in marriage and child-bearing.

How to Make Babies, Wanted and Desired
Having described the many roadblocks to having children, Last makes several proposals to remove them, including:
1.  Reform Social Security. The present system distorts the “market value” of children and forces fertility rates down. Last describes several thoughtful ways to reform the system so that it recognizes the value of children for parents. These different schemes share the same goals: (1) “Let parents keep more of their money” now paid in taxes; and (2) “Reduce the fundamental distortion that Social Security now creates by giving everyone welfare state payouts, regardless of whether or not they bore the cost of creating the relatively few workers who now fund them. These reforms do not hand out money to parents; they simply lessen the economic disconnect created by the government in the first place.”

2.   Rethink College. Higher education is a major roadblock. It often delays marriage and results in enormous debts.  Since 1960 “the real cost of college has increased more than 1000 percent. Meanwhile the ‘value’ of a college degree has increased even in jobs where a college degree is not required and has no bearing at all on work-related knowledge. And all of this has happened as the objective quality of the average college degree has, by most standards, declined.”

Last proposes three measures to address the shortcomings of the current system:

a.  Eliminating the need for college.  In many instances, a college degree has little bearing on a person’s qualification for employment.  Employers require degrees in part because the 1971 Supreme Court decision Griggs v. Duke Power held that employers could not rely on IQ-type tests if minorities performed poorly on them, and Blacks and Hispanics show a persistent underperformance on such tests. “But colleges are allowed to use such considerations. The colleges get rich, students and their parents go into hock…If Griggs were rolled back, it would upend the college system at a stroke.”

b.   Encouraging the college system to become more responsive to market forces. One way to reduce exorbitant tuition and be more responsive to the market would be to create a no-frills, federal degree-granting body that would let students “leapfrog the four-year system” by getting certificates when they met standards for such courses as English, the sciences, mathematics etc.  After they gained sufficient certificates, students could receive a national Bachelor’s Degree Equivalency without going to college.  Government agencies would accept the Equivalency, and grad schools receiving any federal funds would be required to accept it.

c.  Government stipulation that public universities become family-friendly. One cannot, and should not, “try to force college students to marry and have children, but for some students starting a family while they’re in college is ideal.”  Last highlights Brigham Young University in Provo, UT, the “flagship school of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.  BYU provides not only dormitory-style housing but family housing just off campus, and there is no reason why state schools should not provide such housing for the relatively few undergraduate married couples who desire such an arrangement.”

3.  Eliminate the “Dirt Gap.”  Most Americas live in large cities where real estate and associated costs are disproportionately much higher than in rural areas, and many must seek housing in the suburbs where real estate and a home are more reasonable; but commuting to jobs in the central cities is expensive and time consuming. The answer, Last argues, is not more public transportation for married couples both of whom  work and must get children to school, leave their car at the rail station, retrieve car when they return etc. Building more roads is the way to go, and Last points out that Dallas has twice as much road pavement as Los Angeles and a higher fertility rate.

An important way to overcome the Dirt Gap is telecommuting. Currently, over 40 % of American workers telecommute for a good part of their work week.  By increasing both the number or telecommuters and the number of hours they are able to telecommute, the Dirt Gap could be significantly reduced.
Conclusion
Last’s book counters forcefully the widespread secularist view that the greatest threat to the survival of Americans and, indeed, the planet, is people. Those holding this view still embrace the philosophy popularized by Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 book The Population Bomb. The idea that overpopulation is the greatest threat to the planet’s survival has led governments throughout the world to take steps to curb population growth, punishing couples who choose to have more than the replacement number of babies. Last presents compelling evidence to show that under-population is the real threat to our survival.
- See more at: http://www.culture-of-life.org/e-brief/jonathan-last%E2%80%99s-what-expect-when-no-one-expecting-america%E2%80%99s-coming-economic-disaster#sthash.oAfaN7yn.dpuf


Last’s Thesis
America’s fertility rate is falling precipitously and if nothing is done to reverse this situation the nation’s population will no longer be able to care for the swelling numbers of the elderly, or have adequate financial resources to maintain a military force capable of resisting hostile and populous nations.  This is the thesis of Jonathan Last’s recent book, What To Expect When No One is Expecting.

America’s Falling Fertility
In Last’s Introduction, he describes the situation in Old Town Alexandria, VA where he and his wife lived until they had children and moved to rural Virginia.  In 2008, a children’s clothing store closed because of sluggish sales.  By 2012, “the average family in Old Town consist[ed] of a mother, a father, and 0. 57 children,” which means that “the average Old Town married couple has a bit more than half a child!”  More broadly, “the fertility rate for white, college-educated women (we’ll use them because they serve as a fair proxy for our middle class), is only 1.6,” almost as low as the fertility rate in China and far below the replacement level of 2.1.

Accompanying the decline in fertility is the proliferation of pet shops and facilities to care for pets. In Old Town, this growth was spectacular, but it is widespread throughout the country. In Old Town, when people went on holiday, they could leave their dog at “Dog Town,” where each dog had a “separate house complete with air conditioning.”

Opponents will say there’s no need to worry about America’s population, pointing out that in 2010, 50.5 million Americans were of Hispanic descent and that the fertility rate for Hispanic women was 2.3 in 2012.  Moreover, between 2000 and 2009, the total population of the U.S. increased by 27.5 million people—more than half of which were Hispanic.  In addition, the growing population of Americans of Asian descent also had healthy fertility rates.  But Last shows that this is not likely to continue.  The fertility of Hispanic women in the U.S. quickly trends downward toward America's national average.  Furthermore, the fertility rates of the Latin American nations from which these immigrants come, though higher than rates in the U.S., are falling even more sharply.

The decline of American fertility “is the result of a complex constellation of factors, operating independently, with both foreseeable and unintended consequences.  From big things—like the decline in church attendance and the increase of women in the workplace—to little things—like a law mandating car seats in Tennessee or the reform of divorce laws in California—our modern world has evolved in such a way as to subtly discourage childbearing.”  Last also notes the impact of the birth control pill, legalized abortion and the delay in marriage and child-bearing.

How to Make Babies, Wanted and Desired
Having described the many roadblocks to having children, Last makes several proposals to remove them, including:
1.  Reform Social Security. The present system distorts the “market value” of children and forces fertility rates down. Last describes several thoughtful ways to reform the system so that it recognizes the value of children for parents. These different schemes share the same goals: (1) “Let parents keep more of their money” now paid in taxes; and (2) “Reduce the fundamental distortion that Social Security now creates by giving everyone welfare state payouts, regardless of whether or not they bore the cost of creating the relatively few workers who now fund them. These reforms do not hand out money to parents; they simply lessen the economic disconnect created by the government in the first place.”

2.   Rethink College. Higher education is a major roadblock. It often delays marriage and results in enormous debts.  Since 1960 “the real cost of college has increased more than 1000 percent. Meanwhile the ‘value’ of a college degree has increased even in jobs where a college degree is not required and has no bearing at all on work-related knowledge. And all of this has happened as the objective quality of the average college degree has, by most standards, declined.”

Last proposes three measures to address the shortcomings of the current system:

a.  Eliminating the need for college.  In many instances, a college degree has little bearing on a person’s qualification for employment.  Employers require degrees in part because the 1971 Supreme Court decision Griggs v. Duke Power held that employers could not rely on IQ-type tests if minorities performed poorly on them, and Blacks and Hispanics show a persistent underperformance on such tests. “But colleges are allowed to use such considerations. The colleges get rich, students and their parents go into hock…If Griggs were rolled back, it would upend the college system at a stroke.”

b.   Encouraging the college system to become more responsive to market forces. One way to reduce exorbitant tuition and be more responsive to the market would be to create a no-frills, federal degree-granting body that would let students “leapfrog the four-year system” by getting certificates when they met standards for such courses as English, the sciences, mathematics etc.  After they gained sufficient certificates, students could receive a national Bachelor’s Degree Equivalency without going to college.  Government agencies would accept the Equivalency, and grad schools receiving any federal funds would be required to accept it.

c.  Government stipulation that public universities become family-friendly. One cannot, and should not, “try to force college students to marry and have children, but for some students starting a family while they’re in college is ideal.”  Last highlights Brigham Young University in Provo, UT, the “flagship school of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.  BYU provides not only dormitory-style housing but family housing just off campus, and there is no reason why state schools should not provide such housing for the relatively few undergraduate married couples who desire such an arrangement.”

3.  Eliminate the “Dirt Gap.”  Most Americas live in large cities where real estate and associated costs are disproportionately much higher than in rural areas, and many must seek housing in the suburbs where real estate and a home are more reasonable; but commuting to jobs in the central cities is expensive and time consuming. The answer, Last argues, is not more public transportation for married couples both of whom  work and must get children to school, leave their car at the rail station, retrieve car when they return etc. Building more roads is the way to go, and Last points out that Dallas has twice as much road pavement as Los Angeles and a higher fertility rate.

An important way to overcome the Dirt Gap is telecommuting. Currently, over 40 % of American workers telecommute for a good part of their work week.  By increasing both the number or telecommuters and the number of hours they are able to telecommute, the Dirt Gap could be significantly reduced.

Conclusion
Last’s book counters forcefully the widespread secularist view that the greatest threat to the survival of Americans and, indeed, the planet, is people. Those holding this view still embrace the philosophy popularized by Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 book The Population Bomb. The idea that overpopulation is the greatest threat to the planet’s survival has led governments throughout the world to take steps to curb population growth, punishing couples who choose to have more than the replacement number of babies. Last presents compelling evidence to show that under-population is the real threat to our survival. 




sexta-feira, 24 de maio de 2013

The Family Fell First then Faith Followed - by Austin Ruse

In Crisis

The clearest example of the thesis on how family nurtures faith is in vocations. In the olden days larger intact families produced priests. That’s one reason the seminaries bulged back in the baby boom, also why there was something of a religious revival after the Second World War.

But today’s two-child, one-child, no-child, broken-up, broken-down, single-mother, absent-father disasters pretending to be families simply do not produce priests. Today’s disaster families don’t even produce many Church-goers to speak of let alone vocations to religious life.

In her new book How the West Really Lost God, Mary Eberstadt advances the novel idea that the rise of secularism and the decline of religion started with a disruption in the family, that it is the larger intact family that creates religious folk and not the other way around. I gave her central argument short shrift a few weeks ago, so I am back with a closer look.

Traditional secular theory explains that among other things industrialization and urbanization killed religious faith. Eberstadt explains there is an intermediate step between them and the decline of faith.

A fellow moving from the village green to the big city finds many things upon his arrival. Unlike the village, the big city is really expensive and there is not as much room for a large family. But he also discovers the enticements of city life that do not exist in the village, enticements that are inimical to family life—drinking, gambling, prostitution, and the prospect of living a double life. It was not industrialization and urbanization that directly killed the faith. They were the intermediate steps away from the family that killed the faith.

Eberstadt does not offer an ironclad rule about faith only coming within the traditional family. She suggests it is more like a double-helix, that the destiny of faith and family are intimately intertwined. Eberstadt takes us through history to prove her point.

Most people believe the decline in birthrates is a fairly modern phenomenon and they would be wrong. The first country to reach what demographers call the “demographic transition” to dramatically lower fertility was France and this occurred in the 18th century. At the same time in France illegitimacy rose dramatically “from just over 1 percent in the early 18th century to between 10 and 20 percent by the 1780s—and 30% in Paris.”

The French revolution turbocharged family-decline by liberalizing marriage laws and also saw the increased use of contraceptives. Eberstadt writes that religious practice declined precipitously. “Confraternities … saw their membership drop dramatically across the century. Religious bequests in wills declined sharply. Religious symbols became markedly less important in public life; by 1777, the city of Paris could decide that voters would no longer have to swear on the crucifix in electing city councilmen.”

First the French family fell then the faith followed. And France was not alone.

The decline in British fertility began a century later than the French, at “the very height of Victorian England.” What also followed was “fewer births, more divorces, more out-of-wedlock births” such that “by our own time, over half of all children born in Britain are born to unmarried people, and the fertility rate stands at 1.91 children per woman.” And what of the faith in Britain? “Only 15% of the population in the United Kingdom now shows up for church monthly (not weekly).”

Take a look at Ireland. Their demographic transition did not happen until much later. In the 1970s the Irish fertility rate stood at more than 4.0 children per woman. And then it fell off a cliff. Thirty years later Irish fertility had fallen to 1.89. And what about the faith? Mass attendance fell from 91 percent in 1973 to 34% in 2005. In the year 2005 Dublin did not ordain a single priest. Linger over that fact for just a moment.

Eberstadt looks at her thesis from the other direction, too. Are there places and times where a religious revival has followed a baby-boom? She points to an “outbreak of postwar religiosity” in Great Britain (1945-1958), Australia (1955-1963) and West Germany (1952-1962), all of which coincide “almost perfectly” with the postwar baby boom.

The same thing happened in the United States. Gallup polls from the interwar years showed a slight dip in American religiosity but then after the Second World War came the baby-boom and a matching revival of religious faith that only abated with the emergence of the contraceptive pill.

What about America and this thing called American exceptionalism? How is it that this largely secular country has nonetheless kept religious fervor on the boil while the faith in Europe is dying? Though numbers are dropping in the U.S., still figures for Church attendance, orthodox practice, and religious vocations are much higher than in Europe.

Eberstadt points out that as far back as Tocqueville, social scientists and historians have pointed out that American attitudes toward marriage have been different that in Europe. For instance, we never had a tradition of arranged marriages like they did in Europe. And even today, Americans are more marriage minded than Europeans.

Could this change? Eberstadt thinks so. While the U.S. performs better than Europeans in family formation, we are quickly following their lead. A year ago, it was reported that more Americans now live alone than within a family.

Still, there are signs of hope. While the poor and less educated are following the disaster-family model, moderately educated and more affluent Americans are seeing their divorce rates drop, their marriage rates increase and even now it is kind of hip in Hollywood to have more than two children.

Eberstadt’s thesis should make perfect sense to Catholics. Catholics understand that our faith grew from a family, the Holy Family. We revere the Blessed Mother and St. Joseph because it was from their home that Our Savior and therefore our faith came. Christ could have sprung fully formed without mother or father, but he didn’t and neither does our faith grow that way either. We likely learned our faith from our mother. Moreover, as Eberstadt makes clear in this book, our very presence as children likely made our mother’s and our father’s faith grow, too.

Family and faith is the double helix that saves souls and civilizations.

quinta-feira, 9 de maio de 2013

Melhor investimento - Emprego mais bem remunerado - por Nuno Serras Pereira



09. 05. 2013

Bem sei, bem sei; nunca estudei economia nem finanças. Nem tenho formação académica em filosofia política, nem em sociologia; nem, além disso, tenho qualquer tipo de licenciatura. Mais não sou do que um tosco remendo na nas vestes da gloriosa Ordem franciscana. E, no entanto, ninguém me despersuade de que o melhor e mais urgente investimento, por parte de uma nação e de um estado como nosso, é na renovação das gerações, no crescimento da natalidade; apesar de todos os dias ouvir e ler opiniões dos mais graúdos economistas e fiscalistas que, na sua generalidade, ignoram petulantemente este “factor”.

Na suposição de que aquilo que afirmo é verdade, então daí derivará, como consequência inevitável, de que o trabalho, a profissão – que neste caso coincide com a vocação -, mais bem paga deverá ser, sem margens para dúvida, a da paternidade/maternidade (expressões como “parentalidade”, para além de não serem bom português, são ideologicamente venenosas), principalmente no matrimónio – isto é, no casamento natural -, onde os filhos são gerados, nutridos, educados e socializados. O casamento natural, e a família que dele resulta, é a sementeira e o útero, das sociedades sãs, das nações com futuro, da convivência amistosa, da justiça misericordiosa.

Se o estado obtuso se tem, cretinamente, nas últimas décadas, como a diluviana evidência o tem demonstrado à saciedade, empenhado com todas as veras na limitação dos nascimentos e na destruição da família; e se monetariamente em tudo corta menos nessa persecução suicida, então a única salvação, por mais abstrusa que se afigure aos católicos deformados e aos descrentes, será confiar na Providência Divina e acolher os filhos, sem manhas contraceptivas, que Deus quiser, obrigando, desse modo, à mudança de mentalidades e de comportamentos dos actuais ídolos eclesiásticos, dos poderes partidários, governamentais e estatais. 

Parece uma temeridade. Não é. Não queiramos fazer a figura da mãezinha que preocupada com a ida do filho para a força aérea, lhe recomendava instantemente: filhinho voa baixinho e devagarinho…

quinta-feira, 18 de abril de 2013

The Dangers of an Aging World - By Stefano Gennarini, J.D.

WASHINGTON DC, April 19 (C-FAM) Wolves prowl the streets of abandoned cities. Only prostitutes are left to take care of the elderly. War is looming. This is 2013 and the global population is aging. 

These are only a few of the alarming anecdotes retold at a conference last week. Decades of policies to reduce the number of people on our planet have had an effect, and it is generally not a good one, report the authors of three recent books on demographics. Read More

quarta-feira, 17 de abril de 2013

Why is Europe committing demographic suicide? - by Carolyn Moynihan

In MercatorNet

Frankly, not even the experts have the faintest idea

Everybody knows about the economic woes of Europe. In the media you cannot get away from it. What we seldom hear about is a problem that puts debt crises and austerity riots in the shade: the region’s demographic suicide. Europeans, on the whole, are not having enough babies to replace themselves -- a trend which threatens the workforce, support of the aged and even the continued existence of some nations. It is a problem that goes back well before the recent housing bubbles and busts, bank failures and bailouts. It is probably a cause of the latter.

Yet it is a mystery to the people we rely to predict such things. Demographers, economists and psychologists are scratching their heads over a phenomenon that breaks all their statistical models and paradigms of human behaviour. Why would people who are prosperous (and, despite the current situation, western Europe is) not want to do what human beings have always done and leave a posterity? How can they contemplate the eclipse of their nation?

One answer might be that the public is simply not aware of what is happening. Lant Pritchett, an economist and Professor of the Practice of International Development at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, told MercatorNet: “Scientists of perception study ‘change blindness’ and can show people have a hard time even visually seeing gradual change, much less gradual change at the social level. Unlike the advocates for climate change there are no ‘extreme events’ like Hurricane Sandy in demography so it is hard to get attention onto the inevitable consequences of current fertility.”

Dr Pritchett and colleague Martina Viarengo are the authors of an essay, “Why Demographic Suicide? The Puzzles of European Fertility”, which is part of a collection of essays published recently by the New York based Population Council in honour of a distinguished scholar, Paul Demeny. The papers are heavy going but repay the effort to grasp what population experts are saying right now.

This is certainly the case with “Demographic Suicide…”, which states clearly the seriousness of persistent low fertility and the fact that the usual experts simply do not know how to account for it, let alone come up with a remedy. The authors speak of below replacement fertility (BRF) as “a revolution in human affairs”, a “paradigm-shattering phenomenon”. They are not exaggerating. They end by posing the “big open question of how children fit into an overall pattern of ‘family’ in the post modern era.”

“Replacement” as the goal of population policy

Sixty years ago the question was completely different. Influential people like the founder of the Population Council, John D. Rockefeller III, were worried about population growth in the developing world resulting from the fall in death rates (thanks to better health care) and continuing high fertility. They thought that people could not have good quality lives with so many mouths to feed. The fact that former colonies of Europe were becoming independent and you never knew what they might do politically added to First World jitters. Nothing but a concerted effort to stabilise population would do. Demographers did their projections and “replacement fertility” (2.1 children per woman) became their holy grail.

With backing from the UN and the cooperation of Third World governments the “war against population” (as economist Jacqueline Kasun has called it) was launched. The contraceptive pill was rapidly deployed with government subsidies. Abortion became a reproductive right. These methods had their strongest effect in the rich countries, where fertility had been in decline anyway but was boosted by the post-war baby boom. Developing countries took to draconian methods such as sterilisation campaigns in India and the one-child policies in China. Economic development, education and health care also contributed to lower birth rates.

Globally, the goal of replacement level fertility is now within reach. According to the UN’s medium estimate the average woman today will have 2.36 children – down from 4.95 in the early 1950s. New research suggests the 2.1 mark will be reached by around 2050. The trouble is that, while some countries will still be above that magical figure, some will be well below. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that even globally population will stabilise; decline is more probable. Already half the world’s nations, including many of the less developed, have total fertility rates (TFR) below replacement.
Some of the lowest rates in the world are in East Asia, but among the 27 countries of the Europe Union not one currently has a TFR of 2.1 or more, although Ireland, Iceland, Turkey and perhaps France are around 2, and the UK and the Nordic countries have rates between 1.87 and 1.98. At least a dozen EU countries are under 1.5; Spain and Germany are on 1.36 and Italy 1.41 (2010-2011 figures).

Behind these figures are the decisions of women and men shaped not by the imperatives of evolution or the rationales of economics – let alone the assumptions of demographers -- but by factors that experts in those fields are not even equipped to understand.

Demography, as Pritchett and Viarengo point out, is a descriptive discipline and cannot make predictions without a behavioural theory to go with them – which it did not have when its practitioners assumed that fertility would magically stabilise at replacement.

Evolutionary psychology, a popular source of behavioural theory, might (might) tell us what humans will do about procreation in the context of limited resources (have fewer but better quality offspring), but it seems quite useless to explain why people whose wealth and social status are increasing would stop having children. “BRF in Europe seems a paradigm-shattering phenomenon for evolutionary psychology,” Pritchett and Viarengo note.

The economic model

That leaves economics, Pritchett’s own discipline and one that he admits is also at a loss to fully account for persistent low fertility. “The joke about economists is that they are people with a head for numbers that lack the personality to be actuaries,” he told us in an email.

We had asked what could motivate nations to turn this problem around. He said: “I am pretty good with numbers but not only do I not know the answer to this question, being a new phenomenon, we have yet to discover numbers and data from experiences of turning it around so I don't know even know what to do to begin answering this question: that is why the piece was titled ‘puzzles’ not ‘answers’."

All the same, economics has a lot to say about procreation and most of it is a little bit shocking to the layperson who comes across it for the first time. Roughly it goes like this.

Children are “complex capital goods” in whom parents invest with the expectation of a return, or “child services”. These services can be produced by a large number of low quality children or a small number of high quality children. In conditions of rising income people want fewer but higher quality children, investing more in their education and so on. This drives up the price of a child -- together with an opportunity cost in the form of the time it takes to consume the services (pleasure or satisfaction) a child produces -- compared with other goods, such as a summer holidays or a better house.

The trouble with this type of behaviour is that children can be priced off the market completely – and perhaps unintentionally – because once you get down to one child the next step is not a “little bit” of high quality child, but none at all; not a gradual change but a “massive discontinuous drop in the demand for child services,” as Pritchett and Viarengo put it. This can be seen in rates of childlessness in a few European countries at or approaching 20 percent among women aged 45. (There are sub-regional differences which are interesting and worth looking up in the essay.)

Substitution

Clearly, childlessness is the biggest challenge for population theorists. What might people be choosing instead of a child? Pritchett and Viarengo look at possible substitutes for the “little hedonic bundle” that a baby represents and find two likely candidates.

The first is social security for the aged, which replaces the support aged parents once expected from their children – something that is unsustainable, though, in conditions of population decline. The second is the market work that women have embraced and that may return them more meaning and status than motherhood has done up until now.
When it comes to a substitute for the love and intimacy that having children provides in traditional family life, however, the authors of “Demographic suicide” are stumped.

They note that “sexual activity, childbearing and marriage have become disconnected so that increasingly it is socially acceptable to have one without either of the other two,” particularly in northern and western Europe. But: “It is not at all obvious to us what is going on with the ‘demand for intimacy’.” While in some countries people continue to have children without getting married, and in others to marry but have very few children, there are signs (in Finland, for example) that marriage and fertility – especially through an increase in childlessness – are declining together.

“What is substituting in the lives of women and men for the love and intimacy that came from parent–child relationships? It is certainly not a significant increase in marital love and intimacy without children substituting for less marital love and intimacy with children—particularly in countries where marriage and long-term cohabitation have declined.”

One answer to this question might be “same-sex relationships”. But even where children are added to these partnerships by technical means they can hardly solve the social problem of low fertility. And even if they are regarded as married that is not going to boost the birth rate.

Yet marriage, properly defined, does seem to be the answer – the only one we know from long experience -- to the demand both for intimacy and for enough children to give the human race a future. Pronatalist policies such as baby bonuses, paid parental leave and gender equity in the workplace appear to have made some difference to the birth rate in countries where they have been introduced, but there are human motivations that such incentives do not touch – things like till-death-us-do-part commitment to a spouse and the willingness to sacrifice easier pleasures for the joy of seeing mutual love bear fruit in the form of a child.

The question, finally, is what can foster such motivations. In the past it was religious faith. Is there any substitute for that?