A Propaganda Episcopal do Testamento Mortal

Hoje, entre o meio-dia e a uma, a rádio renascença (RR) – que é reconhecida e promovida pela Igreja como católica -, propriedade do Patriarcado de Lisboa e da Conferência Episcopal, num programa cujo nome não recordo pôs a “debate” o, impropriamente, chamado “testamento vital” (devia denominar-se “declaração antecipada de tratamento”). Pelo menos, três das “sumidades” que palraram advogaram obstinadamente o carácter vinculativo do dito documento (embora me esforçasse estoicamente por aguentar tanta barbaridade não aguentei ouvir o programa na sua totalidade). Qualquer pessoa minimamente informada sabe que essa “vinculação” significa de facto abrir a porta à eutanásia constituindo, por isso, uma agressão violenta e homicida, bem como uma ataque directo à autonomia e liberdade da pessoa em estado de enorme vulnerabilidade. Não é para admirar, uma vez que a estação emissora patriarcal (o Patriarcado de Lisboa é, de longe, o proprietário principal) sabia que estes três eutanazis eram conhecidos abortistas que estiveram fortemente empenhados no referendo sobre a liberalização do aborto, pelo lado do Sim à mesma. São eles João Semedo do bloco de esquerda, Eurico Reis, juiz desembargador (convidado residente) e Miguel Oliveira da Silva, presidente do conselho nacional de ética para as ciências da vida (!). Este último, aliás, é especialmente conhecido por, várias vezes, ter orgulhosamente confessado, na televisão, que ele próprio praticava abortamentos.

A rádio dos nossos Bispos está tão feliz e orgulhosa com as declarações deste último que anda a repeti-las nos noticiários.

Se perguntássemos ao Cardeal Patriarca de Lisboa e à Conferência Episcopal se reconhecem ter graves responsabilidades na liberalização do aborto e na eutanásia que aí vem responderiam indignados atirando-nos com uma resma de papéis, que quase ninguém lê, onde está, como de facto está, preto no branco a sua oposição e boa parte da Doutrina da Igreja sobre o assunto. Deste modo o simples facto da interrogação seria etiquetado de ofensa e calúnia. A verdade, porém, é que aquilo que escreveram tem sido contrariado, quer por uma indiferença generalizada, uma negligência de há muitos anos na formação dos católicos sobre o Evangelho da vida, sobre moral e bioética; na aceitação de catequistas, de ministros extraordinários da Comunhão e tantas outras pessoas com responsabilidades eclesiais e diocesanas publicamente favoráveis ao aborto, à eutanásia, à experimentação em pessoas embrionárias, à reprodução artificial, etc.; e na cumplicidade, repito, na cumplicidade com as forças da morte ao conceder-lhes voz para advogarem as suas perfídias pestíferas nos meios de comunicação social da Igreja, particularmente na RR.

Que o mundo fique a saber, os Bispos portugueses desde há muitos anos compactuam, do modo acima descrito, com o abuso mortal de menores nascentes (também se poderia dizer, pedofobia mortífera) e agora com os eutanazis.

Conheço uma quantidade significativa de rádios e televisões católicas, mas em nenhuma oiço ou vejo algo de semelhante. Pelo contrário, têm bastantes programas de formação nestes campos – uma coisa aliás que desse há muitos anos os movimentos de defesa e promoção da vida, aqui em Portugal, vêm pedindo mas sem nenhum sucesso.

O Bispo do Porto, D. Manuel Clemente, tem dito várias vezes que é necessário, mesmo antes de um novo referendo sobre a defesa da vida, um grande debate nacional sobre a mesma. Com toda a consideração que tenho pelo senhor Bispo estou em que o mais urgente é a formação dos católicos sobre estas matérias, coisa com a qual não se vê os senhores Bispos preocupados ou, pelo menos, decididos.

Por mim, não tenho dúvidas, se o comportamento dos meios de comunicação social da Igreja, em particular da RR, a estação emissora com a mais vasta audiência a nível nacional, tivesse sido como devia ser o resultado do último referendo sobre o aborto teria sido muito diferente.

Os nossos Pastores poderão desconsiderar, com um ligeiro encolher de ombros e um suspiro de enfado, aquilo que diz um beldroega como eu, recordem-se, no entanto, que dentro em breve terão de responder diante do Supremo Juiz não só pelo que fizeram, mas também pelo que deixaram fazer e ainda pelo que não fizeram.

À honra de Cristo. Ámen.

Nuno Serras Pereira

Licenciado em nada e Doutorado em coisa nenhuma

24. 09. 2011

Today the word Conscience is used in various ways so that the defender of truth in our hearts, has become a pretext for legitimizing arbitrariness

Newman Teacher of Conscience: Today the word is used in various ways so that the defender of truth in our hearts, “the aboriginal Vicar of Christ”, has become a pretext for legitimizing arbitrariness

by Hermann Geissler

In O. R.

A year ago, on 19 September 2010, Pope Benedict XVI beatified the famous English theologian John Henry Newman. During his Christmas audience with the Roman Curia, on 20 December 2010, the Holy Father spoke again of Newman and his affinity to our times, highlighting his understanding of conscience. As the Pope explains, the word conscience has come to signify in contemporary thought: “that for moral and religious questions, it is the subjective dimension, the individual, that constitutes the final authority for decision.

Newman’s understanding of conscience is diametrically opposed to this. For him, ‘conscience’ means man’s capacity for truth: the capacity to recognize precisely in the decision-making areas of his life — religion and morals — a truth, the truth. At the same time, conscience — man’s capacity to recognize truth — thereby imposes on him the obligation to set out along the path towards truth, to seek it and to submit to it wherever he finds it. Conscience is both capacity for truth and obedience to the truth which manifests itself to anyone who seeks it with an open heart. The path of Newman’s conversions is a path of conscience — not a path of self-asserting subjectivity but, on the contrary, a path of obedience to the truth that was gradually opening up to him.”

Newman found that conscience and truth belong together in partnership, that they support and enlighten each other — indeed, that obedience to conscience leads to obedience to the truth. In the rest of this article, we wish to touch upon the connection between conscience and truth in the fundamental element of Newman’s teaching. By referring to his own experience in his teaching about conscience, Newman reveals himself as a modern and personalistic thinker, influenced by Augustine. It might be useful in our reflections first to enter briefly into Newman’s notion of conscience.

The notion of conscience has many diverse interpretations, some contradictory. Newman describes the crucial reason for these contradictions with the following words, “Conscience – there are two ways of regarding conscience; one as a mere sort of sense of propriety, a taste teaching us to do this or that, the other as the echo of God’s voice. Now all depends on this distinction — the first way is not of faith, and the second is of faith”.

In his famous Letter to the Duke of Norfolk (1874) Newman looks closely at two contrary notions of conscience. The interpretation of conscience as restricted to the material world he describes like this, “When men advocate the rights of conscience, they in no sense mean the rights of the Creator, nor the duty to Him, in thought and deed, of the creature; but the right of thinking, speaking, writing, and acting, according to their judgement or their humour, without any thought of God at all... Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in this age, with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to dispense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and Judge, to be independent of unseen obligations. It becomes a licence to take up any or no religion, to take up this or that and let it go again... Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this century it has been superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it never heard of, and could not have mistaken for it, if they had. It is the right of self-will”.

This description is essentially valid in our time too. Today also, conscience is confused with personal opinion, subjective feelings, and self-will. For many, it no longer implies the responsibility of the creature towards its Creator, but complete independence, total autonomy, overall subjectivity and arbitrariness. The sanctuary of the conscience has been “desacralised”. God has been banned from conscience. The consequences of this godless notion of conscience are painfully before our eyes. Because of this emancipation from God, man is also inclined to separate himself from his neighbour. He lives in his egocentric world often without caring for others, without being interested in them, without feeling responsible for them. Individualism, the pursuit of pleasure, honour, and power, and unbounded unpredictability make the world dark and the ability of people to live together in society ever more difficult.

In the face of this purely worldly interpretation, Newman holds fast to his transcendental interpretation. For him, conscience is not an autonomous but a fundamentally theonomous reality — a sanctuary by which God turns intimately and personally to every soul. In union with the great teachers of the Church, Newman affirms that the Creator has implanted his own law into his rational creatures. “This law, as apprehended in the minds of individual men, is called ‘conscience’; and though it may suffer refraction in passing into the intellectual medium of each, it is not therefore so affected as to lose its character of being the Divine Law, but still has, as such, the prerogative of commanding obedience”.

Newman himself describes the importance and the dignity of conscience with magnificent words: “The rule and measure of duty is not utility, nor expedience, nor the happiness of the greatest number, nor State convenience, nor fitness, order, and the pulchrum. Conscience is not a long-sighted selfishness, nor a desire to be consistent with oneself, but it is a messenger from Him, who, both in nature and in grace, speaks to us behind a veil, and teaches and rules us by His representatives. Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest in its blessings and anathemas, and, even though the eternal priesthood throughout the Church could cease to be, in it the sacerdotal principle would remain and would have a sway”.

In his conscience, man does not only hear the voice of his own self. Newman compares conscience with an angel — a messenger of God who talks to us behind a veil. Indeed, he even dares to call conscience the original Vicar of Christ and to attribute to it the offices of prophet, king and priest. Conscience is a prophet because it tells us in advance whether the act is good or bad. It is a king because it exhorts us with authority: “Do this, avoid that”. It is a priest because it blesses us after a good deed — this means not only the delightful experience of a good conscience, but also the blessing which goodness brings in any case to people and to the world — and likewise “condemns” after an evil deed, as an expression of the gnawing bad conscience and of the negative effects of sin on men and their surroundings. It is a principle that is written in the being of every person. It asks for obedience and refers to one outside of itself: to God — for one’s own sake and the sake of others.

In his great work An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1870), he attempts to prove the existence of God based on the experience of conscience. In his analysis, he distinguishes between the moral sense and the sense of duty. By moral sense, he means the judgement of reason of whether an act is good or evil. By sense of duty, he means the authoritative command to follow good or to avoid evil. Newman bases his reflections particularly on the second aspect of the experience of conscience.

Because conscience is “imperative and constraining, like no other dictate in the whole of our experience”, it has “an intimate bearing on our affections and emotions”. Very simply paraphrasing, we could summarise Newman’s train of thought — which must not be misunderstood in the sense of a mere psychologism — with the following words: if we follow the command of our conscience, we are filled with happiness, joy and peace; if we do not obey our conscience, we are overcome by shame, terror and fear. Newman interprets this experience in the following way: “If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight which follows on our receiving praise from a father, we certainly have within us the image of some person, to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away... and thus the phenomena of Conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive”.

Newman prefers a pathway to God beginning with conscience to the traditional proofs of the existence of God. Some consider this a limitation in Newman’s thought and reproach him for having overemphasised interiority. Newman does not reject the classic proofs of the existence of God, but he is convinced that they lead to a merely abstract image of God — to the image of a God who is the first cause of everything, who orders everything, who is the creator and leader of the world. Newman’s way to God, however, points to a God who has a personal relationship with every person, who addresses him, who directs and guides him, who rebukes and reprimands, who shows him his mistakes and calls him to conversion, who leads him to the perception of the truth and who spurs him on to do good, who is his supreme Lord and Judge.

According to Newman, the basic ethical attitudes brought about by obedience to conscience form an “organum investigandi given us for gaining religious truth, and which would lead the mind by an infallible succession from the rejection of atheism to theism, and from theism to Christianity, and from Christianity to Evangelical Religion, and from these to Catholicity”. In his Apologia Pro Vita Sua, Newman writes the bold words, “I came to the conclusion that there was no medium, in true philosophy, between Atheism and Catholicity, and that a perfectly consistent mind, under those circumstances in which it finds itself here below, must embrace either the one or the other. And I hold this still: I am a Catholic by virtue of my believing in a God; and if I am asked why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe in myself, for I feel it impossible to believe in my own existence (and of that fact I am quite sure) without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as a Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience”.

Newman’s most important statements in regard to conscience and Church are to be found in the previously cited Letter to the Duke of Norfolk. In this work, Newman refutes the accusation that Catholics could no longer be faithful subjects of the Crown after the doctrine of papal infallibility had been proclaimed, since they would be required to give their consciences over to the Pope. Masterfully Newman explains the relationship between the authority of conscience and the authority of the Pope.

The authority of the Pope is based on revelation, which God has given out of pure kindness. God has entrusted his revelation to the Church and takes care that it is infallibly preserved, interpreted and transmitted in and through the Church. If a person has accepted the mission of the Church in faith, nothing else but this person’s conscience commands him to listen to the Church and the Pope. Therefore Newman says: “...did the Pope speak against Conscience in the true sense of the word, he would commit a suicidal act. He would be cutting the ground from under his feet. His very mission is to proclaim the moral law, and to protect and strengthen that ‘Light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world’. On the law of conscience and its sacredness are founded both his authority in theory and his power in fact... The championship of the Moral Law and of conscience is his raison d’être. The fact of his mission is the answer to the complaints of those who feel the insufficiency of the natural light; and the insufficiency of that light is the justification of his mission“. We do not obey the Pope because someone forces us to do so, but because we are personally convinced in faith that the Lord guides the Church through him, and through the bishops in union with him, and that He keeps his Church in the truth.

The conscience enlightened by faith leads to a mature obedience to the Pope and the Church. The Pope and the Church in turn enlighten the conscience, which needs clear orientation and accompaniment. “But the sense of right and wrong, which is the first element in religion, is so delicate, so fitful, so easily puzzled, obscured, perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, so impressible by education, so biased by pride and passion, so unsteady in its course, that, in the struggle for existence amid the various exercises and triumphs of the human intellect, this sense is at once the highest of all teachers, yet the least luminous; and the Church, the Pope, the Hierarchy are, in the Divine purpose, the supply of an urgent demand“. The Church in this sense is not only a great help for the individual, but it also renders an irreplaceable service for society as it is the defender of the irrevocable rights and freedom of human beings. These rights and this freedom, which are rooted in the dignity of the person, build the foundation of modern democracies, but cannot be subjected to the democratic rule of majorities. If the Church reminds us of the singular dignity of the human person, created by God and redeemed by Christ, it accomplishes a fundamental mission in society.

According to Newman, it is impossible for conscience to come into direct conflict with the doctrinal and moral teaching of the Church, for conscience has no authority in questions of revealed truth; the Church is its infallible guardian. Newman knows that “as regards doctrine, the ‘supremacy of conscience’ is not an adequate account of what I should consider safe to say on the subject”. Whether someone accepts a revealed truth that has been defined by the Church is not primarily a question of conscience, but of faith. Whoever thinks, therefore, that he must reject a doctrinal truth on grounds of conscience, cannot actually be referring to his conscience. Or better expressed: his conscience is not — or not yet — enlightened by faith. The conscience of the believer, however, is a conscience which is formed by faith and by the Church.

Newman does not deny that the authority of the Church and the Pope have limits. It has nothing to do with arbitrariness or worldly models of domineering; it is indissolubly linked to the infallible sensus fidei of the whole People of God and the specific mission of theologians. The authority of the Church reaches as far as Revelation. If the Pope makes decisions with regard to Church structures, discipline and administration, his statements do not claim to be infallible.

However, here also Newman employs strict benchmarks. “Prima facie it is his bounden duty, even from a sentiment of loyalty, to believe the Pope right and to act accordingly. He must vanquish that mean, ungenerous, selfish, vulgar spirit of his nature, which, at the very first rumour of a command, places itself in opposition to the Superior who gives it, asks itself whether he is not exceeding his right, and rejoices, in a moral and practical matter to commence with scepticism. He must have no wilful determination to exercise a right of thinking, saying, doing just what he pleases, the question of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, the duty, if possible, of obedience, the love of speaking as his Head speaks, and of standing in all cases on his Head’s side, being simply discarded. If this necessary rule were observed, collisions between the Pope’s authority and the authority of conscience would be very rare. On the other hand, in the fact that, after all, in extraordinary cases, the conscience of each individual is free, we have a safeguard and security, ...that no Pope ever will be able .... to create a false conscience for his own ends.”

In his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, Newman concludes his explanations about conscience with the oft-quoted words, “Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts, (which indeed does not seem quite the thing) I shall drink — to the Pope, if you please — still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards“. These words, which Newman probably formulated with a twinkle in his eye, mean above all that our obedience to the Pope is not a blind obedience but one based on a conscience enlightened by faith. He who has accepted the mission of the Church in faith will obey the Church out of his inner conviction founded on his conscience. Indeed, in this respect a conscience enlightened by faith comes first, and then the Pope.

Newman faithfully upholds the mutual interaction of conscience and Church. To refer to Newman’s words with the intention of pitting the authority of conscience against the authority of the Pope is incorrect. Each of the authorities, both the subjective and the objective, remain dependent and linked to the other.

In today’s language, there are various ways in which the word ‘conscience’ is used. Through his life and his teaching, John Henry Newman can help us to grasp anew the importance of conscience as the echo of God’s voice and to describe it, thus safeguarding it from deficient notions. Newman understood how to show the dignity of conscience clearly without differing from objective truth. He would not say “yes” to conscience, “no” to God or faith or Church, but rather “yes” to conscience and therefore “yes” to God, to faith and to the Church. Conscience is the defender of truth in our hearts. It is “the aboriginal Vicar of Christ”.

Papa afirma que o Nazismo mostrou o perigo do Divórcio entre o Poder e a Lei Natural

Discurso do Papa Bento XVI no Palácio Reichstag de Berlim - Quinta-feira, 22 de Setembro de 2011

In Vatican

... Mas o convite para pronunciar este discurso foi-me dirigido a mim como Papa, como Bispo de Roma, que carrega a responsabilidade suprema da Igreja Católica. Deste modo, vós reconheceis o papel que compete à Santa Sé como parceira no seio da Comunidade dos Povos e dos Estados. Na base desta minha responsabilidade internacional, quero propor-vos algumas considerações sobre os fundamentos do Estado liberal de direito.

Seja-me permitido começar as minhas reflexões sobre os fundamentos do direito com uma pequena narrativa tirada da Sagrada Escritura. Conta-se, no Primeiro Livro dos Reis, que Deus concedeu ao jovem rei Salomão fazer um pedido por ocasião da sua entronização. Que irá pedir o jovem soberano neste momento tão importante: sucesso, riqueza, uma vida longa, a eliminação dos inimigos? Não pede nada disso; mas sim: «Concede ao teu servo um coração dócil, para saber administrar a justiça ao teu povo e discernir o bem do mal» (1 Re 3, 9). Com esta narração, a Bíblia quer indicar-nos o que deve, em última análise, ser importante para um político. O seu critério último e a motivação para o seu trabalho como político não devem ser o sucesso e menos ainda o lucro material. A política deve ser um compromisso em prol da justiça e, assim, criar as condições de fundo para a paz. Naturalmente um político procurará o sucesso, sem o qual não poderia jamais ter a possibilidade de uma acção política efectiva; mas o sucesso há-de estar subordinado ao critério da justiça, à vontade de actuar o direito e à inteligência do direito. É que o sucesso pode tornar-se também um aliciamento, abrindo assim a estrada à falsificação do direito, à destruição da justiça. «Se se põe de parte o direito, em que se distingue então o Estado de uma grande banda de salteadores?» – sentenciou uma vez Santo Agostinho (De civitate Dei IV, 4, 1). Nós, alemães, sabemos pela nossa experiência que estas palavras não são um fútil espantalho. Experimentámos a separação entre o poder e o direito, o poder colocar-se contra o direito, o seu espezinhar o direito, de tal modo que o Estado se tornara o instrumento para a destruição do direito: tornara-se uma banda de salteadores muito bem organizada, que podia ameaçar o mundo inteiro e impeli-lo até à beira do precipício. Servir o direito e combater o domínio da injustiça é e permanece a tarefa fundamental do político. Num momento histórico em que o homem adquiriu um poder até agora impensável, esta tarefa torna-se particularmente urgente. O homem é capaz de destruir o mundo. Pode manipular-se a si mesmo. Pode, por assim dizer, criar seres humanos e excluir outros seres humanos de serem homens. Como reconhecemos o que é justo? Como podemos distinguir entre o bem e o mal, entre o verdadeiro direito e o direito apenas aparente? O pedido de Salomão permanece a questão decisiva perante a qual se encontram também hoje o homem político e a política.

Grande parte da matéria que se deve regular juridicamente, pode ter por critério suficiente o da maioria. Mas é evidente que, nas questões fundamentais do direito em que está em jogo a dignidade do homem e da humanidade, o princípio maioritário não basta: no processo de formação do direito, cada pessoa que tem responsabilidade deve ela mesma procurar os critérios da própria orientação. No século III, o grande teólogo Orígenes justificou assim a resistência dos cristãos a certos ordenamentos jurídicos em vigor: «Se alguém se encontrasse no povo de Scizia que tem leis irreligiosas e fosse obrigado a viver no meio deles, (…) estes agiriam, sem dúvida, de modo muito razoável se, em nome da lei da verdade que precisamente no povo da Scizia é ilegalidade, formassem juntamente com outros, que tenham a mesma opinião, associações mesmo contra o ordenamento em vigor» [Contra Celsum GCS Orig. 428 (Koetschau); cf. A. Fürst, «Monotheismus und Monarchie. Zum Zusammenhang von Heil und Herrschaft in der Antike», in Theol.Phil. 81 (2006) 321-338; a citação está na página 336; cf. também J. Ratzinger, Die Einheit der Nationem, Eine Vision der Kirchenväter (Salzburg-München 1971) 60].

Com base nesta convicção, os combatentes da resistência agiram contra o regime nazista e contra outros regimes totalitários, prestando assim um serviço ao direito e à humanidade inteira. Para estas pessoas era evidente de modo incontestável que, na realidade, o direito vigente era injustiça. Mas, nas decisões de um político democrático, a pergunta sobre o que corresponda agora à lei da verdade, o que seja verdadeiramente justo e possa tornar-se lei não é igualmente evidente. Hoje, de facto, não é de per si evidente aquilo que seja justo e possa tornar-se direito vigente relativamente às questões antropológicas fundamentais. À questão de saber como se possa reconhecer aquilo que verdadeiramente é justo e, deste modo, servir a justiça na legislação, nunca foi fácil encontrar resposta e hoje, na abundância dos nossos conhecimentos e das nossas capacidades, uma tal questão tornou-se ainda muito mais difícil.

Como se reconhece o que é justo? Na história, os ordenamentos jurídicos foram quase sempre religiosamente motivados: com base numa referência à Divindade, decide-se aquilo que é justo entre os homens. Ao contrário doutras grandes religiões, o cristianismo nunca impôs ao Estado e à sociedade um direito revelado, nunca impôs um ordenamento jurídico derivado duma revelação. Mas apelou para a natureza e a razão como verdadeiras fontes do direito; apelou para a harmonia entre razão objectiva e subjectiva, mas uma harmonia que pressupõe serem as duas esferas fundadas na Razão criadora de Deus. Deste modo, os teólogos cristãos associaram-se a um movimento filosófico e jurídico que estava formado já desde o século II (a.C.). De facto, na primeira metade do século II pré-cristão, deu-se um encontro entre o direito natural social, desenvolvido pelos filósofos estóicos, e autorizados mestres do direito romano [cf. W. Waldstein, Ins Herz geschrieben. Das Naturrecht als Fundament einer menschlichen Gesellschaft (Augsburg 2010) 11ss; 31-61]. Neste contacto nasceu a cultura jurídica ocidental, que foi, e é ainda agora, de importância decisiva para a cultura jurídica da humanidade. Desta ligação pré-cristã entre direito e filosofia parte o caminho que leva, através da Idade Média cristã, ao desenvolvimento jurídico do Iluminismo até à Declaração dos Direitos Humanos e depois à nossa Lei Fundamental alemã, pela qual o nosso povo reconheceu, em 1949, «os direitos invioláveis e inalienáveis do homem como fundamento de toda a comunidade humana, da paz e da justiça no mundo».

Foi decisivo para o desenvolvimento do direito e o progresso da humanidade que os teólogos cristãos tivessem tomado posição contra o direito religioso, requerido pela fé nas divindades, e se tivessem colocado da parte da filosofia, reconhecendo como fonte jurídica válida para todos a razão e a natureza na sua correlação. Esta opção realizara-a já São Paulo, quando afirma na Carta aos Romanos: «Quando os gentios que não têm a Lei [a Torah de Israel], por natureza agem segundo a Lei, eles (…) são lei para si próprios. Esses mostram que o que a Lei manda praticar está escrito nos seus corações, como resulta do testemunho da sua consciência» (Rm 2, 14-15). Aqui aparecem os dois conceitos fundamentais de natureza e de consciência, sendo aqui a «consciência» o mesmo que o «coração dócil» de Salomão, a razão aberta à linguagem do ser. Deste modo se até à época do Iluminismo, da Declaração dos Direitos Humanos depois da II Guerra Mundial e até à formação da nossa Lei Fundamental, a questão acerca dos fundamentos da legislação parecia esclarecida, no último meio século verificou-se uma dramática mudança da situação. Hoje considera-se a ideia do direito natural uma doutrina católica bastante singular, sobre a qual não valeria a pena discutir fora do âmbito católico, de tal modo que quase se tem vergonha mesmo só de mencionar o termo. Queria brevemente indicar como se veio a criar esta situação. Antes de mais nada é fundamental a tese segundo a qual haveria entre o ser e o dever ser um abismo intransponível: do ser não poderia derivar um dever, porque se trataria de dois âmbitos absolutamente diversos. A base de tal opinião é a concepção positivista, quase geralmente adoptada hoje, de natureza. Se se considera a natureza – no dizer de Hans Kelsen - «um agregado de dados objectivos, unidos uns aos outros como causas e efeitos», então realmente dela não pode derivar qualquer indicação que seja de algum modo de carácter ético (Waldstein, op. cit., 15-21). Uma concepção positivista de natureza, que compreende a natureza de modo puramente funcional, tal como a conhecem as ciências naturais, não pode criar qualquer ponte para a ética e o direito, mas suscitar de novo respostas apenas funcionais. Entretanto o mesmo vale para a razão numa visão positivista, que é considerada por muitos como a única visão científica. Segundo ela, o que não é verificável ou falsificável não entra no âmbito da razão em sentido estrito. Por isso, a ética e a religião devem ser atribuídas ao âmbito subjectivo, caindo fora do âmbito da razão no sentido estrito do termo. Onde vigora o domínio exclusivo da razão positivista – e tal é, em grande parte, o caso da nossa consciência pública –, as fontes clássicas de conhecimento da ética e do direito são postas fora de jogo. Esta é uma situação dramática que interessa a todos e sobre a qual é necessário um debate público; convidar urgentemente para ele é uma intenção essencial deste discurso.

O conceito positivista de natureza e de razão, a visão positivista do mundo é, no seu conjunto, uma parcela grandiosa do conhecimento humano e da capacidade humana, à qual não devemos de modo algum renunciar. Mas ela mesma no seu conjunto não é uma cultura que corresponda e seja suficiente ao ser humano em toda a sua amplitude. Onde a razão positivista se considera como a única cultura suficiente, relegando todas as outras realidades culturais para o estado de subculturas, aquela diminui o homem, antes, ameaça a sua humanidade. Digo isto pensando precisamente na Europa, onde vastos ambientes procuram reconhecer apenas o positivismo como cultura comum e como fundamento comum para a formação do direito, reduzindo todas as outras convicções e os outros valores da nossa cultura ao estado de uma subcultura. Assim coloca-se a Europa, face às outras culturas do mundo, numa condição de falta de cultura e suscitam-se, ao mesmo tempo, correntes extremistas e radicais. A razão positivista, que se apresenta de modo exclusivista e não é capaz de perceber algo para além do que é funcional, assemelha-se aos edifícios de cimento armado sem janelas, nos quais nos damos o clima e a luz por nós mesmos e já não queremos receber estes dois elementos do amplo mundo de Deus. E no entanto não podemos iludir-nos, pois em tal mundo autoconstruído bebemos em segredo e igualmente nos “recursos” de Deus, que transformamos em produtos nossos. É preciso tornar a abrir as janelas, devemos olhar de novo a vastidão do mundo, o céu e a terra e aprender a usar tudo isto de modo justo.

Mas, como fazê-lo? Como encontramos a entrada justa na vastidão, no conjunto? Como pode a razão reencontrar a sua grandeza sem escorregar no irracional? Como pode a natureza aparecer novamente na sua verdadeira profundidade, nas suas exigências e com as suas indicações? Chamo à memória um processo da história política recente, esperando não ser mal entendido nem suscitar demasiadas polémicas unilaterais. Diria que o aparecimento do movimento ecológico na política alemã a partir dos Anos Setenta, apesar de não ter talvez aberto janelas, todavia foi, e continua a ser, um grito que anela por ar fresco, um grito que não se pode ignorar nem acantonar, porque se vislumbra nele muita irracionalidade. Pessoas jovens deram-se conta de que, nas nossas relações com a natureza, há algo que não está bem; que a matéria não é apenas uma material para nossa feitura, mas a própria terra traz em si a sua dignidade e devemos seguir as suas indicações. É claro que aqui não faço propaganda por um determinado partido político; nada me seria mais alheio do que isso. Quando na nossa relação com a realidade há qualquer coisa que não funciona, então devemos todos reflectir seriamente sobre o conjunto e todos somos reenviados à questão acerca dos fundamentos da nossa própria cultura. Seja-me permitido deter-me um momento mais neste ponto. A importância da ecologia é agora indiscutível. Devemos ouvir a linguagem da natureza e responder-lhe coerentemente. Mas quero insistir num ponto que - a meu ver –, hoje como ontem, é descurado: existe também uma ecologia do homem. Também o homem possui uma natureza, que deve respeitar e não pode manipular como lhe apetece. O homem não é apenas uma liberdade que se cria por si própria. O homem não se cria a si mesmo. Ele é espírito e vontade, mas é também natureza, e a sua vontade é justa quando respeita a natureza e a escuta e quando se aceita a si mesmo por aquilo que é e que não se criou por si mesmo. Assim mesmo, e só assim, é que se realiza a verdadeira liberdade humana.

Voltemos aos conceitos fundamentais de natureza e razão, donde partíramos. O grande teórico do positivismo jurídico, Kelsen, em 1965 – com a idade de 84 anos (consola-me o facto de ver que, aos 84 anos, ainda se é capaz de pensar algo de razoável) –, abandonou o dualismo entre ser e dever ser. Antes, ele tinha dito que as normas só podem derivar da vontade. Consequentemente – acrescenta ele – a natureza só poderia conter em si mesma normas, se uma vontade tivesse colocado nela estas normas. Mas isto – diz ele – pressuporia um Deus criador, cuja vontade se inseriu na natureza. «Discutir sobre a verdade desta fé é absolutamente vão» – observa ele a tal propósito (citado segundo Waldstein, op.cit., 19). Mas sê-lo-á verdadeiramente? – apetece-me perguntar. É verdadeiramente desprovido de sentido reflectir se a razão objectiva que se manifesta na natureza não pressuponha uma Razão criadora, um Creator Spiritus?

Aqui deveria vir em nossa ajuda o património cultural da Europa. Foi na base da convicção sobre a existência de um Deus criador que se desenvolveram a ideia dos direitos humanos, a ideia da igualdade de todos os homens perante a lei, o conhecimento da inviolabilidade da dignidade humana em cada pessoa e a consciência da responsabilidade dos homens pelo seu agir. Estes conhecimentos da razão constituem a nossa memória cultural. Ignorá-la ou considerá-la como mero passado seria uma amputação da nossa cultura no seu todo e privá-la-ia da sua integralidade. A cultura da Europa nasceu do encontro entre Jerusalém, Atenas e Roma, do encontro entre a fé no Deus de Israel, a razão filosófica dos Gregos e o pensamento jurídico de Roma. Este tríplice encontro forma a identidade íntima da Europa. Na consciência da responsabilidade do homem diante de Deus e no reconhecimento da dignidade inviolável do homem, de cada homem, este encontro fixou critérios do direito, cuja defesa é nossa tarefa neste momento histórico.

Ao jovem rei Salomão, na hora de assumir o poder, foi concedido formular um seu pedido. Que sucederia se nos fosse concedido a nós, legisladores de hoje, fazer um pedido? O que é que pediríamos? Penso que também hoje, em última análise, nada mais poderíamos desejar que um coração dócil, a capacidade de distinguir o bem do mal e, deste modo, estabelecer um direito verdadeiro, servir a justiça e a paz. Agradeço-vos pela vossa atenção!

Let’s Talk about Abortion: A Response to Dennis O’Brien - by Christopher Kaczor

by Christopher Kaczor

In The Public Discourse

Fetal killing imposes a serious bodily harm on an innocent human being. The law should prohibit abortion just as it does other serious harms to the well-being of persons, such as assault, rape, kidnapping, and theft.

In a recent discussion, “Can We Talk about Abortion?,” published by Commonweal Magazine, Dennis O’Brien argues that there is a problem of consistency between the ethical principles articulated by those who hold that abortion is killing an innocent human being and the legal penalties that they wish imposed, should abortion ever be criminalized. He writes:

The moral rhetoric used by many bishops to condemn abortion does not seem to fit the criminal penalties that they apparently accept. Further, I find it hard to believe that the bishops would support severe criminal laws commensurate with the moral rhetoric of abortion as an ‘abominable crime.’ When there is a serious disconnect between the gravity of moral condemnation and legal penalty, one or the other should give. Either the rhetoric is too severe or the law is too lenient.

Putting aside the political reality that lessening a criminal penalty may be necessary for getting the legislation to pass, it should be noted that a penalty’s severity is not determined solely by the wrongness of the criminal act, but also by the likely consequences of that wrong for the community. Both the President of the United States and any other person have equal moral and legal rights not to be killed intentionally, and yet it makes sense to impose more stringent penalties on political assassins than on other killers. The difference in penalty is justified by the President’s leadership in society. Killing a political leader can threaten the democratic order, destabilize the geopolitical balance, and perhaps even prompt a world war. Killing the average citizen does none of those things.

Similarly, in the typical case of murder, someone’s life plans are thwarted, someone’s duties can no longer be discharged, and other people may fear for their lives. Though these factors might shape the penalty imposed on the murderer, they become irrelevant from the perspective of an unborn life that ends in abortion. So, one can hold that abortion and the murder of an adult both intentionally kill an innocent human being without being forced to also hold that abortion and the murder of an adult should be punished in exactly the same way by law.

O’Brien proposes that the law should tolerate abortion: “Grave as the moral fault may be, it [abortion] is not something that can fall under legal restraint.” He is right, of course, that not all grave moral faults should also be illegal: It is seriously wrong to insult one’s mother just for fun; it is seriously wrong willfully and without excuse to neglect one’s spiritual life; it is seriously wrong to waste all of one’s time and excess income merely on self-indulgent whims. None of these moral faults, however, should be matters of criminal law.

By contrast, many other moral faults, such as assault, theft, rape, and murder, should be against the law. One way to draw the line between these two kinds of cases is to consider whether the wrong done is seriously injurious to the bodily or material well-being of another person. Private vices, like wasting all one’s time and money on idle pleasures, do not intentionally harm others. Insulting one’s mother does not seriously harm her in terms of her bodily or material well-being. By contrast, assault, theft, rape, and murder do impose serious bodily and material harms on innocent persons.

If morality and law are related in roughly this way, then abortion—understood here as the intentional killing of a human being prior to birth—is not merely a moral fault that deserves legal tolerance. Rather, fetal killing imposes a serious bodily harm on an innocent human being; the law, in its role of protecting the innocent from serious harms imposed by others without due process of law, should prohibit abortion just as it does other serious harms to the well-being of persons, such as assault, rape, kidnapping, and theft.

O’Brien does not deny the harm of abortion, but he does seek to contextualize it in the intimacy of gestation. The reality of pregnancy—the unique, intimate relationship of the human being in utero and the pregnant woman—changes the ethics of feticide: “The pregnant woman’s womb is not just a geographic location for an independent entity that would be the same if it were located someplace else.” To deny this reality is to reduce the pregnant woman to a “container.”

The intimacy argument, as articulated by O’Brien, begs an important question: Why should independent moral status require independent physical status? We don’t think that one conjoined twin may licitly or legally authorize a third party to kill her conjoined sister in order to terminate their intimate relationship. Indeed, the intimate relationship that always exists in pregnancy is a powerful argument against abortion. Every human fetus is a mammal, and every mammal has a mother. Sound ethical reasoning and just laws hold that human mothers and fathers have serious duties to care for and, above all, not harm their own dependent progeny. So, the intimate relationship that exists in every pregnancy gives rise to the duty of the mother not to harm her own child prior to or after birth, including by prematurely ending the child’s life. Precisely because an expectant woman is a mother rather than a mere container, she has duties to her dependent unborn child.

Finally, turning to the rare but real case of rape, O’Brien writes, “A woman may have no moral or legal obligation to carry a child conceived by rape—but she may decide to do so. She has no obligation in justice to continue the pregnancy, but she may act from benevolence. Depending on circumstances, benevolence moves into the realm of moral heroism—in Christian terms, into saintliness. As Christians we are all called to saintliness, but saintliness is not a direct moral demand and it certainly is not enforceable by law.”

O’Brien is correct that a woman who continues her pregnancy is a hero. In so doing, she radically contradicts the act of her attacker. He imposed himself on her; she gives of herself for her child. He acted selfishly; she acts benevolently. He diminished her life for his pleasure; she nurtures a life despite the pain. Such a woman is acting in a saintly manner. Does it now follow that since such a woman is heroic, it is morally and legally permissible to have an abortion? No, it does not.

Unfortunately, evil people can force other, more vulnerable people into situations where the morally permissible but not heroic option is gone, and the only available choice is between moral heroism and moral evil (or illegal activity). A torturer may force a prisoner to choose between heroically keeping silent and telling secrets it would be immoral to reveal. A terrorist can force a hostage to choose between getting killed and helping the terrorist to kill. The rapist who impregnates a woman forces her to choose between enduring an unplanned pregnancy and inflicting life-ending harm on her own innocent child. It takes heroism to choose the former, but it is still wrong to choose the latter.

Archbishop Dolan urges Obama: end campaign against marriage, religious freedom

In Catholic Culture

In a remarkable letter to President Barack Obama, Archbishop Timothy Dolan of New York strongly criticized “recent actions taken by your Administration that both escalate the threat to marriage and imperil the religious freedom of those who promote and defend marriage.”

The prelate, who serves as president of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), concluded the letter by calling upon the Obama administration to end its “campaign against DOMA [the Defense of Marriage Act], the institution of marriage it protects, and religious freedom.”

An accompanying analysis, prepared by USCCB staff, warned that the

comprehensive efforts of the federal government—using its formidable moral, economic, and coercive power—to enforce its new legal definition of “marriage” against a resistant Church would, if not reversed, precipitate a systemic national conflict between Church and State, harming both institutions, as well as our Nation as a whole.

“This past spring the Justice Department announced that it would no longer defend the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in court, a decision strongly opposed by the Catholic Bishops of the United States and many others,” Archbishop Dolan began. “Now the Justice Department has shifted from not defending DOMA—which is problem enough, given the duty of the executive branch to enforce even laws it disfavors—to actively attacking DOMA’s constitutionality.”

“The content of this letter reflects the strong sentiment expressed at a recent meeting by more than thirty of my brother Bishops who serve on the Administrative Committee of our episcopal conference,” Archbishop Dolan continued. “I know they are joined by hundreds of additional Catholic bishops throughout our nation. My observations are offered in the spirit of respectful, but frank dialogue.”

Archbishop Dolan added:

The Catholic Bishops stand ready to affirm every positive measure taken by you and your Administration to strengthen marriage and the family. We cannot be silent, however, when federal steps harmful to marriage, the laws defending it, and religious freedom continue apace …

I know that you treasure the importance that you and the First Lady, separately and as a couple, share in the lives of your children. The Mother’s Day and Father’s Day proclamations display a welcome conviction on your part that neither a mom nor a dad is expendable. I believe therefore that you would agree that every child has the right to be loved by both a mother and a father.

The institution of marriage is built on this truth, which goes to the core of what the Catholic Bishops of the United States, and the millions of citizens who stand with us on this issue, want for all children and for the common good of society. That is why it is particularly upsetting, Mr. President, when your Administration, through the various court documents, pronouncements and policies identified in the attached analysis, attributes to those who support DOMA a motivation rooted in prejudice and bias. It is especially wrong and unfair to equate opposition to redefining marriage with either intentional or willfully ignorant racial discrimination, as your Administration insists on doing …

Mr. President, I respectfully urge you to push the reset button on your Administration’s approach to DOMA. Our federal government should not be presuming ill intent or moral blindness on the part of the overwhelming majority of its citizens, millions of whom have gone to the polls to directly support DOMAs in their states and have thereby endorsed marriage as the union of man and woman. Nor should a policy disagreement over the meaning of marriage be treated by federal officials as a federal offense—but this will happen if the Justice Department’s latest constitutional theory prevails in court. The Administration’s failure to change course on this matter will, as the attached analysis indicates, precipitate a national conflict between Church and State of enormous proportions and to the detriment of both institutions.

In the analysis accompany Archbishop Dolan’s letter, the USCCB staff criticized the Justice Department’s attack on DOMA as a form of “sexual orientation discrimination” as well as the administration’s promotion of adoption by homosexual couples, its “sensitivity training” against “heterosexism,” and its implementation of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”

The USCCB staff members who prepared the analysis added:

[T]he Administration’s efforts to change the law—in all three branches of the federal government—so that support for authentic marriage is treated as an instance of “sexual orientation discrimination,” will threaten to spawn a wide range of legal sanctions against individuals and institutions within the Catholic community, and in many others as well. Based on the experience of religious entities under some state and local governments already, we would expect that, if the Administration succeeds, we would face lawsuits for supposed “discrimination” in all the areas where the Church operates in service to the common good, and where civil rights laws apply—such as employment, housing, education, and adoption services, to name just a few …

Source(s): these links will take you to other sites, in a new window.

• Attacks on DOMA Threaten Marriage, Church-State Relations, Warns Archbishop Dolan in Letter to President (USCCB)
• Full text of letter (USCCB)

¿Quiénes son los que acusan al Papa ante la Corte Penal Internacional de La Haya? - Jorge E. Mújica

In Religión en Libertad

La enésima acusación contra Benedicto XVI por el tema de los abusos contra menores por parte de algunos miembros del clero ha llegado nuevamente ante la Corte Penal Internacional de La Haya el 13 de septiembre de 2011.

En un dossier de más de 70 hojas se pide sea procesado por «crímenes contra la humanidad». La acusación se extiende a los cardenales Tarcisio Bertone, Angelo Sodano y William Levada. ¿Quiénes son los acusantes y qué hay en sus respectivos expedientes?.

El primero de ellos es la «Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests» («SNAP», por sus siglas en inglés); «Center for Constitutional Rights» («CCR», por sus iniciales en inglés) es el segundo.

Un artículo publicado en diario digital italiano L´Occidentale (cf. «Ci mancava solo il Papa come Milosevic», 13.09.2011) evidenciaba los intereses lucrativos de estos grupos y revelaba quiénes son realmente las asociaciones.

En el primer caso recuerda que «es una asociación cuyos métodos de procedimientos en sus actividades no han convencido a la «BBB», la agencia de rating de la caridad estadounidense (es decir, de entes «non profit») que ni siquiera la considerado digna de ser definida «obra de caridad» (se puede conocer el resultado completo de juicio de la «BBB» sobre la «SNAP» en el siguiente enlace).

A continuación el artículo de L´Occidentale refiere dos casos de víctimas que habían estado vinculadas a la «SNAP» y han preferido abandonarla. Se trata de Michael Baumann y Key Ebelingcuyos testimonios sobre la experiencia en la citada asociación es poco menos que alentadora.

Por último, queda expuesto el hecho de que la «SNAP» se financia con dinero de los abogados a los que remite víctimas o presuntas víctimas en cuanto pueden ser clientes potenciales (se puede ver una lista en este enlace).

Pero aún hay más: uno de los mayores colaboradores de la SNAP, el doctor Steve Taylor, fue arrestado en 2008 por poseer más de 100 videos con imágenes pedo-pornográficas (véase el siguiente enlace). Aun conociendo estos hechos, el fundador y actual presidente de la asociación, Barbara Blaine, escribió cartas en defensa de Taylor, con peticiones «poco éticas» (véanse aquí en lengua inglesa).

Por cuanto toca a la segunda asociación, el «Center for Constitutional Rights», UCCR on line revela que se trata de una fundación impulsada por radicales de izquierda y comunistas de los años 60´s: «En el pasado ha defendido a los miembros de la Black Panther, la organización terrorista, marxista-leninista-maoísta de los Estados Unidos. Dos de sus fundadores, Kinoy y Kunstler, se declararon pro Fidel Castro, el dictador cubano ateo». La misma fuente revela que la fundación se financia con dinero de George Soros.

Como ya se había comentado al final de otro artículo (véase «Benedicto XVI fue espiado por la «Stasi»: revelaciones ante su inminente viaje a Alemania», 16.09.2011), según declaraciones de Cuno Tarfusser a «Radio 24», juez de la Corte, la denuncia tiene estrechas posibilidades de prosperar: «en la figura de crimines contra la humanidad sobre los que tenemos jurisdicción y competencia entran diversos tipo de conductas, entre las cuales los delitos de tipo sexual. Pero para que pueda haber una incriminación no basta haber cometido uno o más de estos, es necesario algo más, eso que nosotros llamamos elemento contextual. Esos hechos deben ser cometidos como derivaciones de un ataque a la sociedad civil, deben ser sistemáticos, muy difundidos y, sobre todo, detrás de ellos debe haber una especie de dirección, una política organizativa superior».

Llama la atención que en este caso la prensa haya apostado inmediatamente por una defensa del Papa y las numerosas iniciativas por él impulsadas para desterrar este mal en la Iglesia (se puede ver diversos titulares de prensa en el siguiente enlace en lengua italiana).

Sin dejar de recordar que un solo caso de abuso, dentro o fuera de la Iglesia, es ya demasiado, vistas con más pausa y profundidad las partes implicadas y las motivaciones publicitarias de fondo, no es que reluzca precisamente una confianza hacia ellas.

China's One-Child Policy Toll Reaches 400 Million - by By Steven W. Mosher

In answer to a question from Congressman Tim Huelskamp, a Chinese official has admitted that China’s population control program has cost 400 million lives, a number greater than that of the population of the United States.

In PRI

Over the years, I have been asked many times to estimate how many lives have been lost in China as a result of the one-child policy. Given that the policy has been in place for 30 years, I respond, and given that each year the government aborts between 10 to 15 million women, the total number of unborn children whose lives have been sacrificed is somewhere between 300 and 450 million. It is impossible to be more precise, I add, because of the Chinese Communist party's penchant for secrecy about such sensitive matters.

Now, thanks to Congressman Tim Huelskamp, a pro-life Kansas Republican, we have shocking confirmation of these numbers from a senior Chinese government official.

During a meeting yesterday with members of the House Budget Committee, Congressman Huelskamp asked Gao Qiang, who served for two years as the Party Secretary for the Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China, about the country's population control policy.

Through an interpreter, Party Secretary Gao responded that the population of China is 400 million less than it would have been had the Party not adopted and enforced a one-child policy. He went on to say that China had prevented more births than the population of the United States, which currently stands at 312 million.

"I was shocked to hear a Chinese official admit how many people have been lost as a result of the country's population control policy," Congressman Huelskamp later remarked. "The fact that this policy has resulted in the loss of more people than the overall population of the United States is an eye-opening figure. Think about the demographic consequences of this, particularly the fact that a disproportionate number of these losses are baby girls. But, even if this policy were to be ended today, impacts would be felt for years to come."

That senior Chinese Communist Party officials continue to tout how "successful" their brutal population control policy has been in eliminating people reveals their absolute contempt for international standards of human rights. After all, these numbers were achieved by forcing young women, some in the final months of pregnancy, to have abortions, an act that was declared by the Nuremburg Tribunals to be a crime against humanity.

But it also reveals a fundamental disconnect with the demographic reality that they themselves have created, namely, a rapidly aging population that is disproportionately male. Thanks to family planning run amuck, China is a country where unborn baby girls are selectively aborted, where young men cannot find brides and where young women are trafficked across borders to meet this demand.

Then there are the economic implications.

There is an old book, written in the 1920s by an American businessman, Carl Crook, called 400 Million Customers. He saw China then, as many people still do today, as a huge, untapped market.

I thought of this book when I learned that Party Secretary Gao was bragging about having reduced China's population growth by 400 million over the last 30 years.

Think about China's astonishing economic performance — its annual GDP growth over the past three decades is close to 10% — once the Communist Party stopped trying to control all economic activity. Think of the tremendous work ethic of the Chinese people and their dedication to educating their children. Think of the labor shortages that are now cropping up across the country because of the one-child policy, where many factories cannot recruit enough workers.

Think on these things, and then ask yourself: Is China really better off because its leadership has eliminated 400 million one of the most intelligent, hard working, and entrepreneurially minded peoples the world has ever seen?

Has the Chinese Communist Party lost its collective mind? It has eliminated 400 million customers.

Birth control pill alters women’s emotional memory: new research

by Jeremy Kryn

IRVINE, California, September 15, 2011 (LifeSiteNews.com) – Women on the birth control pill are less likely to retain factual details in memories of emotional events, according to new University of California, Irvine (UCI) research.

“What’s most exciting about this study is that it shows the use of hormonal contraception alters memory,” UCI graduate researcher Shawn Nielsen said.

In the study, which appears in the September issue of the journal Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, groups of women either on the pill or experiencing natural hormonal cycles were shown photographs of a mother, her son, and a car accident. Some in each group were told the car had hit a curb, while others were told the car had hit the boy and critically injured him.

One week later, all were given surprise tests about what they recalled. Women not using hormonal contraceptives remembered more details, such as a fire hydrant next to the car, than women on the pill for as little as one month. Women on the pill remembered more clearly the “gist” of the event, that there had been an accident, that the boy had been rushed to the hospital, and that doctors worked to save his life and successfully reattached both his feet.

The change makes sense, said Nielsen, who co-authored the publication with UCI neurobiologist Larry Cahill, because contraceptives suppress sex hormones such as estrogen and progesterone to prevent pregnancy. Those hormones have previously been linked to women’s strong “left brain” memory.

Nielsen said that only a handful of studies currently examine the cognitive effects of the pill, which is used by an estimated 100 million women around the world.

“It’s a change in the type of information they remember, not a deficit,” she said.

Pauline Maki, professor of psychiatry and psychology at the University of Illinois at Chicago, and a specialist in memory and brain functioning, noted that Cahill is known as an expert for researching “linking sex to memory.”

“The fact that women on oral contraceptives remembered different elements of a story tells us that estrogen has an influence on how women remember emotional events,” she said.

Nielsen said that the findings, which were made possible by National Institute of Mental Health funding, could help lead to answers about why women experience post traumatic stress syndrome more frequently than men, and how men remember differently than women.

According to the UCI press release, men typically rely more on right-hemisphere brain activity to encode memory. They retain the gist of things better than details. Women on the pill, who have lower levels of hormones associated with female reproduction, may remember emotional events similarly to men.

Other side effects pointed out by critics against the popular drug are less benign: the pill has been classed a Group 1 carcinogen, or a “definite” cause of cancer, by the World Health Organization for its effect on breast cancer risk.