CATÓLICO E MAÇON? A desmistificação de uma contradição – P. Gonçalo Portocarrero de Almada

1. Todas as pessoas são livres de opinar sobre o que quiserem, mas só algumas têm a competência necessária para dirimirem, com autoridade, uma questão polémica. A Maçonaria talvez possa permitir que os seus súbditos sejam católicos, mas não que os cristãos sejam maçons, porque só a Igreja, pela voz autorizada do seu magistério e da sua hierarquia, é apta para decidir se um fiel pode, ou não, pertencer à Maçonaria.

2. Sobre esta matéria, a verdade é que a Igreja não tem sido omissa. Já em 1738, com a Constituição Apostólica In eminenti, de Clemente XII, a Maçonaria foi formal e expressamente proibida aos católicos, sob pena de excomunhão. Desde então, todos os Papas confirmaram a radical e insolúvel incompatibilidade entre as duas instituições. Leão XIII, na Encíclica Humanum genus, de 1884, reafirmou a interdição dos fiéis aderirem à Maçonaria e, em mais 225 documentos, reiterou até à saciedade esta condenação. O diagnóstico foi sempre o mesmo: são duas visões insanavelmente divergentes no que respeita a Deus, ao homem, à verdade e à liberdade. Também os Papas actuais, nomeadamente o Beato João Paulo II e Bento XVI, mantiveram o mesmo veredicto que, portanto, se deve considerar doutrina definitiva e irreformável da Igreja. Pelo menos enquanto a Igreja e a Maçonaria forem o que são.

3. Também, do ponto de vista canónico, não há lugar para dúvidas. O anterior Código, de 1917, previa a pena máxima, ou seja, a excomunhão automática, para o católico que se inscrevesse numa qualquer loja maçónica. O Código actual, de 1983, embora não imponha de forma imediata essa sanção, que contudo também não exclui, esclarece que um cristão que pertença à Maçonaria fica, ipso facto, em situação de pecado grave ou mortal e, em consequência, privado da comunhão sacramental.

4. Como entender, então, que alguém se afirme publicamente como católico e maçon? A expressão, contraditória nos seus termos, só admite duas possíveis explicações.

A primeira hipótese é a de que o dito crente ignore, de boa-fé, a doutrina da Igreja sobre o particular, bem como a natureza intrinsecamente anticristã da Maçonaria.

Alguns cristãos – crianças, analfabetos, etc. – talvez desconheçam esta incompatibilidade, mas seria estranho que entre os maçons, uma elite supostamente tão ilustrada, se desse uma tal ignorância. É, no mínimo, curioso que­, em pleno séc. XXI, haja ainda intelectuais, como os ditos pedreiros livres, que desconheçam uma doutrina reafirmada repetidamente, há quase três séculos, pela Igreja, e atestada por nada menos do que 598 declarações unânimes do seu magistério!

Se a boa-fé for autêntica e tão crassa a ignorância, o crente maçon é inocente de uma tal incoerência. Mas deixará de o ser se, esclarecido sobre a impossibilidade de pertencer às duas entidades, não deixar a Maçonaria.

5. A outra hipótese é a de que o cristão, que publicamente se diz maçon, aja de má-fé. Com efeito, um fiel que, conhecendo minimamente a doutrina cristã, adere consciente e voluntariamente a uma ideologia que sabe ininterrupta e fundadamente proibida por todos os Papas, de fiel só tem o nome. De facto, um soldado, que desobedece a quase seiscentas ordens dos seus legítimos superiores, não é apenas um refractário, mas um desertor, ou um traidor. Talvez fosse pensando nestes tais «cristãos» que Paulo VI afirmou que o fumo de Satanás se infiltrou na Igreja de Deus…

Quem, de forma tão acintosa, desrespeita um mandato formal da máxima autoridade religiosa e disso faz público alarde, ofende gravemente a Igreja, que devia amar e servir. Aliás, estes «cristãos», que são tão solícitos no apoio à «sua» Maçonaria, nunca vêm a público defender a Igreja, ou o seu magistério, que amiúde contradizem. Não em vão Cristo disse que é pelas obras que se conhecem os seus verdadeiros discípulos e, ainda, que ninguém pode servir a dois senhores.

6. Talvez seja esta a prova que faltava para poder concluir, na verdade da caridade, que a Maçonaria – não obstante a eventual boa fé, por ignorância invencível, de alguns dos seus membros – continua fiel, apesar das suas campanhas de desinformação e de branqueamento do seu passado, ao seu ideário anticristão e anticlerical.

Afinal de contas, «católico maçon» não é apenas uma contradição, mas uma dupla mentira: nem católico, … nem pedreiro!

The social sciences cannot settle the moral status of homosexuality - by Stanton L. Jones

In First Things

Many religious and social conservatives believe that homosexuality is a mental illness caused exclusively by psychological or spiritual factors and that all homosexual persons could change their orientation if they simply tried hard enough. This view is widely pilloried (and rightly so) as both wrong on the facts and harmful in effect. But few who attack it are willing to acknowledge that today a wholly different, far more influential, and no less harmful set of falsehoods—each attributed to the findings of “science”—dominates the research literature and political discourse.

We are told that homosexual persons are just as psychologically healthy as heterosexuals, that sexual orientation is biologically determined at birth, that sexual orientation cannot be changed and that the attempt to change it is necessarily harmful, that homosexual relationships are equivalent to heterosexual ones in all important characteristics, and that personal identity is properly and legitimately constituted around sexual orientation. These claims are as misguided as the ridiculed beliefs of some social conservatives, as they spring from distorted or incomplete representations of the best findings from the science of same-sex attraction.

Today we approach same-sex attraction with views grounded in social and biological scientific perspectives that are only partially supported by empirical findings. Until the early decades of the twentieth century, moral disapproval of “sodomy” guided public policy, but that grounding was displaced by a psychiatric model that viewed homosexuality as a mental illness. Once homosexuality came to be seen not as a sin but as a sickness, it became a simple matter for social science to overturn the opposition to homosexual acts. Alfred Kinsey’s studies of male and female sexuality, published in 1948 and 1953, portrayed homosexual behavior of various kinds as a normal and surprisingly common variant of human sexuality. In 1951, Clellan Ford and Frank Beach published Patterns of Sexual Behavior, their famous study of diverse forms of sexual behavior, including same-sex behavior, across human cultures and many animal species; they suggested a widely shared “basic capacity” for same-sex behavior.

But the decisive blow to the mental-illness construal of homosexuality came from a single study in 1957. Psychologist Evelyn Hooker published findings that convincingly demonstrated that homosexual persons do not necessarily manifest psychological maladjustment. On the basis of Hooker’s work, and the findings of similar studies, in 1973 the American Psychiatric Association amended its designation of homosexual orientation as a mental illness.

To avoid misunderstanding the phenomenon of homosexuality, we must grapple with the Achilles heel of research into the homosexual condition: the issue of sample representativeness. To make general characterizations such as “homosexuals are as emotionally healthy as heterosexuals,” scientists must have sampled representative members of the broader group. But representative samples of homosexual persons are difficult to gather, first, because homosexuality is a statistically uncommon phenomenon.

A recent research synthesis by Gary Gates of the Williams Institute, a think tank at UCLA Law School dedicated to sexual-orientation law and public policy, suggests that among adults in the United States, Canada, and Europe, 1.8 percent are bisexual men and women, 1.1 percent are gay men, and 0.6 percent are lesbians. This infrequency makes it hard to find participants for research studies, leading researchers to study easy-to-access groups of persons (such as visible participants in advocacy groups) who may not be representative of the broader homosexual population. Add to this the difficulty of defining homosexuality, of establishing boundaries of what constitutes homosexuality (with individuals coming in and out of the closet, and also shifting in their experience of same-sex identity and attraction), and of the shifting perceptions of the social desirability of embracing the identity label of gay or lesbian, and the difficulty of knowing when one is studying a truly representative sample of homosexual persons becomes clear.

With this caution in mind, we can now approach the broad beliefs shaping our culture. First, are homosexual persons as psychologically healthy as heterosexuals? Many believe so, and public representations of the scientific evidence support the belief. For instance, in 1986, in its amicus curiae brief for the Supreme Court case Bowers v. Hardwick, the American Psychological Association (APA) stated, erroneously, that “extensive psychological research conducted over almost three decades has conclusively established that homosexuality is not related to psychological adjustment or maladjustment.” Today, twenty-five years later, the association’s website still declares, after decades of research to the contrary, that “being gay is just as healthy as being straight.”

Evelyn Hooker, in her 1957 study, was careful to reject only the claim that homosexuality is always pathological. She never made the logically distinct assertion that homosexual persons on average are just as psychologically healthy as heterosexuals. It is well that she did not, because the consistent findings of the best, most representative research suggest the contrary, despite a few scattered compatible findings from smaller studies of less representative samples. One of the most exhaustive studies ever conducted, published in 2001 in the American Journal of Public Health and directed by researchers from Harvard Medical School, concludes that “homosexual orientation . . . is associated with a general elevation of risk for anxiety, mood, and substance-use disorders and for suicidal thoughts and plans.” Other and more recent studies have found similar correlations, including studies from the Netherlands, one of the most gay-affirming social contexts in the world. Depression and substance abuse are found to be on average 20 to 30 percent more prevalent among homosexual persons. Teens manifesting same-sex attraction report suicidal thoughts and attempts at double to triple the rate of other teens. Similar indicators of diminished physical health emerge in this literature.

Social stigma is the popular explanation, both in scientific studies and in mass media, for heightened psychological distress among homosexuals. The possibility that the orientation and all it entails cuts against a fundamental, gender-based given of the human condition, thus creating distress, is not raised. The correlation between social stigma and psychological problem is real, but the empirical case for the first causing the second has yet to be made. This has not stopped advocates, however, from battling alleged stigma by increasingly framing all “anti-gay sentiment” as a form of prejudice. This has led to the creation of new terminology: No matter how congruent with the scientific evidence, any belief that homosexuality is not a normal and positive variant of human sexuality is a manifestation of “homophobia” and “heterosexism,” a symptom of destructive “master narratives of normativity” (of which “heteronormativity” is a part).

Is homosexuality biologically determined at birth? A pervasive understanding is settling into Western culture that homosexual orientation, indeed any and all sexual orientations, has been proven by science to be a given of the human person and rooted in biology. Why does this falsehood—that homosexuality has been proven to have an exclusively biological cause—matter? It is the basis for asserting that sexual orientation is the same sort of characteristic as race or skin color, which has become, for instance, the foundational metaphor in the push for the right to marry someone of the same sex.

One reason it is generally believed that homosexuality is conclusively caused by biological factors is the supposed lack of a credible alternative. Two astonishing examples: The 2009 APA task force report on Sexual Orientation Change Efforts (SOCE), Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation, presents over and over as established “scientific fact” that “no empirical studies or peer-reviewed research supports theories attributing same-sex sexual orientation to family dysfunction or trauma.” Neuroscientist Simon LeVay, author of a major book on the science of same-sex attraction, in considering environmental and psychological factors influencing sexual orientation concludes that “there is no actual evidence to support any of those ideas.”

There are, in fact, many such studies and a lot of actual evidence. Recent studies show that familial, cultural, and other environmental factors contribute to same-sex attraction. Broken families, absent fathers, older mothers, and being born and living in urban settings all are associated with homosexual experience or attraction. Even that most despised of hypothesized causal contributors, childhood sexual abuse, has recently received significant empirical validation as a partial contributor from a sophisticated thirty-year longitudinal study published in the Archives of Sexual Behavior. Of course, these variables at most partially determine later homosexual experience, and most children who experienced any or all of these still grow up heterosexual, but the effects are nonetheless real.

To say that psychological and environmental variables play a part in causation does not mean that biology does not, rather just not to the extent that many gay-affirming scholars claim. The two most influential contemporary theories of biological causation focus respectively on fraternal birth order and genetics; each has some level of support, but for modest-sized causal effects at best.

The fraternal birth order theory hypothesizes that some mothers develop something akin to an allergic reaction to their body’s encounter with the male hormones generated by their male fetus, and hence manifest a hormonal resistance against the masculinization process in the developing male fetus. Males who were the product of such wombs are incompletely masculinized. And it is posited that the more male children such mothers bear, the more profound their reactions and the greater the likelihood that the later-born sons will be homosexual. In short, the more older brothers, the more likely the younger brothers are to be homosexual. The actual evidence such an immunological reaction exists is minimal apart from the raw claim that gay men tend to have disproportionate numbers of older brothers. But do they?

Early studies claiming to demonstrate a disproportionate presence of older brothers among homosexual men were based upon advertisement-recruited, volunteer samples vulnerable to volunteer bias. As Anthony Bogaert and Ray Blanchard, the major proponents of this theory, multiplied their reports of this phenomenon, their larger and larger samples were created by folding new volunteer samples into a common pool with their original samples, thus creating larger and larger nonrepresentative samples.

Recently, Bogaert analyzed two nationally representative samples and found only an exceptionally weak older-brother effect, but only for same-sex attraction, not for same-sex behavior. Then he analyzed an independent and truly representative sample eight times the size of his previous studies, finding no older-brother effect. At roughly the same time, a study of two million Danes and another of 10,000 American teenagers both failed to find the effect. It is thus mystifying why many gay-affirming researchers still confidently assert, like Simon LeVay, “that gay men do have significantly more older brothers, on average, than straight men.”

If there is a genetic component to sexual orientation, then the more two people share their genetic endowment, the more likely they are to share the same sexual orientation. The then-moribund genetic theory received a huge boost from J. Michael Bailey’s famous 1991 study that recruited subjects through advertisements and posted announcements throughout Chicago’s gay community. Bailey examined three groups in descending order of genetic similarity: genetically identical twins, fraternal twins and non-twin brothers who are essentially 50 percent identical, and adopted siblings who have no particular genetic similarity. Bailey reported a widely misinterpreted 52 percent “concordance” for identical male twins, compared with 22 percent for fraternal twins, 9 percent for non-twin brothers, and 11 percent for adopted brothers. The results generated wide and simplistic media coverage. It had been settled, the media suggested: Sexual orientation was determined by one’s genes. What was not widely understood was that only in 14 of the 41 identical-twin pairs did the two twin brothers match for sexual orientation; in the remaining 27 sets the identical twin brothers did not match.

But the deeper problem with the study was again one of sample representativeness. What if individuals were more likely to volunteer for the study if they shared same-sex attraction with a sibling, and less likely to do so if they didn’t? Using a more representative sample from the Australian Twin Registry, Bailey in 2000 saw the concordance for identical male twins fall from 52 to a mere 20 percent, and the matching for homosexual orientation between each pair of identical male twins fell to a mere 3 out of 27 pairs (11.1 percent). The findings of Bailey’s new study failed to reach statistical significance. The ballyhooed genetic effect had shrunk considerably, a fact that failed, of course, to capture any media attention and is often left out of the textbook treatments of the subject. In 2010, an impressive and much larger study utilizing the Swedish Twin Registry produced almost identical results: Among the 71 pairs of identical male twins of whom at least one twin was gay, in only seven cases (9.8 percent) was the second twin also gay, yet another statistically insignificant result.

But the search for a genetic mechanism continues, using a more statistically powerful calculation, that of heritability, which estimates how much of the variability of sexual orientation may be attributed to genetic influences. The higher this estimate, the greater the suggested genetic contribution. The best recent studies consistently generate heritability estimates for male homosexuality of 30 to 50 percent, a statistically significant finding that sounds quite powerful. Heritability estimates for female homosexuality are slightly less than for males, but still statistically significant. But what do heritability estimates of 30 to 50 percent mean?

Behavior genetics has established heritability estimates for a vast array of psychological traits. Quite a number of traits demonstrate much higher heritability than does homosexual orientation. Those with roughly similar heritability include social attitudes such as right-wing authoritarianism, inclination to religiosity, and church attendance. One study by a giant of behavioral genetics, Robert Plomin, found that the proclivity to watch television has an average heritability estimate of 45 percent, on par with the typical estimate for the heritability of male homosexuality.

Contrary to the assumptions of many social conservatives, biology does appear to play a modest part in determining sexual orientation. Contrary to the assumptions of many social progressives, psychological and environmental variables also appear to play at least a modest part in determining sexual orientation. In contrast to the hubris of those prone to making emphatic pronouncements, what we do not yet know about the causation of sexual orientation dwarfs the bit that we are beginning to know. And the fact that causation is indubitably a complex and mysterious by-product of the interaction of biological and psychological variables confounds the assertion that sexual orientation is just like skin color, determined at birth or even conception. And contrary to the suggestions of some, the involvement of some biological influence does not prove that change in sexual orientation is impossible. One of our foremost behavior genetics experts, Thomas Bouchard, has argued forcefully that “one of the most unfortunate misinterpretations of the heritability coefficient is that it provides an index of trait malleability (i.e., the higher the heritability the less modifiable the trait is through environmental intervention).”

If some measure of heritability does not establish that the trait is not modifiable, what does the direct evidence show about change? Attorney General Eric Holder, explaining the Obama administration’s decision not to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, repeatedly cited the “immutability” of sexual orientation: “A growing scientific consensus accepts that sexual orientation is a characteristic that is immutable.” The recent APA amicus brief for the Proposition 8 case is also forceful on the issue of change; contrary to claims that change is possible, they say, “research suggests the opposite.”

Has science established that sexual orientation cannot change? Dozens of scholarly papers appeared in journals from the 1940s to the early 1970s reporting that a substantial portion of those wanting to change homosexual orientation did change to some degree. But rarely since 1980 has a professional publication reported such results. Did science change direction and prove change impossible? Not quite.

Certainly, there has been lately less research of late studying the possibility of change. The removal in 1973 of homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders both changed the political environment in the mental-health professions and undermined grant funding for research on this subject. Many academics no longer had any motivation to study this phenomenon and considerable political reasons not to do so. Further, prior published research is commonly dismissed as inadequate. The APA’s website stated for many years that claims that homosexual orientation can change “are poorly documented. For example, treatment outcome is not followed and reported over time as would be the standard to test the validity of any mental health intervention.”

Such criticism took its most comprehensive form in the report of the 2009 APA task force studying SOCE (sexual-orientation change efforts). These scholars set extraordinary standards of methodological rigor for what they regarded as a reasonable scientific study of the possibility of sexual-orientation change, a move that resulted in the classification of only six studies out of dozens as meriting close examination. These studies were, in turn, dismissed for a variety of reasons, leaving the panel with no credible findings, by their standards, documenting the efficacy of SOCE. After dismissing SOCE for its lack of empirical validation, the panel then recommended gay-affirming therapy while explicitly acknowledging that it lacked the very type of empirical validation required of SOCE.

In the absence of evidence, it would be proper scientific procedure to acknowledge one’s ignorance. The members of the APA task force claim that their review has established that “enduring change to an individual’s sexual orientation is uncommon” and “that it is unlikely that individuals will be able to reduce same-sex attractions or increase other-sex sexual attractions through SOCE.” But even more-forceful claims have been made. The Public Affairs website of the APA for many years stated, “Can therapy change sexual orientation? No,” and insisted that homosexuality “is not changeable.” But has science proven this? Not at all; rather, skeptical reviewers have dismissed evidence of the possibility of change for some on the basis of such studies being methodologically inadequate by post hoc and artificially stringent standards.

Is sexual orientation immutable? With Mark Yarhouse of Regent University, I recently studied people seeking to change their sexual orientation. We assessed the sexual orientations and psychological distress levels of 98 individuals (72 men, 26 women) trying to change their sexual orientation through ministries organized under Exodus International, beginning early in the process and following them over six to seven years with five additional, independent assessments. Our original round of findings was published in a book titled Ex-Gays?; the latest round, in the Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy.

Of the 61 subjects who completed the study, 23 percent reported success in the form of “conversion” to heterosexual orientation and functioning, while 30 percent reported they were able to live chastely and had disidentified themselves from homosexual orientation. On the other hand, 20 percent reported giving up and fully embracing homosexual identity, and the remaining 27 percent continued the process of attempted change with limited and unsatisfactory success. On average, statistically significant decreases in homosexual orientation were reported across the entire sample, while a smaller but still significant increase of heterosexual attraction was reported. The attempt to change orientation was not found to lead to increases in psychological distress on average; indeed, the study found several small significant improvements in psychological distress associated with the interventions. And lest we fall prey to the same mistakes we have been criticizing in others, we have said repeatedly that because our sample was not demonstrably representative of those seeking change among all religious homosexuals, these are likely optimistic outcome estimates.

I conclude that homosexual orientation is, contrary to the supposed consensus, sometimes mutable. “Homosexuality” is a multifaceted phenomenon; there are likely many homosexualities, with some perhaps more malleable than others. Not all interventions are the same; not all practitioners are equally skilled. Perhaps most important, those seeking change vary considerably in their intensity of motivation, in their resourcefulness, and in the context in which they try to change. Most of those seeking change and most of those who actually attain some level of change are highly religiously committed, and these individuals who believe in a God who intervenes in their lives are embedded in communities of care and are motivated by their core understanding of who they are as a person before God. It is a wonder that anyone without such resources successfully obtains sexual-orientation change.

Are homosexual relationships equivalent to heterosexual ones? In his ruling overturning Proposition 8, Judge Vaughn Walker cited UCLA psychologist Letitia Peplau’s testimony that “despite stereotypes suggesting gays and lesbians are unable to form stable relationships, same-sex couples are in fact indistinguishable from opposite-sex couples in terms of relationship quality and stability.” The APA’s brief for this case similarly claimed that “empirical research demonstrates that the psychological and social aspects of committed relationships between same-sex partners closely resemble those of heterosexual partnerships.” That brief relies upon the 2007 overview of research on same-sex relationships by Peplau and A. W. Fingerhut.

Here again we return to the issue of sample representativeness, which Peplau and Fingerhut handle with unfortunate evasiveness. They typically launch into discussions about various characteristics of homosexual couples without ever clearly stating that the studies they cite do not examine representative samples. They offer only intriguing hints that the studies on which they rely may be unrepresentative and hence potentially biased. They also raise in passing the provocative possibility that homosexual couples may bias their self-reports to look good.

Even so, intriguing hints of differences, of “nonequivalency,” between heterosexual and homosexual couples emerge from Peplau and Fingerhut’s survey. They mention one large study that found that 28 percent of lesbians had had sex outside their primary relationship—comparable to the 21 percent of women in relationships with men and 26 percent of men in relationships with women. By contrast, 82 percent of gay men had had sex with someone other than their main partner. However one construes such a striking difference in sexual monogamy, whether as a trivial stylistic difference or as indicative of something fundamental and pervasive, such a finding seriously challenges the equivalency hypothesis.

Stability is a relational characteristic of direct relevance to the types of functional concerns intrinsic, for instance, to evaluation for adoption fitness. How does equivalence look in this area? Peplau and Fingerhut cite one study that found that over a five-year period, 7 percent of married heterosexual couples broke up, compared with 14 percent of cohabiting male couples and 16 percent of cohabiting lesbian couples. They also summarize, without mentioning specific numbers, a more representative study from Norway and Sweden, which have sanctioned same-sex partnerships since the 1990s, reporting “that the rate of dissolution within five years of entering a legal union is higher among same-sex partnerships than among heterosexual marriages, with lesbian couples having the highest rates of dissolution.” Their rendering underplays the magnitude of the actual findings, which was that gay male relationships are 50 percent more likely to break up than heterosexual marriages, while lesbian relationships are 167 percent more likely to break up than heterosexual marriages. Odd that they would not mention these actual numbers.

One common obfuscation of such matters can be illustrated through the sensitive issue of rates of homosexual attraction among children raised in homosexual households. Summarizing this research, Gregory Herek, a psychologist who specializes in the study of homosexuality, wrote that “the vast majority of those children eventually grow up to be heterosexual.” It appears he is right, technically. Terms such as “a vast majority” are often used in this literature to obscure probabilistic trends in the data. The small bit of research that exists suggests increased rates of same-sex orientation among the children of such couples; my informal synthesis would be that gay parenting approximately triples or quadruples the rate of same-sex attraction. It may be technically true that “the vast majority of these children eventually grow up to be heterosexual,” but only because if being raised by same-sex parents increases the occurrence of same-sex attraction from 2 percent to 8 percent, 92 percent are still heterosexual. But a fourfold increase is still a sizable effect statistically.

Has empirical science established homosexual identity as positive and legitimate? Some would claim so. University of California psychologists Phillip Hammack and Eric Windell argue that a dramatic shift has “repositioned the scientific narrative of homosexuality from sickness to species” and homosexuality is to be affirmed as “a legitimate minority identity akin to race and ethnicity.” The APA task force on SOCE declared in 2009 that “Same-sex sexual attractions, behavior, and orientations per se are normal and positive variants of human sexuality.”

Declarations that homosexuality is “normal,” “positive,” and “legitimate” would seem be the product of value judgments rather than objective science. The APA’s Proposition 8 brief argues that sexual orientation “encompasses an individual’s sense of personal and social identity based on those attractions, behaviors expressing them, and membership in a community of others who share them.” There indeed are persons who organize their lives around their sexual orientation. But to claim for all human persons that “sexual orientation encompasses an individual’s sense of personal and social identity” is remarkable both conceptually and scientifically. I cannot conceive of data comprehensive enough to support this claim. And how does science establish that such a grounding of human identity is “positive”?

Science may be able to contribute valuable evidence about the association of such identities with certain measurable functional realities of life, such as whether such individuals experience heightened levels of emotional distress, report levels of self-esteem comparable to those of others, and so forth. But how did science become the arbiter of what is positive? Such a thing can happen, precisely as Hammack and Windell suggest, through a paradigm shift within the discipline, a decision of practicing psychologists to embrace the “minority narrative of homosexuality.” But can empirical science establish homosexual orientation as “a legitimate minority identity” or sexual orientation as a fundamental for constituting the self? I hardly see how.

The APA SOCE task force, and the gay-affirming psychological mainstream it represents, describes gay-affirming therapy as pursuing “congruence” between identity and sexual orientation. It seems to take this as a self-evident good. But the task force also seems to recognize that an affirmation of same-sex attraction goes beyond the traditional competence of science. Reflecting on the clash of scientific and religious perspectives on this point, they note that “some religions give priority to telic congruence” while, in contrast, “affirmative and multicultural models of LGB psychology give priority to organismic congruence.” In a moment of exceptional clarity, the task force put its finger on a core issue: Gay-affirming psychologies necessarily embody extrascientific moral and ethical deliberations that raise the potential of conflict with religious beliefs, precisely because the very act of giving priority to organismic congruence is a religious and ethical choice.

As the late theologian Don Browning noted, psychology “cannot avoid a metaphysical and ethical horizon.” Meaningful consideration of the nature of personhood always involves moving beyond the analysis of human life to the broader valuation of this or that characteristic, this or that phenomenon, this or that outcome. The social sciences do not contain within themselves adequate resources to adjudicate among conflicting ways of understanding the good. Individual scientists, stepping beyond their professional bounds, may declare homosexual orientation positive, normal, and legitimate, but such science cannot make this judgment. Such judgments are the domain of religion, theology, and philosophy. The twin claims that science conclusively establishes that sexual orientation grounds human identity and that psychology as a science establishes the legitimacy of such a claim are too far a reach.

So where does this leave us? We know much more now than we did ten and thirty years ago about the emotional well-being of homosexual persons, the complicated interaction of nature and nurture in the causation of sexual orientation, of the complicated and difficult possibilities of sexual-orientation malleability, of the functional and descriptive characteristics manifest in same-sex partnerships, and of the contours of the psychological identities of homosexual persons. The contributions of science to this area, however, remain sketchy, limited, and puzzling. It is remarkable how little scientific humility is in evidence given the primitive nature of our knowledge.

Nevertheless, our culture is polarized between those relentlessly advancing the full acceptance and normalization of homosexuality, indeed of all sexual variations, and those resisting those moves. As religious believers, we must confess our own culpability in creating the mess we are in.

We were complicit, even if ignorantly and passively so, in the cultural embrace of the disease conceptualization of homosexuality. We off-loaded responsibility for the articulation of a thoughtful, caring, theologically rich, and pastorally sensitive understanding of sexual brokenness grounded in our various religious traditions by conceptualizing homosexuality as a disease, and so we were unprepared for the vacuum created by that explanation’s timely demise. The best ecclesiastical, professional, legal, and social policy will be founded not on falsehoods or grotesque and indefensible simplifications but on a clearheaded grasp of reality in all its complexities, as well as on a humble recognition of all that we do not know.

Stanton L. Jones is provost and professor of psychology at Wheaton College. An expanded version of this essay is available at www.christianethics.org, as is a document offering the specific citations for this February, 2012, feature article.

O coming out de um pro-life

O coming out de um pro-life - por Carlos Guimarães Pinto

Tão queridos que eles são

1. Os nossos queridíssimos e ternurentos irmãos que, com um amor infinito, adoram homicidiar esses horrendos e temíveis entes que são os execráveis concebidos por nascer, no seu benigno empenho esforçado por nos persuadir da desumanidade malvada de nos opormos à legalização/liberalização do excelso aborto, remédio e antídoto eficaz de todos os males da mulher e da sociedade, repetiram, insistiram, embezerraram, marralharam, caturraram, que, contrariamente a nós crescidos, os abjectos concebidos eram uma amálgama intrusa, invasora, dira e cruévil, inoculada, pérfida e venenosamente, no seio claustral das mulheres. Nada, mesmo absolutamente nada, assim nos doutrinaram, havia de comum entre um recém-nascido e um concebido ainda não parturido. O facto de sair, nascendo, do seio da grávida constituía uma mutação essencial que transformava o horripilante monstruoso num encantador e esplêndido ser humano, pessoa como nós. Eliminar uma criança parida era indubitavelmente um nefando infanticídio, totalmente inaceitável, uma barbaridade hedionda.

Nós, os fundamentalistas, crucificadores das mulheres grávidas, católicos fanáticos, inquisidores barbudos, casmurros desapiedados, instigadores e perpetuadores do flagelo do aborto, argumentámos, com a perfídia e a hipocrisia própria dos desalmados, a igualdade essencial da dignidade transcendente, do valor sublime, de cada ser humano, desde o seu início até ao seu termo, uma vez que não havia dissolução de continuidade desde a concepção até à morte; mas pelo contrário, adiantávamos na nossa presunçosa ignorância, eram sempre os mesmos, percorrendo diversa fases de desenvolvimento. E assim como o facto de um bebé nascido não ter ainda o cérebro completo, ou um menino não ter barba nem pêlos nas axilas, ou não ser capaz de procriar, por ainda não estar plenamente desenvolvido não fazia dele menos pessoa do que um jovem ou adulto, do mesmo modo as diversas fases de amadurecimento durante a prenhez são sinal de que aquele que será já o é, pois se assim não fora nunca seria.

Claro que quem tem uma noção exacta da realidade e a exprime não pode deixar de ser escorraçado, chacoteado, escarnecido como pulha tirano que pretende obstar a que espíritos egrégios decidam eles próprios nas suas fantásticas lucubrações subjectivistas produzir o real, o que é e o que não é, que uma coisa pode ser e não ser ao mesmo tempo e sob o mesmo aspecto, e outras deslumbrantes vacuidades do mesmo teor.

Uma vez conseguida a banalização do aborto os generosos benfeitores da humanidade que para ela contribuíram vêem agora num fervor, num excesso de caridade esclarecer as nossas mentes obscuras, iluminando as trevas da nossa cegueira para que vejamos claramente que um infante dado à luz afinal não é senão o mesmo que um concebido não nascido. Por isso pode e dever ser aniquilado, se os adultos assim o entenderem, pois isso não passa de um abortamento pós-parto. Seguramente que estas inteligências clarividentes, dotadas não só de grande talento como de uma genialidade imensa nos ensinarão num futuro breve, para nosso grande proveito, e bem de toda a humanidade, que há ainda mais classes de seres humanos que não são pessoas, ou por que nunca o foram ou porque o deixaram de ser. Afortunadamente, com o decorrer do tempo, os limites alargar-se-ão de modo a permitir uma cada vez maior abundância de viventes humanos desmascarados como não pessoas. Creio mesmo que todos estaremos ansiosos que nos classifiquem com tais de modo a que o nosso nada parasitário seja reconhecido e devidamente debelado com as medidas higiénicas adequadas à eliminação dos que, como nós, não são. Que alegria, que júbilo, que exultação virmos a ser letalmente eliminados para que os mais fortes e poderosos possam, como devem, singrar sem empecilhos para uma humanidade nova, constituída por super-homens! Os nossos cadáveres serão o estrume que lhes permitirá florescer! Viva a nossa morte!!!

Para grande gáudio dos geneticamente superiores, detentores da riqueza das nações, do domínio dos média, do poder político, desde há muito que se pratica de facto o infanticídio ou, como agora se deve dizer, o aborto pós-natal. O presidente Obama, tão do agrado do nosso Cardeal Patriarca, ainda antes de ser eleito presidente votou a favor do infanticídio dos bebés que sobrevivessem ao abortamento. Nalguns hospitais de Portugal, induz-se o parto para depois deixar morrer passivamente ou matar activamente a criança nascida dando-a como abortada.

Embora a taxa de sobrevivência de bebés nascidos prematuramente a partir das 22 semanas seja muito significativa ela é dispensada na maioria dos hospitais, com o equipamento necessário, um pouco por todo o mundo.

Um estudo realizado sobre 10. 000 recém-nascidos publicado, em Dezembro passado, no Journal of the American Medical Association que incidiu sobre a sobrevivência dos mesmos entre as 22 e as 25 semanas chegou aos seguintes resultados: sobrevivência às 22 semanas: 27, 1%; às 23 semanas: 41, 8%; às 24 semanas: 60% 4. O neonatalogista Carlo Bellieni depois de apresentar estes dados conclui: “Quantos adultos de pois de um ictus ou de um enfarte desejariam um prognóstico deste tipo? E a ninguém passa pela cabeça (por agora) em não socorrer quem tem um enfarte (ou de só o socorrer depois de ter conversado com os parentes) ”.

Nuno Serras Pereira

06. 03. 2012

Santorum intensificó su fe gracias a su suegro y le hizo una promesa al hijo que perdió al nacer

In Religión en Libertad

Salvo un repunte sorpresa de Newt Gingrich el próximo martes, a Barack Obama le disputarán en noviembre la presidencia de los Estados Unidos o Mitt Romney o Rick Santorum. Éste ya cuenta con protección del Servicio Secreto en cuanto aspirante con posibilidades, y está saliendo victorioso de los intensivos escrutinios a que la prensa somete a los candidatos durante el largo proceso de primarias e incluso después.

The New York Times, no precisamente favorable a Santorum, le dedica este fin de semana un reportaje centrado en su profunda religiosidad católica, quizá el aspecto más irritante para el establishment cultural progresista norteamericano, junto con su determinación de atacar Irán si es preciso para defender la seguridad del país.

El reportaje revela que, según confesó el mismo Santorum en algún off the record el año pasado, él era un "católico de nombre" hasta que conoció a su mujer y pensaron en casarse. Fue en 1988, y Karen era enfermera neonatal. Según el diario, la hoy esposa de Rick venía de una relación con un médico abortista y ella misma era partidaria del aborto.

Cara a cara con el suegro
Pero algo la hizo cambiar, y de hecho cuando empezó a salir con aquel joven aspirante a político (tenía 30 años) que llegaría al Senado en 1991, le urgió a visitar a su futuro suegro. Kenneth Garver era pediatra en Pittsburgh, especialista en genética y padre de una familia numerosa formada en una profunda fe católica.

"Nos sentamos uno en frente del otro en torno a su mesa, y estuvimos toda la tarde hablando del aborto. Quedé absolutamente convencido de que tanto desde el punto de vista de la ciencia como desde el punto de vista de la fe, no había más que una postura posible", explicó Santorum en octubre a un grupo provida.

Según el diario neoyorquino, ése fue el momento en el que Santorum y su mujer intensificaron su vivencia religiosa, traducida a lo largo de toda esta campaña en unos posicionamientos inequívocos en torno al aborto, los anticonceptivos, el "matrimonio" entre personas del mismo sexo, la libertad de educación de las familias o la separación entre Iglesia y Estado. Lo cual le ha granjeado votos, pero también se los ha quitado. Rick ha preferido en cualquier caso decir lo que piensa y presentarse ante sus electores tal como es.

Cartas a Gabriel... y una promesa
En buena medida, eso se debe a la promesa que le hizo a su hijo Gabriel, que murió a las pocas horas de nacer tras un embarazo al que le sugirieron en más de una ocasión poner término, porque los problemas del feto se detectaron desde la vigésima semana. Pero los Santorum creyeron siempre que Dios tenía un plan para la corta vida de unas horas que sabían tendría el bebé.

Dice un amigo suyo desde hace veinte años, Frank Schoeneman, que, al fallecer el pequeño, Santorum hizo el voto de llevar una vida de la que Gabriel pudiese sentirse orgulloso. Y eso incluye no esconderse ni tener respetos humanos en la profesión de su fe. En 1998 escribió un libro, Cartas a Gabriel, volcando su alma en recuerdo de la tragedia vivida.

Schoeneman añade que Rick no es un new-born (renacido) que vio la luz de golpe: "Ha habido una evolución. Siempre fue católico y siempre fue un hombre de fe, pero no con este nivel de fe", subraya.

Encontrar a Dios en la política
Curiosamente, el otro momento decisivo en esa evolución fue su llegada al Senado. Allí conoció a un senador de Oklahoma, Don Nickles, quien le animó a asistir con otros senadores a unas reuniones de estudio de la Biblia.

Finalmente, Karen y él encontraron el lugar idóneo para intensificar su fe en la parroquia de Santa Catalina de Siena, en el norte de Virginia, a donde se habían trasladado a vivir: "El párroco era extraordinario y nos llenó del Espíritu Santo", confesó el aspirante a la Casa Blanca.

El cual tiene muy claro que Dios es el centro de su vida, y muy clara cuál es su actitud ante Jesucristo: "Ante sus ojos soy totalmente inútil. No puedo hacer nada por Él. Sólo amarle".

Viva o Cardeal! - Keith O´Brien, el cardenal que le para los pies a Cameron por el matrimonio homosexual

In Religión en Libertad

El primer ministro británico, David Cameron, quiere someter a referéndum el establecimiento del llamado matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo. Entre otras cosas, por las presiones de su socio de gobierno, el liberal Nick Clegg.

Pero se está encontrando una fuerte resistencia de la sociedad inglesa, galesa y escocesa. La última expresión de ese rechazo es el artículo escrito en el Telegraph este sábado por el cardenal Keith O´Brien, arzobispo de San Andrés y Edimburgo.

Una locura
"No podemos permitirnos pasar por alto esta locura", afirma en el titular. Y lo cierto es que argumenta con gran dureza y contundencia las razones.

Primero, señalando que aquí no hay peticiones inocentes que valgan. Primero, porque las uniones civiles llevan años existiendo, y cuando fueron introducidas "sus partidarios se desgañitaban diciendo que no querían el matrimonio, y que el matrimonio sería siempre entre un hombre y una mujer": "Y a quienes nos oponíamos se nos acusaba de alarmistas por advertir de que con el paso del tiempo se pediría también el matrimonio".

Pero, además, "puesto que todos los derechos legales del matrimonio ya están disponibles para las parejas homosexuales, está claro que esta propuesta no va de derechos, sino más bien es un intento de redefinir el matrimonio para toda la sociedad a instancias de una minoría de activistas".

Los siguientes párrafos son una previsión clarividente de lo que en realidad pretende esa minoría pretendiendo que se llame matrimonio a las relaciones homosexuales: "Redefinir el matrimonio tendrá enormes implicaciones sobre lo que se enseña en las escuelas, y para toda la sociedad. Redefinirá la sociedad, puesto que la institución del matrimonio es uno de los pilares fundamentales de la sociedad".

Totalitarismo en la escuela
"¿Puede cambiarse una palabra cuyo significado ha sido claramente entendido siempre en todas las sociedades a través de la historia, cambiarse de la noche a la mañana por algo distinto? Si se legaliza el matrimonio del mismo sexo, ¿qué pasará con el profesor que quiera enseñar a sus alumnos que el matrimonio sólo puede entenderse -y siempre se ha entendido- como la unión entre un hombre y una mujer? ¿Se respetará el derecho de ese profesor a sostener y enseñar su punto de vista, o será despedido?", se pregunta el cardenal O´Brien.

Y se responde a sí mismo, aunque en forma interrogativa: "¿Acaso no se convertirá tanto a profesor como a alumnos en las próximas víctimas de la tiranía de la tolerancia, en herejes cuya disensión respecto a la ortodoxia impuesta por el Estado será aplastada a costa?".

El purpurado recuerda que el artículo 16 de la Declaración de Derechos Humanos establece que el matrimonio es entre hombre y mujer, y sin embargo se presta oídos "educados" a quienes quieren destruirlo, y se disculpa su "locura", a pesar de que "su proyecto supone una subversión grotesca de un derecho humano universalmente aceptado".

El daño a los menores
El cardenal O´Brien recuerda luego que el matrimonio es una institución natural y por tanto ninguna ley humana puede pretender convertirse en su dueña y señora, sino protegerlo como la más beneficiosa institución para la sociedad, "en vez de atacarla y desmantelarla".

Y recuerda también la otra parte perjudicada: los niños en los casos de adopción. "El matrimonio del mismo sexo eliminará por completo de la ley la idea básica de una madre y un padre para cada niño. Se creará una sociedad que elige deliberadamente privar a un niño o de su padre o de su madre".

Además, "si el matrimonio puede redefinirse para que ya no signifique la unión entre un hombre y una mujer, ¿por qué parar ahí?". Se abren también las puertas a la poligamia, pues "¿sobre qué base podrá impedirse casarse a tres personas que se aman?".

El argumento que ha usado el gobierno británico de que no se obligará a las comunidades religiosas a casar a personas del mismo sexo no disminuye la gravedad del cambio, remata O´Brien: "¿Se aceptaría la esclavitud alegando que a nadie se le obligará a tener esclavos?".

Porque é que o bebé há-de viver? - por Pedro Vaz Patto

Muita polémica e indignação gerou a publicação de um artigo numa revista de ética médica (Journal of medical ethics), da autoria de Alberto Giubilini e Francesa Minerva, com o título O aborto pós- natal; porque é que o bebé há-de viver?. Nele se defende a tese de que é lícito matar um bebé recém-nascido. Não se fala em infanticídio, mas em aborto pós- natal, porque o bebé recém-nascido, como o embrião e o feto, não tem o estatuto moral de pessoa. Não basta ser humano para ter direito a viver. Só tem o estatuto de pessoa e o direito a viver quem é capaz de atribuir valor à sua existência porque formula objetivos (“aims”) para o futuro dessa existência e tem, por isso, interesse em viver. Quem não tem essa capacidade (como sucede com o recém-nascido, mas já não com alguns animais não humanos), não sofre qualquer privação ou dano quando morre. Pode um recém-nascido sofrer um dano quando a morte lhe causa dor. E pode ele ter algum valor moral quando os pais querem que ele viva. Mas se isso não acontecer, nada obsta a que se mate um recém-nascido, não só quando ele padeça de alguma deficiência (o que já sucede na Holanda, onde é, nesse caso, lícita a chamada eutanásia pós-natal) e a vida possa ser, supostamente, para ele um fardo; mas também quando ele, por qualquer motivo, represente um fardo, psicológico e económico, para os pais e a sociedade. Os interesses destes (pessoas actuais) prevalecem sempre sobre os de quem ainda não é pessoa e só o será potencialmente. Nas primeiras semanas após o nascimento, a criança não tem capacidade de ter objetivos (“aims”) para a sua vida. E mesmo quando, pouco depois, começa a ter essa capacidade de forma incipiente, esta ainda deve ceder perante a capacidade que têm os adultos de formular planos desenvolvidos para as suas próprias vidas. A morte da criança poderá, para os seus pais, ser menos traumatizante do que a autorização de adopção, porque neste caso a aceitação da realidade da perda definitiva pode ser mais difícil, pois não há a certeza da irreversibilidade e permanece a esperança do retorno. Quando assim for, é preferível matar a criança.

A tese não é inteiramente inovadora (já havia sido defendida pelos influentes académicos Michael Tooley e Peter Singer), mas ainda não tinha sido exposta com tanta crueza, nem levada a consequências que muitos considerarão tão arrepiantes.

Deve reconhecer-se a coerência da tese: entre o embrião, o feto e o recém- nascido não há uma diferença de natureza, qualitativa ou substancial. A criança antes e depois do nascimento não é substancialmente diferente. Estamos apenas perante fases distintas de um processo de evolução contínuo. Mas isso deve servir para estender a ilegitimidade do infanticídio à ilegitimidade do aborto, não para estender a pretensa legitimidade do aborto à pretensa legitimidade de infanticídio. Até porque também não há saltos de qualidade no processo de evolução contínuo que vai do nascimento à idade adulta.

A repulsa que espontaneamente tem causado esta tese (que revela como, apesar de tudo, permanece viva uma sensibilidade marcada pela cultura judaico-cristã e valores humanistas) quase dispensaria a tentativa de a refutar no plano racional. Estamos perante uma tese que é, antes de mais, contra-intuitiva. Mas não deixa de ser útil proceder a tal refutação.

Em coerência, a tese levaria ao absurdo de considerar que a perda da vida (como de outros direitos) não representa um dano para quem não tem consciência do mesmo, por estar temporariamente inconsciente (a dormir, por exemplo). Os autores do estudo respondem à objecção dizendo que nestes casos não há uma verdadeira incapacidade, mas uma simples privação temporária. Só que não se compreende a relevância dessa diferença. Será diferente ter a possibilidade de readquirir a consciência umas horas depois (como sucede com quem está a dormir), ou de a vir a adquirir alguns meses depois (como sucede com um recém-nascido)?

Ao pôr termo à vida de um feto ou de um recém-nascido não se está a privar estes de um interesse explícito e actual em viver, mas está-se a impedir (o que não é menos grave) que eles venham a adquirir esse interesse no futuro, como viriam a adquirir se não fosse impedido o seu natural desenvolvimento (nenhum de nós estaria hoje vivo se tivesse sido impedido esse natural desenvolvimento, o que representaria um inegável dano). A esta objecção, respondem os autores do estudo com um raciocínio falacioso, que assenta numa petição de princípio: dizem que quem ainda não tem o estatuto de pessoa (o que está por demonstrar), quem ainda não existe (o que não é seguramente verdade), não pode sofrer qualquer dano, e, por isso, os interesses das pessoas actuais prevalecem sempre sobre os interesses das pessoas potenciais. Mas o embrião, o feto e o recém-nascido, não existem apenas em potência, são já actuais, embora não tenham ainda actualizadas todas as suas potencialidades (o que sempre se verifica com a pessoa até à idade adulta, e até ao fim da vida).

A vida é o maior dos bens humanos e o primeiro dos direitos humanos, o pressuposto de todos os outros bens e de todos os outros direitos. Este é um dado objectivo. É assim mesmo que o seu titular não tenha consciência disso e disso não se aperceba. Se isso sucede, tal verifica-se porque há alguma debilidade devida à idade (do embrião, do feto, do recém-nascido, da criança), à doença ou à deficiência em graus extremos. Não é por causa de uma qualquer incapacidade ou debilidade que a pessoa perde dignidade, valor moral ou direitos. Pelo contrário, é precisamente nos casos de maior debilidade ou incapacidade que mais se justifica eticamente o cuidado dos outros e a tutela da ordem jurídica. Quem mais precisa de ser defendido é quem não é capaz de se defender por si próprio. É nesses casos que vale especialmente a advertência evangélica sobre o amor ao «mais pequeno dos meus irmãos». E também a regra de ouro comum a todas as religiões e correntes éticas laicas: «não faças aos outros o que não gostarias que te fizessem a ti» (a ti, que já fostes um feto ou um recém-nascido e a quem ninguém impediu o natural desenvolvimento). Ou a advertência da nota, publicada a propósito deste estudo, do Centro de Bioética da Universidade Católica italiana del Sacro Cuore: «se não formos capazes de tutelar quem não é capaz de se auto-tutelar poremos fim à própria ideia de democracia tal como a reconstruímos depois das violências totalitárias».