The Day After: A Declaration of War - by Christopher Manion

In Crisis 

“We’ve grown hoarse saying this is not about contraception, this is about religious freedom,” Timothy Cardinal Dolan has repeatedly insisted, regarding the lawsuits opposing the HHS Obamacare Mandate.

I beg to differ. On both prudential and metaphysical grounds, it is about contraception.

On the practical level, in politics, as Grover Norquist reminds us, you don’t get two desserts. With the loss at the Supreme Court, we will have to adopt the position that the Mandate is a bad law and we will not follow it regardless of our loss in court. “Sore losers!” will come the reply.

Why not just tell the truth now? Yes, our First Amendment rights are fundamental – in fact, they existed long before the Bill of Rights was written. But the courts are no longer bound by Jefferson’s “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” and they have said so. With regard to our religious freedom, they simply cannot be trusted. And for that judgment we have ample precedent.

New York Gov. Charles Evans Hughes, before he became Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, affirmed 95 years ago that “we are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is, and the judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty and of our property under the Constitution.”

Actually, Your Honor, the Constitution is the safeguard of our liberty and of our property. But the Supreme Court has been glad to arrogate to itself that august task. In Cooper v. Aaron (1958), a unanimous Court made it clear:

Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous court, referring to the Constitution as the “fundamental and paramount law of the nation, declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared that basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this court in the country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”

Which brings us to the metaphysical level – or, rather, to the denial of metaphysics altogether. If “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” – that is, the Natural Law – no longer constrain the Court’s powers, what – beyond judicial caprice — is to protect our First Amendment rights? Los Angeles Archbishop José Gomez acknowledges America’s Christian roots, but goes on to observe that “our freedoms are also being eroded as the result of constant agitation from de-Christianizing and secularizing elements in American society.” Unfortunately, those “elements” now dominate our legal system, where “the Dictatorship of Relativism” abounds in the robes of Legal Positivism.

Natural Law Need Not Apply

Legal Positivism rests on the assumption that the law need have no basis in morality. As Notre Dame Professor of Constitutional Law Charles Rice has noted, “Hans Kelsen, the father of legal positivism, observed that Auschwitz and the Soviet Gulags were valid law. He could not criticize them as unjust because justice, he said, is ‘an irrational ideal.’”

Kelsen’s view holds not only for Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union, but for America today. During the Senate hearings considering the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, Judiciary Committee Chairman Joseph Biden repeatedly browbeat the nominee about the dangers of applying the Natural Law in American jurisprudence. “You come before this committee with a philosophy different from that which we have seen in any Supreme Court nominee in the [last] 19 years,” he sniffed. What did Biden find so “different”? Simple: “You are an adherent to the view that the Natural Law should inform the Constitution.” Biden couldn’t have been more clear: appeals to the Natural Law will fail in the Supreme Court.

Senator Patrick Leahy then asserted that the Natural Law is “elastic,” a notion which Biden seconded by alleging that his version of the Natural Law protects abortion rights. But Judge Thomas would not engage the legal issue. “My interest in the whole area was as a political philosophy,” he told Biden.

Biden, Leahy, and Thomas are all Catholics. So is Justice Kennedy, who wrote in 1992 that “at the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Clearly current jurisprudence has sundered the courts from the true source of justice. They simply cannot be trusted.

Catholic? Or American?

In Cardinal Dolan’s May 12 commencement speech at Catholic University, he exulted “that this university is both Catholic and American, flowing from the most noble ideals of truth and respect for human dignity that are at the heart of our Church and our country.” Indeed, ever since Cardinal Gibbons, American prelates have labored to make Catholics “good Americans.” But today the bishops — longtime supporters, collaborators, and beneficiaries of the federal government — have suddenly awakened to the fact that the government might have filed for divorce.

Clearly, Catholics have every right to demand that the courts respect what Cardinal Dolan’s address called the “essential ingredient in American wisdom and the genius of the American republic … the freedom it allows for religion to flourish.” However, our positivist courts roundly reject the notion that they might have any responsibility to do so. The courts have revised the First Amendment repeatedly over the years, and they are likely to do so again. After all, “the Constitution is what they say it is.”

Is The Truth “Too Hot To Handle”?

What cannot be revised, however, is Humanae Vitae. There, Natural Law and the Teaching and Tradition of the Church combine to illuminate our troubled world with the brilliant, saving light of eternal moral truth. Why hasn’t Cardinal Dolan even mentioned Humanae Vitae, at least en passant, in the current Fortnight of Freedom? Aren’t our freedoms grounded on truth – the Way, the Truth, and the Life? After all, the Truth is still the Truth, whatever the courts say it is.

Cardinal Dolan has candidly admitted why he doesn’t want contraception to be the issue: the bishops, he told the Wall Street Journal in March, haven’t taught Humanae Vitae for 44 years. In essence, he has admitted that, when it comes to sexual morality, our shepherds have abandoned the teachings both of the Magisterium and the Natural Law ever since Vatican II.

“We have gotten gun-shy…in speaking with any amount of cogency on chastity and sexual morality,” he said. The “flashpoint” was Humanae Vitae: “It brought such a tsunami of dissent, departure, disapproval of the Church, that I think most of us—and I’m using the first-person plural intentionally, including myself—kind of subconsciously said, ‘Whoa. We’d better never talk about that, because it’s just too hot to handle.’”

Cardinal Dolan went on to regret that the clerical abuse and cover-up scandals have attenuated even more the authority of our bishops. The scandals “intensified our laryngitis over speaking about issues of chastity and sexual morality, because we almost thought, ‘I’ll blush if I do. . . . After what some priests and some bishops, albeit a tiny minority, have done, how will I have any credibility in speaking on that?’”

Cardinal Dolan proposed no program to reverse this half-century trend.

The laity have every right to know that however weak the voice of our bishops has been on moral matters in our lifetimes, the truth has not been abrogated. And when the law attacks the truth, the decision is simple: lex malla, lex nulla. As Aquinas puts it, “human law is law only by virtue of its accordance with right reason; and thus it is manifest that it flows from the eternal law. And in so far as it deviates from right reason it is called an unjust law; in such case it is no law at all, but rather a species of violence.” (ST I-II 93.3 ad 2)

Avoid contraception? Avoid Humanae Vitae? Abandon Natural Law? If we do, we are left naked before a sterile secular sword wielded by the Dictatorship of Relativism. Moreover, on the practical level, as Mary Eberstadt observes in her penetrating Adam and Eve After the Pill, “contraceptive sex … is the fundamental social fact of our time.”

Which brings to mind: doesn’t Humanae Vitae teach genuine “Social Justice”?

Pope Benedict knows the score. He has repeatedly offered encouragement regarding the Church’s moral teachings to various groups of bishops on the ad limina visits to Rome. “I urge you as Pastors to ensure that the Church’s moral teaching be always presented in its entirety and convincingly defended,” he told a group from the United Kingdom.  To bishops from the United States he said in May, “It is no exaggeration to say that providing young people with a sound education in the faith represents the most urgent internal challenge facing the Catholic community in your country.”

Given the Supreme Court’s decision on Obamacare, it is clear that Catholics cannot put their faith in princes, however highly regarded their station. We are up against the cultural haycutter — Archbishop Gomez is correct: it is not only the Obama Administration, but the entire panoply of the cultural elites that confronts the Church today as never before. Even though the elites constitute a small minority of Americans, their deleterious impact has been so profound that one wonders if it is reversible at all. Whatever those prospects, the Church cannot count on a court that has abandoned metaphysics, the Natural Law, and The Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.

What Is To Be Done?

One cannot blame Cardinal Dolan for pursuing the legal defense of our First Amendment rights. After all, at Catholic University, Dolan proudly hailed the school – and implicitly the church in the United States – as “both Catholic and American.” But if Cardinal Dolan were to firmly plant his feet on the Catholic Truth and the Natural Law, instead of going to the U.S. courts, it would amount to a Declaration of Independence by the American Church from America’s rotting regime. It would also constitute a Declaration of War – in this case, fully justified under the Just War doctrine because the Catholic Church, her members, and her good works have been brutally and mortally attacked.

Such a declaration would be supported by the teaching, tradition, and authority of the Church –not only declaring the ObamaCare Mandate illegitimate, but proclaiming that the American legal system is no longer to be trusted. Clearly, since Engel v. Vitale, Roe v. Wade, and a host of other deleterious Supreme Court decisions, any sane person knows that the Supreme Court, like Biden and Leahy, has only contempt for the Natural Law. But for the Church formally to announce that fact as the basis for its refusal to obey a lex malla would bring on certain retaliation, abuse, and even persecution, driven by the cultural and political elites whose power relies on the progressive degeneration of our culture and the corruption of our politics.

Cardinal James Francis Stafford has written that 1968 represents America’s “suicide attempt” – most notably evidenced within the Church by the rebellion against Humanae Vitae. What Cardinal Dolan has called the “laryngitis” of our shepherds has led to a laity that is adrift, suffocating in a culture of sin and swill. They are longing to breathe free, energized by the truth – as Pope Benedict insists, all of it. Ignoring Humane Vitae has brought the Church to the brink of suicide, yet that document is precisely the life preserver we have been longing for.

The perils of positivist law should be posted with a “no trespassing” sign when it comes to eternal truths. The Catholic Church should tell the U.S. government what religious liberty is, not the other way around.

Today our bishops are united as never before, and so are the faithful. Our bishops have our prayers, our attention, and our support. This very day the American Church is more energetic than it has been for decades.

Enough of the “laryngitis”! Now is the time to teach Humanae Vitae!

Papa afirma que o Nazismo mostrou o perigo do Divórcio entre o Poder e a Lei Natural

Discurso do Papa Bento XVI no Palácio Reichstag de Berlim - Quinta-feira, 22 de Setembro de 2011

In Vatican

... Mas o convite para pronunciar este discurso foi-me dirigido a mim como Papa, como Bispo de Roma, que carrega a responsabilidade suprema da Igreja Católica. Deste modo, vós reconheceis o papel que compete à Santa Sé como parceira no seio da Comunidade dos Povos e dos Estados. Na base desta minha responsabilidade internacional, quero propor-vos algumas considerações sobre os fundamentos do Estado liberal de direito.

Seja-me permitido começar as minhas reflexões sobre os fundamentos do direito com uma pequena narrativa tirada da Sagrada Escritura. Conta-se, no Primeiro Livro dos Reis, que Deus concedeu ao jovem rei Salomão fazer um pedido por ocasião da sua entronização. Que irá pedir o jovem soberano neste momento tão importante: sucesso, riqueza, uma vida longa, a eliminação dos inimigos? Não pede nada disso; mas sim: «Concede ao teu servo um coração dócil, para saber administrar a justiça ao teu povo e discernir o bem do mal» (1 Re 3, 9). Com esta narração, a Bíblia quer indicar-nos o que deve, em última análise, ser importante para um político. O seu critério último e a motivação para o seu trabalho como político não devem ser o sucesso e menos ainda o lucro material. A política deve ser um compromisso em prol da justiça e, assim, criar as condições de fundo para a paz. Naturalmente um político procurará o sucesso, sem o qual não poderia jamais ter a possibilidade de uma acção política efectiva; mas o sucesso há-de estar subordinado ao critério da justiça, à vontade de actuar o direito e à inteligência do direito. É que o sucesso pode tornar-se também um aliciamento, abrindo assim a estrada à falsificação do direito, à destruição da justiça. «Se se põe de parte o direito, em que se distingue então o Estado de uma grande banda de salteadores?» – sentenciou uma vez Santo Agostinho (De civitate Dei IV, 4, 1). Nós, alemães, sabemos pela nossa experiência que estas palavras não são um fútil espantalho. Experimentámos a separação entre o poder e o direito, o poder colocar-se contra o direito, o seu espezinhar o direito, de tal modo que o Estado se tornara o instrumento para a destruição do direito: tornara-se uma banda de salteadores muito bem organizada, que podia ameaçar o mundo inteiro e impeli-lo até à beira do precipício. Servir o direito e combater o domínio da injustiça é e permanece a tarefa fundamental do político. Num momento histórico em que o homem adquiriu um poder até agora impensável, esta tarefa torna-se particularmente urgente. O homem é capaz de destruir o mundo. Pode manipular-se a si mesmo. Pode, por assim dizer, criar seres humanos e excluir outros seres humanos de serem homens. Como reconhecemos o que é justo? Como podemos distinguir entre o bem e o mal, entre o verdadeiro direito e o direito apenas aparente? O pedido de Salomão permanece a questão decisiva perante a qual se encontram também hoje o homem político e a política.

Grande parte da matéria que se deve regular juridicamente, pode ter por critério suficiente o da maioria. Mas é evidente que, nas questões fundamentais do direito em que está em jogo a dignidade do homem e da humanidade, o princípio maioritário não basta: no processo de formação do direito, cada pessoa que tem responsabilidade deve ela mesma procurar os critérios da própria orientação. No século III, o grande teólogo Orígenes justificou assim a resistência dos cristãos a certos ordenamentos jurídicos em vigor: «Se alguém se encontrasse no povo de Scizia que tem leis irreligiosas e fosse obrigado a viver no meio deles, (…) estes agiriam, sem dúvida, de modo muito razoável se, em nome da lei da verdade que precisamente no povo da Scizia é ilegalidade, formassem juntamente com outros, que tenham a mesma opinião, associações mesmo contra o ordenamento em vigor» [Contra Celsum GCS Orig. 428 (Koetschau); cf. A. Fürst, «Monotheismus und Monarchie. Zum Zusammenhang von Heil und Herrschaft in der Antike», in Theol.Phil. 81 (2006) 321-338; a citação está na página 336; cf. também J. Ratzinger, Die Einheit der Nationem, Eine Vision der Kirchenväter (Salzburg-München 1971) 60].

Com base nesta convicção, os combatentes da resistência agiram contra o regime nazista e contra outros regimes totalitários, prestando assim um serviço ao direito e à humanidade inteira. Para estas pessoas era evidente de modo incontestável que, na realidade, o direito vigente era injustiça. Mas, nas decisões de um político democrático, a pergunta sobre o que corresponda agora à lei da verdade, o que seja verdadeiramente justo e possa tornar-se lei não é igualmente evidente. Hoje, de facto, não é de per si evidente aquilo que seja justo e possa tornar-se direito vigente relativamente às questões antropológicas fundamentais. À questão de saber como se possa reconhecer aquilo que verdadeiramente é justo e, deste modo, servir a justiça na legislação, nunca foi fácil encontrar resposta e hoje, na abundância dos nossos conhecimentos e das nossas capacidades, uma tal questão tornou-se ainda muito mais difícil.

Como se reconhece o que é justo? Na história, os ordenamentos jurídicos foram quase sempre religiosamente motivados: com base numa referência à Divindade, decide-se aquilo que é justo entre os homens. Ao contrário doutras grandes religiões, o cristianismo nunca impôs ao Estado e à sociedade um direito revelado, nunca impôs um ordenamento jurídico derivado duma revelação. Mas apelou para a natureza e a razão como verdadeiras fontes do direito; apelou para a harmonia entre razão objectiva e subjectiva, mas uma harmonia que pressupõe serem as duas esferas fundadas na Razão criadora de Deus. Deste modo, os teólogos cristãos associaram-se a um movimento filosófico e jurídico que estava formado já desde o século II (a.C.). De facto, na primeira metade do século II pré-cristão, deu-se um encontro entre o direito natural social, desenvolvido pelos filósofos estóicos, e autorizados mestres do direito romano [cf. W. Waldstein, Ins Herz geschrieben. Das Naturrecht als Fundament einer menschlichen Gesellschaft (Augsburg 2010) 11ss; 31-61]. Neste contacto nasceu a cultura jurídica ocidental, que foi, e é ainda agora, de importância decisiva para a cultura jurídica da humanidade. Desta ligação pré-cristã entre direito e filosofia parte o caminho que leva, através da Idade Média cristã, ao desenvolvimento jurídico do Iluminismo até à Declaração dos Direitos Humanos e depois à nossa Lei Fundamental alemã, pela qual o nosso povo reconheceu, em 1949, «os direitos invioláveis e inalienáveis do homem como fundamento de toda a comunidade humana, da paz e da justiça no mundo».

Foi decisivo para o desenvolvimento do direito e o progresso da humanidade que os teólogos cristãos tivessem tomado posição contra o direito religioso, requerido pela fé nas divindades, e se tivessem colocado da parte da filosofia, reconhecendo como fonte jurídica válida para todos a razão e a natureza na sua correlação. Esta opção realizara-a já São Paulo, quando afirma na Carta aos Romanos: «Quando os gentios que não têm a Lei [a Torah de Israel], por natureza agem segundo a Lei, eles (…) são lei para si próprios. Esses mostram que o que a Lei manda praticar está escrito nos seus corações, como resulta do testemunho da sua consciência» (Rm 2, 14-15). Aqui aparecem os dois conceitos fundamentais de natureza e de consciência, sendo aqui a «consciência» o mesmo que o «coração dócil» de Salomão, a razão aberta à linguagem do ser. Deste modo se até à época do Iluminismo, da Declaração dos Direitos Humanos depois da II Guerra Mundial e até à formação da nossa Lei Fundamental, a questão acerca dos fundamentos da legislação parecia esclarecida, no último meio século verificou-se uma dramática mudança da situação. Hoje considera-se a ideia do direito natural uma doutrina católica bastante singular, sobre a qual não valeria a pena discutir fora do âmbito católico, de tal modo que quase se tem vergonha mesmo só de mencionar o termo. Queria brevemente indicar como se veio a criar esta situação. Antes de mais nada é fundamental a tese segundo a qual haveria entre o ser e o dever ser um abismo intransponível: do ser não poderia derivar um dever, porque se trataria de dois âmbitos absolutamente diversos. A base de tal opinião é a concepção positivista, quase geralmente adoptada hoje, de natureza. Se se considera a natureza – no dizer de Hans Kelsen - «um agregado de dados objectivos, unidos uns aos outros como causas e efeitos», então realmente dela não pode derivar qualquer indicação que seja de algum modo de carácter ético (Waldstein, op. cit., 15-21). Uma concepção positivista de natureza, que compreende a natureza de modo puramente funcional, tal como a conhecem as ciências naturais, não pode criar qualquer ponte para a ética e o direito, mas suscitar de novo respostas apenas funcionais. Entretanto o mesmo vale para a razão numa visão positivista, que é considerada por muitos como a única visão científica. Segundo ela, o que não é verificável ou falsificável não entra no âmbito da razão em sentido estrito. Por isso, a ética e a religião devem ser atribuídas ao âmbito subjectivo, caindo fora do âmbito da razão no sentido estrito do termo. Onde vigora o domínio exclusivo da razão positivista – e tal é, em grande parte, o caso da nossa consciência pública –, as fontes clássicas de conhecimento da ética e do direito são postas fora de jogo. Esta é uma situação dramática que interessa a todos e sobre a qual é necessário um debate público; convidar urgentemente para ele é uma intenção essencial deste discurso.

O conceito positivista de natureza e de razão, a visão positivista do mundo é, no seu conjunto, uma parcela grandiosa do conhecimento humano e da capacidade humana, à qual não devemos de modo algum renunciar. Mas ela mesma no seu conjunto não é uma cultura que corresponda e seja suficiente ao ser humano em toda a sua amplitude. Onde a razão positivista se considera como a única cultura suficiente, relegando todas as outras realidades culturais para o estado de subculturas, aquela diminui o homem, antes, ameaça a sua humanidade. Digo isto pensando precisamente na Europa, onde vastos ambientes procuram reconhecer apenas o positivismo como cultura comum e como fundamento comum para a formação do direito, reduzindo todas as outras convicções e os outros valores da nossa cultura ao estado de uma subcultura. Assim coloca-se a Europa, face às outras culturas do mundo, numa condição de falta de cultura e suscitam-se, ao mesmo tempo, correntes extremistas e radicais. A razão positivista, que se apresenta de modo exclusivista e não é capaz de perceber algo para além do que é funcional, assemelha-se aos edifícios de cimento armado sem janelas, nos quais nos damos o clima e a luz por nós mesmos e já não queremos receber estes dois elementos do amplo mundo de Deus. E no entanto não podemos iludir-nos, pois em tal mundo autoconstruído bebemos em segredo e igualmente nos “recursos” de Deus, que transformamos em produtos nossos. É preciso tornar a abrir as janelas, devemos olhar de novo a vastidão do mundo, o céu e a terra e aprender a usar tudo isto de modo justo.

Mas, como fazê-lo? Como encontramos a entrada justa na vastidão, no conjunto? Como pode a razão reencontrar a sua grandeza sem escorregar no irracional? Como pode a natureza aparecer novamente na sua verdadeira profundidade, nas suas exigências e com as suas indicações? Chamo à memória um processo da história política recente, esperando não ser mal entendido nem suscitar demasiadas polémicas unilaterais. Diria que o aparecimento do movimento ecológico na política alemã a partir dos Anos Setenta, apesar de não ter talvez aberto janelas, todavia foi, e continua a ser, um grito que anela por ar fresco, um grito que não se pode ignorar nem acantonar, porque se vislumbra nele muita irracionalidade. Pessoas jovens deram-se conta de que, nas nossas relações com a natureza, há algo que não está bem; que a matéria não é apenas uma material para nossa feitura, mas a própria terra traz em si a sua dignidade e devemos seguir as suas indicações. É claro que aqui não faço propaganda por um determinado partido político; nada me seria mais alheio do que isso. Quando na nossa relação com a realidade há qualquer coisa que não funciona, então devemos todos reflectir seriamente sobre o conjunto e todos somos reenviados à questão acerca dos fundamentos da nossa própria cultura. Seja-me permitido deter-me um momento mais neste ponto. A importância da ecologia é agora indiscutível. Devemos ouvir a linguagem da natureza e responder-lhe coerentemente. Mas quero insistir num ponto que - a meu ver –, hoje como ontem, é descurado: existe também uma ecologia do homem. Também o homem possui uma natureza, que deve respeitar e não pode manipular como lhe apetece. O homem não é apenas uma liberdade que se cria por si própria. O homem não se cria a si mesmo. Ele é espírito e vontade, mas é também natureza, e a sua vontade é justa quando respeita a natureza e a escuta e quando se aceita a si mesmo por aquilo que é e que não se criou por si mesmo. Assim mesmo, e só assim, é que se realiza a verdadeira liberdade humana.

Voltemos aos conceitos fundamentais de natureza e razão, donde partíramos. O grande teórico do positivismo jurídico, Kelsen, em 1965 – com a idade de 84 anos (consola-me o facto de ver que, aos 84 anos, ainda se é capaz de pensar algo de razoável) –, abandonou o dualismo entre ser e dever ser. Antes, ele tinha dito que as normas só podem derivar da vontade. Consequentemente – acrescenta ele – a natureza só poderia conter em si mesma normas, se uma vontade tivesse colocado nela estas normas. Mas isto – diz ele – pressuporia um Deus criador, cuja vontade se inseriu na natureza. «Discutir sobre a verdade desta fé é absolutamente vão» – observa ele a tal propósito (citado segundo Waldstein, op.cit., 19). Mas sê-lo-á verdadeiramente? – apetece-me perguntar. É verdadeiramente desprovido de sentido reflectir se a razão objectiva que se manifesta na natureza não pressuponha uma Razão criadora, um Creator Spiritus?

Aqui deveria vir em nossa ajuda o património cultural da Europa. Foi na base da convicção sobre a existência de um Deus criador que se desenvolveram a ideia dos direitos humanos, a ideia da igualdade de todos os homens perante a lei, o conhecimento da inviolabilidade da dignidade humana em cada pessoa e a consciência da responsabilidade dos homens pelo seu agir. Estes conhecimentos da razão constituem a nossa memória cultural. Ignorá-la ou considerá-la como mero passado seria uma amputação da nossa cultura no seu todo e privá-la-ia da sua integralidade. A cultura da Europa nasceu do encontro entre Jerusalém, Atenas e Roma, do encontro entre a fé no Deus de Israel, a razão filosófica dos Gregos e o pensamento jurídico de Roma. Este tríplice encontro forma a identidade íntima da Europa. Na consciência da responsabilidade do homem diante de Deus e no reconhecimento da dignidade inviolável do homem, de cada homem, este encontro fixou critérios do direito, cuja defesa é nossa tarefa neste momento histórico.

Ao jovem rei Salomão, na hora de assumir o poder, foi concedido formular um seu pedido. Que sucederia se nos fosse concedido a nós, legisladores de hoje, fazer um pedido? O que é que pediríamos? Penso que também hoje, em última análise, nada mais poderíamos desejar que um coração dócil, a capacidade de distinguir o bem do mal e, deste modo, estabelecer um direito verdadeiro, servir a justiça e a paz. Agradeço-vos pela vossa atenção!

Legal positivism and the New Evangelisation - by Mgr Michel Schooyans

by Mgr Michel Schooyans
Professor Emeritus at the University of Louvain

There are two key notions of human rights. The first of these notions is rooted in the realist tradition; the second in the nominalist tradition. The same declaration of these rights is open to conflicting interpretations.

The realist notion

The rights recognised

In our contemporary age, the realist tradition has benefited from research spearheaded by the phenomenology of perception. Existential phenomenology, as promulgated by Merleau-Ponty for example, must "formulate an experience of the world, a contact with the world which precedes all thinking on the world »^[1]. To perceive is to grasp the object itself, not a duplicate of that object. Contemporary realism bows before the real human being and only later develops a thought on that human being. We bow to a reality which our reason can grasp, and which we express in language. We bow to man as a concrete entity, and we recognise that all men have the same rights. In this sense, human rights are universal. They exclude all discrimination. Such rights are expressed in the great Declarations, above all the US Declaration of Independence (1776); Constitution of the United States (1787); Declaration of the Rights and Man and of the Citizen of 1789 in France, and Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.

These rights are inherent in human nature: man is born with them. Even before he/she enters into civil and political society, each human being has fundamental rights. Man has these rights even before they have been written in laws. The rights of a human being to life, freedom of expression, marriage, formation of the family, choice of religion, etc. exist before they have been expressed. The great Declarations record a reality which is acknowledged.

The realist tradition emphasises that man is a being endowed with reason and liberty. Man has in his constitution the capacity to judge and decide, is able freely to assent to what is. As beautifully expressed by Aimé Forest, man is able to "consent to being »^[2]. We are able in particular to recognise the reality of others and consent to accept the limits on our freedom, so that others too may exist and be affirmed in their connaturality and difference.

Positive laws

It is not sufficient for human rights to be recognised. If they were simply recognised and declared, human rights would have a theoretical significance only; they would be purely formal. By their very nature, human rights need, even demand, to be translated into written laws, legal rules. This is what is called positive legislation, positive law. Certainly, laws are the subject of juridical pronouncements which differ depending on the traditions of various peoples; these positive legislations can therefore be compared. But they all converge towards the same end: to recognise, promote and protect the fundamental rights inherent in all members of the human family. States do not create these rights. What confers legitimacy on the legal order is respect for natural human rights. The adherence of the various States to these human rights is the best guarantee of peace among nations and justice within nations.

In the realist notion, the rule of law means that the leaders of a State recognise the reality of human rights and strive to ensure that these rights are respected in civil and political society, through legal instruments. Under this same realist tradition, reference is sometimes made to new rights. These are rights which, although held by man by nature, have not yet been clearly or sufficiently expressed.

An indefatigable quest

To recognise human rights is to embark on an indefatigable quest for those rights; it is to admit that this quest envisages an objective which is never fully attained and which, for that very reason, gives rise to advances in positive legislation. This continuous process constitutes genuine progress in as far as, unfolding throughout history, it reveals a better perception of fundamental human rights, and what is common to all men. Yet, as witnessed in recent history, these benefits remain precarious and require constant protection by adequate legal instruments.

Well-known examples illustrate various stages in this progress. It is as a result of a better perception of the equality of man that slavery has been condemned, the status of serfs and workers challenged and that today, discrimination against women is countered, exploitation of the Third World challenged, etc. It has also been concluded, rightly, that, because there is a better perception of these new rights, they should be enshrined in appropriate positive legislations and hence pave the way for further discoveries.

There is therefore a history of the perception of natural human rights. There are cultures which honour natural human rights better than others. The human conscience derives benefit from historical experience, which reveals denials of the rights it strives to remedy by better laws. Yet this very progress demonstrates a need for unfailing vigilance, because regression is always possible. Hence the irreplaceable role of the Judge.

The positivist notion

The science of legal rules

The notion of human rights which emerges in legal positivism derives from the nominalist tradition: beyond words, there is no knowable reality. The prime characteristic of this notion is to concern oneself purely with positive legislation, positive law. According to this notion, the classical major declarations are, in the majority of cases, political declarations, which have, and should have, no impact on positive law.

Reference to man's innate rights is banished. Under positivism, law is the science of legal rules, the science of pronouncements which the legislator records in written laws, codified in legal rules. The appeal to anything beyond positive law is devoid of relevance. Any reference to real men and their innate rights is denounced as falling within the unknowable sphere of metaphysical thought. The latter is firmly dismissed by the science of laws.

This positivist notion of the law is echoed in the positivist notion of science, in particular the physical and chemical sciences, which are concerned purely with phenomena and formal pronouncements, the compatibility of which is assumed. These disciplines do not pay attention to the questions explored by metaphysics. Just as the man of science is concerned purely with phenomena, the jurist should only concern himself with legal rules formulated by the legislator. These legal rules must be as consistent as possible.

The major theoretician of legal positivism, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), falls within the Kantian tradition^[3]. He postulates the supreme legal rule: « The rule must be respected because it is the rule»; « The law must be respected because it is the law». The supreme rule is seen to impose itself as an immediate given, as an axiom. There has ceased to be any human reality to recognise, any rights inherent in every human being. There is no longer any need to consider anything beyond the written law, or refer to the fundamental rights which precede these written laws. In the positivist tradition, the right of all to life, pivotal to the realist tradition, is increasingly under threat from positive laws. Positive law is increasingly dissociated from natural law since the latter, if deemed to exist, would be unknowable and entirely to be discounted.

An example of agnosticism

Legal positivism is hence presented as a form of agnosticism: there is no longer any truth of man or on man, which, by its very existence, imposes itself on reason. Originally, it was up to the individual to decide what was right, in complete autonomy. Relativism and individualism go hand-in-hand. However, if the individual wishes to take the law into his own hands and covets what his neighbour covets, a state of war will, sooner or later, be generated in society.^[4] To avoid such a situation, men must submit to the supreme rule, the guarantor of which is the person who finds himself in a dominant position, to the point where his will has the force of law. One thinks of the Princes and other Leviathans of modern times. This force of law can derive from two sources: either men voluntarily surrender their liberty in favour of a leader to whom they submit; or the leader imposes himself on them – through violence or trickery. In both cases, legal rules will have but one source: the will of the Prince. Human rights will therefore proceed purely from the will of the person who, being the strongest, is able to give the force of law to the determinations of his will. According to this notion, men have an interest in entering political society, but will not be safe unless they consent to be slaves^[5].

There are therefore two types of positive right and therefore positive laws: the first, inspired by realism; the second, inspired by positivism. In addition, to posit the principle that man has no innate rights is to leave man defenceless in the face of violence which the law has no reason to contain.

Which interpretation of the 1948 Declaration?

Justice, conformity with the law

Currently, the positivist notion of human rights is increasingly supplanting the realist notion which was the hallmark of the 1948 Universal Declaration. We will demonstrate this on the basis of a number of examples.

In the realist notion of human rights, words derive their meaning from the reality they express. Men can talk to one another, deliberate, understand each other because the meaning of words is not the outcome of voluntaristic decisions. The right to life is said to be inherent to all human beings because they are human beings. Here, the legal rule is natural. Justice is determined by the respect due to each man, more precisely to his rights: each man must be rendered his due.

Contrary to the realist notion, in the positivist notion, words cease to refer to realities. The meaning of words in law is dependent on the will of the legislator. The right to life is defined and delimited in rules laid down by the legislator; it is no longer universal. Given that words no longer relate to realities, to rights inherent in the person, their meaning can only be conventional.

The supreme rule postulated by Kelsen is purely formal: The law must be respected because it is the law. However, for this assumption to be more than a dead letter, it is necessary to provide legal rules which ultimately derive their validity from the supreme rule. Here, legal rules appear to be the outcome of a consensual procedure, on completion of which men agree to define the legal rules to be validated by the upholder of fundamental law. The legal rules so validated may however be interpreted at the discretion of the dominant will. Justice is then defined as conformity with the law, whatever it is.

It follows – again under the positivist notion - that human rights, as formulated in the 1948 Declaration, convey the impression of being universal, and are indeed so in the realist perspective, that of those who drafted the 1948 Declaration. But the universality of human rights is at peril if that Declaration is subjected to a positivist interpretation. According to this interpretation, each legislator may assign words the meaning he desires, hence corroborating the false impression of universality^[6]. In effect, words such as life, family, marriage, education, etc appear unambiguous - as in the realist interpretation - yet become polysemous and equivocal if subjected to a positivist interpretation. The price of rejection of the anchorage of words in reality is the confusion of a Babel-like language. Rather than unite, such language divides.

Claiming the « new rights »

Relativism, as the characteristic of legal positivism, then gives rise to the claiming of « new rights ». These « new rights » are the result of negotiations among individuals, which must lead to consensual decisions^[7]. They are validated by the guarantor of the supreme rule.

The « new rights » include the « right to abortion », « right to unions between persons of the same sex », « right to euthanasia », etc. Yet this claiming of « new rights » can only be honoured at the cost of the instigation of a superior power which, by an act of its will, validates the « new rights » in question. In the final instance, it is the guarantor of the supreme rule who is called upon to decide on the meaning to be ascribed to words, to determine what is just and what is not.

Relativism allows legal positivism to present human rights as conquests of the freedom of individuals. Individuals may negotiate and even claim « rights », which coincide with their desires. Initially, individuals will feel sure they have conquered “« new rights ». But they will soon perceive that this claim cannot be honoured without the inauguration of a superior power on which validation of the « new rights » will depend. This positivist notion of the law hence leads individuals to be deprived of their autonomy, so highly prized. It also exposes States to the deprivation of their sovereignty in as far as, due to the deviation from realism, their particular rights require endorsement in the name of the supreme rule.

A systematic deconstruction

A distortion of meaning

We are currently witnessing a demonstrable attempt at systematic deconstruction of the realist notion of human rights. The reality of the human being since conception is not recognised. The legislator reserves the right to define the moment at which there is a human being. The same applies to the family. The family is no longer a natural institution. This distortion of the meaning of the 1948 Universal Declaration, this positivist interpretation of the Declaration enables the UNO, and also the European Union, to present as guarantors of the "supreme rule". Validation of the particular rights of individuals and States is dependent on one and the other. For positivists, the 1948 Declaration is no longer admissible because it falls within the realist tradition, which originally inspired it. The wording of the Declaration is now viewed through a filter of interpretation, which leaves the meaning of words entirely volatile. This meaning is to be fixed, or altered, purely by those who have the power to impose their will.

In brief, the original meaning of the 1948 Universal Declaration has been forcefully overthrown, which means that verbal engineering today ascribes to words a meaning contrary to that ascribed yesterday.

We will return to a few examples.

The right to found a traditional, heterosexual and monogamous family is now accompanied by a catalogue of « new rights », in which one encounters blended, reconstituted, single-parent families, etc. The « new rights » extend to various « new models » of the family. This enervates all natural solidarities.

The word marriage, reserved for the commitment of two people of a different sex, is currently used to designate the "right" to homosexual or lesbian unions, even homosexual parenthood. Such different unions may be accompanied by the "right" to adopt children or the "right" to repudiate a partner.

In the realist tradition, the word motherhood means, first of all, the biological process by which a woman welcomes a new human being. Today, the word refers to the « new rights » which legalise assisted-motherhood techniques, in vitro fertilisation, pregnancy to order, etc. Rights to « risk-free motherhood » and « reproductive health » include in particular the right to abortion.

By the same token, the word fatherhood traditionally refers to the biological process by which a man, united to his wife, engenders a new human being. But today, in accordance with the « new rights », fatherhood can be exercised furtively, even anonymously. The biological father merely provides his sperm and undertakes to step aside in favour of the father who brings up the child.

The word health refers to the condition one is in when the human body is functioning well. But we have witnessed the emergence of « new rights » adapted to the « new paradigm of health ». According to the latter, priority is henceforth to be accorded to the health of the social body, and no longer to the health of individuals.

From the onset of adolescence, children have the « right » to have recourse to contraception, even abortion, without the knowledge of their parents. Parents are therefore dispossessed of one of their essential responsibilities in the upbringing of their children.

Respect for life, in particular a suffering or declining life, also forms part of the realist tradition. It is in the name of this tradition that crimes against humanity, generally declared indefeasible, have been condemned. Now, respect for life has become flexible and we are witnessing the emergence of « new human rights », which legalise euthanasia, previously condemned at Nuremberg, and abortion.

On the human body, it has traditionally been affirmed that it is « inalienable ». The human body cannot be the subject of a sale or an agreement. The human body cannot be instrumentalised, used for experimental purposes. Now, « new rights » translate into practices such as test-tube babies, designer babies, surrogate mothers, and abortion itself.

In short, the culture of death is the poisonous fruit of legal positivism[8].

In its habitual meaning, the word gender refers to sexual differentiation, innate anatomical, physiological and psychological differences between a man and a woman, between Mars and Venus. Now, in the name of the « new rights », each person is able to choose, even change, his/her « sexual orientation», « gender ». The differences in the roles of a man and woman are presented as purely cultural; they have - we are assured - no natural foundation. A new culture is emerging which will abolish all traces of an era in which women were oppressed by men and crushed by pregnancies.

To recap, reality is relegated in parenthesis and words have the meaning the speaker wishes to give them. Hence, a new language arises where words such as gender, family, marriage, motherhood, fatherhood, abortion, contraception, etc have the meaning assigned by the speaker, leaving aside any reference to the real. Ultimately, a new society may be constructed on the basis of these « new rights »^[9].

What rule of law?

We turn to the final example, on which we have already touched: the question of the rule of law, l’État de droit. This expression is traditionally taken to mean that, in a State, the governing and the governed should recognise and respect the rights vested in man by nature: the right to life, to marry, to found a family, express oneself, associate, etc. Public authorities, in particular, are required to establish legal rules, positive laws, which give concrete form to the rights vested naturally in man.

However, the expression « rule of law » can also be used in a positivist sense. This expression then means that, in a given State, there is a right, there are laws. From this perspective, the law is to be respected because it is the law, without any reference whatsoever to the rights vested in man by nature. Laws are then the expression of the will of the legislator. This is what Kelsen declared with reference to the Nazi and Stalinist States:

« In terms of judicial science, the law established by the Nazi regime is the law. We may deplore this, but we cannot deny it is a law. The law of the Soviet Union is law! We may abhor this, as we hold a poisonous snake in horror, but we cannot deny it exists, which means it is valid. »^[10]

This positivist notion of the law is still to be found in all legal systems supported by totalitarianisms of every kind, declared or rampant. It is in the process of being imposed in international relations. It is placing religious liberty at risk. While under the realist notion, the rule of law is there to serve human rights, under the positivist notion of the rule of law, the law is exposed to becoming the ultimate weapon of dictatorship and tyranny.

The hand extended

The neo-positivist temptation

The influence of legal positivism today extends to certain catholic moralists, some of whom are even developing an adulterated notion of Christian morality. The basic error of such moralists is to abandon the realist notion of man and the rights naturally attaching to man. This tendency is especially perceptible in discussions on the issue of human life. Many bioethicists fail to accord sufficient significance to fundamental morality. We frequently see schizophrenic behaviour in certain, allegedly Catholic, politicians, who declare for example: « Personally, I'm against abortion, but as a Member of Parliament, I'm in favour of its legalisation ».

The position with regard to bioethics is the same as the position with regard to law. When inspired by the realist notion, bioethics considers the concrete human being and various bodies of knowledge acquired on that concrete human being. Bioethics views man as a person, open to relations with others, naturally sociable. Natural morality hence draws on a number of different scientific disciplines to recall the fact that neither man nor woman can do as they like with their body, and that the body itself imposes limits on man's freedom. Yes, this man of flesh and bone is truly loved by God, who reveals his full dignity in the Incarnation of his Son. When condemning sodomy, Scripture is certainly referring to God's plan on human sexuality, but is also drawing on an observation of the facts. Christian morality incorporates these experiential conclusions, as it incorporates the conclusions of philosophical anthropology. Although benefitting from the perspective proper to the Christian tradition, these conclusions not infrequently predate the Gospels. At the dawn of the New Alliance, how can we fail to think of the martyrdom of St John the Baptist, who told Herod he had no right to keep his brother's wife^[11]?

When of positivist inspiration, bioethics holds that man is an individual, turned in on himself and primarily alert to his own interests, his pleasures, what is useful to him. This form of bioethics flourishes on ethics committees; this is a virtual forum where the most diverse opinions confront one another in a frantic search for an improbable consensus. The aim of the discussion is not to know the real, because it is said to be unknowable; it is to discuss. This is an elegant way of applying epoché, or suspension of judgement. One discusses for discussion’s sake, like the sophists of old and the sceptics. This form of bioethics may present itself as Christian, but its rationale underplays or dismisses as definitely not interesting the philosophical question of the reality and dignity of man, and the existential relationship of man to the creator. What counts is dialogue, or rather negotiation. It is necessary to decide on what is permitted or defended today, yet the door should be left open to different decisions at a later date, in as far as any moralist is entitled to express an opinion on what he regards as admissible or otherwise. Hence, a return to relativism and casuistry. Reality is then emptied of itself and ceases to be a normative discipline. Morality pronounces on the basis of calculations: on utility, pleasure, the risk posed by a given type of behaviour in a given situation.

Complete autonomy

The profound crisis currently experienced by Christian morality thus arises from a rejection, frequently arbitrary, of reference to natural law and human rights which it is open to reason to discover. It also arises from a frequent disregard, by certain Christians, of the rootedness of this Christian morality in a theology of creation and the incarnation. Relativism, scepticism and agnosticism are in the process of corrupting the foundations of Christian morality. It follows that theologians prominent in the media find themselves in alliance with the proponents of legal positivism. For such theologians, there is no act which is truly good, and no act which is truly bad. The only morality is situational morality. It is left to the individual to decide on the fundamental intention which will guide his actions.

Many Christian bioethicists accept the hand extended to them by legal positivism in the matter of human rights. They consider that, in morality, everything can be discussed, challenged, deconstructed and reconstructed. Hence the support given by these theologians to the « new human rights», adopted in positivist circles. This casuist interpretation of Christian morality considers that individuals are entirely autonomous and must « follow their conscience » in complete freedom. There is no longer any moral rule; there is no longer any fundamental morality. Moral action is to be based on a free individual examination of conscience. It is self-evident that this rejection, by Christians, of natural human rights serves to embolden the actions of the militants of the culture of death.

Fuelling the confusion?

The Magisterium and arbitration

Passengers in the boat of St Peter are at times profoundly influenced by this trend. Once again, the use of bioethics is significant. Meetings attended by prominent ecclesiastical authorities have become forums where the goal is to arrive at a consensus. This sometimes occurs at ecumenical meetings where it is seen as necessary to make concessions, gloss over differences, to arrive at a common denominator at any price. Spokespersons and other unofficial organs may muddy the waters still further.

A typical example is provided by the interminable discussions on the condom. Out of fear, perhaps, of looking the reality in the face, disturbing data, facts, are systematically concealed or disparaged and replaced by pronouncements convenient to those proclaiming them. The supreme Magisterium is then called upon to rescue the situation and engage in arbitration, which exposes it to all kinds of pressures.

Where does this trend lead?

It deprives the Magisterium of that for which it was instituted.

How can this be?

Under the influence of the positivist trend, the Magisterium is no longer required to expound and elaborate on the Church's doctrine, of which it is custodian and upholder. It is no longer be called upon to throw light on the reference of the Church’s doctrine to the truth. Because the Magisterium is now expected, in the Church, to be the guarantor of the consensus, negotiations and arbitration, the Magisterium would be required to express the « new morality ». Is the Magisterium now not expected to be the guarantor, not of a truth, but of ethical pronouncements to be endorsed in accordance with the supreme moral rule: « A morality is necessary»? This « new morality » will be pronounced by bioethicists and its rules will be subject to validation by the supreme Magisterium.

To achieve this aim, the declarations of the Magisterium are flattened, in the sense that all declarations have the same weight, are trivialised and always open to challenge. Whether it is a matter of conciliar declarations, encyclicals, synodical exhortations, an interview during the journey, an unfortunate phrase in a speech or collection of interviews: all texts have the same weight and all are reversible. To compound the situation, inconsistencies between various translations, at times botched, of pontifical texts, add a jubilatory note to the muddle. This offers a feast to editors and readers! Equally, those in a position of sufficient strength to do so attempt to present themselves as authentic interpreters of magisterial declarations, even to the extent of hawking new moral rules.

The authority of the supreme Magisterium runs the risk of being wrecked when there is no longer discernment of the truth to be received or conveyed. This method of proceeding places the Pope at odds with himself and with his predecessors. For that matter, it is argued, the Pope himself does not hesitate to invite his readers to discuss his positions.

Protecting the Pope

Here is what Benedict XVI has written in his splendid Jesus of Nazareth^[12] :

« Clearly, I have no need to make it explicit that this book is in no way an act of the Magisterium, purely the expression of my personal search for « the face of the Lord » (cf. Ps 26 [27], 8). Therefore anyone is free to contradict me. I simply ask my readers to accord me the credit of goodwill, without which comprehension is not possible ».

It is worth drawing attention to the goodwill of the Pope himself, who has the delicacy to write that his scientific works, even those signed during his Pontificate, are not acts of the Magisterium. This is precisely the inverse of the message that certain of his members of staff wish to present, by insinuating that it is sufficient for a declaration to proceed from the will of the Pope for it to have magisterial weight. It is therefore elementary to recall that everything the Pope says or writes does not call for the same level of adherence. Certain pontifical documents attributed to the Pope call for criticism in order to protect the Pope himself, and the Magisterium, from possible inopportune initiatives from staff members exceeding their mandate.

The Church and social re-engineering

Through this slide towards a positivist interpretation of its authority and magisterial declarations, the Church finds itself objectively associated with the plan of social re-engineering instigated by the UNO and EU. The Church is to be hijacked, that is won over to the plan of world governance under the aegis of a positivist international law, itself applied by supranational courts.

If not annexed by consent, intimidation or betrayal (one thinks of Henry VIII), the Church is to be destroyed, not because it has a morality, but because it has a morality which disturbs because it is profoundly realist. The foundation of this morality is the passion, death and resurrection of the son of God, who came on Earth to invite all men to become children of God. This is the key event in human history, and it is to this event that the Apostles were the first to bear witness. Those whose faith had vacillated prior to the betrayal, those who had not believed in his resurrection, as testified to by the holy women, then in fact, inspired by the Holy Spirit, began to proclaim that he is alive. They confronted the powers of evil to announce, even unto martyrdom, this good news. This is the rock on which the entire history of the Church is based: the Apostles saw; they recognised; they heard, they touched. Here is the truth which the Magisterium has to receive and pass on.

This is why the Church endorses the efforts of so many generations to protect man and his innate rights. The Church recognises and welcomes the labour of generations of politicians, legislators, jurists of the standing of Cicero, to procure for human societies a legislation which protects and promotes these rights. More fundamentally still, the Church invites all men to return to the reality of man and rise up with courage against the ascendancy of the culture of death.

Positivism and the culture of death

For all jurists and for all moralists, Catholic or otherwise, adherence to a positivist notion of the law and morality is tantamount to the restoration of a contemporary form of manicheism. According to this notion, it is incumbent on a category of men, the enlightened, to define what is good or evil in the world, and to reflect this dichotomy through judicial institutions permeating the social fabric. However, despite evil and sin, the Church is called upon to imitate God’s view of man and the world: the creator saw that what he had done was good^[13]. The Church must invite all men to marvel at the beauty of the world, to choose life, to rediscover the fact that this world has been created for man, and that man is the caretaker of the first revelation that is the created world.

The sad thing about legal positivism is that, by reason of its agnosticism, it leaves the door wide open to a self-engulfing culture of death. A culture of death which began by decreeing the death of a self-styled God who became jealous of his creature. A culture of death which credits man with the power to deify himself and give himself rights. Excuse me! A culture in the name of which men have decreed the death of the son of God, of the Innocent par excellence and of those who are in his image. A culture of death which, according to some demographers, could lead to the extinction of the human species …

It emerges from the above that the confrontation between the realist and positivist notions of human rights has become the crucial question in the world today, in particular within the leading international organisations. This question poses a special challenge to representatives of the positivist tradition. According to this tradition in effect, « a law is necessary », and « the law must be respected ». Justice is therefore purely procedural: it ratifies a consensual decision achieved as a result of a « fair-play » discussion. Laws conceived through this process have no basis in a recognised reality. Whence the creation of a new positivist international law in the service of world governance. Yet how is it possible to fail to recognise that, with the rise of legal positivism, the « right » to give death has become the supreme right?

What is equally troubling is that this positivism has been welcomed by numerous Christian moralists, in particular among those who present themselves as bioethicists. As can be observed in many ad hoc committees, bioethicists, desirous of arriving at a consensual decision and prepared to endorse that decision, imitate their positivist jurist colleagues and decree that beyond the consensual decision, there is nothing to be taken into consideration. Anything which is beyond the supreme moral rule – « A moral rule is necessary » – belongs to the obscure world of metaphysics. Entirely logically, this rejection of metaphysics and the related field of anthropology, are accompanied by a rejection of any fundamental morality which concerns itself, for example, with the relationships between conscience, truth, liberty.

Finally, neither legal positivism, nor a certain « Christian morality » at times the clone of the latter, can evade the question of knowing who is speaking, who is uttering legal and moral pronouncements, who, in the final instance, is validating the particular rules. These various pronouncements always conceal real men, parties, groups, organised to a greater or lesser extent, hidden societies prepared to deconstruct the world and anxious to reconstruct it in line with decisions proceeding from their will.

Shaken from the outside by the forces of evil and from the inside by convulsions whose magnitude is downplayed, the Church, today as yesterday, has to breathe life into the members, revive the Word of love, rekindle the fire which the Lord entrusted to it to inflame the world. If Peter and Paul were alive today, they would probably be accused of fundamentalism. However it is on them, and their successors, that the future New Evangelisation depends.

Mgr Michel Schooyans is Emeritus Professor at the Catholic University of Louvain, where he has taught political philosophy, contemporary ideologies and the ethics of demographic politics. He has also taught for ten years at the Catholic University of São Paulo. A philosopher and theologian, Michel Schooyans is a member of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, Pontifical Academy for Life and Mexican Academy for Bioethics. He is an adviser to the Pontifical Council for the Family.

Louvain-la-Neuve, July 2011.

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[1] Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens [Meaning and non-meaning], Paris, Gallimard, 1948; new edition of 2001. See pages 54 et seq.

[2] Cf. Aimé Forest, Du consentement à l’être, [Consent to being], Aubier, 1936.

[3] The most celebrated work of Hans Kelsen is his Théorie pure du droit [The pure theory of law ] [1962], Paris, LGDJ, 1999. On Kelsen, see our study, La face cachée de l’ONU [The hidden face of the UNO], Paris, Le Sarment, 2000; see pages 133-172.

[4] See the work of René Girard, in particular Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde [Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World], Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1978.

[5] Étienne de la Boétie, Le discours de la servitude volontaire [The discourse of voluntary servitude], Paris, Payot, 1976.

[6] The ethics of responsibility, as expounded by Max Weber, serve to strengthen further this positivist interpretation of human rights. See Max Weber, Le Savant et le Politique, [The Scholar and the Politician] Paris, Le Monde on 10/18, 1959 ; cf. pages 172-175.

[7] See in this regard John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, 1972; various new editions.

[8] See Rémi Brague, Les ancres dans le ciel. L’infrastructure métaphysique [Anchors in the sky. The metaphysical infrastructure], Paris, Edition du Seuil, 2011.

[9] For a discussion on « constructivism », see in particular the work of Ian Hacking, Entre science et réalité : La construction sociale de quoi ? [Between science and reality: the social construction of what?], Paris, la Découverte edition, 2001.

[10] Hans Kelsen, Das Naturrecht in der politischen Theorie, Vienne, 1963, page 148; this is a presentation to the Congress of the International Research Centre relating to the fundamental problems of science. We reproduce the text as cited by Julien Freund, L’essence du politique [The essence of politics], Paris, Sirey edition, 1965, pages 723 et seq. Some passages in Théorie pure [Pure theory] can be said to pave the way for this assertion. See also note 3 above.

[11] Mt 14, 4.

[12] See Joseph Ratzinger - Benedict XVI, Jésus de Nazareth, Paris, Flammarion edition, 2007; page 19.

[13] Gn 1, 10. 12. 18. 21. 25 ; cf. 2, 18.